tion of one for a year. In 2 Bl. Comm. 410, | navigate to any other destination than those it is said that if the lease be but for half presently indicated." Held, that the words a year or a quarter, or any less time, the "for one voyage only, including the going lessee is respected as a tenant for years, and and returning," showed that the voyage was is styled so in some legal proceedings, and to commence and conclude at Dantzig, and that every estate which must expire at a the vessel having proceeded from Dantzig period certain and prefixed, by whatever to London, and thence to Bourdeaux, she words created, is an estate for years. Shaf- was not protected by the license on a further fer v. Sutton, 5 Bin. 228, 229. voyage from Bourdeaux to London. Everth v. Tunno, 1 Barn. & Ald. 142, 145. "One year from date," as used in a contract executed on the 24th of June, requiring one of the parties thereto to deliver a deed after one year from date, means the 24th day of June of the next succeeding year. Vorwerk v. Nolte (Cal.) 24 Pac. 840, 841. "One year's rent," as used in Code 1873, c. 134, 11, giving a landlord a lien for one year's rent on goods removed from the leased premises, denotes the amount of rent to be distrained for, and does not refer to the specific rent of any particular year or period of time. Wades v. Figgatt, 75 Va. 575, 582. "One year," as contained in an indorsement on an insurance policy stating that, for an extra premium, permission was thereby granted to the life assured to proceed to and reside at Belize for one year, means exclusive of the time occupied in the voyage out, and did not limit the period to any particular year. Notman v. Anchor Assur. Co., 4 C. B. (N. S.) *476, 481. ONE YEAR AND AN INDEFINITE PERIOD THEREAFTER. Where premises are leased for "one year and an indefinite period thereafter," at an annual rent, and the lessee enters and occupies them, he is the owner of an estate as tenant from year to year. Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. (1 Kern.) 494, 496. ONE YEAR'S PROVISIONS. The words "one year's provisions," in a bequest of one year's provisions, cannot be construed to create a specific legacy. Everitt v. Lane, 37 N. C. 548, 552. ONE VOYAGE ONLY. A vessel sailed under a license valid for "one voyage only, including the going and returning," and was authorized thereby to depart from Dantzig and proceed to the des ONEROUS TITLE. Under the Spanish and Mexican law, property acquired by the husband and wife during the marriage, and whilst living together, whether by onerous or lucrative title, and that acquired by either of them by onerous title, belonged to the community, whilst property acquired by either of them by lucrative title solely constituted the separate property of the party making the acquisition. By "onerous title" was meant that which was created by a valuable consideration, as the payment of money, the rendition of services, and the like, or by the performance of conditions, or payment of charges to which the property was subject. Scott v. Ward, 13 Cal. 458, 471; Kircher v. Murray (U. S.) 54 Fed. 617, 624. An onerous title is the cause in virtue of which we acquire a thing by payment of its value in money, in another thing, or in Iservices, or by means of certain charges and conditions to which we subject ourselves, as purchase, exchange, renting, and dowry. Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576, 597 (citing Escriche Diccionario, tit. "Oneroso"; Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 433, 453. The title is said to be onerous when it is acquired for a certain price or under certain charges. It is the contrary to a lucrative title. Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 3556, subd. 22. ONLY. See "Going Only." "Only," as contained in the United States Constitution, providing that "treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort," was used to exclude from the criminal jurisprudence of the federal government the odious doctrines of constructive treasons, tination of London, with liberty either to and limits the definition to plain, overt acts. come back direct and in ballast into the port Shortridge v. Macon (U. S.) 22 Fed. Cas. 20, 21. of departure, or, having sold her cargo, to enter into one of the ports of Nantz or of Bourdeaux. Another clause provided that "she may load in the ports of Nantz or Bourdeaux, and to the destination of that from which she departed, silks, etc., but shall not "Only," as used in Cr. Prac. Act, § 440. which declares what shall be grounds for new trial, and uses the words "in the following cases only," is employed literally, and excludes all other grounds than those enumerated. People v. Fair, 43 Cal. 137, 146. "Liable only for the amount opposite