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ORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICT. according to the custom of London. Under "Organized," as used in Laws 1893, c.
the statutes of North Carolina, carpenters' 216, § 1, abolishing organized school districts, tools may be seized under an original at
tachment. Martindale v. Whitehead, 46 N. implies a school district organized and spe
C. 64. cially created by legislative act, with special powers made a part of its organization, or at least special powers coeval with its or- ORIGINAL BILL. ganization, and not one organized by the
An original bill is one which relates to town. School Dist. No. 1 in Gorham V. Deering, 40 Atl. 541, 542, 91 Me. 516.
some matter not before litigated in the court by the same persons, and standing in the
same interests. Longworth v. Sturges, 4 ORGANIZED VILLAGE.
Ohio St. 690, 707; Butler v. Ounningham (N. The words “organized or incorporated," Y.) 1 Barb. 85, 87. in Laws 1883, c. 185, § 2, providing that
A bill brought for the purpose of cross“any village which has been or shall be or litigation, or of suspending or reversing the ganized or incorporated under the general same decree or order of court, or of obstatutes shall be governed according to the
taining the benefit of the former decree, is provisions of this chapter, and to the end in the nature of an original bill. Longworth that uniformity of village government and v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 690, 708. equal privileges to all may be secured,” should be liberally construed, so as to in
Where a bill does not relate to some clude all villages governed by the provi- matter already litigated in the same court sions of the general law, without regard to by the same persons, and which is not eibow they were first incorporated or brought ther in addition to, or a continuance of, the into being. Flynn v. Little Falls Electric & original suit, it is an original bill, and not Water Co., 78 N. W. 106, 74 Minn. 180.
an ancillary one, and, in order to confer jurisdiction on the federal court on the ground
of diverse citizenship, the parties must be ORIGINAL.
citizens of different states. Christmas v. “ Original means pertaining to the be Russell
, 81 U. S. (14 Wall.) 69, 20 L. Ed.
762. ginning or origin; the first or primitive form of a thing." Commonwealth v. Schollenber The terms "original bill” and “bills in ger, 27 Atl. 30, 33, 156 Pa. 201, 22 L. R. A. the nature of an original bill" are used by 155, 36 Am. St. Rep. 32; Haley v. State, 60 the judges and text-writers in a restricted N. W. 962, 963, 42 Neb. 556, 47 Am. St. Rep. sense, and refer to the character of the plea, 718; State v. Southard, 29 S. W. 751, 60 Ark. rather than that of the action or proceeding 247.
to which they apply. There is considerable The term "original,” as used in the chap- contrariety of opinion on the question whethters relating to railroads and street railways, er bills of review and bills of impeachment as applied to a street railway location in a
on the ground of fraud are or are not origcity or town, means the first location grant
inal bills. In Willard, Eq. Jur. 163, such bills ed to the company in such city or town. Story, Eq. Pl., they are classed with those
are treated as strictly original bills, while in Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 978, c. 111, $ 1.
bills which are for the purpose of cross
litigation, or for the purpose of securing a ORIGINAL AMOUNT IN CONTRO
reversal of some decree or order of the court, VERSY.
or carrying it into effect, and therefore are Const. art. 4, $ 4, provides that the appel- not original bills. Smithson v. Smithson, 56 late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall N. W. 300, 302, 37 Neb. 535, 40 Am. St. Rep. not extend to civil actions at law for the 504. recovery of money, when the original amount in controversy does not exceed $200. Held, ORIGINAL BILL IN THE NATURE OF that the word "original" is a word of plain A BILL OF REVIEW. import, meaning the amount originally in controversy or the amount sued for, and
Where the object of a bill is to impeach hence the appellate jurisdiction is governed a final decree of an equity court, rendered by such amount, and not by that recovered. at a former term, for alleged fraud, it is Bleeker v. Satsop R. Co., 27 Pac. 1073, 1074, commonly called an "original bill in the na3 Wash. 77.
ture of a bill of review." McDonald v. Pear
son, 21 South. 534, 536, 114 Ala. 630. ORIGINAL ATTACHMENT.
