offered to deliver the horse to defendant free of all charges. He refused this offer also, and insisted upon his right to have compensation for the expenses he had incurred, as well as for his loss of time. In the course of a few months the company paid the livery stable keeper's bill, amounting to £17, and sent the horse to defendant, by whom it was received. The company then brought an action in Bedford County Court to recover the sum of £17, and on judgment being given for the defendant, carried the case on appeal to the Court of Exchequer, where this judgment was reversed. The grounds upon which the decision of this Court was given may be gathered from the succinct statement in Baron Pollock's judgment: "If the case had rested on what took place on the night when the horse arrived, I should have thought the plaintiffs wrong, for this reason, that although a common carrier has, by the common law of the realm, a lien for the carriage, he has no lien in his capacity as warehouseman; and it was only for the warehousing or keeping of this horse that the plaintiffs could have made any charge against the defendant." Here we have also a statement of the two questions referred to above: First, can a carrier by land make any charge as warehouseman? Secondly, has a carrier any lien for such charges? On the first point there appears to be no direct authority; but in the case of Notara v. Henderson, L. R., 7 Q. B., an analogous question was fully debated. In that case the plaintiffs shipped a quantity of beans on the defendant's ship from Alexandria to Glasgow. The ship called at Liverpool, and in going out met with a collision, which detained her for a few days. By reason of the collision the beans were wetted by sea-water, and the plaintiffs, who were at Liverpool, offered to receive them, and pay freight pro rata. The offer was refused, and the beans were carried to Glasgow. There it was discovered that they were much depreciated in value, and that much of this depreciation was due to the fact that they had not been dried after the collision. The plaintiffs accordingly brought an action against the shipowners for the neglect of the master to take reasonable care of the beans by drying them at Liverpool, where there was sufficient accommodation, and where the ship had put in for repairs. In the unanimous judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, delivered by the late Mr. Justice Willes, the chief authorities upon the duty of a ship's master to use reasonable care in preserving the goods intrusted to him, are gone into, and the decision arrived at is that there is such a duty. This case was cited with approbation by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Cargo ex Argos, L. R., 5 P. C. 134. After this decision had been given, it was but an advance in the same direction to say that the same duty devolves upon carriers by land, or in other words, we might say it was but another deduction from the same general principle, if we were discussing the civil law and not the laws of England. In the case we are now considering, the question raised was whether expenses incurred by the railway

company as warehousemen were incurred justifiably; whether there was any duty incumbent upon them to take reasonable precaution to prevent any damage happening to the horse after its arrival at the place of destination. This point having been settled in the affirmative, we think it a very natural result to maintain that they could recover the expenses thus cast upon them. If such were not the case their position would be a very hard one. The law tells them "under certain circumstances it is incumbent upon you to make certain outlays for the security of the bailor's goods intrusted to you for carriage." What could be more reasonable than that the bailor should reimburse them? It is not likely that this treatment will at all tend to give the bailee an advantage over the bailor, for Courts of Law will be able to examine into the necessity of the expenses incurred on alleged behalf of the bailor; while on the other hand, the bailor will himself have the satisfaction of knowing that the duty of the railway company does not cease with the mere arrival of the goods at the place of destination. The civil law went a step further than our law; it allowed even to the negotiorum gestor an action against the dominus to recover the expenses incurred bona fide in managing the affairs of the dominus.

With respect to this second point, we shall find there are a variety of dicta and cases. In 1793 was decided the case of Lambert v. Robinson, 1 Esp. 118, which was an action of trover against a carrier. The Lord Chief-Justice Eyre held that there was no lien given by law where the carrier makes a claim for booking or warehouse room. This case, however, is so briefly reported that it gives few grounds for deciding the point. In Orchard v. Rackstraw, 9 C. B. 698, it was decided that a livery stable keeper has no lien for the keep of a horse, and that a veterinary surgeon has none for his attendance. This decision has, apparently, a bearing upon the present topic. Judson v. Etheridge is another decision, by Lord Lyndhurst, that livery stable keepers have no lien for the keep of a horse. In addition to these decisions we have a very clear statement of the nature of a lien in Story's Equity Jurisprudence. “A lien," he says, "is not in strictness either a jus in re, or a jus ad rem, but simply a right to possess and retain property, until some charge attaching to it is paid or discharged. It generally exists in favour of artisans and others who have bestowed labour and service on the property, in its repair, improvement, and preservation. It has also an existence in many other cases by the usage of trade, and in maritime transactions."