his name," as used in a subscription contract providing that a subscriber shall be "liable only for the amount opposite his name," is so construed as to make the contract a several obligation. McFarland v. Lyon, 23 S. W. 554, 555, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 586. The use of the word "only" in bank shares, which provide that they shall be transferred only at the banking house, and on the books of the bank, "carries an implication as strong as negative words can make it that there is no other mode of transfer, and therefore they cannot be effectually transferred, as against a creditor of the vendor who attaches them without notice of any transfer, by the delivery of the certificates thereof, with an assignment and blank power of attorney from the vendor to the vendee, even if notice of such transfer be given to the bank before the attachment." Fisher v. Essex Bank, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 373, 381. On a card advertising cigars, the state ment that "we use only the very best grades of Havana tobacco, and manufacture only genuine Havana cigars," the word "only" means wholly; and the statement precludes the idea of the use of any tobacco except Havana tobacco in the cigars. Hilson Co. v. Foster (U. S.) 80 Fed. 896, 900. Code 1851, 162, providing that, in an action or defense founded on an instrument for the payment of money only, it shall be sufficient to give a copy of the instrument, and to state that there is due thereon a specified sum, means not merely exclusive of any other promise or stipulation, but free from any condition or contingency. v. Schmidt, 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 363. Alder "Only," as used in an instruction in a railroad crossing accident case, in which the negligence of defendant's flagman in inviting the plaintiff to cross the tracks in front of a train is in issue, that the fact that the company employed the flagman is only evidence of the additional care exercised by the defendant, in effect renders the conduct of the flagman immaterial. Ayres v. Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 50 Atl. 958, 959, 201 Pa. 124. The word "only," in a statute providing that, in a prosecution for a certain crime, the jury may acquit the defendant of that crime, and convict of a certain allied crime only, has the same meaning as the word "merely." Commonwealth v. Lewis, 21 Atl. 501, 502, 140 Pa. 561. The use of the word "only," as used in the charter of Superior of 1889, subc. 13, § have power to issue bonds for certain pur103, providing that the common council shall poses only (naming them), is clearly restrictive, and excludes, as clearly as language can, the idea that the council can issue bonds Uncas Nat. Bank v. City of Superior, 91 N. for purposes other than those expressed. W. 1004, 1006, 115 Wis. 340. An indorsement on a bill of exchange to "pay to J. S. only" has been held to be a restrictive indorsement, which operates to put an end to the negotiability of the paper. Lee v. Chillicothe Branch of State Bank (U. S.) 15 Fed. Cas. 151, 153. The word "only," in a claim made by an inventor that the main characteristics of his invention consist in the plate for secondary batteries, having cells, etc., and the active material, etc., "packed in said cells only," means exclusively, and that the active material was to be placed or packed in the cells of the plate to the entire exclusion of every other receptacle or part of the plate. Accumulator Co. v. Consolidated Electric Storage Co. (U. S.) 53 Fed. 793, 794. In limitation in deed or lease. In construing a deed to a railroad company, conveying one tract of land only for depot and other railroad purposes, and then granting another parcel, and stating in a subsequent clause that "both of said pieces or parcels are granted only and solely for said road purposes," it was said that the words "only and solely" are words of restriction or exclusion. As used in this deed, their effect clearly is to prohibit the grantee from using the lands for other than the specified purposes. Horner v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Wis. 165, 175. viding that if the building was damaged by The word "only," as used in a lease profire, etc., the lessee should pay rent only for such portion of the premises as he can reasonably occupy during the time required to make the necessary repairs, but, if it should be so damaged as to require it to be rebuilt, then the lease should end, does not warrant an inference that the rent should be suspended while the premises are untenantable from injury by fire, without necessarily compelling rebuilding. New York Real Estate & Bldg. Imp. Co. v. Motley, 38 N. EL 103, 104, 143 N. Y. 156. "Only," as used in a lease to