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General Patterson, who was in command of the Army of the Shenandoah, was more in accord with the popular feeling. Writing to the Adjutant-General from Hagerstown, June 28, he stated:

I beg to remind the General in Chief that the period of service of nearly all the troops here will expire within a month, and that if we do not meet the enemy with them we will be in no condition to do so for three months to come. The new regiments will not be fit for service before September, if then, and meanwhile this whole frontier will be exposed.

I have got my command into as good condition as I could expect in so short a time. Officers and men are anxious to be led against the insurgents, and if the General in Chief will give me a regiment of regulars and an adequate force of field artillery, I will cross the river and attack the enemy, unless their forces are ascer tained to be more than two to one. a

The next three weeks gave him a personal experience of the perplexities which beset Washington throughout the Revolution. The part assigned to him in the approaching campaign was to so occupy the enemy's forces in the Shenandoah Valley, as to prevent them from making a junction with their main body at Manassas. Accordingly on the 2d of July he crossed the Potomac, and after a slight skirmish occupied Martinsburg. On the 15th, he advanced to Bunker Hill, only 10 miles from Winchester, then occupied by the enemy. Here he was confronted and his plans deranged by the impending dissolution of his

army.

June 16, he wrote to the Adjutant-General:

I have to report that the term of service of a very large portion of this force will expire in a few days. From an under-current expression of feeling I am confident that many will be inclined to lay down their arms the day their time expires. With such a feeling existing, any active operations toward Winchester cannot be thought of until they are replaced by three years' men.

Having relinquished the project of a further advance, and transferred his army to Charlestown, nearer Harpers Ferry, he telegraphed from there on the 18th:

With the existing feeling and determination of the three months' men to return home, it would be ruinous to advance or even to stay here without immediate increase of force to replace them. They will not remain.

I have ordered the brigades to assemble this afternoon, and shall make a personal appeal to the troops to stay a few days until I can be reenforced. Many of the regiments are without shoes; the Government refuses to furnish them; the men have received no pay; and neither officers nor soldiers have money to purchase with. Under these circumstances I cannot ask or expect the three months' volunteers to stay longer than one week.

The same day he also wrote from Charlestown:

* *Before marching from Martinsburg I heard of the mutterings of many of the volunteer regiments and their expressed determination not to serve one hour after their term of service should expire. I anticipated a better expression of opinion as we approached the enemy, and hoped to hear of a willingness to remain a week or ten days. I was disappointed; and when I prepared for a movement to the front, by an order for the men to carry two days' provisions in their haversacks, I was assailed by earnest remonstrances against being detained over their term of service, complaints from officers of want of shoes and other clothing, all throwing obstacles in the way of active operations. Indeed I found I should, if I took Winchester, be without men and be forced to retreat, thus losing the fruits of victory. Under these circumstances neither I nor those on whom I could rely, could advance with any confidence. I am, therefore, now here with a force which will be dwindling away very rapidly. I to-day appealed almost in vain to the regiments to stand by the country for a week or ten days.d

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, pp. 126, 127. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, p. 132. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, pp. 138, 139. Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, p. 139.

The efforts made by General Patterson to hold his army together, are fully explained in the testimony of Colonel Biddle before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Q. When did you first hear any complaints there that the regiments wanted to go home?-A. I think there was no question about their going until they got to Charlestown. The time of none of them expired until then. They all expected to go home at the end of their three months. There was no appeal made to them until we got to Charlestown.

