"opposite party" within the meaning of a OPTICAL INSTRUMENT.
statute relating to transactions with dece-
dent, unless such person was the legatee un-
der the will or had any interest in the estate,
except the fact that she was the widow of
the deceased. Duryea v. Granger's Estate,
33 N. W. 730, 733, 66 Mich. 593.

Under How. Ann. St. 7545, excluding evidence of the "opposite party" as to facts equally within the knowledge of a decedent in a suit prosecuted or defended by his “heirs, assigns, devisees or personal representatives," a daughter who seeks to enforce against the widow and other heirs a parol contract made by her deceased father is incompetent to testify as to the terms of the contract. Lloyd v. Hollenback, 98 Mich. 203, 205, 57 N. W. 110, 111.

OPPOSITE POLITICS.

Certain slightly made magic lanterns, not sufficiently substantial to be used by a mature person, but rather by children, as toys, are not dutiable as "optical instruments," under paragraph 321, Schedule N, § 1, c. 349, Tariff Act Aug. 27, 1894, 28 Stat. 514. Borgfeldt v. United States (U. S.) 124

Fed. 457, 458.

OPTION.

See "Buyer's Option"; "Local Option
Law"; "Time Option."

Contract of sale distinguished, see "Con-
tract of Sale."

Purchase of option as a bet, see "Bet."

"Option" means a privilege. Illges v. Dexter, 77 Ga. 36, 38.

"Opposite politics," as used in Act 1870, The word "option," as used in a conrequiring the publication of the Session Laws tract by which a seller agreed to deliver at a in two newspapers which are of "opposite certain place, between the 15th of May and politics," and fairly represent the two po- the 15th of June, at "buyer's option," meant litical parties into which the people of the a privilege to the buyer of demanding fulcounty are divided, is not the exact equiva-fillment of the contract on any day within lent of "fairly represent the two political the specified limits. Dodge v. Kiene, 44 N. parties." That papers are of opposite poli-W. 191, 193, 28 Neb. 216. tics is not implied of necessity in the requirements that they fairly represent the two principal parties. People v. Sullivan County Sup'rs, 56 N. Y. 249, 254.

The word "oppression" has not acquired a strictly technical meaning, and may be taken in its ordinary sense, which is an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination, or excessive use of authority. When a revenue officer, under color of law, willfully and unlawfully takes the property of another, or subjects him to greater hardships than are necessary for the proper enforce ment of the law, he is guilty of oppression.

It is not essential that an unlawful act

should be a serious injury to a person to make it oppressive. The exercise of unlawful power, or other means, in depriving an individual of his liberty or property against his will, is generally an act of oppression. United States v. Deaver (U. S.) 14 Fed. 595, 597.

The word "option" is a synonym for “choice" or "preference," and, as used in a contract giving a real estate broker an option solely to sell, is evidence of an intention to confer a right which he was to possess or enjoy above all other persons, and hence secured him against the interference of the owner of the premises, as well as other persons. Levy v. Rothe, 39 N. Y. Supp. 1057, 1058, 17 Misc. Rep. 402.

contract, but merely a right reserved in a An option is not an actual or existing subsisting agreement. In a certain sense an option is a mere pollicitation, a promise without mutuality, not yet ripened into a perfect agreement. It is a proposition by one party to a contract, which must be accepted in precise terms by the other in order that it may be binding upon both parties. Rivers v. Oak Lawn Sugar Co., 27 South, 118, 122, 52 La. Ann. 762 (citing Schleider v. Dielman, 10 South. 934, 44 La. Ann. 462).

It

An option is an unaccepted offer. states the terms and conditions on which the owner is willing to sell or lease his land, if the holder elects to accept them within the time limited. If the holder does so elect, he must give notice to the other party, and the accepted offer thereupon becomes a valid and binding contract. If an acceptance is not made within the time fixed, the owner is no longer bound by his offer, and the option is at an end. McMillan v. Philadelphia Co., 28 Atl. 220, 159 Pa. 142.

An option is, in a sense, a continuing offer of a contract; and if the offeree decides

OPTION ACCOUNT.

stock of any railroad company or other com- be treated together without great liability pany, the court quotes with approval Web- to confusion and error. Hanly v. Watterster's definition of "option" as being a stipu- son, 39 W. Va. 214, 220, 19 S. E. 536, 538. lated privilege to a party in a time contract of demanding its fulfillment on any day within the specified limit, and says that the word "option" as used in the statute, taken with a context, means a mere choice, right, or privilege of selling or buying, and it is a contract for such choice, right, or privilege of selling or buying at a future time any commodity which the statute was intended to prohibit, as contradistinguished from an actual sale or purchase with the intention of delivering and accepting the commodities specified. Tenney v. Foote, 95 Ill. 99; Id., 4 Ill. App. (4 Bradw.) 594, 599; Schneider v. Turner, 22 N. E. 497, 499, 130 Ill. 28, 6 L. R. A. 164; Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., 43 N. E. 774, 778, 160 Ill. 85, 31 L. R. A. 529.