the lessor's mother of a dwelling house, only for herself to occupy for a residence, does not mean that the lessee alone shall occupy the premises, but refers to the purpose for which the house was to be occupied, though not exclusively Schroeder v. King, 38 Conn. 78. So. In limitation in devises. separate use. In limitation of jurisdiction. The word "only," as used in Code Civ. Proc. § 1780, providing that an action may be maintained against a foreign corporation by a nonresident "in one of the following cases only," is inserted as a word of restriction, and implies a general jurisdiction, purposely narrowed and restrained. Chambers v. Feron & Ballou Co., 56 N. Y. Supp. 338 (citing Hopper v. Hopper, 125 N. Y. 400, 26 N. E. 457). The words "only proper use," as used in a deed of gift by which a father conveys a slave to a daughter, to the "only proper use" "Only," as used in the Constitution proand behoof of such daughter, mean her ownviding that the Supreme Court shall have Caldwell v. Pickens' Adm'r, appellate jurisdiction only, coupled with the other words employed, plainly indicates a purpose to render the court's primary and principal powers appellate. People v. Richmond, 26 Pac. 929, 933, 16 Colo. 274. 39 Ala. 514, 520. A bequest to a wife, stipulating that the property shall be held by her only, has the effect of excluding her husband from any rights in the property. Ozley v. Ikelheimer, 26 Ala. 332, 336. "Only for the benefit of," as used in a will wherein testatrix bequeathed certain slaves to be held in trust only for the benefit of a certain daughter, was synonymous with "for her sole use," and secured the property to the separate use of the daughter. Nixon v. Rose (Va.) 12 Grat. 425, 428. ONROERENDE AND VAST STAAT. The phrase "onroerende and vast staat” is by a statute of the colony of New York passed October, 1810, translated in English "immovable and fast estate," and therefore, in Dutch wills, deeds, and antenuptial contracts, the phrase should be construed to mean land or real estate. Spraker v. Van Alstyne (N. Y.) 18 Wend. 200, 208. The word "only" in a will giving testator's property to his wife for life, and after her death to be divided equally between his ONUS PROBANDI. heirs, only his daughters B. and M., was construed to have been used in the sense of "except," thus excluding the daughters from any interest under the will. Lott v. Thompson, 15 S. E. 278, 279, 36 S. C. 38. Under a bequest to executors of money to be invested and the income only paid over semiannually to a certain person, he is entitled to the income only during his life, and not the principal legacy. Wynn v. Bartlett, 45 N. E. 752, 167 Mass. 292. In limitation of insurance risk. The word "only" in a clause in a fire policy declaring that it is issued on the express condition that the property shall not be operated as a distillery during the term of the insurance, it being intended by the policy to cover carpenter's risk only, manifestly means that the carpenter's risk is the only hazard assumed by the company. Alkan v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 10 N. W. 91, 94, 53 Wis. 136. "Only," as used in a policy of insurance on a steamboat against loss by fire only, does not limit the liability of the assurer to losses by fire caused by any particular agency, or to exclude such liability where the fire was caused by a particular agency, but simply shows that no risk whatever was assumed except loss by fire. Germania Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio St. 33, 46. See "Burden of Proof." ONYX. "Onyx marble" is defined in the Imperial Dictionary to be a "very beautiful, translucent limestone, of stalagmitic formation, discovered by the French in the province of Oran. It is used for the manufacture of ornamental articles. Merchandise invoiced as onyx columns, vases, etc., and known by dealers in marble as onyx marble, is assessable as manufactures of marble for a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem, under Rev. St. U. S. § 2499, providing that a nonenumerated article bearing a similitude to an enumerated article shall be dutiable at the same Seeberger (U. S.) 39 Fed. 760, 761. rate as the enumerated article. OONTZ. Mandel v. Oontz or craps, as it is otherwise known, is a game ordinarily played with two dice. They are shaken up in the hand, and then rolled or thrown from it. The player wins if he throws the numbers seven or eleven, otherwise he loses. It can be played with any four-cornered thing or cube with numbers on it that can be thrown or rolled, and upon any surface, as the floor, the ground. a box, a hat, etc. Commonwealth v. Kammerer (Ky.) 13 S. W. 108. OPEN. See "Held Open." The words "outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is, opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real, at