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CASES

ARGUED AND DETERMINED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

OF THE

STATE OF INDIANA,

AT INDIANAPOLIS, NOVEMBER TERM, 1871, IN THE FIFTY-SIXTH
YEAR OF THE STATE.

TILMAN V. HARTER ET AL.

PROMISSORY NOTE.—Indorsement.—The indorsement of a promissory note is not required to be set out in the complaint in a suit by the indorsee against the maker.

PRACTICE.-Bill of Exceptions.—Where there is no proper bill of exceptions, no question on the evidence is presented on appeal, nor is a ruling on a motion for setting aside a continuance or a motion for taxing costs before the court for consideration.

APPEAL from the Wabash Circuit Court.

PETTIT, J.-This suit was brought by the appellees against the appellant, and the complaint is this: "The plaintiffs, Joseph B. Harter and Jacob Harter, complain of the defendant, Job E. Tilman, and allege that the said defendant, on the 12th day of September, 1866, by his note, a copy of which is filed herewith, promised to pay to the order of John Thorn, who indorsed said note to Milton M. Boggs, who indorsed said note to the plaintiffs, and that defendant, on the 12th day of October, 1866, paid fifty dollars on said note; that the residue thereof, and the interest thereon, are VOL. XXXVIII.-I

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Tilman v. Harter et al.

yet due and unpaid. Wherefore the plaintiffs demand judgment for one hundred and fifty dollars, and for other proper relief."

The note and indorsements filed are as follows:

SEPTEMBER 12th, 1866.

"$150. "On or before the 10th day of July, 1867, I promise to pay to the order of John Thorn one hundred and fifty dollars, value received, without any relief whatever from valuation or appraisement laws. JOB E. TILMAN." Endorsed: "JOHN THORN, MILTON M. BOGGS." The defendant answered in two paragraphs; first, payment; second, counter claim; to which there were proper replies and issues made.

The cause, for trial, was submitted to the court. The court, at the request of the appellant, found specially the facts and the conclusions of law thereon, to which no exception was taken.

A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and exception taken by appellee.

The errors assigned are, "first, the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant below." The only possible objection to the complaint exists in its not stating that the indorsements or assignments are filed with the note. This did not render the complaint bad. See Treadway v. Cobb, 18 Ind. 36.

"Second, the court below erred in permitting improper and irrelevant evidence to be introduced at the trial of said cause over the objection of the defendant below, to which he excepted." This is no legal assignment of error, but might be used as a cause for a new trial if the particular evidence thought to be improper and irrelevant had been pointed out; but without this it would not have been a good or proper cause for a new trial. There is no evidence in the record. That which is claimed to be a bill of exceptions, instead of being signed by the judge as true, is certified by him to be not full and complete.

"Third, the court erred in permitting the deposition of

Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ellis et al.

Milton M. Boggs to be read in evidence over the objection of appellant." We do not know what this deposition was, as there is no proper bill of exceptions setting it out.

"Fourth, the court erred in not taxing costs on an issue to the appellees." There is no bill of exceptions showing a motion or reasons for so taxing the costs.

“Fifth, the finding of the court was contrary to law; sixth, the finding was contrary to evidence." We are not able to see why the finding was contrary to law, as no exception was taken to it; nor why it was contrary to the evidence, as there is none before us.

"Seventh, the court erred in setting aside the continuance in this case over appellant's objection." There is no bill of exceptions showing the setting aside of a continuance, or any objection to the action of the court in that respect.

"Eighth, the court below erred in refusing to sustain the motion of the defendant below for a new trial."

We have noticed, considered, and answered, above, every question that was presented in the motion for a new trial. It follows that there was no error in overruling the motion for a new trial, or in any other action of the court below, of which the appellant can take advantage.

The judgment is in all things affirmed, at the costs of the appellant.

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TRUSTEES OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH V. ELLIS 151 353

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ET AL.

TAX-Statute.-Rule of Construction.-A statute which exempts persons or
property from taxation is to be strictly construed.
SAME.-Exemption of Property Erected for Religious Worship.-Parsonage.
Under the provisions of the fourth clause of section 6 of the assessment law
(1 G. & H. 69), a parsonage, that has been erected for the convenience and
accommodation of the pastor of a church, is not exempted from taxation,

Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ellis et al.

APPEAL from the Wabash Circuit Court.

BUSKIRK, J.-This was a proceeding by the appellants in the court below to enjoin the appellees from collecting certain taxes. The court below sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the appellants having refused to amend the complaint, judgment was rendered by the court for the appellees, from which judgment the appellants appeal to this court to obtain a reversal thereof. It is claimed by the appellants that the property described in the complaint is, under the laws of this State, exempt from assessment and taxation.

The material facts stated in the complaint are, that the Methodist Episcopal Church, of the town of Wabash, county of Wabash, in the State of Indiana, was a body corporate, organized under the laws of 1843, for religious purposes; that such corporation purchased an in-lot in the said town of Wabash, in the county and State aforesaid, known upon the recorded plat of said town as No. 224; that the said corporation erected upon the said lot a large and commodious church building for religious and public worship of the said congregation; that in the said church is the office and pastor's study; that the said corporation also purchased the west twenty feet of in-lot, in the said town, No. 223; that the said west half of said lot was contiguous to the said lot, No. 224; that the said corporation erected on the said west half of lot No. 223, a building for the residence of the minister officiating in said church; that the said parsonage was erected within twelve feet of the said church building; that there was a door opening from the said church building opposite to, and within twelve feet of, the door opening into the said parsonage, by means of which doors, the minister of the said congregation had access to and from the said parsonage to his study in the said church building and into the main church building when used for public religious purposes; that the said lots were purchased, and the said church building and parsonage were erected by the corporation with corporate means, and that the said lots and buildings were used

Trustees of the Methodist Episcopal Church v. Ellis et al.

solely and exclusively for the purposes of the said religious corporation; that the said corporation derived no rent or income from the said lots or buildings; that the title to the said lots was vested in the trustees of the said corporation, and their successors in office in perpetuity; that the said west half of lot No. 223, had been appraised by the appraisers of real estate for purposes of taxation; that the auditor of the said county had placed the same for taxation on the tax duplicate; that the said duplicate had been placed in the hands of the treasurer of the said county; that the taxes assessed on the said property amounted to forty dollars and ninety cents; that the said treasurer was about to sell the said lot for the payment of the said taxes. The prayer of the complaint was for a perpetual injunction, enjoining the collection of the said taxes.

The real question arising upon the facts stated is, whether the west half of lot No. 223 is exempt from state, county, and local taxation. The decision of the question depends upon the construction to be placed upon section one of article ten of our State Constitution, and clause four of section six of an act entitled "an act to provide for the valuation and assessment of the real and personal property," etc. Section one of article ten of our constitution reads thus: Sec. 1. The General Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such only for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, as may be specially exempted by law." I G. & H. 50.

The fourth clause of section six of the assessment law reads thus: "Fourth, every building erected for religious worship, and the pews and furniture within the same, and the lands whereon such building is situate, not exceeding ten acres." I G. & H. 69.

Chief Justice MARSHALL, in M'Culloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, in speaking of the power of taxation, says:

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