Q. They manifested no dissatisfaction before that time?-A. No, sir; I do not know as they did, until at Charlestown when they expected to go home. I recollect perfectly the discussions that took place in regard to those troops. The regular officers said the troops would not stay a day after their time had expired. The General said, "Well, you will see." They said, "We know, because we saw it in Mexico." I said, “This is entirely a different matter; this is a fight for the existence of our Government, and the men will not dare go home, I think." General Patterson took it up and went out and made a direct appeal to the men. The General speaks very well under all circumstances, and he made remarkably good speeches then, as I thought, and as all thought. The General went to his son's regiment, which was a very fine regiment, and which we understood was willing to remain. The General made a speech to them, but to our surprise a considerable number of them refused to put up their muskets when the question was put to them. The officers were very much mortified at this, and spoke to the men, and finally they got them, with few exceptions, to put up their muskets. But still it was a sort of touch-and-go with them. That was the first time the fear crossed my mind that there would be trouble. The General then went to the other regiments, but found that it was not feasible at all; from one-half to two-thirds refused to go. He finally got to an Irish regiment and made a very powerful appeal to them, knowing the Irish character very well. He carried them with a sort of shout, and they all said they would remain. They all lifted up their muskets. But he had hardly turned his back when they hallooed out "Shoes and pants!" "Shoes and pants!"" Q. And it was evident then that you could do no more?-A. Yes, sir.a

While, through short enlistments, such was the demoralization of the troops in the Shenandoah, the disposition of the militia in the main army was quite as alarming. On the morning of the 21st of July, although the Secretary of War and the commanding general had besought them to remain, a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery, whose term of service had expired, began their homeward march to the sound of the enemy's cannon.

The same day the remainder of the army, launched against the enemy in position at Bull Run was totally defeated. In the panic that ensued, discipline again gave proof of its value. The battalion of regulars which covered the retreat and was the last to leave the field, checked the enemy's pursuit and retired in perfect order.

It is well known that the strength of a chain is that of its weakest link, and with slight modification the same principle applies to an army-that complicated mechanism upon which has often depended the fate of republics and empires. The army which went forth to Bull Run, freighted with the hope of a loyal people, was simply a chain of weak links.

Except a battalion of eight companies, made up of the Second, Third, and Eighth Infantry, a battalion of marines, a small detachment from the First and Second Dragoons, and 6 batteries of artillery, aggregat ing 800 men, the troops who were expected to vanquish opposition,

a Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 3, pp. 196, 197. General McDowell's official report, Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 6, Doc. 1.

cOfficial Report Maj. George Sykes's, Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 25, Doc. 1. d Draper's History of the American Civil War, vol. 2, p. 115.

were composed exclusively of volunteers and militia. Some of the former had, on the day of the battle, been mustered into the service less than a month; the term of service of all the regiments of militia was on the eve of expiring. These facts will explain to any military mind the loss of the battle. The plan was all that could have been anticipated from an able and judicious commander, but when he sought to execute it "to test his machinery," he found that discipline, the only sure bond of cohesion, was entirely wanting.

General Heintzelman, after having in vain sought to rally his broken regiments, spoke of their conduct as follows: "The want of discipline in these regiments was so great, that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear and continue to firefortunately for the braver ones, very high in the air, and compelling those in front to retreat."

As a skirmish line from some of the regiments of volunteers which participated in the conflict, was afterwards able to dispute the advance of the enemy in line of battle, it is plain that the loss of the battle was due more to the lack of discipline than to the want of individual courage.

The number of troops which crossed Bull Run was: Confederate forces, estimated at 29,949: Union forces, 28,568.

The Union loss in killed and wounded was 1,492, or but 5 per cent of the total force engaged.d

The same regiments after a year's discipline would have scorned to retire with a loss of less than 30 to 50 per cent.

The effect of this disastrous battle, which gave the enemy all the advantages of the initiative, had he chosen to use it, was to paralyze military operations for more than six months.

Amazed and humiliated, the people bowed their heads, and confiding everything to military commanders, patiently awaited the opening of another campaign.

In contrast with the conclusions of the historian, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, reported that the principal cause of defeat on that day was the failure of General Patterson to hold the forces of Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley.

a Official report of General Heintzelman, Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 2, p. 26, Doc. 1.

Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 249. Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, vol. 1. d'These figures and those in the preceding paragraph of the text are in error, due to a confusion of the first and second battles of Bull Run. The best estimates of the strength of the opposing forces at the opening of the first battle indicate that they were approximately equal and of about 28,000 men each. Only about 18,000, however, on each side were actually engaged. The Union loss as reported was: Killed, 460; wounded, 1,124; missing, 1,312; total, 2,896.-M. I. D., January, 1907.