ORIGINAL BILL IN THE NATURE OF An original attachment is a process glv
A SUPPLEMENTAL BILL. en by statute to compel a defendant to appear. It is a continuation of a distringas- “An original bill in the nature of a supa common-law process, and a garnishment, plemental bill is properly applicable when
new parties with new interests arising from , ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR. events since the institution of the suit are
Code "Original contractor,” in
Civ. to be brought before the court, the latter being to all intents and purposes the com- Proc. $ 1187, providing that every "original mencement of a new suit, which, neverthe contractor" claiming the benefit of the me less, may in its consequences draw to itself chanic's lien must file his claim within 60 the advantage of the proceedings on the for- days after the completion of the work, inmer bill.” Bowie v. Winter, 2 Ala. 406, 411. cludes a person who has contracted to paper
and decorate several rooms in a dwelling An original bill in the nature of a sup- house, and to furnish the labor and material plemental bill "embraces in some degree the therefor, and to receive what the labor and qualities of an original bill and a supple material are reasonably worth, though no mental bill. The foundation of a bill of this set price was agreed. La Grill v. Mallard, description is an event occurring after the 27 Pac. 294, 90 Cal. 373. commencement of a suit in a court of equity, which event is of such a nature that Materialman. the suit cannot be continued as to all the parties by a mere supplemental bill, and in the law relative to mechanics' liens, in
The term "original contractors," as used therefore, in regard to those parties, it par cludes a person furnishing material, particutakes of the character of an original bill. larly to the owner. J. H. Baxter Lumber Co. If the event determines the interest of one
v. Nickell, 60 S. W. 450, 451, 24 Tex. Civ. of several defendants, and his interest be App. 519; Colorado Iron Works v. Riekencomes vested in another by a title not de berg, 38 Pac. 651, 652, 4 Idaho, 262; Lane rived from the former, as in the case of a & Bodley Co. v. Jones, 79 Ala. 156, 160; determination of an estate for life and the Hearne V. Chillicothe & B. R. Co., 53 Mo. vesting of a subsequent remainder, the re
324, 325. mainderman must be brought in by an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, The term "original contractor," within which, as to him, is an original bill, while the meaning of the mechanic's lien law, givas to the other defendants it is supplemen- ing original contractors four months to file tal.” Butler v. Cunningham (N. Y.) 1 Barb. their lien, includes any person contracting 85, 87.
with the owner to furnish materials for the
building or improvement of premises, it ORIGINAL CAPITAL STOCK.
there is no contractor intervening between
them. Whiteselle v. Texas Loan Agency The term "original capital stock," as (Tex.) 27 S. W. 309, 312; Matthews v. Wagused in Act Feb. 10, 1869, providing, in seco enhaeuser Brewing Ass'n, 19 8. W. 150, 151, tion 4, that, whenever it is ascertained that 83 Tex. 604. a toll road or turnpike pays a greater dividend than 10 per cent. per annum upon the An “original contractor," within the original capital stock, the tolls are to be re meaning of the mechanic's lien law, means duced until it meets 10 per cent. only upon one contracting with the owner to labor or its stock, means the amount of stock sub- to furnish material. The term cannot be scribed, or issued and sold, which has been limited to those doing service by way of actually expended for the accomplishment of work, labor, or superintendence upon the the object of the road's charter; that is, the building in question. Ambrose Mfg. Co. v. construction of the road. Bank Lick Turn- Gaper, 22 Mo. App. 397, 401. pike Co. v. Phelps, 81 Ky. 613, 615.
Materialmen furnishing materials direct
ly to an owner, to be used in the construcORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION.
tion of a building, are not "original con"Original construction," as used with re-tractors" within the meaning of the megard to railroads, has, as distinguished from chanic's lien law. Should every person who "repairs," a technical meaning. It is that furnishes materials to an owner be regarded construction of bridges, grades, culverts, as an original contractor, it would follow rails, ties, docks, etc., that is necessary to be that every mechanic working on the builddone before the road can be open, or before ing for the owner should be regarded as an they can be occupied or used; not such struc- original contractor, and this, as will be readtures as are intended to replace old and ily seen, would result in very serious comworn-out counterparts. Cleveland, C. & S. plications in determining who are original Ry. Co. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. (U. 8.) contractors and who are subcontractors. 86 Fed. 73, 76.
