e Ridge, his retreat could be cut off by troops moving eastward Shenandoah Valley. If he sought to advance down the must first overcome any force assigned for its defense. as the system was designed to be, nearly all work was susit early in the spring of 1862. In fact, had the capital for want of adequate entrenchments, the responsibility ure have been traced directly to Congress, which, at campaign of 1862, appropriated $150,000 for comof Washington, with the proviso, "that no part propriated shall be expended on any work here required to garrison the works was estimated "pointed by the Secretary of War, in October, ons required for their defense, computed at 2 men per yard 1 man per yard of rear perimeter, is about 25,000. The total ymen required (to furnish three reliefs for each gun) is about 9,000. necessary to keep the infantry supports attached to the works. The en, whose training requires much time, having learned the disposition of armament and computed the distances of the ground over which attacks may be ooked for, and the ranges and service of their guns, should not be changed; they should remain permanently in the forts. The 25,000 infantry should be encamped in such positions as may be most convenient to enable them, in case of alarm, to garrison the several works; and a force of 3,000 cavalry should be available for outpost duty, to give notice of the approach of an enemy. Whenever an enemy is within striking distance of the capital, able by a rapid march to attempt a coup de main which might result in the temporary occupation of the city, the dispersion of the Government, and the destruction of the archives, all of which could be accomplished by a single day's possession, a covering army of not less than 25,000 men should be held in position, ready to march to meet the attacking column. Against more serious attacks from the main body of the enemy, the capital must depend upon the concentration of its entire armies in Virginia or Maryland. They should precede or follow any movement of the enemy seriously threatening the capital. It will be seen from the above report, that to prevent a successful coup de main, the maximum force for garrison purposes was placed at 37,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, while in addition there was to be a covering force of 25,000, or a total of 62,000. Having described the defenses and given the largest estimate of men needed to repel a sudden attack, we may now resume the discussion of the campaign. When Wadsworth reported his force in "numerical strength and character" entirely inadequate to, and unfit for, the important duty to which it was assigned, the Secretary of War assumed no responsibility, but at once referred the question as to whether Washington had been left "entirely secure" by the commander of the Army of the Potomac, to General Thomas, the Adjutant-General of the Army, and General E. A. Hitchcock, recently assigned to special duty in the War Department. @ Barnard's Defenses of Washington, p. 15. This legislation was inspired by news of Thomas's and Grant's victories at Mill Spring and Fort Donelson, and Du Pont's victory at Port Royal. Barnard's Defenses of Washington, p. 19. This commission was composed of "Brevet Brig. Gen. J. G. Totten, Chief Engineer, U. S. Army; Brig. Gen. M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, U. S. Army, formerly of the U. S. Engineers; Brig. Gen. W. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery; Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer Defenses of Washington; Brig. Gen. G. G. Cullum, U. S. Engineers, Chief of Staff to the General in Chief." (Barnard, p. 18.) 932°-17-19 to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budds Ferry. He further stated that he was ordered to send 4,000 men to Manassas and Warrenton, to relieve General Sumner. After reporting that he had no light artillery, that nearly all his force was "new and imperfectly disciplined," that "several of the regiments were in a disorganized condition," he continued: I am not informed as to the position which Major-General Banks is directed to take, but at this time he is, as I understand, on the other side of the Bull Run Mountains, leaving my command to cover the front from the Manassas Gap, about 20 miles beyond Manassas, to Aquia Creek. I deem it my duty to state that, looking at the numerical strength and character of the force under my command, it is, in my judgment, entirely inadequate to, and unfit for, the important duty to which it is assigned. I regard it as very improbable that the enemy will assail us at this point, but this belief is based upon the hope that they may be promptly engaged elsewhere, and may not know the number and the character of the force left here. a To properly appreciate the dispositions made by General McClellan, it is important to have a clear idea of the earthworks constructed for the defense of the capital, and completed before the close of the year 1861. As enumerated a year later by a special commission appointed by the Secretary of War, they were classified into four groups. First, those south of the Potomac, beginning with Fort Lyon, below Alexandria, and terminating with Fort De Kalb, opposite Georgetown; second, those at Chain Bridge; third, those on the north bank of the Potomac, extending from above Chain Bridge to the Anacostia, or Eastern Branch; fourth, those east and south of the Eastern Branch, terminating at Fort Greble, opposite Axexandria. The length of the line, excluding the Potomac between Forts Greble and Lyon, was 33 miles; including this space it was 37 miles. General Barnard states: Comprised in the foregoing categories there are 23 forts south of the Potomac, 14 forts and 3 batteries between the Potomac and Anacostia, and 11 forts beyond the Anacostia, making 48 forts in all. These works varied in size, from Forts Runyon, Lyon, and Marcy, of which the perimeters were 1,500, 939, and 736 yards, to Forts Bennett, Haggerty, and Saratoga, with perimeters