on. The words "owner, resident, or householder," as used in the homestead statute to describe the persons entitled to the homestead exemption, are not limited to married men; and therefore a widower whose children are all married and away from home, and who has rented the premises claimed as his homestead, but who still boards and lodges in the house, is entitled to the homestead exemption. Myers v. Ford, 22 Wis. 139, 141. "The owner of property is one who has en, or any lien, charge, or incumbrance theredominion of a thing, real or personal, cor- In re Opening of Oneida St., 49 N. Y. poreal or incorporeal, which he has the right Supp. 828, 832, 22 Misc. Rep. 235. to enjoy and to do with it as he pleaseseither to spoil or destroy it as far as the law permits-unless he be prevented by some agreement or covenant which restrains his right." Garver v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 28 N. W. 555, 556, 69 Iowa, 202; McLain v. Maricle, 83 N. W. 85, 87, 60 Neb. 353; Territory v. Young, 2 N. M. 93; Turner v. Cross, 18 S. W. 578, 580, 83 Tex. 218, 15 L. R. A. 263; Dow v. Gould & Curry Silver Min. Co., 31 Cal. 629, 649; Directors of Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Abila, 39 Pac. 794, 796, 106 Cal. 355; Larimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 Pac. 1111, 1112, 4 Colo. App. 78; Johnson v. Crookshanks, 21 Or. 339, 28 Pac. 78 An owner is one who has dominion over that which is the subject of the ownership. He has the right to make such use of it, consistently with the rights of others, as he may see fit. The ownership may extend to the entire thing, or may be limited to an interest in it, and whatever is the subject of the ownership is held by the owner for his own individual benefit. Florman v. School Dist. No. 11, 40 Pac. 469, 6 Colo. App. 319. The word "owner," as applied to land, has no fixed meaning which can be declared to be applicable under all circumstances, and as to any and every enactment. It usually denotes a fee-simple estate, but it has been defined to be "one who has the usufruct, control, or occupation of land, with a claim of ownership, whether his interest be an absolute fee or a less estate." Coombs v. People, 64 N. E. 1056, 1057, 198 Ill. 586. The word "owner," as used in Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 782 (Horner's Rev. St. 1897, 770), which provides that lands sold under a judgment, when redeemed by the owner, shall be subject to resale to pay an amount remaining unpaid on such judgment, means any owner of the real estate whose interest is subject to payment of the judgment, without regard to whether or not he is the judgment debtor, or claims under him. Lemmon v. Osborn, 54 N. E. 1058, 1060, 153 Ind. 172. Under St. 1888, c. 390, 40, providing that if taxes are not paid, the whole of the land may be sold, and, after the taxes and charges are paid therefrom, the city or town shall pay the balance to the owner of the estate on demand, the word "owner" means the owner at the time of the sale, and not the owner at the time of the assessment. Worcester v. City of Boston, 60 N. E. 410, 411, 179 Mass. 41. "Owner of the land," as used in Rev. St. c. 117, § 7, directing that the court shall order notice of the filing of a petition for a mechan means the contractor-the debtor-the party who procures the work to be done, by which various designations the same person is-intended, such is the party intended to be the defendant, and to be summoned in the suit. Howard v. Robinson, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 119, 122. An owner, according to Black's Diction-ic's lien to be given to the owner of the land, ary, is a person in whom is vested the ownership, dominion, or title of property. It is defined by Webster as one who owns; a rightful proprietor; one who has the legal or rightful title, whether he is the possessor or not. It is a sufficient allegation of ownership in an action of ejectment to authorize proof of any right to property, general or special. Atwater v. Spalding, 90 N. W. 370, 371, 86 Minn. 101, 91 Am. St. Rep. 331. In an action under Rev. St. 1889, § 4512, authorizing a recovery against the owner or keeper of dogs for damages for stock killed or maimed by such dogs, an instruction was given, and approved on appeal stating that the words "owner and keeper" meant one who actually owns or claims to own a dog, or who maintains or controls and uses the dog of another. Jacobsmeyer v. Poggemoeller, 47 Mo. App. 560, 563. The remedy against the "owner or occupant" in Rev. St. c. 14, § 16, providing that, "when any source of filth or other cause of sickness is found on private property, the owner or occupant thereof shall, within 24 hours after notice," etc., at his own expense, remove or discontinue it-all expenses of removing the same by the committee or officer of the town, in case of failure to comply with the notice, to be paid by such owner or occupant-would be construed, in