The expression "option account," as used in a letter by a customer to a broker, who had been dealing in wheat on margins, in which the customer stated, "I now see that you have my actual wheat account mixed with my option account," meant an account of transactions in which it was not intended by either party that the actual commodity should be received or delivered, but which transactions consisted of mere wagers on the rise and fall of the price of wheat. Dows v. Glaspel, 60 N. W. 60, 64, 4 N. D. 251.

OPTION DEAL.

An option deal is not a gaming or “gambling device," within the meaning of the Missouri statutes providing that all judgments by confession, conveyances, bonds, bills, notes, and securities, when the consideration is money or property won at any game or Third Nat. gambling device, shall be void. Bank v. Harrison (U. S.) 10 Fed. 243, 248.

The words "dealing in options, futures, or margins" are well understood to mean a mere speculative contract in which the parties speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and imply a contract in relation to the price of the contract, and not the article itself. A contract for the sale and purchase of grain to be delivered at a future time, if entered into without an intention of having any grain pass from one party to another, but with an understanding that at the appointed time the purchaser is merely to receive or pay the "Optional contracts," as used with referdifference between the contract and the ence to transactions on the board of trade, market price, is a transaction which the law are contracts which are usually settled by adwill not sustain. Plank v. Jackson, 26 N. Ejusting market values as the party having 568, 569, 128 Ind. 424.

A contract of sale in which the seller is bound to deliver at a future time, within certain limits, is not an "option" to buy or sell at a future time, within the meaning of a statute declaring such option contracts illegal. Jackson v. Foote (U. S.) 12 Fed. 37, 41; White v. Barber, 8 Sup. Ct. 221, 230, 123 U. S. 392, 31 L. Ed. 243.

OPTIONAL CONTRACTS.

the option may elect. It is simply "a mode adopted for speculating in differences in the market value of grain or other commodities." Such a contract is obviously fictitious, having none of the elements of good faith, as in a contract where both parties are bound. Pearce v. Foote, 113 Ill. 228, 234, 55 Am. Rep. 414; Osgood v. Bauder, 39 N. W. 887, 890, 75 Iowa, 550, 1 L. R. A. 655.

Construed as and.

The term "option," as used in a statute, OR. providing that a contract to have or give an option to sell or buy any grain or other commodity at a future time shall be void, refers to optional contracts, or the mode adopted of speculating in differences in market values on grain or other commodities. Such a contract is fictitious, and has none of the ele ments of good faith, and is defined as a "gambling contract." The word "option" as so used means a mere choice, right, or privilege of buying or selling. Osgood v. Bauder, 39 N. W. 887, 890, 75 Iowa, 550, 1 L. R. A.

655.

There are two elements in an option contract: First, the offer to sell, which does not become a contract until accepted; and, second, the completed contract to leave the offer open for a specified time. These ele ments are wholly independent, and cannot

And construed as or, see "And."

"Or" and "and" are sometimes synony. mous. People v. Van Rensselaer (N. Y.) 8 Barb. 189, 200; Hope v. Clifden, 6 Ves. 499, 508.

The popular use of "or" and "and" is so loose and so frequently inaccurate that, while they are not treated as interchangeable, and their strict meaning should be followed when their accurate reading does not render the sense dubious, their strict meaning is more readily departed from than that of other words, and one may be read in place of the other in deference to the meaning of the context. Witherspoon v. Jernigan (Tex.) 76 S. W. 445–447.

The construing of "or" as "and," or the converse, both in wills and deeds, is freely admitted by courts whenever it is held to be unequivocally clear that the true general intent will thereby be given effect. Slingluff v. Johns, 39 Atl. 872, 875, 87 Md. 273; Harris v. Parker, 41 Ala. 604, 616.

“Or" will be stricken out, and the word "and" inserted, where the intent of the parties require it, even if the whole thought and sense of the instrument is thereby changed. Richmond v. Woodard, 32 Vt. 833, 838.

"It is not uncommon to construe 'or' to mean 'and' when necessary to carry into effect the intention of the parties." Litchfield v. Cudworth, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 23, 27.

