Erasures in record.-A deed is not to be challengeable on the ground that there is an erasure in the record, unless it be proved that the erasure was done fraudulently, or that the record is not conformable to the deed as presented for registration (sec. 54). The Act 6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 33, provided that erasures in instruments of sasine and of resignation ad remanentiam made before registration should not affect their validity, provided the words written in erasure tallied with those appearing on the record; and section 144 of the Titles to Land Consolidation Act extended the provision to "all instruments."

Right of heritable Creditors in sequestrations-Section 118 of the Bankruptcy Statute of 1856 provided that no poinding of the ground not carried into execution by sale of the effects sixty days before the date of the sequestration, and no decree of maills and duties on which a charge was not given sixty days before that date, should be available to the heritable creditor in any question with the trustee in the sequestration, except for the interest of the debt for the current half-yearly term and a year's arrear of interest. It was further provided that the heritable creditor, having a security preferable to the trustee's right, might execute a poinding, or obtain a decree of maills and duties which should be available to the above extent. This section, which was a re-enactment of section 95 of the Act 2 & 3 Vict. cap. 41, is now repealed. That provision" took away the right which formerly belonged to an heritable creditor of securing a preference over the moveables for his whole debt, principal and interest, in competition with the personal creditor, by raising and executing a summons of poinding the ground after the sequestration, but before the confirmation of the trustee" (per Lord Mackenzie in Barstow v. Mowbray, March 11th, 1856; see also Campbell's Trs. v. Paul, 13 S. 237). The effect of the repeal of section 118 of the Bankruptcy Act is consequently to revive the right of the creditor to attach the rents and the moveables on the lands prior to the confirmation of the trustee.

Execution of Deeds by Companies under the Companies Acts.A deed executed after the commencement of the Act, to which a company registered under the Companies Acts 1862 and 1867 is a party, may be executed in the way pointed out in the Acts, or may be sealed with the common seal of the company, and subscribed on its behalf by two of the ordinary directors and the secretary, in which latter case witnesses are not required. By the Companies Act of 1862 the memorandum and the articles of association are to be signed by each subscriber in the presence of, and be attested by one witness at the least (secs. 11 and 16). See also section 37 of Companies Act of 1867.

Certain offices are abolished, and the duties attaching to them, so far as they continue to exist, are transferred to the Sheriff of Chancery and the Sheriff-Clerk of Chancery. It is no longer necessary to hold a court for the disposal of unopposed petitions for service (sec. 57).

The Act applies to lands held of the Crown or Prince, but is not to affect the jus corona as a title to lands or heritages (sec. 59).

Reference to description of lands.-The Titles to Land Act 1858, the first statute in which description by reference to a description of lands in a recorded deed was authorised, required a specification of "the leading name or names or other short distinctive description of the lands," "and the name of the county or parish or supposed parish." The Titles to Land Act 1860 made it sufficient to specify the name of the county, and where the lands were held burgage of the burgh and county. The Titles to Land Consolidation Act, again, required the specification of some leading name or names, or some distinctive description of the lands, "as contained in the titles thereto." And now the present Act, which repeals section 11 of the Titles to Land Consolidation Act, dispenses with the mention of a leading name or names; and provides that no objection can be taken to any specification because of the omission of that particular (sec. 61).

Provisions substituted for provisions in Titles to Land Consolidation Act.-Sections 62, 63, 64, and 65 are intended to amplify the provisions of, or to rectify some errors which occurred in the framing of certain sections in, the Titles to Land Consolidation Act relative to the completion of the title of adjudgers and the heirs or executors of creditors in heritable securities. Sections 62, 125, 127 and 129 of the Titles to Land Consolidation Act are repealed, and new provisions substituted, which are to stand as part of that Act; the Act is to be read as if these had been originally expressed in it. These provisions, as they now stand, are to this effect. A decree of adjudication for debt or in implement, or a decree of constitution and adjudication for debt or in implement, or a decree of declarator and adjudication, or a decree of sale, are, except where the subjects contained in the decree of adjudication, constitution and adjudication, or declarator of adjudication, are heritable securities, to have the effect of a conveyance of the lands therein contained in favour of the adjudger or purchaser by the ancestor of the apparent heir, or by the owner or proprietor in trust or otherwise, and whether in life or deceased, of the lands adjudged or by the seller of the lands sold (sec. 62). Where a creditor in an heritable security constituted by infeftment dies, leaving a testamentary or mortis causa deed, naming executors or disponing or bequeathing the security, the executors duly confirmed, or the disponees or legatees, as the case may be, may complete a title by writ of acknowledgment, granted by the debtor in the security. Where, from the exclusion of executors, the heir has right to the security, he may complete a title in the same way (sec. 63). Section 64 provides for making up a title by notarial instrument. Where, in the case of the subject being an heritable security, an adjudger obtains a decree of adjudication, or constitution and adjudication, or declarator and adjudication, the adjudger may complete a title by recording the abbreviate of ad

judication, or an extract of the decree, in the register of sasines, the effect of which is to place him in the same position as if he had a recorded assignation granted by the ancestor, or person or creditor in trust or otherwise, whether in life or deceased, whose estate is adjudged (sec. 65).

Nothing in the Act is to affect any action in dependence at its passing or instituted before its commencement (sec. 68).

The Month.