of 146, 128, and 154 yards. The greater portion of them were inclosed works of earth, though many, as Forts Craig, Tillinghast, Scott, south of the Potomac, and Forts Saratoga and Gaines on the north, were lunettes, with stockaded gorges. The armament was mainly made up of 24 and 32-pounders, on seacoast carriages, with a limited proportion of 24-pounder siege guns, rifled parrott guns, and guns on field carriages of light caliber. Such were the defenses of Washington at the beginning of the year 1862. b By destroying the Long Bridge, Aqueduct Bridge, and Chain Bridge, it is manifest that, excepting annoyance from artillery fire, the capital would be safe from any force whatever its size, which might approach from the south. The only points therefore, available for an attack, were to be found on the north bank between Chain Bridge and the Eastern Branch, the latter, like the Potomac, being unfordable to near its intersection with the general line of works. To approach the city from the north, it would first be necessary to cross the Potomac either by one or more of the fords east of the Blue Ridge, or by making a still longer detour by way of the upper Potomac and the Shenandoah Valley. In either case the distance to be marched would prevent a coup de main, or surprise. If the enemy crossed east of a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 317. the Blue Ridge, his retreat could be cut off by troops moving eastward from the Shenandoah Valley. If he sought to advance down the valley, he must first overcome any force assigned for its defense. Elaborate as the system was designed to be, nearly all work was suspended upon it early in the spring of 1862. In fact, had the capital been captured for want of adequate entrenchments, the responsibility could in a measure have been traced directly to Congress, which, at the opening of the campaign of 1862, appropriated $150,000 for completing the defenses of Washington, with the proviso, "that no part of the sum hereby appropriated shall be expended on any work hereafter to be commenced." The number of men required to garrison the works was estimated by a special commission, appointed by the Secretary of War, in October, 1862, to be as follows: The total infantry garrisons required for their defense, computed at 2 men per yard of front perimeter, and 1 man per yard of rear perimeter, is about 25,000. The total number of artillerymen required (to furnish three reliefs for each gun) is about 9,000. It is seldom necessary to keep the infantry supports attached to the works. The artillerymen, whose training requires much time, having learned the disposition of the armament and computed the distances of the ground over which attacks may be looked for, and the ranges and service of their guns, should not be changed; they should remain permanently in the forts. The 25,000 infantry should be encamped in such positions as may be most convenient to enable them, in case of alarm, to garrison the several works; and a force of 3,000 cavalry should be available for outpost duty, to give notice of the approach of an enemy. Whenever an enemy is within striking distance of the capital, able by a rapid march to attempt a coup de main which might result in the temporary occupation of the city, the dispersion of the Government, and the destruction of the archives, all of which could be accomplished by a single day's possession, a covering army of not less than 25,000 men should be held in position, ready to march to meet the attacking column. Against more serious attacks from the main body of the enemy, the capital must depend upon the concentration of its entire armies in Virginia or Maryland. They should precede or follow any movement of the enemy seriously threatening the capital. It will be seen from the above report, that to prevent a successful coup de main, the maximum force for garrison purposes was placed at 37,000 infantry, cavalry, and artillery, while in addition there was to be a covering force of 25,000, or a total of 62,000. Having described the defenses and given the largest estimate of men needed to repel a sudden attack, we may now resume the discussion of the campaign. When Wadsworth reported his force in "numerical strength and character" entirely inadequate to, and unfit for, the important duty to which it was assigned, the Secretary of War assumed no responsibility, but at once referred the question as to whether Washington had been left "entirely secure" by the commander of the Army of the Potomac, to General Thomas, the Adjutant-General of the Army, and General E. A. Hitchcock, recently assigned to special duty in the War Department. a Barnard's Defenses of Washington, p. 15. This legislation was inspired by news of Thomas's and Grant's victories at Mill Spring and Fort Donelson, and Du Pont's victory at Port Royal. Barnard's Defenses of Washington, p. 19. This commission was composed of "Brevet Brig. Gen. J. G. Totten, Chief Engineer, U. S. Army; Brig. Gen. M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster-General, U. S. Army, formerly of the U. S. Engineers; Brig. Gen. W. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery; Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer Defenses of Washington; Brig. Gen. G. G. Čullum, U. S. Engineers, Chief of Staff to the General in Chief." (Barnard, p. 18.) 