person who shall willfully and maliciously kill, maim, or disfigure any horses, cattle, or "other beasts" of another person shall be punished, etc. Patton v. State, 19 S. E. 734, 93 Ga. 111, 24 L. R. A. 732. Other beverages. Laws 1885, p. 151, 1, entitled "An act to protect the property of manufacturers, bottlers, and dealers in mineral waters, soda water, and other beverages from loss of syphons, bottles, and boxes," does not protect the manufacturer of a liquid preparation used as a beverage, and known as "Wild Cherry Bitters," since the words, "or other beverages," as used in the act, refer to the class known as "mineral waters" or "soda water." State v. Dinnisse, 19 S. W. 92, 93, 109 Mo. 434. Other buildings. See "Building." "Other building," within the meaning of a statute making it burglary for any person to break or enter any shop, store, booth, tent, warehouse, or other building, means a building of like kind with those enumerated, and does not therefore embrace a chicken house. State v. Schuchmann, 33 S. W. 35, 36, 34 S. W. 842, 133 Mo. 111. Contra, see Gillock v. People, 49 N. E. 712, 713, 171 Ill. 307; State v. Rogers, 39 Pac. 219, 220, 54 Kan. 683, deciding that a courthouse was in cluded. Other business, trade, avocation, or profession. "Other business," as used in Act 1872, designed to secure money due for labor and services rendered by any miner, mechanic, laborer, or clerk from any person or persons or charter company employing clerks, miners, mechanics, or laborers, either as owners, lessees, contractors, or underowners of any works, mines, manufactory, or "other business" where clerks, miners, or mechanics are employed, is not sufficiently comprehensive to embrace cutting and driving logs. The preceding words designating particular branches of business with which the idea of permanency and completeness in a certain sense is always associated control the meaning of the more general expression, "other business," used in immediate connection therewith. The other business is ejusdem generis with that more particularly described by the preceding words of the context, business of the same general character, and not embracing every species of employment in which the services of others may be rendered. Appeal of Pardee, 100 Pa. 408, 412. Act June 13, 1883, amends Act April 9, 1872, so as to greatly enlarge the classes of employés whose wages due from any person or persons or chartered company employing clerks, miners, mechanics, or laborers, ei ther as owners, lessees, contractors, or underowners of any works, mines, manufactory, or "other business," shall be a lien on the property, and entitled to a preference in payment. Held, that the words "or other business" in the act of 1883 should not be limited to business of the same general nature as those specifically enumerated, which was the construction given to the act of 1872, but the class of employers is enlarged, by necessary implication, to correspond with the classes of employés enumerated in the act, and the words "other business," in the act, include all kinds of business in which any of the classes of employés named in the act are engaged. Sproul v. Murray, 27 Atl. 303, 304, 156 Pa. 293. The term "other business," in the act of April 9, 1872, as amended by the act of June 13, 1883, making the wages of employés in certain designated businesses and other business a preferred claim, does not include the business of a skating rink, as the statute makes no reference to places of amusement. Merriam v. Mullett, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 360, 362. "Other business, trades, avocations or professions," within the meaning of a statute conferring upon the city of St. Joseph the power of licensing, taxing, and regulating auctioneers, grocers, commission merchants, retailers, merchants, hotel and inn keepers, boarding houses, public buildings, public grounds, concerts, photographists, artists, agents, porters, runners, drummers, public lecturers, public meetings and shows, real estate agents and brokers, horse and cattle dealers, beerhouses, patent right dealers, inspectors, gaugers, stock yard and wagon yard proprietors, mercantile agents and insurance agents, banking and other corporations and institutions, street railroad cars, coaches, omnibuses, carts, drays, job wagons, ice wagons, and other vehicles, and all other business, trades, avocations, or professions whatsoever, does not include an abstracter of titles, though it may be admitted that the words are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the avocation if they were considered as standing alone, independent of the preceding parts of the section and other provisions of the statute in pari materia; but it is among the well-recognized rules of construction that, when a particular enumeration of words is followed by general terms or words, the latter are to be understood as limited in their scope and application to the business and thing of the same kind and character as those specified in the preceding part. City of St. Joseph v. Porter, 29 Mo. App. 605-668. The words "all other business, trades, avocations or professions," in St. Louis City Charter, authorizing the city by