county than that in which the judgment is rendered, "or" that in which the defendant resides, until execution has been issued to one of the counties named and been returned by the proper officer "no property found," "or" should be construed in its alternative sense. Vance's Adm'x v. Gray, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 656, 658.

As used in General Corporation Act, art. 9, § 21, conferring power on the corporate authorities of cities and villages to make local improvements by special assessment or by special taxation, or both, on contiguous property, or by general taxation "or" otherwise as they shall by ordinance prescribe, "or" is used in its ordinary and disjunctive sense, and corresponds with "either," mean ing one or the other of two, but not both. Kuehner v. City of Freeport, 32 N. E. 372,

374, 143 Ill. 92, 17 L. R. A. 774.

In a statute providing that, if any school land be not sold on the day of sale, it may be offered at the next "or" any succeeding term, "or" means "either," and will not be construed "and." Brown v. Rushing (Ark.) 66 S. W. 442, 446.

The word "or" is ordinarily employed to indicate an alternative, as one or the other, but not both of two or more persons or things. The courts have sometimes, in the construction of a statute, declared that "or" was used in the sense of "and," and vice versa, but that is only done in cases where the context or other provisions of the statute, or from former laws relating to the same subject, and indicating the policy of the state thereon, such clearly appears to have been the legislative intent. As used in Greater New York Charter, § 41, requiring the owner "or" general contractor engaged in the construction or erection of any building over five stories in height, to build a temporary roof from the sidewalk in front of the building, and to secure permission for such construction from the commissioner of public works, the word cannot be construed as meaning "and," but rather in the sense of "either." Koch v. Fox, 75 N. Y. Supp. 913, 916, 71 App. Div. 288.

"Or" generally indicates an alternative, corresponding to "either," as "either this or that"; that is to say, either one thing or another thing. Thus, in a city charter authorizing the granting of licenses to barrooms on written consent of the bona fide householders "or" property holders within 300 feet, "or" means "either." Shepard v. City of New Orleans, 25 South. 542, 544, 51 La. Ann. 847.

As used in Rev. St. art. 153, providing that an affidavit in attachment shall state that it is not sued out for the purpose of "injuring ‘or' harassing the defendant," the word "or" is not to be construed as "and," the words "injuring" and "harassing," as

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used in the statute, relating to distinct and independent subjects. Moody v. Levy, Tex. 532, 534.

Gen. St. 1878, c. 39, §§ 21, 22, as amended by Laws 1883, c. 38, provide that a seed-grain stitute a lien, shall be filed in the office of contract, or a copy thereof, in order to con

the "town clerk of the town, or the clerk or recorder of the city or village in which the borrower resides, 'or' in which land on which the grain to be sown is situated." Held that the word "or" cannot be construed as meaning "and," so as to require the contract to be filed both where the borrower resides and where the land is situated. Minnesota Agricultural Co. v. Northwestern Elevator Company, 60 N. W. 671, 58 Minn. 536.

that "if any person shall recover by verdict The word "or," occurring in a provision 'or' judgment less than fifty pounds, he shall not recover costs," is disjunctive, and the phrase "verdict 'or' judgment" equally embraces verdicts on trial and judgments by default. White v. Hunt, 6 N. J. Law (1 Halst.) 415, 418.

The word "or," in section 4201, subsec. 4, Shannon's Code, providing that willful “or" malicious desertion of either party without reasonable cause for two whole years is a ground for divorce, will not be construed as "and," the Legislature, in revising the law, having deliberately changed the word to "or." McBride v. McBride (Tenn.) 69 S. W. 781, 782.

The word "or," in Sess. Laws 1890, c. 80, § 130, providing that in the canvass of the votes any ballot which is not indorsed by the official stamp, "or" has not the name or initials of the judge of election, as provided in the act, shall be void and shall not be counted, cannot be construed to mean "and," and therefore both the official stamp and the name or initial of the judge must appear on the ballot. Slaymaker v. Phillips, 42 Pac. 1049, 5 Wyo. 453, 47 L. R. A. 842.

Under section 31 of the charter of the

city of Niles, providing that the amount that may be voted "or" raised in any year under the provisions of that section shall not exceed 2 per cent. of the assessed valuation of the property, the word "or" will not be construed to mean "and," so as to authorize the levy of taxes in excess of the 2 per cent. by allowing the council to levy 11/2 per cent. and the freeholders 2 per cent. additional. Schneewind v. City of Niles, 61 N. W. 498, 499, 103 Mich. 301.

