5 Buck v. Manhattan R'y Co. (1888) N. Y. Ct. of Com. Pleas, 19 N. Y. St. Rep. 908.

6 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Pillsbury, 123 Ill. 9; 5 Am. St. Rep. 483. 7 Pittsburg and Ft. W. R. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 503.

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§ 1002. (b). By servants of the carrier.Scope of employment.-In an action against a carrier for the tort of its servant, the plaintiff need not show that the act complained of was specifically authorized by the company, nor that it was within the scope of his employment.' It is sufficient to render the company responsible, that the tort was committed while the servant was acting in the line of his employment, although in committing the act complained of he thereby exceeded his authority, and acted maliciously, and against orders. This is well illustrated by a case in Wisconsin, where the plaintiff was allowed to recover for mental suffering caused by a servant of the company kissing her while he was acting in his employment as conductor of the train. The company plead that it had not authorized the act, and that in kissing the plaintiff, the conductor went beyond the general scope of his employment; but the court held the defendant to be liable under the rule as stated above.* The scope of the servant's authority is frequently brought in question in suits against railway companies for the unnecessary violence of its employees in ejecting persons from trains. In such cases, to show the extent of the conductor's authority, it need not be proven that he was specifically empowered to eject persons from his train, when it appears that he had general authority to receive or reject persons applying for passage.5 Whether the expulsion of passengers is within the general scope

of a brakeman's duty, however, is more difficult to determine. It would seem to depend upon the custom of the road, and this may be established by evidence that other brakemen had ejected persons who refused to pay their fare." To show that the

person committ ng the tort was a servant of the company, evidence of his deporting himself in that capacity on the train, and acting as such between certain points on the road, is sufficient." But it is not sufficient proof of his being a servant of the company that he wore a cap with a badge, and carried a lantern with the company's initials upon it.s And in the case last cited, where the passenger when about to take the train had been assaulted and robbed by an unknown person, it was held that even upon the hypothesis that the tort was committed by a servant of the company, it could not be held responsible for an act wholly disconnected from any service in which any of its employees were engaged.9

1 Louisville N. A. & C. R. R. Co. v. Wood (1888), 113 Ind. 544; Craker v. Chicago etc. R'y Co. 33 Wis. 657; 17 Am. Rep. 504; Travers v. Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. 63 Mo. 421; St. Louis, I. M. & S. P'y Co. v. Hendricks, 43 Ark. 177; 3 Am. St. Rep. 220; Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. Co. v. Brown, (1837), 123 Ill. 162; 5 Am. St. Rep. 511; Pendleton v. Kinsley (1871), 3 Cliff. 416; S. C. Thompson on Carriers, 352.

2 Cagney v. Manhattan R'y Co. (1888), 2 N. Y. Supl. 410; and cases cited in preceding note.

3 Philadelphia and Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby (1852), 14 How. 463; S. C. Thompson on Carriers, 31.

4 Craker v. Chicago etc. R'y Co. 33 Wis. 657; 17 Am. Rep. 504.

5 Travers v. Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. 63 Mo. 421.

6 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R'y Co. v. Hendricks, 43 Ark. 177; 3 Am. St. Rep. 220.

7 St. Louis I. M. & S. R'y Co. v. Hendricks; 48 Ark. 177; 3 Am. St. Rep. 220.

8 Sachrowitz v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co. (1887) 37 Kan. 212. 9 Sachrowitz v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co. (1887) 37 Kan. 212.

§ 1003. (c.) The carrier's peculiar obligation to female passengers.-Toward its female passen

gers the carrier owes a peculiar diligence, to preserve them from obscenity, immodest conduct or wanton approach.' And an instruction in such case that, if defendant's employees "were insulting, either in words, tone, or manner," to the plaintiff, the jury should award damages, is not erroneous on account of the use of the word "tcne." 2 But it will not be liable for such conduct of its employees in the presence of female passengers as can only be denominated "indecorous,' nor for the disorderly and disgraceful conduct of persons intruding upon its stations, when it had no reason to anticipate such proceedings.*

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1 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Ballard (1887), 85 Ky. 307; Craker v. Chicago etc. R'y Co. 36 Wis. 657; 17 Am. Rep. 504.

2 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Ballard (1887), 85 Ky. 307.