ordinance to license, tax, and regulate auctioneers, grocers, merchants, retailers, hotels, boarding houses, tenement houses, office buildings, | ports of commissioners of the court, extends public halls, public grounds, concerts, photog- further than to the mere setting aside of the raphers, artists, agents, porters, runners, reports for exceptions thereto, and does not drummers, public lecturers, public meetings authorize the appointment of new or differand shows, real estate agents and brokers, ent commissioners, the words "power usual horse and cattle dealers, beerhouses, patent in other cases" meant the power to set aside right dealers, inspectors and gaugers, stock- by the court, but not to appoint new comyard proprietors, examiners of titles, con- missioners. Bachus v. Gartner, 50 N. W. veyancers, mercantile agencies, insurance 646, 650, 89 Mich. 209. companies, banking or other incorporations or institutions, street railroad cars, hackney carriages, omnibuses, carts, drays, and all other vehicles, and "all other business, Other casualty. "Other casualty," as used in Rev. St. § trades, avocations or professions" whatever, 3221, abating tax on distilled spirits destroycannot be made to include persons not of ed while in a bonded warehouse by fire or the same generic character or class as the other casualty, means an accidental destrucenumerated persons, and therefore the char- tion by some cause of like character and opter does not authorize the city to license law-eration as fire, such as lightnings, floods, cyyers. City of St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559, 564. Other cars. clones, storms, or some uncontrollable force which ordinary foresight and prudence could not guard against nor prevent, and hence spirits lost by the warping of barrels from "Other cars," as used in Laws 1893, C. oration caused by such heat, or the existence unusual and excessive heat, abnormal evap220, providing that every railroad company shall be liable for injuries caused by negli- of undiscoverable wormholes within the bargence to employés engaged in operating pas-rels, was not a loss within the meaning of senger or freight or other trains, engines, Cox (U. S.) 49 Fed. 555, 559, 1 C. C. A. 365. the statute. Crystal Spring Distillery Co. v. or cars, will include hand cars, and not merely cars used in operating trains on the road, under the rule ejusdem generis. Benson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 77 N. W. 798, 799, 75 Minn. 163, 74 Am. St. Rep. 444. Other cases. "Other cases," as used in Act 1836, § 17, giving a right of appeal in all actions, suits, controversies, etc., on cases arising under any law of the United States granting or conferring on inventors the exclusive right to their inventions when the sum in dispute is below the value of $2,000, and in all "other cases" in which the court shall deem it reasonable to allow the same, refers to the cases described in that section and in which the matter in dispute is below $2,000. Wilson v. Sanford, 51 U. S. (10 How.) 99, 101, 13 L. Ed. 344. The words "powers usual in other cases" in How. Ann. St. c. 93, § 10, providing that, on the report of the commissioners appointed by a court of record to ascertain the damages sustained by the owners of real estate taken by railway companies, the court on motion shall confirm the same, unless, for good cause shown by either party, "said court, as to the confirmation of such report, shall have the powers usual in other cases," refers to the powers of courts in the confirmation of reports made to such court by some body or person authorized by law to make them in accordance with the known practice of the court; and since neither the practice in chancery causes with reference to the confirmation of reports made by court commissioners or other officers of the court, nor the statute provisions with relation to the re Other causes. As used in Gen. Laws 1865, c. 189, § 2, authorizing the board of supervisors of M. county to remove an inspector of the house of correction for certain specified causes or "other causes" satisfactory to said board, "other causes" is to be considered as meaning "other kindred cause showing that it is improper that the incumbent should be retained in office." State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496, 498. "Other causes," as used in a report of appraisers appointed to fix the full amount of the loss, and stating that taking into consideration the condition of the property, and making deductions for depreciations and "other causes," will be held to mean, under the maxim of ejusdem generis, such causes as might tend to fix the full amount of such loss, and to aid them in making an award equivalent to damages sustained. Stemmer v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co., 53 Pac. 498, 501, 33 Or. 65. The "other causes" mentioned in a statute giving a wife the privileges of a free trader whenever her husband, from drunkenness, profligacy, or "other cause," shall neglect or refuse to provide for his wife, or shall desert her, does not apply to the tempo. rary inability of the husband to support his wife by reason of sickness. "There must be a desertion or