present time, as a matter of fact; not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318. See, also, Helleher v. City of Keokuk, 15 N. W. 280, 281, 60 Iowa, 473; State v. Millard, 18 Vt. 574, 577, 578, 46 Am. Dec. 170. The requirement of Rev. Laws 1813, c. 86, § 178, providing that lands acquired by a city for streets and public places shall be held in trust, and shall be held "open" for public places forever, is not violated by the erection of a soldiers' monument in a park 100 feet in height, and based on a platform 120 feet long, which is situated on the crest of a hill, with a broad driveway on one side, and the open river on the other. "The placing of monuments and statues in parks is a generally recognized and legitimate use of such parks, whether such monuments are purely ornamental, or include the idea of a memorial." Parsons v. Van Wyck, 67 N. Y. Supp. 1054, 1058, 56 App. Div. 329. Judgment. Opening a judgment is not setting it aside, annulling, or reversing it. It is but a mode of allowing the defendant a hearing on the merits, and the court may impose such terms as it may deem proper. A party has no right to a hearing after judgment, except for causes which touch the honesty and justice of the case. If a judgment is deemed erroneous, an application should be made to strike it off, and not to open it, and the ruling on such point will distinctly draw in question the power of the court to enter such judgment. Huston Tp. Co-op. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beale, 1 Atl. 926, 928, 110 Pa. 321. Saloon. A city ordinance making it criminal for any person to keep "open any saloon, barroom or tippling house" between certain hours, will be construed to include a restaurant which sells liquor in connection with its other business, though there is a curtain between the bar where the liquor is sold and the eating room. "The object of the ordinance is manifestly not merely to stop drink ing at that hour, but also to compel those who are inclined to collect and tarry at such places to then depart." Baldwin v. City of Chicago, 68 Ill. 418, 426. Where a saloonkeeper connects his living rooms with his saloon, and occasionally serves liquor in them, they become a part of the saloon, and to open them on Sundays to others than members of his family is an opening of the saloon. People v. Cox, 38 N. W. 235, 237, 70 Mich. 247. Street. A public highway might be opened without anything being done by the road overseers for that purpose. The people themselves along the line of the road might open it, or the public travel might at once take Whenever possession of a road and use it. a public road is traveled it is in fact opened, although nothing may have ever been done by the road overseers for the purpose of opening it. No formal opening is ever required. It is true it may be formally opened by the several overseers along the line of the road, but it may also be informally opened by themselves or by others, or it may be opened in fact by the public travel taking possession of it and using it. Wilson v. Janes, 29 Kan. 233, 248. to open or extend streets has been held not to authorize the extension of a street across the right of way of an existing railroad, as such right of way is already devoted to a public use by express legislative grant, and the extension of the street across it is an An authority to a municipal corporation unauthorized appropriation of it to another public use. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 30 N. E. 1044, 1045, 141 Ill. 586, 17 L. R. A. 530. "Be open for travel," as used in a petition in relation to a highway, is insufficient as a request "that a highway be established," so as to invest the supervisors with any jurisdiction in the matter. hontas Co., 72 Iowa, 151, 33 N. W. 616. Curtis v. Poca The words "open and make the same," in St. c. 500, § 7, making it the duty of county commissioners to fix the time within which the several towns through which any highway may be laid out shall open and make the same, mean "to make the road passable, safe, and convenient for travelers and others passing with their teams, wagons, or other carriages." Lowell v. Inhabitants of Moscow, 12 Me. (3 Fairf.) 