Sparks v. Butte County Gravel Min. Co., 55 Paving a street with fire-clay brick in Cal. 389, 392; Inmen v. Henderson, 45 Pac. place of a macadamized road laid some 30 300, 301, 29 Or. 116. years before was an "original construction,” within St. $ 3572, providing that an original
Owner of tools. construction of any street shall be made at Where the owner of certain tools rented the cost of the abutting owners. City of Cat. them to the owners of a building, by whom lettsburg v. Self (Ky.) 74 S. W. 1064, 1065. they were used for the purpose of moving a.
house from elsewhere onto the lots belonging ten application, acknowledged before a no
, , inal contractor" within the meaning of the if such change was approved by the board statute, providing that an original contractor of managers, the secretary should issue bim may file a statement for lien within four a new certificate; and that no change of months. Burke v. Brown, 10 Tex, Civ. App. beneficiaries should be made in any other 298, 30 S. W. 936.
way. The by-laws also provided that the
benefit should be paid to such person or perORIGINAL COST.
sons as the deceased member may have des
ignated, as the same shall appear on the In a contract whereby A. agreed to de books of the association, and, if no designaliver stock in a mining claim to B. at its tion had been made, then to his legal heirs "original cost," the amount of the stock to or devisees. A certificate of membership be of the value of a certain sum, the term was issued to the deceased without his hav"original cost” was intended by the parties ing designated any beneficiary. Subsequentto mean its cost to A. Eagan v. Clasbey, 13 ly he went to the office of the association Pac. 430, 434, 5 Utah, 154.
and verbally designated to the secretary four
of his children as beneficiaries, and requested The terms "original cost” and “present the secretary to make or enter such designavalue" are not equivalent. National Water- tion. Thereupon the secretary, in his presworks Co. v. Kansas City (U. S.) 62 Fed. 853, ence, entered or recorded, in the book of the 865, 10 C. C. A, 653, 27 L R. A. 827. There association kept for that purpose, the names are other elements beside cost of reproduc of the four children as the beneficiaries, and tion or replacement which affect present assured the member that this was all that value, and, as applied to a waterworks about
was necessary to be done. This entry reto be condemned, it is proper to consider mained in the records of the association, what the existing system can be reproduced without objection, until the death of the or replaced for, as having some tendency to member, six years afterwards. In a contro show the present value. But there two
versy between the four children and the othadditional elements—one that it is a com
er heirs of the deceased as to who were enpleted structure connected with buildings titled to the benefit, it was held that the act prepared for use, and the other that the com- of the member was an "original designation" pany is a going concern. Kennebec Water
as distinguished from a "change" of beneDist. v. Waterville, 54 Atl. 6, 18, 97 Me, 185,
ficiaries. Hanson V. Minnesota Scandina60 L. R. A. 856.
vian Relief Ass'n, 60 N. W. 1091, 59 Mion. "Original," as used in a contract of dis- 123. solution of a partnership, providing for an inventory of part of the stock at the original ORIGINAL ENTRIES. or wholesale cost thereof, does not mean the cost the firm paid for it. The use of the See "Book of Original Entries." word "original" seems to mean something more, and requires a going behind the price ORIGINAL EVIDENCE. paid by the firm to an earlier or original price. Prima facie, therefore, it would seem Original evidence is an original writing to mean the price when the goods were first, or material object introduced in evidence. 1. e., originally, bought for the purpose of Ann. Codes & St. Or. 1901, 8 682 being made part of the stock of the store, whether by the firm or by their predeces
ORIGINAL GIFT. sors in the business. This would seem to be the "original price” of the goods, considered A gift to the issue is substitutional if the as part of the stock to be inventoried, in share which the issue are to take is by a reference to which the words were used in prior clause expressed to be given to the the writing. Holloway v. Frick, 24 Atl. 201, parent of such issue, and a gift to the issue 202, 149 Pa. 178.
is an original gift when the share which the
issue are to take is not by a prior clause ORIGINAL DESIGNATION OF BENE- expressed to be given to the parent of such FICIARIES.
issue. Acken v. Osborn, 17 Atl. 767, 769, 45
N. J. Eq. 377. The by-laws of a mutual benefit society, whose expressed object was “to aid and ORIGINAL INDEBTEDNESS. assist the widows and orphans of deceased members," provided that every applicant for The term "original indebtedness," in a membership should designate in his applica- written receipt reciting the payment of certion the person or persons to whom, in the tain money to apply on a contract if the balevent of his death, the benefit should be paid; ance due on such contract should be paid as also that any member might change bis ben- therein provided, otherwise to be applied on eficiary by sending to the secretary a writ- the original indebtedness of the party mak.
