Truitt et al. v. Truitt. case is docketed for trial, then he must comply with the rules of the court as to the time when application shall be made for a change of venue; but it would, in our opinion, be a hard and unreasonable rule to deprive a party, who voluntarily enters his appearance, of a right secured to him by positive law. Under such a rule, no party would voluntarily enter his appearance after the day on which the cause was docketed for trial, and this would cause delay instead of expediting the trial of the cause. We are of the opinion that the court erred in refusing to entertain the application of Walden for a change of venue, and for this error the judgment must be reversed. There are some other errors assigned, which will arise upon another trial, and we will therefore pass upon them. It is next claimed that the decree of the court is void, because there was no personal judgment against Joshua Truitt on the note. We think otherwise. We think otherwise. The court found the amount due on the note, and rendered a decree for the sale of the land to satisfy the amount so found to be due. It was not necessary that there should have been a personal judgment to sustain a decree in rem. A party may take a decree for the foreclosure of a mortgage, or the enforcement of a mechanic's lien, without a personal judgment over against the party liable. This was a proceeding in rem, to enforce a lien on the land, and we are unable to see how the defendants have been injured by the failure to take a personal judgment also. This remedy will be exhausted when the land is sold, and the liability of Joshua Truitt will end with the sale of the land. This would be the case if he had not been discharged in bankruptcy. It is next claimed that the court erred in rendering a decree for the sale of the land to discharge the lien thereon against the appellant Joshua Truitt, who had pleaded and proved his discharge in bankruptcy. We are of a different opinion. The discharge of a party in bankruptcy does not release a mortgage or lien on real property, which had been created prior to the commence Truitt et al. v. Truitt. ment of the proceedings in bankruptcy, nor does such discharge deprive the party holding such lien from enforcing the same. Bump Law and Prac. Bankrup. 160, 445. A party that has a lien upon property fraudulently conveyed away by the bankrupt may prosecute a suit to enforce it, instituted before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, even though the discharge is pleaded in bar of the suit. Payne v. Able, 4 Bankrup. Reg. 67; S. C. 18 Pitts. Law J. 101. If the court had rendered a personal judgment against Joshua Truitt, after he had pleaded and proved his discharge in bankruptcy, it would have been erroneous, but we see no error in rendering a decree in rem for the sale of land to satisfy a lien which was created prior to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Walden, having purchased the land in dispute pending an action involving the title thereto, acquired no title thereto as against the plaintiff. It was said by this court in Green v. White, 7 Blackf. 242, that "the principle is now too well settled to be even doubted, that a lis pendens, duly prosecuted, is notice to a purchaser, so as to affect and bind his interest by the decree. In Worsley v. The Earl of Scarborough, 3 Atk. 392, it was said that all people are supposed to be attentive to what passes in a court of justice, and it is to prevent a greater mischief that would arise by people's purchasing a right under litigation and then in contest, that this principle has been established. See, also, 2 Sugd. Vend. 281. A purchase of a right which is undergoing a judicial investigation is a fraud upon the plaintiff, and is so far considered a nullity that it cannot avail against his title." See Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441. A party who purchases property pending litigation respecting such property takes the title subject to the rights of the plaintiff as determined in such action. In the action that was pending when Walden purchased the land in dispute, the court decreed that the title of Annie A. Truitt was fraudulent and void as against the plaintiff, and that he had a Crews v. The State. lien thereon to secure the payment of the sum due him from Joshua Truitt. Walden, therefore, holds the title to the land subject to the prior and paramount equities of the plaintiff. This case is a sequel to a case decided at this term (37 Ind. 514), wherein the plaintiff in this action was the plaintiff, and Joshua and Annie A. Truitt were defendants. The judgment is reversed, with costs; and the cause is remanded, with directions for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. T. J. Sample, for appellants. W. March, W. Brotherton, and C. E. Shipley, for appellee. CREWS V. THE STATE. CRIMINAL LAW.-Selling Share in Lottery Scheme.-Selling envelopes, some of which contain money, and others do not, and paying a sum of money when an empty envelope is purchased by chance, is a violation of section 32, 2 G. & H. 468. APPEAL from the Hancock Circuit Court. WORDEN, C. J.-This was an indictment against the appellant, charging, in substance, that on the 16th of August, 1870, at said county, the appellant sold to one John C. Atkinson a share in a lottery scheme, as follows, viz.: The appellant then and there placed in a box an indefinite number of letter envelopes, in each of which, except three, was a sum of money ranging from one cent to one hundred dollars; the amount in any particular envelope being unknown to the purchasers of shares. The shares, or in other words, the right to any one of the envelopes, were sold by the appellant at fifty cents each. The purchaser of a share, or one of the envelopes, was to be entitled to the envelope and its contents; but if the envelope proved to be one in which Crews v. The State. no money was placed, the purchaser was to be entitled to fifty dollars from the appellant. The appellant sold to said Atkinson one of these shares or envelopes for the sum of fifty cents. On this indictment the appellant was tried and convicted. The only question made is as to the sufficiency of the indictment. We have condensed the statements in the indictment, and set out what seems to us to be its substance; and it makes a case clearly within the statute on the subject. 2 G. & H. 468, sec. 32. The indictment, in our opinion, was good, and the judgment must be affirmed. The judgment below is affirmed, with costs. F. L. Mason, C. G. Offutt, J. W. Gordon, and W. March, for appellant. D. W. Chambers and B. W. Hanna, Attorney General, for the State. CREWS V. THE STATE. APPEAL from the Hancock Circuit Court. WORDEN, C. J.-The judgment in this case must be affirmed, for reasons stated in another case between the same parties, involving the same question, at the present term, ante, p. 28. The judgment below is affirmed, with costs. F. L. Mason, C. G. Offutt, F. W. Gordon, and W. March, for appellant. D. W. Chambers and B. W. Hanna, Attorney General, for the State. Heller, Receiver, v. McCormick. CREWS V. THE STATE. APPEAL from the Hancock Circuit Court. WORDEN, C. J.-The judgment in this case must be affirmed, for reasons given in another case between the same parties at the present term, ante, p. 28. The judgment below is affirmed, with costs. F. L. Mason, C. G. Offutt, F. W. Gordon, and W. March, for appellant. D. W. Chambers and B. W. Hanna, Attorney General, for the State. CREWS V. THE STATE. APPEAL from the Hancock Circuit Court. WORDEN, C. J.-The judgment in this case must be affirmed, on another case between the same parties at the present term, ante, p. 28. The judgment below is affirmed, with costs. F. L. Mason, C. G. Offutt, F. W. Gordon, and W. March, for appellant. D. W. Chambers and B. W. Hanna, Attorney General, for the State. HELLER, RECEIVER, v. MCCORMICK. MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,-Receiver.-The case of Embree v. Shideler, 36 Ind. 423, approved, and this case affirmed upon its authority. APPEAL from the Hendricks Common Pleas. BUSKIRK, J.-The appellant sued the appellee upon a premium note before a justice of the peace. A trial re |