300, 301. Same-Construction and improvement. The term "opening," in a clause of the city charter authorizing the opening of a street, etc., "refers to throwing open to the public what before was appropriated to individual use, and the removing of such obstructions as exist on the surface of the earth, rather than any artificial improvement of the surface. By the term 'opening' we do not understand the improvement of a street or highway by grading, culverting, etc. The term is generally (we think always) clearly distinguishable from such kind of improvement." Reed v. City of Toledo, 18 Ohio, 161, 165. A statutory power to open and extend a street includes the construction of the street, or the extension thereof, as well as the mere act of laying it out. Matthiessen & Wiechers Sugar Refining Co. v. Jersey City, 26 N. J. Eq. (11 C. E. Green) 247, 254. "Opening a street" refers to throwing open to the public what before was appropriated to individual use, and the removing of such obstructions as exist on the surface of the earth, rather than any artificial improvement of the surface; and hence Act March 6, 1889, § 1, authorizing the opening, extending, or widening of any street, does not authorize the grading or graveling of a street. Wilcoxon v. City of San Luis Obispo, 35 Pac. 988, 989, 101 Cal. 508. The act of Congress giving to the city of Washington power to open and keep in repair streets, avenues, lanes, etc., agreeably to the plan of the city, includes the power to alter the grade or change the level of the land on which the streets, by the plan of the city, are laid out. Smith v. Washington City, 61 U. S. (20 How.) 135, 147, 15 L. Ed. 858. As used in a statute authorizing the overseers of highways to open them, the word "open" means to clear away the obstruction in the road, or the physical act of inclosing the highway for the public use, and not the mere form of giving it to the public in its finished condition. Gaines v. Hudson County Ave. Com'rs, 37 N. J. Law (8 Vroom) 12, 14. It cannot be said with propriety that a road has been opened, as a whole, when nothing has been done to that entire portion which constitutes three-fourths of it, and the remainder was a road, opened and used before as such. State v. Inhabitants of Cornville, 43 Me. 427, 428. whatever, means that it must be opened as a highway over its entire route. Beckwith v. Whalen, 70 N. Y. 430, 435. Same-Dedication. Where the landowners have dedicated to the public the land of a street regularly located on the confirmed city plan, the street is "open," so as to charge adjoining owners with the cost of constructing a sewer thereon. City of Philadelphia v. Thomas' Heirs, 25 Atl. 873, 874, 152 Pa. 494. Streets cannot be said to be "laid out and opened," within the meaning of a city charter giving the city power of taxation for back from the line of such streets as the municipal purposes to a distance of 240 feet corporate authorities had "laid out and opened," until there has been a formal acceptance of them by the authorities of the town according to law, though they may have been, by the owners of property, and may have since an alleged dedication, used as streets been generally considered streets of the town. Valentine v. City of Hagerstown, 38 Atl. 931, 932, 86 Md, 486 (cited in Sindall v. City of Baltimore, 49 Atl. 645, 647, 93 Md. 526). Same-Lay out. "Open," as used in an application to se lectmen to open a street, is equivalent in meaning to the words "lay out" as used in the statute authorizing such petition. Winooski Lumber & Water Power Co. v. Town of Colchester, 57 Vt. 538, 541. The words "opening and laying out," as used in the road laws in reference to the laying out or opening of roads, “are constantly used as equivalent expressions." In re Twenty-Eighth St., 102 Pa. 140, 146. The term "open and dedicated," employed with respect to a street or highway, means laid out or set apart by the owner, and imply that nothing further is necessary to make it a highway in fact. Hemphill v. City of Boston, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 195, 197, 54 Am. Dec. 749. OPEN ACCOUNT. A road is opened, within the statute pro"An open account is one in which some viding that it shall be considered discontinu-item of the contract is not settled by the pared unless it is opened within six years from its establishment, where the trees on it have been felled and cut up for more than six years, although it was impassable except for those on foot. Baker v. Runnels, 12 Me. (3 Fairf.) 235, 237. "Opened," as used in 1 Rev. St. 520, providing that every public highway laid out that shall not be opened and worked within six years from the time of its being so laid out shall cease to be a road for any purpose ties, whether the account consists of one item or many, or where there have been running or current dealings between the parties, and the account is kept open with expectation of further dealings." Purvis v. Kroner, 23 Pac. 260, 261, 18 Or. 414; Battle v. Reid, 68 Ala. 149, 152; Sheppard v. Wilkins, 1 Ala. 62, 64; McCamant v. Batsell, 59 Tex. 363, 368. An account consisting of the price of a carriage purchased and paid for by plain tiff for defendant at his request, together with the cost of the transportation from New |