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V. Pacific R. R. Co. 41 Mo. 503; Dunlap v. International Steamboat Co. 98 Mass. 371.

2 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332; 76 Am. Dec. 749; Jordan v. Fall River R. R. Co. 5 Cush. 69; 51 Am. Dec. 44; Fairfax v. Now York Central R. R. Co. 73 N. Y. 167; 29 Am. Rep. 119.

3 Weed v. Saratoga etc. Co. 19 Wend. 534.

4 Illinois etc. R. R. Co. v. Copeland, 24 Ill. 332; 76 Am. Dec. 749

5 Hickox v. Naugatuck etc. R. R. Co. 31 Conn. 281; 83 Am. Dec. 143. 6 Philps v. London & N. W. R'y Co. 19 Com. B. N. S. 321.

7 Stewart v. International Steamboat Co. 98 Mass. 371.

8 The Ionic, 5 Blatchf. 538.

9 Jordan v. Fall River R. R. Co. 5 Cush. 69; Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wend. 85; 24 Am. Dec. 129; Miles v. Cattle, 19 Con. Law Rep. 219; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 19 Ill. 578; Doyle v. Kiser, 6 Ind. 242; Dunlap v. International etc. Co. 98 Mass. 371; First National Bank v. Marietta etc. Co. 20 Ohio St. 259; 5 Am. Rep. 655; Weeks v. New York etc. R. R. Co. 72 N. Y. 50; Fairfax v. New York etc. R. R. Co. 73 N. Y. 167; 29 Am. Rep. 119; Hutchins v. Western etc. R. R. Co. 25 Ga. 61.

10 Weeks v. New York etc. R. R. Co. 9 Hun, 669.

§ 902. Knowledge of contents as affecting liability of carrier.-If the trunks, valises or other packages of a passenger contain articles of unusual value, it is his duty to inform the carrier of the fact, and if he fail to do so he is guilty of such legal fraud as will absolve the carrier from liability for failure to transport them. For by presenting them to the carrier in the ordinary way, to be checked, he represents by implication that they contain nothing but personal baggage. In such a case the company cannot be held liable on the ground that baggage-masters at other stations on the same road had previously given checks for the same trunk or valise with a knowledge of the contents.* If, however, the carrier knew the nature of the contents, and received and checked them as baggage, it will be liable, although the articles were not such as are usually included in that term.5 But to render the carrier liable it must have actual knowledge before accepting the package. It is not sufficient that the appearance was such as to put the com

pany upon inquiry as to the contents. It is under no obligation to inquire. Where, however, the packing is such that inquiry is needless, the nature of the contents being plainly visible, the company will be considered as having such knowledge thereof, as will render its acceptance without extra charge, equivalent to a waiver of its rights."

1 Michigan etc. R. R. Co. v. Carrow, 73 Ill. 348; 24 Am. Rep. 248. 2 Blumenthal v. Maine Central R. R. Co. (1888), 79 Me. 550.

3 Blumenthal v. Maine Central R. R. Co. (1888), 79 Me. 550. 4 Blumenthal v. Maine Central R. R. Co. (1888), 79 Me. 550.

5 Chicago, R. I. etc. R. R. Co. v. Conklin, 32 Kan. 55; Hæger v. Chicago, M. etc. R'y Co. 63 Wis. 100; 53 Am. Rep. 271, where the sample trunks of a drummer were so accepted; Jacobs v. Tutt (1888), 33 Fed. Rep. 412, where the trunk of a jewelry salesman was so received and the company held liable as for ordinary baggage; Hannibal etc. R. R. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. (U. S.) 262; Butler v. Hudson River R. R. Co. 3 Smith E. D. 571; Minter v. Pacific R. R. Co. 41 Md. 508; 97 Am. Dec. 288; Ross v. Missouri etc. R. R. Co. 4 Mo. App. 582; Waldron v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co. 1 Dakota, 351. Contra, Blumantle v. Fitchburg R. R. Co. 127 Mass. 322; 34 Am. Rep. 376.

6 Cahill v. London etc. R'y Co. 30 Law J. Com. P. 287; S. C. 31 Law J. Com. P. 271, where the package was marked "Glass."

7 Great Northern R'y Co. v. Shepherd, 8 Exch. 30; Waldron v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co. 1 Dakota, 351; Ross v. Missouri etc. R. R. Co. 4 Mo. App. 582.

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§ 903. The limit of weight and value-Extra compensation.-A carrier may limit the amount and designate the nature of the things which it will accept as baggage.1 It may require a statement of the value of the articles, and exact a premium for the greater risk incurred. In a case decided not long since in Virginia, a rule that only baggage containing passengers' wearing apparel should be carried on passenger trains, was considered reasonable; and it was held that one who is in the habit of carrying his wares as baggage, and refuses to state that his trunk contains only wearing apparel, has no cause of action for damages for the company's refusal to carry it. In that

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case, the plaintiff having been detected in violating the rule on previous occasions, filled his trunk with soiled wearing apparel, and brought it to be checked, for the purpose of having defendant refuse, unless he should sign an affidavit as to its contents, which he had determined not to do, and thus lay the foundation of an action for damages. But it was held that he could not question the reasonableness of the requirement as to signing the affidavit, and that he had no cause of action. For the obligation to carry free of charge only extends to such things as passengers usually take with them as personal baggage, and which are necessary fr their use and comfort. It may refuse to accept merchandise without compensation," or unwieldy articles, such as hobby-horses, even though within the limit of weight. Making an extra charge for accepting and carrying articles not classified as baggage will render the carrier liable for their loss through the fraud or negligence of its servants, in the absence of fraud on the part of the passenger." And, on the other hand, a waiver of its night to demand extra compensation, is an assumption of liability as upon ordinary baggage of the usual

amount.9

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1 Mytton v. Midland R'y Co. 28 Law J. Ex. 385; Phelps v. London etc. R'y Co. 19 Com. B. (N. S.) 321; Rumsey v. North Eastern R'y Co. 14 Com. B. (N. S.) 641; Stewart v. London & N. Western R'y Co. 10 Jur. (N. S.) 805; Walsh v. The H. M. Wright, 1 Newberry (U. S.) 494.