a neglect or refusal upon the part of the husband, something that involves the willful nonperformance of a duty on his part." King v. Thompson, 87 Pa. 365, 369, 30 Am. Rep. 364. Other choses in action. As used in Rev. St. § 629, declaring that no circuit court shall have jurisdiction of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or "other chose in action" in favor of an assignee unless the suit might have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment had been made, the phrase "other chose in action" is broad enough to comprehend any claim, whether liquidated or not, which is the subject of assignment, and did not confine the scope of the section, therefore, to choses in action evidenced by transferable paper. Corbin v. Black Hawk County, 105 U. S. 659, 665, 26 L. Ed. 1136. Other children. "Other children," as used in a will providing that after the death of the decedent's wife the estate should be divided among their surviving children, the sons' shares to be given to them absolutely, and the shares of the daughters to be assigned to a trustee and the income applied to the benefit of the daughters and their husbands during life, and after their death the trust property to vest in their respective issue, if any, and, if none, to "go to my other children or their issue,' should not be construed to mean all of the testator's children, but to mean those who survive the son or daughter so dying. Lee v. Welch, 39 N. E. 1112, 1113, 163 Mass. 312. The words "other children," in a will in which testator devises certain of his lands to his son A. and other lands to his son C., and providing, if the sons should die, or either of them, without child or children, the real estate given to them or either of them should go to testator's other children, share and share alike, were construed to include one of the sons who died leaving a child. Brooks v. Kipp, 35 Atl. 658, 661, 54 N. J. Eq. 462. Other civil proceedings. "Other civil proceedings," as used in Code 1851, includes all proceedings for special relief which cannot be included within the term "civil or criminal actions," and the words are intended to represent proceedings of a special or independent character, such as contempt, injunction, mandamus, information, etc. Kramer v. Rebman, 9 Iowa, 114, 118. Other conditions. A bill of lading stating that the goods are to be delivered on the payment of the agreed freight "and other conditions" means that before a consignee was entitled to delivery he was bound to make a payment beyond the freight, and to make other payments specified in the charter party, such as demurrage, when demurrage is mentioned therein. Smith v. Sieveking, 4 E. & B. 945, 951. Other contracts. "Other contracts," within the meaning of Code, § 2594, providing that actions on promissory notes, bonds, or other contracts, express or implied, for the payment of money, must be prosecuted in the name of the party really interested, whether he has the legal title or not, includes contracts of fire insurance. Insurance Co. of North America v. Forcheimer, 5 South. 870, 875, 86 Ala. 541. Other contrivance. Under Act March 25, 1886, making it a felony to set up, carry on, or conduct a keno bank, faro bank, or other machine or contrivance used in betting, it is held that the term "other machine or contrivance" must, under the rule of ejusdem generis, be limited to such as are similar in character to a faro or keno bank, and that hence the game of oontz, played with dice on a table or other surface, by betters, does not come within the meaning of the term "other machine or contrivance." Commonwealth V. Kammerer (Ky.) 13 S. W. 108. Other corporations. Comp. Laws 1871, c. 130, § 9, provides that, when any judgment shall be recovered against any turnpike or "other corporation" authorized to receive toll, the franchise of such corporation may be taken on execution, etc. Section 13 provides that the officer's return shall transfer to the purchaser all the privileges belonging to such corporation so far as relates to the right of demanding toll, and the officer shall deliver possession of all the toll houses and gates belonging to such corporation. Held, that the words "other corporation," as used in section 9, when read in connection with section 13, meant other corporations having tollhouses and tollgates of the same general nature and kind as turnpike and toll-road corporations, and hence did not include nor apply to telephone companies. Ripley v. Evans, 49 N. W. 504, 507, 87 Mich. 217. The words "other corporations," in Acts 1877, p. 188, entitled "An act to secure the payment of wages or salaries to certain employés of railway, canal steamboat, and other corporations," and giving such employés a prior lien on the franchises, etc., of the companies, must be construed, by the maxim "noscitur a sociis," to mean corporations ejusdem generis. If we give the title the broad signification claimed for it by the appellants, and make the words "other corporations" mean corporations of every class, as well as corporations for transportation purposes, the title of the act would not express its object, and the act would be obnoxious to the constitutional requirement. Crowther