3 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Ballard (1887), 85 Ky. 307.

4 Battou v. South & N. A. R. R. Co. 77 Ala. 591; 54 Am. Rep. 514.

§ 1004. (d). The conductor's duty and authority in the premises.-The carrier's duty of protecting its passengers devolves upon the conductor of the train, who, upon occasions of danger, may exercise the functions of a civil officer.1 In the case last cited, the court said that the conductor "should have stopped the train, and hewed a passage through the intrusive mass until he had expelled the rioters, or had demonstrated, by an earnest experiment, that the undertaking was impossible." 2 In such cases, where it is necessary for the conductor to use deadly weapons, the company is not liable for the consequences to a disorderly person, wounded in the conflict.3

1 Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago R'y Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512; 8. C. Thompson on Carriers, 295.

2 Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago R'y Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 503. 3 Peavy v. Georgia R. R. Co. (Ga. 1889).

1005. (e.) Exemplary damages for failure to protect. When the company has been found to have neglected its duty to protect its passengers from the misconduct of its servants, exemplary damage: may be awarded.1 And such damages may be awarded for an assault by a fellow-passenger also, when the party assaulted called upon the conductor for assistance, and he refused to interfere.'

1 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Ballard (1887), 85 Ky. 307; Cagney v. Manhattan R'y Co. (1888), 2 N. Y. Supl. 410.

2 Flannery v. Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. 4 Mackey (D. C.) 111.

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§ 1006. Connecting carriers.-Through tickets.-There are several English cases holding that a company selling a through ticket to a point beyond its terminus, is liable for any injury to the passenger, whether occurring on its own road or that of the connecting carrier.' This would seem to be the rule in Wisconsin, also. And in New Jersey it is held that a railway company cannot avoid its duty safely to transport a passenger over the entire route for which it has sold him a ticket, by alleging contracts and arrangements made with connecting lines, of which no notice was given to the passenger. But it is generally held in America that the initial carrier is liable only for injuries sustained by the passenger while upon its own line.* This would seem to be upon the theory that the company selling the through ticket acts merely as the agent of the connecting carrier. So, where a contract was made between a railway company and an omnibus driver, by which the latter agreed to convey passengers from the station on tickets sold by the company, it was held that a passenger could not recover from the company for an injury

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induced by the negligence of the driver. But where the defendant issued excursion tickets to a point on a connecting line, and by contract between the two roads the train was to be taken over the latter by its engine and in charge of its servants, it was decided that they were pro hac vice the employees of the company issuing the tickets, and that the defendant was liable for their negligence.'

1 Gt. Western R'y Co. v. Blake, 7 Hurl. & N. 987; Bristol & Exeter R'y Co. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cas. 194; Buxton v. North Eastern R'y Co. Law R. 3 Q. B. 549.

2 Candee v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 21 Wis. 582; S. C. Thompson on Carriers, 419.

3 Little v. Dusenbury, 46 N. J. 614.

4 Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Weaver, 9 Lea, 38; 42 Am. Rep. 654; Poole v. Delaware etc. R. R. Co. 35 Hun (N. Y.) 29; Nashville etc. R. R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 311; 35 Am. Rep. 705; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421; Knight v. Portland etc. R. R. Co. 56 Me. 234. See, however, Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306, S. C. Thompson on Carriers, 423, where the liability was said to depend in each case upon the nature of the contract between the parties.

5 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Connell, 112 Ill. 295. Cf. Young v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. 11 East. Rep. 717; Bethea v. Northeastern R. R. Co. 26 S. C. 91; Mosher v. St. Louis etc. R'y Co. 127 U. S. 390.

6 Poole v. Delaware, Lackawanna etc. R. R. Co. 35 Hun, 29. 7 Washington v. Raleigh etc. R. R. Co. 101 N. C. 239.

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§ 1007. Sleeping and parlor cars.-Companies owning and operating sleeping-cars are common carriers of passengers, and are liable as such; and this is true, although the main compensation paid for transportation be received by the railway company, and not by the sleeping-car company. The railway company also, is liable for the negligence of the sleeping-car company." The porter and other employees of the latter are considered to be the servants of the railway, and their negligence is imputed to it. For the railway company cannot exonerate itself from its public duty to carry safely,

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BEACH ON RAILWAYS-108