common parlance, to be against either, at the option of the officer, as he should decide as to the responsibility of the respective parties. An owner of land is liable under this section for the expense of removing a nuisance therefrom, although a tenant for a term of years caused the nuisance, and continued to be the occupant of the premises under his lease when the nuisance was removed. City of Bangor v. Rowe, 57 Me. 436, 439. Under Act May 2, 1834, § 12, "to provide for supplying the city of New York with water," and authorizing the water commissioners to enter upon land and agree with the owner of any property which may be required as to the amount of compensation to be paid to him, the word "owner" means the person or persons who represent a particular piece of property, where there is a unity of possession. Dyckman v. City of New York (N. Y.) 7 Barb. 498, 506. In the provisions of the revenue laws of the United States which require the delivery of distilled spirits by the government warehousemen to the owner when the tax is paid, Congress merely intended by the use of a general word of description to designate, without circumlocation or needless specification, any person who upon the payment of the government dues is in law entitled to the possession of the goods. Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. App. 352, 8 L. R. A. 147. The term "owner," as used in determining who may redeem from tax sale, has been construed to include mortgagees, judgment creditors, and holders of contingent interests in the land affected by the sale. Lane v. Wright, 96 N. W. 902, 903, 121 Iowa, 376. The word "owner," as used in an act relating to municipal liens, means the person or persons in whose name the property is registered, if registered according to law, and in all other cases means any person or persons in open, peaceable, and notorious possession of the property, as apparent owner or owners thereof, if any, and, if not, then, the reputed owner or owners thereof in the neighborhood of such property. P. & L. Dig. Laws Pa. 1897, vol. 4, col. 1269, § 55. As used in the chapter relating to domestic animals, the term "owner," used with reference to animals, means any one entitled to the present possession thereof-the one having care or charge of them-and the person holding the legal title to them, and, as to land, the person having title thereto, or the lessee or occupant thereof. Code Iowa 1897, § 2311. The term "owner," as used in the act relating to mines, is defined to mean the immecoal mine, or any part thereof. Horner's diate proprietor, lessee, or occupier of any Rev. St. Ind. 1901, § 5463. The terms "owner," "owners," "lessee," "agent," or "operator," as used in the act re lating to mines and mining, shall include the immediate proprietor, lessee, or occupier of any coal mine, or any person having on behalf of any owner or owners or lessee as aforesaid the care and management of any coal mine, or any part thereof. Gen. St. Kan. 1901, § 4141. Any person, association of persons, or corporation in the peaceable possession of any mining claim under claim or color of title, and engaged in the mining and sale of ores therefrom, shall, as to all persons purchasing such ore or ores in good faith, and without notice of the claim or claims of any other person, association, or corporation to such mining claim or claims, be deemed to be the owner or owner of such ore or ores. Any person who, or association or corporation which, shall in good faith, and in the usual chase and obtain delivery of any ore or ores course of business, and without notice, purfrom any person, association, or corporation in possession of any mining claim or claims, shall be deemed the owner or owners of such ore or ores. Mills' Ann. St. Colo. 1891, §§ 3235, 3236. The terms "owners" and "operators," as used in the act relating to mines and mining, mean any person or body corporate who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of any coal mine or colliery, or any part thereof. The term "owner" does not include ceives a royalty, rent, or fine from a coal a person or body corporate who merely remine or colliery, or part thereof, or is merely the proprietor of the mine subject to any lease, grant, or license for the working or operating thereof, or is merely the owner of the soil, and not interested in the minerals of the mine, or any part thereof. But any contractor for the working of a mine or colliery, or any part or district thereof, shall be subject to this act as an operator or owner, in like manner as if he were the owner. P. & L. Dig. Laws Pa. 1894, vol. 2, col. 3110, § 193. Whenever the term "owner or manager" "Owner," as used in the herd law act, includes the person entitled to the immediate possession of the animal, and also the per- is used in the chapter relating to coal mines, the same shall include lessees or other persons controlling the operation of any mine. Rev. St. Utah 1898, § 