v. Fidelity Ins., Trust & Safe-Deposit Co. (U. S.) 85 Fed. 41, 42, 29 C. C. A. 1. See, also, Fidelity Ins. & Safe Deposit Co. v. Shenandoah Iron Co. (U. S.) 42 Fed. 372, 377. | every ferry boat, canal boat, yacht, or “other Hence the act, in attempting to give a prior lien to employés of mining and manufacturing companies, was unconstitutional as not expressing such object in the title. Fidelity Ins. & Safety Deposit Co. v. Shenandoah Iron Co. (U. S.) 42 Fed. 372, 377. Code Civ. Proc. § 1276, providing that any religious, benevolent, literary, scientific, "or other corporation," or any corporation having or being known by the name of any benevolent or charitable society, may apply to the superior court for a change in its corporate name, is not restricted in its application to corporations of the kind especially enumerated, but applies also to corporations organized for profit. In re La Societe Francaise d'Epargnes et de Prevoyance Mutuelle, 123 Cal. 525, 530, 56 Pac. 458, 460. Other costs. The phrase "other costs," in a note for a certain sum with attorney's fees and other costs in case the holder is obliged to enforce payment at law, renders the note nonnegotiable, since it cannot be construed as simply referring to the legal costs collectible in case of an action fixed and determined by statute. Such phrase renders the amount due uncertain. Johnson v. Schar, 70 N. W. 838, 839, 9 S. D. 536. Other counsel. "Other counsel," as used in Cr. Prac. Act, 354, providing that the district attorney or other counsel for the people must open the cause and offer the evidence in support of the indictment, means private counsel. People v. Biles, 6 Pac. 120, 121, 2 Idaho (Hasb.) 114. Other court. As used in Rev. St. p. 615, §§ 1, 5, providing that actions arising under the ordinance of a town should be brought before a justice of the peace residing within the town, or, if there were none such, then before any justice of the peace of the county or other court of competent jurisdiction, "other court" means some one already established by existing law, such as the probate court. People v. Curley, 5 Colo. 412, 415. Other craft. "Other craft," as used in 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 75, § 37, forbidding any person not a freeman to navigate on certain waters any wherry, lighter, or other craft, meant craft of the same kind as wherry or lighter, and would not include a steam tug, though such vessel might ordinarily be included within the term "craft." Reg. v. Reed, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 133, 136. Rev. St. § 4426 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3029], declaring that the hull and boilers of small craft of like character" propelled by steam shall be inspected, should not be construed to apply to a small pleasure boat 29 feet long and 7 feet wide, without deck, propelled by a small steam engine with a cylinder of 9 inches stroke and 31⁄2 inches diame ter, run occasionally by its owners for amusement on Buffalo Bayou below Houston, Tex. United States v. The Mollie (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas. 1290, 1292. The term "boats, vessels and other craft," in St. 7 & 8 Geo. IV, c. 75, § 57, authorizing by-laws for the government of "boats, vessels and other craft" to be rowed or worked, includes steamboats. Tisdell v. Combe, 7 Adol. & E. 788, 796. Other creditors. In construing a clause in a composition agreement stating that, "in consideration of other creditors accepting a like percentage of their respective claims and demands against" the debtor "in full settlement and compromise thereof," the court said: "The term 'other creditors,' as here used, must be construed as meaning all other creditors." M. A. Seed Dry-Plate Co. v. Wunderlich, 69 Minn. 288, 72 N. W. 122, 123. Other crime. "Other crime," as used in Const. art. 8, §3, which disfranchises all persons who shall have been convicted of treason, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery, or other crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, while it applies to all felonies not specifically named, includes all grades of larceny or other offenses particularly named, whether felonies or misdemeanors. Anderson v. State, 72 Ala. 187, 189. "Other crime," as used in the Constitution and laws of the United States and the statutes of Massachusetts relative to the surrender of fugitives from justice, means any offense indictable by the laws of the state demanding the surrender of the alleged criminal. In re Brown, 112 Mass. 409, 411, 17 Am. Rep. 114. eral Constitution relating to the surrender of In construing the provision of the fedfugitives from justice by the states, the courts say that it is quite possible that the general term "other crime" in the Constitution should be limited, by the words which precede it, so as to include only crimes of a single genus-to those which may be denominated "felonies." In re Greenough, 31 Vt. 279, 287. Other dangerous trade or business. A covenant not to erect or permit upon the premises conveyed any brewery, distillery, or "other dangerous trade or business" should be construed to mean any business which is as dangerous as the business which is prohibited by express designation. Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt (N. Y.) 50 Barb. 135, 141. Other deadly weapon. "Other deadly weapons of like kind," as used in Code, § 1005, making it indictable for one to carry concealed about his person any pistol, bowie knife, razor, or "other deadly weapon of like kind," means weapons similar in their deadly character to those enumerated. State v. Erwin, 91 N. C. 545, 547. As used in St. § 1166, providing for the punishment of any person who shall willfully and maliciously cut, strike, or stab another with a knife, sword, "or other deadly weapon." the phrase "other deadly weapon" does not refer to guns, pistols, knives, or swords, or other deadly weapons mentioned therein, but embrace any deadly weapon with which a person might be wounded, by cutting or stabbing, not therein specifically referred to. Sprague v. Commonwealth, 58 S. W. 430, 431. Other dependents. 972, "Other dependents," in Rev. St. providing that beneficial associations may include in their corporate powers the privilege of providing for the relief and aid of the families, widows, orphans, or other dependents of the deceased members, or assisting such as may be sick, etc., "are inserted to include persons who, not being either members of the family of the deceased nor his widow or orphans, are yet dependent upon him in some manner." Grand Lodge Order of Hermann-Soehne v. Elsner, 26 Mo. App. 108, 116. Other depositories of filth. or circuit. It means a physical or mental disability arising from either death, sickness, or insanity, or disorder of like character, by reason of which the judge was disabled from the performance of judicial functions. Western Dredging & Improvement Co. v. Heldmaier (U. S.) 111 Fed. 123, 125, 49 C. C. A. 264. The term "other disability" was said by the court, in Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vt. 653, in construing the term as used in a statute giving an official board jurisdiction in case of a vacancy occurring in certain public offices from nonacceptance, death, removal, insanity, or "other disability," "to import such like disability as had been before enumerated; that is, such as wholly vacated the office and left it the same as if there had been no appointment." Turnipseed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 446, 19 Am. Rep. 15. The phrase "other legal disabilities," in a limitation statute providing that if the owner of real estate shall, at the time of a judicial sale thereof, be a minor, insane, or under the legal disabilities, he shall have five years after such disability is removed in which to bring suit or action, does not embrace nonresidents in the state, but, so far as it refers to absence, means out of the United States. Smith v. Bryan, 74 Ind. 515–518. Other easement. As used in 2 & 3 Wm. IV, c. 71, § 2, enacting that no claim which may be lawfully made at common law by custom, prescription, or grant to any way or "other easement," or to any water course or the use of any water, the words "other easement" mean any other ejusdem generis with the way— something that is to be exercised on or over the soil of the adjoining owner. Webb v. Bird, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 268, 286. Other effects. "Other depositories of filth," as used in a city charter prohibiting the construction and maintenance of sinks, cesspools, or “other depositories of filth," means such depositories as are of the same nature as sinks or "Other effects," as used in a bequest cesspools, and means such as are constructed after an enumeration of certain kinds of perto hold the waste matter, solid and fluid, un-sonalty, applies to things of the same kind til they are emptied by natural causes (as by percolation through the soil or by evaporation of the fluid matter) or by artificial means. Sprigg v. Town of Garrett Park, 43 Atl. 813, 815, 89 Md. 406. Other disability. In Rev. St. § 953, as amended by Act June 5, 1900, permitting the allowance and signing of the bill of expenses by another judge thereafter holding court when the judge before whom the cause was tried is, by reason of death or sickness or other disability, unable to allow and sign the same, "other disability" means disability of like character to death or sickness, by which the trial judge is disabled from the performance of judicial functions, and not a disability arisIng from temporary absence from the district as those enumerated, and a bequest of plate, linen, household goods, and "other effects" will not include money. Ivison v. Gassiot, 27 Eng. Law & Eq. 483, 487; Hotham v. Sutton, 15 Ves. 320, 326. Where a testatrix gave her daughter all the plate, linen, household goods, and "other effects," money excepted, it was held that the words "other effects," following articles specified in general, included such things only as were ejusdem generis, but that the exception of money showed that the words were wise the exception would have been unnecesused in their most extended sense, as other, sary. Tefft v. Tillinghast, 7 R. I. 434, 436. A statute providing that every person who has, knowingly and designedly, by false pretense, obtained from any person any mon |