The use of the word "or," in a statute imposing a tax upon persons keeping or exhibiting for use a billiard table or tables, must be taken distributively, and renders any one subject to the tax who either keeps a billiard table for use or exhibits it for use. Germania v. State, 7 Md. 1, 6.

of the objects of execution, and inflicted a penalty on the sheriff for taking more than was allowed for executing any execution against either body, lands, "or" chattels, and the variance was material. King v. Marsack, 6 Term R. 771, 775.

The use of the word "or," in an indictment for retailing ardent spirits without a license, in speaking of the various kinds of spirituous liquors charged to have been sold, is not erroneous. Morgan v. Commonwealth (Va.) 7 Grat. 592.

Same-In wills.

As used in a will devising real estate to testator's son charged with the support of his wife, and directing that the son should, at the expiration of a certain time from the testator's decease "or" the decease of his wife, pay certain sums, the word "or" should not be construed "and." Miller v. Philip (N. Y.) 5 Paige, 573, 574.

As used in a will providing that if a certain person should decease previous to the death of another, "or" fail to discharge recited payments, land should be sold, the word "or" cannot be construed to mean "and." The courts have interpreted "or" to mean "and" when such interpretation was necessary to reconcile it to conflicting clauses in a will. Toothman v. Barrett, 14 W. Va. 301, 319.

As used in a will providing that after the termination of his wife's life estate the whole should be equally divided among testator's surviving children "or" the heirs of their body, "or" must have its common and natural signification, which is alternative. Anderson v. Smoot (S. C.) Speers, Eq. 312, 319.

As used in a will directing, on the death of testator's wife, the share to go to J. and C. to be held by trustees during the lives of the cestuis que trust, and at their death the principal to go to their issue, if any, and, if none, the same to fall into the general estate, "or" as my said wife by her will shall direct, "or" was used in the alternative. Austin v. Oakes, 1 N. Y. Supp. 307, 48 Hun, 492.

In holding that the word "or," in a devise of the rents and profits of lands to M. until his youngest child should become of age, and providing that at such time the property shall vest absolutely in M. and his heirs and could be disposed of by him or them, as he or they should judge best for his or their interests, was not to be construed as meaning "and," it was said "that it is unquestionably true that the word ‘or' may often be assigned a conjunctive instead of a disjunctive effect. But changes of this nature are only made where it is clearly necessary to effectuate the intention of the testator,

or give meaning and force to the will. We know of no case that the word 'or' will be read 'and' for the purpose of defeating the effect of words accurately and clearly de vising an estate of that nature." Shimer v. Mann, 99 Ind. 190, 195, 50 Am. Rep. 82.

Where a devise was to a class "or" their heirs, the word "or" was held to be in the alternative, so as to vest an estate in the children of a deceased legatee. In re Shade's Estate, 15 Montg. Co. Law Rep'r, 195, 198.

As being or consisting of.

Where a contract for public work provided that 15 per cent. of the amount earned each month should be reserved until the whole was completed, and within 90 days thereafter a final estimate should be made showing what remained due, and the contractor assigned "all of the reserved money 'or' 15 per cent. held by the state on monthly or all estimates," the word "or" should be construed as equivalent to the word "be ing," making the phrase of the assignment read "all of the reserved money being 15 per cent," etc. People v. Third Nat. Bank, 54 N. E. 35, 37, 159 N. Y. 382.

Testatrix bequeathed one-tenth of all she possessed to charitable objects, and the rest, "or" nine-tenths of my available stock, to a certain person. Held, that "or," as so used, was not equivalent to "consisting of," and the will did not therefore specify the articles of property to be understood as alone embraced in the preceding word. Its object was to express the quantum or extent of the property given. In re Sweitzer's Estate, 21 Atl. 885, 142 Pa. 541.

"Or," as used in a judgment against the parties named therein, "or" such of them as are now surviving, should be construed to have been used to explain the meaning of the preceding clause, and both expressions to mean the same persons. Downs v. Allen (U. S.) 22 Fed. 805, 809.

As indicating difference.

The use of the word "or" in the tariff act of 1872, fixing a duty on all oilcloth foundations "or" floorcloth canvas made of flax, etc., was construed not to show that the articles so designated were different, but they were held, in view of commercial usage, to be synonymous, and to have been used by the Legislature for the purpose of leaving no doubt upon the subject. Arthur v. Cumming, 91 U. S. 362, 23 L. Ed. 438.