1525. Laws 1881 (Act March 23) making it the duty of the owner, agent, or proprietor of any coal mine to keep a sufficient supply of timber when required to be used as props to secure the mine against caving in, etc., expressly defines the word "owner" to mean the immediate proprietor, lessee, or occupant of any coal mine, or any part thereof. Leslie v. Rich Hill Coal Min. Co., 110 Mo. 31, 41, 19 S. W. 308; Fell v. Rich Hill Coal Min. Co., 23 Mo. App. 216. The term "owner," in the Pennsylvania act of March 3, 1871, requiring owners of coal mines to ventilate the same, is defined by the act itself to mean the immediate proprietor, lessee, or occupier of the coal mine or colliery, or of any part thereof; and the term "agent," in the act, is defined as meaning any person having, on behalf of the owner, the care or direction of any coal mine or colliery. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U. S. (14 Pet.) 526, 538, 10 L. Ed. 573. As occupier. The word "owner," as applied to realty, does not necessarily import that the party is the occupier of the premises. Russell v. Shenton, 3 Q. B. 449, 451. Every person for whose immediate use and benefit any building, erection, or improvement is made, having the capacity to contract, shall be included in the word "owner" thereof, as used in the act relating to mechanics' liens. Code Civ. Proc. S. D. 1903, § 710. The term "owner, or reputed owner," as used in an act relating to the powers of boroughs, means any person or persons in open, peaceable, and notorious possession of property, remaindermen, or other persons interested in expectancy. P. & L. Dig. Pa. vol. 3, p. 50, § 32. As owner at the time of. Rev. St. c. 18, § 53, as amended by Acts 1872, c. 46, providing for the recovery of damages for an injury to the owner of adjoining land by the raising or lowering of a street or way, applies to the owner of the property at the time of the injury. Sargent V. Inhabitants of Machias, 65 Me. 591, 592. Under Act 1854, making taxes a lien upon land throughout the state, and directing that all lands shall be assessed in the name of the owner, and declaring that any assessment of taxes against any person or persons on account of lands "of such person or persons"—that is, lands of which he or they are the owner-shall be a lien on the said lands, etc., the phrase "owner or owners" was used to denote the owner of an estate in possession at the time of the assessment, and not a prior owner, or the owner of an estate in expectancy, or any executory or contingent interest; and the design of the act was to make the interest of such owner, and assessed. Hopper v. Malleson's Ex'rs, 16 N. those claiming under him, liable to the tax J. Eq. (1 C. E. Green) 382, 387. As payee. In an action on a written "promise to pay steamship Juda and owners or order" a certain sum of money 30 days after date, it was claimed that the instrument was not a promissory note, and that an indorsee was not vested with the legal title thereto, on the ground that the name of the payee did not appear on the face of the note. In considering this objection, the court said: "The statute does not require that the real name of the payee should be expressed in the note. It must contain a promise to pay a person, etc., but we perceive no reason why such person may not be designated on the face of the note under any style or description agreed on by the parties. Indeed, in the case before us it may be said that the term 'owners,' as it occurs in the note, sufficiently indicates a person, within the intent of the law." Moore V. Anderson, 8 Ind. 18, 22. As right to possession. The term "owner," as used in the replevin statute, is defined by Cobbey, Repl. § 533, as meaning not the absolute and unqualified title, but as meaning a right to possession. "Any interest coupled with a right of immediate possession constitutes ownership, under these statutes." Therefore the failure of a complaint in a replevin action to show right to immediate possession to chattels on the part of the plaintiff is not supplied by averment in the answer that defendant is the owner and entitled to immediate possession. W. W. Kimball Co. v. Redfield, 54 Pac. 216, 218, 33 Or. 292. In an action of forcible entry and detainer, an allegation that plaintiff is the owner of the premises therein described does not raise a question of title, so as to deprive a probate court of jurisdiction; the word "owner," as there used, being merely descriptive of plaintiff's right of possession, and not changing the character of the action. MeClung v. Penny, 69 Pac. 499, 500, 11 Okl. 474. Absolute or qualified owner. Laws 1885, c. 349, declares that a mechanic's lien shall also attach to, and be a lien on, the real property of any person on whose premises improvements are made; such owner having knowledge thereof. Held, that the words "real property of any person" and the word "owner," in the statute, were synonymous, and meant the same thing. The word "owner" does not always mean absolute ownership. Edwards & McCulloch Lumber Pac. 1076, 1077, 15 Colo. 201, 22 Am. St. Rep. Co. v. Mosher, 60 N. W. 264, 265, 88 Wis. 672. 