932°-17--19 The following documents were submitted to them, from which they were to form their conclusions: First, the President's order of March 8, directing that no change of base should be made without leaving Washington entirely secure;" second, the report of the council of corps commanders convened at Fairfax Court House on the 13th of March; third, General McClellan's letter of April 1, stating that independent of the garrison of Washington, he had left a covering force of 55,456 men; fourth, the letter of General Wadsworth of April 2, already referred to. The very day that this question was referred to these officers, April 2, they reported as follows: It is, we think, the judgment of officers that some 30,000 would be necessary thus to man these forts, which, with the number of the covering force, would make a total of 55,000. In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no very large force would be necessary to hold that position.a Referring to the 55,456 men, exclusive of the 19,022 present for duty under General Wadsworth, they added: In the above enumeration, General Banks's army corps is included, but whether this corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, should be regarded as part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington, the undersigned express no opinion. After quoting from General Wadsworth's letter, showing the state and organization of his force, they concluded as follows: If there was need of a military force for the safety of the city of Washington within its own limits, that referred to in the report of General Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate. In view of the opinion expressed by the council of commanders of army corps, of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by General McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of opinion that the requirements of the President that the city shall be left "entirely secure", not only in the opinion of the General in Chief, but those of the "commanders of the army corps" also, has not been complied with. The vital error in this report related to Banks's army. Ignoring, or more probably overlooking, the fact that the destruction of the bridges over the Potomac would make the capital safe from attack in front, and that the only danger was from the rear, they evaded the question of Banks's 35,000 men, and then reported: We are of the opinion that the requirements of the President-that the city shall be left entirely secure, not only in the opinion of the General in Chief, but those of the "commanders of the army corps" also-have not been complied with. On the false assumption that a force originally designed for one purpose could be used for no other, General Hitchcock in 1863, in explanation of his action, testified: I did not consider the force in the Shenandoah Valley as available for the immediate defense of the capital, being required for the defense of that valley. The haste with which the two officers performed the duty assigned to them, precluded any personal investigation of the defenses of Washington, but the map could have shown them, that from the Potomac a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 317. above Georgetown, extending via Arlington, Fort Albany, Fort Richardson, and Fort Scott, to the Potomac 2 miles south of Long Bridge, there was a high defensible ridge about 4 miles long, and crowned by no less than 15 forts or regular earthworks. Even abandoning these, neither the Long Bridge, Aqueduct Bridge, nor Chain Bridge could have been captured without first assaulting Forts Runyon, Corcoran, and Ethan Allen, which were constructed at their respective debouches. These facts, as well as the official documents, should have been considered, before expressing an opinion which was destined to hopelessly unsettle the mind of the President." They should have known that as a civil officer he could not pretend to analyze their report. He did not presume to act on his own judgment or that of the Secretary of War, and probably had not time to consider General Wadsworth's significant statement, "I regard it very improbable that the enemy will assail us at this point." If he read it or the more important admission of the two officers, that as the enemy had destroyed the railroads, it was "fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position," it is quite possible that neither statement made any impression on his mind. There was but one part of the report that he could well comprehend, and that was the opinion unequivocally expressed, that his orders by the Secretary of War had not been complied with. This bold statement, suddenly and unexpectedly presented, devolved upon the President new and grave responsibilities which, unaided, he was wholly at a loss to meet. SECOND AULIC COUNCIL. As one of the natural consequences of having no General in Chief, there sprang up about this time what has aptly been called the "Second Aulic Council. Its existence was soon recognized, for in the testimony given by General Meigs, before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, on the 14th of July, 1862, occurs the question by Mr. Chandler: "You are a member of the military council of war?" General Meigs replied: I am a member of the body to which you allude. It has no legal existence; but the Secretary of War has invited some of us to come there for that purpose. c From the testimony given by General Hitchcock, January 21, 1863, the council appears more specifically to have been composed of "the chiefs of the various bureaus of the War Department." These chiefs To avoid the possibility of misjudging in this controversy, the reader should bear in mind that in order to make Washington secure, Generals Thomas and Hitchcock estimated the garrison and covering force at 55,000. Nearly a year later the commission appointed by the Secretary of War estimated it at 62,000. General McClellan fully appreciating the strategic importance of a strong force in the Shenandoah Valley, as a defense to the capital, actually left as a garrison and covering force 73,456. Another important fact must not be overlooked. The subordinates of the Secretary of War did not base their report on the number of men actually left behind, but on the figures contained in the four documents submitted. Official documents do not show whether the report of General Wadsworth was volunteered by him or called for by the Secretary of War. The latter is to be presumed from the date, as also from the fact that the information was conveyed by letter, instead of in the form of a monthly return. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 1, p. 296. |