The effect of the lesson taught at Bull Run is thus described by Mr. Swinton, the historian of the Army of the Potomac: "When the army that so lately had gone forth with such high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discomfited to the banks of the Potomac, wise men saw there that which had suffered worse defeat than the army-it was the system under which Bull Run had been fought and lost. The lesson was a severe one; but if it was needed to demonstrate the legitimate result of the crude experimentalism under which the war had been conducted, when campaigns were planned by ignorant politicians and battles precipitated by the pressure of sanguine journalists, were fought by raw three-month levies-the price paid was perhaps not too high. The Bull Run experiment taught the country it was real war it had undertaken, and that success could only be hoped for by a strict conformity to military principles.' (Swinton's Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.) Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. 2, p. 5.

OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1861.

The victories of Rich Mountain and Carricks Ford, which resulted early in July in the capture and dispersion of the enemy's forces in western Virginia, partly relieved the gloom and depression occasioned by the defeat at Bull Run, but these victories were soon obscured by fresh tidings of disaster.

August 10, General Lyon was killed and the Union forces defeated at Wilson's Creek, Missouri; September 20, Lexington, Mo., was surrendered, followed on the 21st of October by the disastrous repulse at Balls Bluff; November 7, occurred the bold but indecisive battle of Belmont, succeeded on the 20th of December by the victory of Drainesville.

The loss in killed and wounded at Wilsons Creek was 949, at Lexington 150, at Balls Bluff 449, at Belmont 263, at Drainesville 68. It will be seen from the above figures that with the exception of Wilson's Creek those engagements scarcely rose above the dignity of a skirmish; nevertheless so conscious was the country of being unprepared for war, that in moral effect they were all invested with the importance of great battles.

In connection with the quality and paucity of troops placed at the disposition of the Union commanders, the trifling losses in the battles and skirmishes of 1861 possess for the statesman a special significance. They attested at the beginning of the war the utter weakness of a nation, which needed only time to develop its resources, to take a foremost rank among the great powers of the world.

a Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion, vol. 1, pp. xxxvii-xl.

CHAPTER XVIII.

MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE REBELLION (CONTINUED).

MILITARY LEGISLATION IN 1861.

The military system under which, in two campaigns of seven weeks each, Prussia humiliated Austria, in 1866, and subverted the French Empire in 1870, was the joint product of soldiers and statesmen, who began their laborers (in 1806) immediately after the disastrous battle of Jena. The military system under which we subdued the Rebellion was established by Congress in less than four weeks.

The energy and haste with which the new Congress set to work to repair the neglect of its predecessors, may be inferred from the number and character of the bills and the joint resolution introduced in the Senate on the 6th of July, two days after the opening of the session, which bills were as follows: A bill to authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property; a bill to increase the present military establishment of the United States; a bill providing for the better organization of the military establishment; a bill for the organization of a volunteer militia force, to be called the National Guard of the United States; also a joint resolution to ratify and confirm certain acts of the President for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion."

In providing for the national defense, no false notions of economya political virtue paraded only in time of peace were permitted to delay Congressional action. The first bill, in conformity with the recommendation of the President, proposed to authorize a force of 400,000 volunteers, and to appropriate $400,000,000, a sum greater than the total cost of the wars of the Revolution and 1812. Prodigal as these propositions may appear, the number of men was increased by 100,000 and the appropriation by $100,000,000. The bill as thus amended the appropriation was stricken out and reserved for separate consideration-passed the Senate on the 10th day of July, and was sent to the House. On the 11th it was recalled by resolution of the Senate, and after several important amendments was again sent to the House. On the 16th the bill with amendments passed the House. The Senate non-concurring, it was referred on the 17th to a committee of conference, passed both Houses on the 18th, and on the 22d received the President's signature.

The same day that the first bill to authorize the employment of half a million of men became a law, another bill was introduced in the Sen

a Frank Moore's Rebellion Record, vol. 10, p. 1, Doc. 1.

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