388. The term "owner," in an action of claim and delivery, in which the plaintiff alleges generally that he is the owner and entitled to immediate possession, does not necessarily import general or absolute ownership. Cumbey v. Lovett, 79 N. W. 99, 100, 76 Minn. 227. er. Administrator. The word "owner," as used in the statutes, means any one who has the right of An administrator possession to property. appointed in Nevada cannot sue to redeen: from a mortgage on land of his intestate in another state, by setting off against the mortgage debt waste committed thereon by the mortgagee in possession after the death of the intestate, nor to recover for damages to, or trespass committed on, the land, since he is not an owner thereof; and is not entitled to its possession, nor are the assets in his hands for the payment of debts. Price v. Ward, 58 Pac. 849, 852, 25 Nev. 203, 46 The word "owner," in the revenue act, is always used in the sense of absolute ownFor example, it provides that the real estate becoming taxable for the first time shall be listed to the owner thereof, that the owner of the property on the 1st day of April in any year shall be liable for the taxes of that year, that the purchaser of property on the 1st day of April shall be construed the owner on that day, and that L. R. A. 459. land comprising more than one subdivision belonging to one owner may at his request be listed as one tract. These provisions of the revenue act clearly indicate that the Legislature uses the word "owner" in the popular sense the sense in which it is understood by the people at large. Leigh v. Green, 86 N. W. 1093, 1096, 62 Neb. 344, 89 Am. St. Rep. 751. Agent or servant. The word "owner," as used in the charter of the city of St. Paul, c. 4, § 10, subd. 42, compelling the owner or occupant of any grocery, etc., to cleanse, remove, or abate the same from time to time, as may be deemed necessary for the health, comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of the city, includes an agent who is endowed with full power to control or regulate the premises. City of St. Paul v. Clark, 86 N. W. 893, 894, 84 Minn. 138. Under a statute requiring a juror to be the owner of real estate, it is not necessary that he should be the absolute owner of the fee, and the requirement is met if the juror be in possession of, or have a qualified interest in, the real estate. Territory v. Young, of land through which a railroad runs, but One who is an agent and in possession 2 N. M. 93. The word "owner," as used in the charter of a railroad, which directs the method by which the railroad may acquire land or other materials when the owner thereof cannot agree with the company for the use or purchase thereof, means the person having some legal estate which the company proposes to acquire by the condemnation. National Ry. Co. v. Easton & A. R. Co., 36 N. J. Law (7 Vroom) 181, 184. It includes any person having a claim or interest in real property, though less than an absolute fee. Larimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 Pac. 1111, 1112, 4 Colo. App. 78 (quoting Lozo v. Sutherland, 38 Mich. 171). The word "owner," as used in Gen. St. 1878, c. 90, § 1, providing for a mechanic's lien in favor of one performing labor or furnishing material by virtue of a contract with the owner, does not mean the absolute owner, but includes a qualified ownership. who is not the owner of such land, cannot maintain an action against a railroad company under Code, § 3480, providing that railroads shall construct cattle guards wherever the owner of land through which the road passes shall make demand on them or their agents, etc. The language of the statute forbids a construction extending its provisions to any other person than the owner of the land. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Murphree, 29 South. 592, 593, 129 Ala. 432. Sp. St. 1868, c. 448, § 3, providing that if any sawdust or refuse wood or timber of any sort shall be thrown in the Penobscot river "by any person or persons who may be in the employ of any mill owner or owners, mill occupant or occupants, such owner or owners, occupant or occupants, shall also be liable" for such offenses, does not apply to the agent of the owner and lessor of a mill. State v. Coe, 72 Me. 456, 459. The term "owner or holder," within the Benjamin v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 517, 520, 26 meaning of a statute requiring notice of ap N. W. 725. plication for a public road to be served on The term "owner," when used alone, im- the owner or holder of the land over which ports an absolute owner, or one who has the road is to run, includes an overseer on complete dominion of the property owned, the premises. The words "owner or holder" as the owner