ing the payment, held to refer to claims ex-, vent Congress from conferring original jurisisting before the making of the receipt. Fos- diction in such cases also upon the suborillter v. McGraw, 64 Pa. (14 P. F. Smith) 464, nate courts of the Union, the term "original" 469.
not baving the force of “exclusive." Bors v. Preston, 4 Sup. Ct. 407, 409, 111 U. S. 252,
28 L. Ed. 419; Pooley v. Luco (U. S.) 76 ORIGINAL INVENTOR.
Fed. 146, 147. “The term 'original inventor,' in patent
Laws 1862, c. 18, providing that the sev. law, is used to designate a pioneer in the eral district courts of the state shall have art; one who evolves the original idea, and original jurisdiction in all cases of mandabrings it to some successful, useful, and tan- mus, does not mean that such courts shall gible result. Such a person is, by the law have exclusive jurisdiction thereof. Crowell of patents, entitled to a broad and liberal
v. Lambert, 10 Minn. 369, 372 (Gil. 295, 298). construction of his claims, whereas an improver is only entitled to what he claims, and nothing more." Norton v. Jensen (U. S.)
ORIGINAL LOCATION. 90 Fed. 415, 422, 33 C. C. A. 141.
Within the statute regulating the rights
of street railways, the term "original locaORIGINAL JURISDICTION.
tion" is defined to mean the first location
granted to the company in such city or town, The phrase "original jurisdiction," as so that an extension of an original location used in Rev. St, art. 2, c. 69, § 3, as amend- is not an original location. City of Spring. ed, limiting the jurisdiction of the district field v. Springfield St. Ry. Co., 64 N. E. 577, court, and conferring upon it original juris- 580, 182 Mass. 41. diction in certain cases, means jurisdiction to entertain cases in the first instance, as dis
ORIGINAL MACHINE. tinguished from appellate jurisdiction. Castner v. Chandler, 2 Minn. 86, 88 (Gil, 68, 71). Wherever the patent law speaks of "im
Const, art. 6, $ 6, declares: “The district provement,” it is on some machine of manucourts shall have original jurisdiction in facturing, and not on manual labor. Conse
quently, an improvement of an article manulaw and equity in all civil cases where the factured by manual labor is not, strietly amount in dispute exceeds $200; in all crim speaking, an “invention,” but an original mainal cases not otherwise provided for, and chine. Evans v. Eaton (U. S.) 8 Fed. Cas. in all issues of fact joined in the probate
856, 859. courts their jurisdiction shall be ‘unlimited.'” In considering the question whether the word "unlimited" qualifies the character ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT. of the jurisdiction fixed by the term "original,” or whether it qualifies the specified § 1410 (Rev. St. 1894, § 1476), the longhand
By express provision of Rev. St. 1881, limitation as to the amount in value fixed in manuscript of the evidence taken by a stethe first paragraph of the section, the court nographer is an "original manuscript or doc. said: “We are compelled to decide in favor ument" incorporated in the bill of excepof the latter proposition. The term 'original' tions, and hence may be treated as embraced is a general term of limitation, contradistin- within and constituting part of it, and canguished from the term appellate,' which lat. not be construed to be a mere transcription ter defines the jurisdiction of the Supreme of the evidence introduced at the trial. Zeis Court. If, therefore, a change in the general
v. Passwater, 41 N. E. 796, 799, 142 Ind. 375. character of the jurisdiction was intended to take place in a certain class of cases, that change would have been designated by the ORIGINAL MEETING. use of the general term, which in all other
According to parliamentary law, strictly parts is used for the purpose of conferring speaking, an "original meeting" and an “adjurisdiction. It is also strictly in consonance journed meeting” constitute the same meetwith the proper use of language that where ing; but it is held that in Gen. St. 1878, c. a limitation is removed, and there is an im- 13, &$ 49–53, relative to meetings of the board mediately prior specific limitation, the re- of county commissioners, and providing that, moval shall apply to the latter, and not be when a petition is made for the establishallowed to qualify a general term of limita- ment, change, or vacation of a county road, tion which is more remote in its position in the county auditor shall lay it before the the sentence." Reed v. McCormick, 4 Cal. board at their next session, and after the 342, 343.
lapse of 30 days at the next meeting of the
board they shall proceed to determine the As exclusivo.
prayer of the petition, the words "session" The constitutional grant of original juris- and “meeting” are not used in any strictly diction to the federal Supreme Court in all technical sense, but have reference merely cases affecting consuls is held not to pre- to a time when the board is lawfully con
vened and in session for the transaction of them from the company, the court said: business. Burkleo v. County of Washington, “The words 'original owners' in the prospec38 Minn, 441, 442, 443, 38 N. W. 108. tus were not terms of art, science, or trade
which required the aid of experts to explain.