Business of and Procedure in the Court of Session-Lord Shand's Address to the Scots Law Society.-In his address to the Scots Law Society, Lord Shand considered, among other topics, the question, How far recent legislation for the amendment of the procedure in the Supreme Court has been attended with the desired effect? And the answer is, that the change has on the whole been satisfactory; an opinion which not only is to be regarded with the deference due to the position of the learned Judge, but which also possesses the weight derived from his large experience, both at the Bar and on the Bench, of the working of the Act of 1868. If the saving of expense and the securing of despatch are to be considered advantages, then undoubtedly the Court of Session Act of 1868 has been a success. The old system has not only ceased, but it has almost gone out of memory. Now-a-days we should be as much surprised to hear of a case going on for three or four years as we would be to hear of a sentence of death being carried into execution in Scotland. Let us not, however, be unjust to the ancien régime. Vixere fortes ante Lord Ormidale. There was then no hurry, there was much leisure, much deliberation, frequent review; and so perhaps it was that the men of those older days built up a more exact and scientific system of law than is possible in these days of hurry-scurry, in which we do not care very much about making the law scientific, and do care very much about making it convenient and conducive to the public advantage,—which, however, it cannot be in the long run unless it is systematic and scientific.

There is no use denying that for a long time the Court of Session had acquired an evil reputation for expense and for delay. This evil repute, as always happens, hung about it even after it had ceased to be deserved. This has however come to an end. It may safely be said that there is no Supreme Court in Her Majesty's dominions in which cases are dealt with in a more thorough and satisfactory manner or with more despatch. And we think the public have come to be quite aware of the fact. We never hear now those complaints against the Court which used to be rife

Once in a year, perhaps, you

enough but a very few years ago. may find a newspaper article in which the Court is denounced as behind the age, etc., etc.; but then it turns out that it is written by a lawyer who has had a case and lost it-Rachel weeping for her children and refusing to be comforted. This little game soon comes to be known, and it is only the most innocent yokel who continues to fancy that it is the Scottish lion that is roaring while in reality it is only Snug the joiner.

The marked increase of business in the Court is the best evidence that the public appreciate the new system of procedure and the efforts of the able and earnest Judges who are working it. There may still be matters that are not above the suspicion of requiring amendment; but unless these faults are glaring, we are inclined to set our face against any more improvements for some time to come. It is only six years since the last great alteration in procedure was made; and a great deal more depends on the ability, anxiety, and earnestness of the men who are working the present system than on any improvement which can be suggested upon it. The coach is going very well at present, and we do not see the advantage of eternally sending it to the coachmaker's. The team is a good one, and although there may possibly be one among the number inclined to jib a little, and kick over the traces occasionally, that is due to the natural friskness of youth, which will subside in due course. Indeed, all along, the worst fault of the coach was that it had not enough of passengers. But, what between the lowering of the fares and the journey being performed considerably under the former time, there has already been a considerable increase in the traffic, and there promises to be more.

One matter of which considerable complaint has been made is the expense connected with proofs before the Lord Ordinary. Lord Shand suggests as a remedy that the verdict of the Judge in whose. presence the witnesses are examined should have the same effect as the verdict of a jury, i.e. should be regarded as final unless the Court of review should be satisfied that it is "contrary to evidence." We do not think that the remedy lies in this direction. No doubt the course suggested would have the effect of saving expense in litigation, as of course every measure does which restricts the right of review. But expense, it seems to us, although an important, is only a secondary consideration. The thing we have mainly and primarily to attend to in this matter is to secure justice and to make people satisfied, or at least to give them reasonable grounds for being satisfied, that they do obtain it. The principle would require to be carried a little farther. If the Lord Ordinary's judgment is to be final on the facts, why should not the judgment of the Sheriff-Substitute? There is one very strong objection to treating the judgment of the Lord Ordinary as we do the verdict of of a jury, viz., that he is not a jury. The intervention of a jury is invoked on the principle that the inarticulate common sense of

twelve ordinary men is preferable to the trained ability of a lawyer, although they should be entirely incapable of stating any reasons for their opinions. The Lord Ordinary cannot claim immunity from the review of his brethren on that ground. He has not that divinity which doth hedge a jury. Again, it is to be considered that the impossibility, in the ordinary case, of having the verdict of a jury reviewed was just one of the reasons why jury trial has fallen into such disfavour. Could anything be more annoying to a litigant than to be told on a motion being made for a new trial, “if we had had to decide the case ourselves we should have decided in your favour; but the jury have taken a different view, and as it was within their privilege to do so, we can do nothing?" It would be equally unsatisfactory for a litigant to be in effect told by the Lord President, that if he had been the Lord Ordinary he would have given a different decision on the facts; but as he was only the Lord President, he was powerless in the matter. Another reason against the change suggested is that a judge and his judgments are seldom improved by removing the right of review and the chance of reversal. We do not think the change proposed or suggested will be a popular one; and if carried into effect we are pretty sure that it would diminish the number of proofs. The preference at present given to a judge over a jury, to a legal tribunal over a popular one, is a preference given to a legal tribunal which has the advantage of the help furnished by review in arriving at the truth and justice of the case.

But there is one item of expense in proofs in which surely a saving might be effected, the expense of taking down the evidence. In the first place, the fees allowed to shorthand writers are exorbitant. In the second place, the notes of evidence are in most cases put to no use whatever. They are useless to counsel, because as a rule the counsel has to speak on the evidence before the notes are extended; and so far from being a help to him the system of shorthand reports is a hindrance, because from the rapidity with which the trial proceeds it is impossible for counsel to take notes for his own use as the trial goes on. They are useless to the judge in cases where, as often happens, judgment is given on the spot; and they are in reality of use in few cases except those which are appealed to the Inner House. The expense is incurred on account of the exception, not on account of the rule.

When writing on the subject of Court of Session expenses we may mention a peculiar suggestion, which we happened to see not a great while ago. The suggestion occurred in a letter signed "-agent" which appeared in one of the Edinburgh newspapers; and it was to the effect that defences in an action should be prepared by agents instead of by counsel as at present. It was argued that as the summons might be prepared without the assistance of counsel, the defences, the preparation of which is attended with much less difficulty, ought also to be so prepared. We should rather put it