The use of the word "and" to unite the words "assessments" and "taxes," in Comp. St. c. 12a, § 91, providing for the listing of "assessments and taxes" by the proper city officer and the subsequent sale of the land affected thereby, show that the words were not synonymous; but had the disjunctive

word "or" been used, then there would have been some ground upon which to base such a construction. State v. Irey, 60 N. W. 601, 606, 42 Neb. 186.

As conferring discretionary power.

"Or," as used in a statute requiring teue ment houses to have a supply of water on each floor occupied, and providing that the water shall be furnished in sufficient quantity in one "or" more places on each floor, should not be construed so as to leave the number of places of supply entirely to the discretion of the board of health, but the word simply authorized them to require on each floor one such place, fairly accessible to all the occupants of the floor. Health Department v. Trinity Church, 39 N. E. 833, 840, 145 N. Y. 32, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579.

The word "or,” as used in a will giving the executors authority to pay taxes and assessments on the property until the sale "or" division of it, and to lease or rent any of the real estate until such sale or division, declares an intention that the direction for sale is not absolute. The executors are either to sell or to divide, as in their judgment may appear to the best interest of their cestui que trust. Story v. Palmer, 18 Atl. 363, 366, 46 N. J. Eq. (1 Dick.) 1.

of the offense was punishable by imprisonment "or" by fine, etc., when the military offense was transferred to the Military Code, as it appears in the sixtieth article of war, the word "and" was changed to "or." Held, that it does not necessarily follow from this that it was intended to confine the punishment of the Military Code to either fine or imprisonment, but it would rather seem that the word was used to give play to discretion, so as to authorize a punishment by either fine or imprisonment, or both. The decision of the case does not, however, rest upon this holding, but upon the fact that the prisoner at bar had been convicted of two offenses, and that the punishment of both fine and imprisonment was thereby justified. Carter v. McLaughry, 22 Sup. Ct. 181, 192, 183 U. S. 365, 46 L. Ed. 236.

A city charter which requires street improvements to be made by "or" under the direction of a superintendent of streets makes either method allowable. City of Schenectady v. Trustees of Union College, 21 N. Y. Supp. 147, 151, 66 Hun, 179.

As limiting or extending.

The word "or," as used in a will which gives an estate to certain devisees for life, and, upon the survivor's death, one-tenth of the estate to a certain city in trust, the income to be applied for the purchase of books for the Young Men's Institute "or" any public library which may from time to time exist in the city, should be construed as an alternative, vesting in the city a discretion to use the income for either the institute or the libraries. New Haven Young Men's Institute v. City of New Haven, 22 Atl. 447, 448, 60 Conn. 32.

As used in a power given to a donee in a will to appoint the property to any or either of three sisters, "or" to all or any or either of their lawful issue, "or" is to be construed as being used in a discretionary rather than a substitutional sense, and to authorize the donee to pass the property to the children, though the sisters may still be living. Drake v. Drake, 32 N. E. 114, 118, 134 N. Y. 220, 17 L. R. A. 664.

Act March 2, 1863, §§ 1, 2, provided that for certain offenses committed by any one in the military service the punishment should be fine "and" imprisonment, or such other

punishment as the court-martial should adjudge, etc., while a person in civil life guilty

As nor.

In Const. art. 8, § 11, providing that no county containing a city of over 100,000 inhabitants, or any such city, "shall be allowed to become indebted, for any purpose 'or' in any manner, to an amount which, including existing indebtedness, shall exceed ten per centum of the assessed valuation of its real estate," "or" is a disjunctive conjunction connecting the two clauses, and expressing at the same time a separation, and has the same effect, where it stands, as the word

"nor." Adams v. East River Sav. Inst., 20 N. Y. Supp. 16, 64 Hun, 635.

"Or," as used in Sp. Laws 1885, c. 7, 8 19, providing that no action shall be maintained against the city of St. Paul on account of any injuries from a defect in a bridge or highway unless such action shall be commenced within one year from the happening of the injury, "or" unless notice shall first have been given in writing to the mayor or the city clerk within 30 days of the injury, should be read as "nor." Maylone v. City of St. Paul, 42 N. W. 88, 89, 40 Minn. 406.

In the charter of the city of Amsterdam, providing that "when the grade of a street