Nobody could well mistake their meaning. ORIGINAL NOMINATION.
They simply imported that no profits were Laws 1896, § 66, provides that, when no added to the prices paid by the company for nomination shall have been originally made their lands on account of any intermediate by a political party or by an independent party or agent between it and the precedent body for an office, no committee of such owners of the soil. It excluded the idea of a party or independent body can nominate or purchase at a speculative price." Simons v. substitute the name of another party or in- Vulcan Oil & Mining Co., 61 Pa. (11 P. F. dependent body for such office. By the use Smith) 202, 220, 100 Am. Dec. 628. of the phrase "original nominations” in such section, the Legislature clearly meant the ORIGINAL PACKAGE. first nominations, as distinguished from those made to fill vacancies caused by death, res
Original package or otherwise, see "Othignation, or otherwise after the original first
erwise." or primary nomination. Gillespie v. Mc
The character of the article shipped as Donough, 79 N. Y. Supp. 182, 185, 39 Misc. an original package is determined by the Rep. 147.
condition of the package when delivered for
shipment by the importer to and received by ORIGINAL NOTICE.
the railway company or transporter, and not
by the acts of the latter after receipt of pack“Original notice," as used in Code, $ age by it without knowledge of the former. 2532, providing that the delivery of the orig. Tinker v. State, 11 South. 383, 384, 96 Ala. inal notice to the sheriff of the proper county 115. with intent that it is to be served immediately is a commencement of the action, does
on of "original package" not include a notice with the appearance day commonly accepted and believed to be corleft blank, with the intention that the sher- rect is that it is a bundle put up for transif sball ile the same as soon as convenient. portation or commercial handling, and usualPhinney v. Donobue, 25 N. W. 126, 127, 67 ly consists of a number of things bound toIowa, 192
gether convenient for handling and conveyance. In the case of State v. Winters, 44
Kan. 723, 25 Pac. 237, 10 L. R. A. 616, it is ORIGINAL OUTFIT.
said: “The original package' was and is Converting a ship from her original des
the package as it existed at the time of its tination with intent to commit hostilities, or, It is quite apparent that the words ‘original
transportation from one state to another. m other words, converting a merchant ship into a vessel of war, must be deemed an package' bave reference to the unit which "original outfit" within the meaning of Act
the carrier receives, transports, and delivers June 5, 1794 (1 Stat. 381), $ 3, providing for as an article of commerce. The importer dethe punishment of any person who shall cides for bimself the size of the package within the waters of the United States fit which he desires to import, and when he deout and arm, or attempt to fit out and arm,
livers it to the carrier for transportation he or procure to be fitted out and armed, any until sold in that form, or broken and trans
gives it the initial step; and from that time ship or vessel to be employed, in the service of any foreign prince or state, to cruise or ferred, it is the subject of interstate comcommit hostilities upon the subjects, citi.
merce; but when sold or broken, or when it zens, or property of another foreign prince changes form, it ceases to be an article of or state with whom the United States are this protection. The original package, then,
interstate commerce, and no longer enjoys at peace. United States v. Guinet (Pa.) 2 Dall. 321, 328, 26 Fed. Cas. 53, 1 L. Ed. 398. importer to the carrier at the initial point of
is that package which is delivered by the
shipment in the exact condition in which it ORIGINAL OWNERS.
was shipped. If sold, it must be in the form In an action by a corporation against broken after such delivery, it by that act
as shipped or received; for, if the package be the promoters thereof, who bad induced the corporation to purchase from them oil lands alone becomes a part of the common mass by false representations that they had bought to the laws of that state passed in virtue of
of property within the state, and is subject the lands for the company from original owners, and that the prices paid by the company w. 1041, 1043, 104 Iowa, 465, 39 L. R. A. 484,
its police power." McGregor v. Cone, 73 were those paid to the original owners, and 65 Am. St. Rep. 522. were low, when in fact the prices paid by them were about $75,000 less than the prices The term "original package" does not represented, and the amount received by seem to have received, and, perbaps, is not