Of the four learned judges who delivered judgment in the case of the Great Northern Railway Company v. Swaffield, three referred to this question of lien; but only one, Baron Pollock, expressed a decided opinion on the point we are now investigating. Baron Pigott passed over the question, simply remarking that they had not to deal with any question of lien, but Baron Pollock, whilst fully recognising the acknowledged rights of a common carrier,

distinctly stated that he had no lien in his capacity of warehouseman. On the other hand, Baron Amphlett, without expressing any decided opinion, did not wish it to be thought that he held identical views with those of Baron Pollock on this subject. "I should not wish," he observes, "to be considered as holding that in a case of this sort, the person who, in pursuance of a legal obligation, took care of a horse, and expended money upon him, would not be entitled to a lien on the horse for the money so expended." However, as these remarks of the learned judges were but obiter dicta, not necessary to support the judgment, we have yet to learn what is the law in such a state of circumstances as those described by Baron Amphlett. The several decisions referred to above will not be of much avail in elucidating the question. We do not know that any obligation was cast by the law upon the bailees, and we take it that this is really the vital point in the question of a right of lien now under investigation. If we were allowed to discuss the question upon abstract grounds, it would be no difficult matter to make our deductions, provided we were agreed upon first principles. We might, for instance, say, whoever does an act in pursuance of a legal obligation, has a specific lien for his reasonable expenses thus incurred. Here, when the circumstances arose, it would be a comparatively easy proceeding to apply the general rule to the particular facts. But this is not the way in which our English case law proceeds. Here we must seek our rules and principles by a wide generalization of decisions, and abandon the method of deduction for that of induction.

It certainly will be an interesting investigation when a case in which is involved this right of lien comes into Court for judgment. Equitable considerations may suggest that when the law compels a man to expend money on the goods and chattels of another, he should have the best possible security for repayment, otherwise we should find the law inflicting on one an evil which might very possibly be far greater than any corresponding advantage that would accrue as a result to another. Such legislation is certainly not to the interest of the community at large; nor would it be at all consistent with the maxims of far-seeing jurisprudents, such as Bentham and his school. Perhaps the best way of considering the matter is that adopted by those jurisprudents in their moral and legal investigations. There is a safer method than one which varies with the sympathies and antipathies of the legislator. We have some safeguard against reckless legislation if we seek to change no law until we are quite assured that the resulting good will more than counterbalance the evil that must of necessity follow from any change. We cannot go far wrong when we know how to interpret and apply the well-worn maxim, Salus populi suprema lex. If we apply such a method here, there seems good reason to hold by the opinion of Baron Amphlett. The law inflicts an evil whenever it enjoins a duty upon man; it does more if it does not make

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every reparation allowed by the case. It modifies the evil, and, at the same time, introduces a counterbalance of good if it secures for the one party the preservation of his property, and for the other a good surety that the expense cast upon him by the law will be met by the person benefited, and secured by the law.-Law Times.

Touting-Railway accidents have been alarmingly frequent of late; and it would seem that there are some people who are disposed to make hay while the sun shines. Some of the sufferers in the recent railway collision near Norwich have been pestered by letters, of which the following is a specimen. To reverse the proverb,-what is one man's poison is another man's meat.