In a by-law of a corporation providing that the directors shall serve for the term of one year "or" until their successors shall be elected, "or" must be read as "and," as the intention evidently is that the directors should serve for one year, and thereafter until their successors. should be elected. Chemical Nat. Bank v. Colwell (N. Y.) 14 Daly, 361.

cute his suit with effect in the Supreme Court, "or" perform the judgment, sentence, or decree of the Supreme Court, the bond shall be void, is equivalent to "and," as used in the statute prescribing that the bond should be conditioned that the appellant should prosecute his suit with effect in the Supreme Court and perform the judgment. The obligation or bond is alternative to do one or the other, therefore, though the statute uses the word "and" in conditioning the two alternative obligations, the meaning is more appropriately expressed by the word "or." Robinson v. Brinson, 20 Tex. 438, 439. Same-In deeds and conveyances.

The word "or" is often used in deeds, conveyances, and elsewhere in the place of the word "and," and will be construed to mean "and" where that meaning is apparent from the context. Town of Easthampton v. Vail, 45 N. E. 1030, 1032, 151 N. Y. 463.

by the context. Attorney General v. West Wisconsin Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 466, 486.

In deeds, agreements, wills, and other private papers the word "or," said to be one of the most equivocal in the language, should be construed in a copulative, and not in a disjunctive sense, when necessary to the The word "or," in a city charter, declar- spirit and intent of the document. In such ing that no suit shall be brought against the papers "and" and "or" are readily converticity for personal injuries caused by its neg-ble words, according to the sense required ligence unless the claim shall have been presented to the common council, and until 30 days after such presentation shall have been made, "or" unless claim has been made with in 60 days, was construed to mean "and," and therefore the statute requires such claim to be presented within 60 days from the injury, and prohibits action to be brought thereon till the expiration of 30 days from such presentation. Jewell v. City of Ithaca, 73 N. Y. Supp. 953, 954, 36 Misc. Rep. 499.

Same-In bonds and notes.

"Or," as used in a deed stipulating that the grantor "or" his heirs should have the privilege of a road to pass and repass from the highway, should be construed to mean

"and." To effectuate the intentions of the parties it is not unusual to construe "or" as "and." White v. Crawford, 10 Mass. 183, 187.

As used in a lease providing that the lessee should continue the renewing "of such

lease or leases," "or" is to be construed "and," as it comprehends new leases. Furnival v. Crew, 3 Atk. 83, 86.

In a note by which the maker promised to pay "W. 'or' J. on demand," the word "or" must be understood to mean "and," and, such payees being joint owners of the As used in a deed wherein a grantor renote, an action thereon by one of them only served to himself all minerals "or" magcould not be maintained. Willoughby v. Wil-nesia of any kind, "or" meant "and,” and loughby, 5 N. H. 244, 245; Quinby v. Mer- hence there was reservation of all the minritt, 30 Tenn. (11 Humph.) 439, 440.

A bond was executed by B. and others to S., administrator, "or" L., administratrix, of M., deceased. The word "or," used in the instrument, must be taken to mean "and," so that because the writing describes the money owing as payable to either one or the other will not vitiate it. Brittin v. Mitchell, 4 Ark. (4 Pike) 92–94.

erals. Gibson v. Tyson (Pa.) 5 Watts, 34, 38.

In a surrender of copyhold premises, which provides that if the grantee shall die during the lifetime of the surrenderer "or" without issue of his body, "or" was construed to mean "and." "Where sense requires it, there are many cases to show that we may construe the word 'or' into 'and,' and 'and' into 'or,' in order to eftherefore, in order to give effect to the infectuate the intention of the parties. Here, tention of the surrenderer, we must say that when he used the word 'or' he meant ‘and.' I would say with Lord Hardwicke that there "Or," as used in appeal bond condi- is no magic in particular words, further tioned that if the appellant should prose- than as they show the intention of the par

The word "or," in a bond for land, payable to S. or T., who were the joint owners of the land, means "and." Parker v. Carson, 64 N. C. 563, 564.

6 WDS. & P.-9

ties." Wright v. Kemp, 3 Term R. 470, term of years, "or" remainder to the col473. lateral heir of the decedent, it shall not be subject to any tax, "or" means "and." It is will not have their literal meaning when to well settled that the words "or" and “and” give them their literal meaning renders the sense of a statutory enactment dubious. Ayers v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 58 N. E. 318, 323, 187 III. 42.

As used in Act April 11, 1848, § 8, providing that a married woman living with her husband may incur debts for necessaries for the maintenance of herself and family, but that no judgment shall be rendered against the wife unless it shall appear that that redemption from a tax sale may be the debt was contracted by the wife "or" incurred for articles necessary for the support of the husband and wife, "or" must be read "and." Murray v. Keyes, 35 Pa. (11 Casey) 384, 391.