2 The Bermuda, 23 Blatchf. C. C. 554; S. C. 27 Fed. Rep. 476; Hollister v. Nowlen (1835), 19 Wend. 231; S. C. Thompson on Carriers, 488.

3 Norfolk & W. R. R. Co. v. Irvine (1888), 84 Va. 553.

4 Hudson v. Midland R'y Co. Law R. 4 Q. B. 366.

5 Merrill v. Grinnell, 30 N. Y. 591; Stimson v. Connecticut River R. R. Co. 98 Mass. 83; 93 Am. Dec. 140; Smith v. Boston etc. R. R. Co. 44 N. H. 325.

6 Collins v. Boston etc. R. R. Co. 10 Cush. (Mass.) 603; The Ionic, 6 Blatchf. (U, S. Cir. Ct.) 538; Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 83; 56 Am. Dec. 460;

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Bell v. Drew, 4 Smith E. D. 59; Stimson v. Connecticut River R. R. Co. 93 Mass. 83; 93 Am. Dec. 140; Hawkins v Hoffman, 6 Hill, 586; Doyle v. Kyser, 6 Ind. 242.

7 Hudson v. Midland R'y Co. 10 Best & Smith, 504. Cf. Zunc v. South Eastern R'y Co. Law R. 4 Q. B. 539.

8 Camden etc. R. R. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. St. 67; 55 Am. Rep. 481 where the passenger's trunk contained specie. See, also, Hamburg-Ameri can Packet Co. v. Grattman (1889), 127 111. 598.

9 Glasco v. New York Central R. R. Co. 36 Barb. 557.

§ 904. Of baggagechecks—Connecting carriers. The possession of a baggage check is prima facie evidence that the carrier received the passenger's baggage, and that it still retains it in custody.1 Where a railroad company's trains, by an arrangement with a depot company, regularly enter and depart from the depot of the latter, which is intrusted with the business of handling and checking the baggage of passengers, furnishing its own checks therefor, such company must be deemed the agent of the railroad company in respect to such business. And where the passenger delivers the check to the agent of a connecting railroad company, and receives its check in exchange, the presumption is, that the baggage is received in due course by the latter company, and it is responsible therefor. But the presumption may be rebutted.*

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1 Ahlbeck v. St. Paul, M. & M. R'y Co. (1888) 39 Minn. 424; Milnor v. New York etc. R. R. Co. 53 N. Y. 363; Davis v. Cayuga etc. R. R. Co. 10 How. Pr. 330; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Clayton, 78 111. 616; Davis v. Michigan etc. R. R. Co. 22 111. 278; 74 Am. Dec. 151; Dill v. South Carolina R. R. Co. 7 Rich. (S. C.) 153; 62 Am. Dec. 407; Wilson v. Chesapeake etc. R. R. Co. 21 Gratt. (Va.) (54.

2 Ahlbeck v. St. Paul, M. & M. R'y Co. 39 Minn. 424.

3 Ahlbeck v. St. Paul, M. & M. R'y Co. 30 Minn. 424; Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Moutelle, 10 Kan. 119. Cf. Davis v. Michigan etc. R. R. Co. 22 Ill. 278; 74 Am. Dec. 151; Hickox v. Naugatuck R. R. Co. 31 Conn. 281; 83 Am. Dec. 143.

4 Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Clayton, 78 Ill. 616.

905. Liability of connecting carriers-The initial carrier.—The contract of carriage involves

not only the transportation of the passenger himself, but of his baggage also; so that a company contracting to transport a passenger to a point beyond its own line, through the agency of connecting carriers, assumes liability for the loss or injury of his baggage occurring on any part of the entire journey, even though it be through the fault of the connecting carrier.1 And the same rules in regard to the termination of liability apply to the first carrier as in ordinary cases of transportation over a single line. It is liable as insurer, until the passenger has had a reasonable time to take his baggage away from the station at which his journey ends, and after the lapse of that time it remains liable as a warehouseman, for the negligence of the connecting carrier." A through ticket, together with a through check, is evidence of the entirety of the contract, sufficient to prove the liability of the carrier issuing them; unless, in selling the through ticket, it acted merely as the agent of the connecting carriers. But a through check is not sufficient evidence to show the entirety of the contract, where no through ticket was issued. If the first carrier received the baggage, it will not be relieved of liability by the second carrier having rechecked it.“ Of course, where the first carrier did not check the baggage, the passenger taking it with him in the car and having it checked for the first time at the junction, he can book to the connecting carrier alone for damages. So. where the first carrier checked the baggage with one of the checks of the connecting carrier, the latter alone is liable for an injury or loss occurring on its part of the journey.8

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