"London, 11th Sept. 1874.-Dear Sir,-We are sorry to find you amongst the injured in the terrible railway accident at Thorpe on Thursday last. We are the solicitors for two clients who were unfortunately killed, and we shall be glad to represent your interest and obtain for you proper compensation from the railway company without putting you to any expense in the matter. To enable us to do so please sign and return to us the authority on the other side. -Yours faithfully, &c."

Appointments. Mr. DAVID PETER CHALMERS has been appointed Queen's Advocate for the Gold Coast Colony.

LORD GIFFORD, being the Senior Lord Ordinary, takes the seat in the Second Division of the Court of Session vacant by the death of Lord Benholme. It is not often that a Judge attains a place in the Inner House after such a short service in the Outer House as in this case. It is not yet five years since his Lordship was raised to the Bench. The learned Judge who last took his seat in the Second Division, Lord Ormidale, was twelve years Lord Ordinary. LORD CRAIGHILL has been still more fortunate in his speedy escape from the drudgery of Junior Lord Ordinary, having only sat one day in that capacity.

No authoritative announcement has yet been made as to who is to succeed to the vacant Judgeship. It is understood, however, that Mr. John Marshall or Mr. Blackburn will receive the appointment.

The Chair of Constitutional Law and History in the University of Edinburgh is vacant by the death of Mr. Cosmo Innes. The appointment is in the hands of the Faculty of Advocates. If services already rendered to historical literature are any recommendation for such a post, there is one man whose name at once suggests itself and whose claims are pre-eminent,-Mr. John Hill Burton, the historian. We doubt, indeed, whether he would accept of the chair; but it appears to us that it would be a graceful thing on the part of the patrons to offer it to him. The candidates already in the field are Mr. George Seton, Mr. Æneas J. G. Mackay, and Mr. Kirkpatrick. There is one matter to which we take this opportunity of calling the attention of the Faculty of Advocates. Some years ago they made it imperative for candidates for admission to the Bar to attend lectures on Constitutional Law and History. But to this day that subject has no place in the lists

of subjects for examination before admission. This is surely a mistake. If the subject is of such importance that it is necessary to attend lectures upon it, it is of such importance that it is necessary to make sure that the candidates know something about it, and if it is not necessary to know anything about t,should not be imperative to attend the lectures.

Obituary.

LORD BENHOLME.-MR. COSMO INNES.

WHEN the Court of Session meets at the opening of the winter session, those who have occasion to frequent the Parliament House will miss from the Second Division two of the old familiar faces. We shall miss the venerable forms of two men who sat for many years in that Court-men remarkable and distinguished in their respective ways, remarkable even by their presence and personal appearance. We refer to Lord Benholme, who died on the 14th of September, one of the Judges of the Second Division, and Mr. Cosmo Innes, advocate, one of the principal Clerks of that Court, who died on the 31st of July.

Lord Benholme, long and favourably known at the Bar as Hercules Robertson, was born in the year 1795, so that at the time of his death he was verging on his eightieth year. He passed as Advocate in the year 1817, the year after Lord Colonsay was called to the Bar. In 1842 the Conservative Government of that time appointed him Sheriff of Renfrewshire. In 1853 the Liberal Government of that time raised him to the Bench, and on the retirement of Lord Wood, in 1859, he took his place in the Second Division. Twenty-one years of judicial service, fifty-seven years of professional duty, are things which few men can point to at the close of their career. For some years we believe he had been the oldest man who acted as Judge in any Supreme Court in Great Britain.

Although the late learned Judge took his place on the bench of the Division until the very close of the last session,-indeed was able to take his turn in rotation as Judge in the Bill Chamber only a fortnight before his death, it was very evident to all who saw him last July that the end was not far off. Indeed it was sometimes painful to witness his exhaustion, and the pallor and emaciation of his appearance. But if it was painful to witness these things it was pleasant to note the unimpaired vigour of his mind, and it was a proud thing to see the triumph of the firm will over the feeble. body. It seemed his determination to do his work to the last-so long as a spark of life was left in him; and he did it, and did it