in fee of real property. But its were not used as meaning the tenant only, meaning is varied according to the connec- or the person holding under a lease, but reation in which it is used, and is to be under- sonably extend to any person occupying or stood according to the subject-matter to in possession, placed there by the owner, which it relates. McFeters v. Pierson, 24 who may be expected to take care of his in terests in this as on other matters connected with the land. In re Kinney (Del.) 5 Har. 18. An indictment charging larceny, and alleging that the property taken was the property of one who was a mere superintendent of the owner, is insufficient. A bailee or person who has a special property in a chattel, may be alleged, in an indictment for larceny of it, to be the owner, when it is taken from his possession, but not a servant. The servant's possession is construed as that of the master or employer. The distinction, though, between these relations, is not always clear. It has also been suggested that, as larceny is always accompanied by a trespass, except in some cases of a peculiar kind, as larceny by a bailee, any person-and only a person-who could maintain the action of trespass for the taking of a chattel, may properly be alleged as an owner of it, in an indictment for the larceny of such chattel, and this is probably a good rule. Heygood v. State, 59 Ala. 49, 50. Within the statute providing that the owners, lessees, and tenants of a disorderly house shall be punished, a servant of the owner of such house, merely taking care of the place, cannot be punished. By fair intendment, it would seem that only those who occupied the relation described should be punished Speaking on the subject, Mr. Bishop says: "But when we descend among the minor misdemeanors, we find some differences occasioned by the smaller degrees of blameworthiness involved in the offense or the special terms of the statute creating it. If the terms of the statute distinctly limit the penalty to persons who participate in the act only in a certain way, these terms furnish the rule for the court. Or if the expression is general, then, if the offense is of minor turpitude, and especially if the thing is only malum prohibitum, the court will limit its operation to those persons who are more particularly within the reason or the expressed words of the enactment." Mitchell v. State, 30 S. W. 810, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 311. Rev. St. c. 119, § 1, providing that "whoever willfully and maliciously sets fire to the dwelling house of another, or to any building adjoining thereto, or to any building owned by himself or another, with intent to burn such dwelling house, and it is thereby burnt in the nighttime, shall be punished with death," while in terms excluding only the owner of the dwelling house, also excludes, by a reasonable construction, the servant of such owner. State v. Haynes, 66 Me. 307, 308, 309, 22 Am. Rep. 569. claim for damages against the owner of cattle who is charged with the duty of keeping them off the cultivated lands of others, an agister is held to be an owner, within the meaning of the statute, but a mortgagee without possession is not an owner. Goff v. Byers Bros. & Co. (Neb.) 96 N. W. 1037, 1038. All persons having an interest. The words "owner or owners," used in Sp. Laws 1887, tit. 1, p. 335, § 4, indicating the procedure for the making of assessments of damages for injury to property resulting from a change of grade of a street under a city charter, are used to designate the parties interested, and in whose favor the assessment is to be made. The words are to be construed in a comprehensive sense, as including all persons having interests in the land, or who are entitled to the compensation to be awarded for the injury to the property. Moritz v. City of St. Paul, 54 N. W. 370, 371, 52 Minn. 409. The word "owner," in the homestead exemption law, and even in the case of certain criminal offenses, includes all who have a claim or interest in the property, even though it is an undivided interest, or falls short of absolute ownership in fee. Lozo v. Sutherland, 38 Mich, 168, 171. The word "owner," found in Gen. St. §§ 1550, 1561, prescribing how the right of way A mother devised real es The word "owner," as used in a statute authorizing the condemnation by a railroad for its right of way of private property, and the awarding of damages therein, applies to any person having an interest in the estate. Gerrard v. Omaha N. & B. H. R. Co., 14 Neb. 370, 371, 15 N. W. 231. For the purpose of the act relating to mechanics' liens, except when otherwise indicated, any person having an assignable, transferable, or conveyable interest or claim in or to any land, building, structure, or other property mentioned in the act shall be deemed an owner. Mills' Ann. St. Colo. 1891, § 2867. Every person for whose use or benefit any building, erection, or other improvement |