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ON THE SHORE LINE.

The words "along," "with," "by," or "on" the shore line, mean on a line parallel with, and three miles from, the shore. Pol. Code Cal. 1903, § 3907.

ON STOCKS.

"In common understanding, an advance or loan of money on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes is an advance or loan where these species of property are applied as collaterals, or are hypothecated to secure the return of the advance, or the payment of the sum lent." It is used in this sense in Rev. St. § 3407, providing that every person, firm, or company having a place of business where money is advanced or loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, etc., shall be regarded as a bank or as a banker. Selden v. Equitable Trust Co., 94 U. S. 419, 421, 24 L. Ed. 249.

ON STORE.

The words "on store," in a receipt for grain delivered at a warehouse, ordinarily mean that the grain is sold to a miller or warehouseman, and that the market price is to be demanded at such time as suits the person leaving the grain, or the actual intention of the parties may be shown by parol. Light v. Heilman (Pa.) 1 Pears. 537, 538.

ON THE TRACK.

indicted for trading with a slave, it shall not be necessary for the state to aver or

prove," etc., means the prosecution of any person. Hirschfelder v. State, 19 Ala. 534, 539.

On the trial of a case, after the evidence had been closed on both sides, and after the arguments of the counsel had been delivered to it and the jury, the court permitted the plaintiffs to amend their declaration. The statute provided that when, in the opinion of the court, any informality exists in the declaration which shall affect the merits of a cause, the plaintiff shall be permitted to amend on or before the trial of the cause. In construing defendant's objection that the amendment was allowed too late, the court said: "The amendment complained of here must be construed as having been allowed within the time prescribed for the act, though perhaps done near to the close of the last hour. It was after the trial had been commenced, but being before the court had charged the jury in regard to the law of the case, and before any verdict was made or ready to be delivered by the jury, it was certainly done during the trial of the cause, and must therefore have been done on the trial of it, which brings it, as to the trial, within the express terms of the act." Yohe v. ertson (Pa.) 2 Whart. 155, 158. See, also, Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Findlay (Pa.) 6

Whart. 483, 497, 37 Am. Dec. 430.

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A stipulation allowing the evidence in a certain case to be read on the trial of another case applies to any trial of the case, whether the first or second, so long as neither party is relieved from the obligation by an application to the court. Herbst v. Vacuum Oil Co., 22 N. Y. Supp. 807, 68 Hun, 222.

The words "on the track," in Code, 1699, requiring a locomotive engineer, on perceiving any obstruction on the track of the road, to use all means known to skillful engineers in order to stop the train, mean an obstruction on the track of the road, against ON THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY. which the locomotive or train may strike while running its proper course and direction; and an animal, though near the road, and on the company's right of way, is not an obstruction on the track of the road, within the meaning of the statute. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Bayliss, 77 Ala. 429, 434, 54 Am. Rep. 69.

An engine in a roundhouse for repairs is not upon a railroad track, within St. 1887, § 270, making the employer liable for injury to an employé from negligence of an employé in charge or control of an engine or train upon a railroad track; the words "upon a railroad track" contemplating the dangers from a locomotive engine or train as a moving body. Perry v. Old Colony R. Co., 41 N. E. 289, 164 Mass. 296.

ON THE TRIAL.

The expression "on the trial of any person," as used in Act Feb. 7 1850, enacting

A testator directed all of his estate to be sold, and the proceeds divided into six shares, to be paid to the legatees "on their own responsibility," and they to use it during their natural life, and at their decease the said principal so paid to them, to be divided among their lawful heirs, share and share alike. Held, that the words "on their own responsibility" meant that the persons entitled should receive the fund without giving security therefor, but that such construction would not be given the words without qualification, so that, where one of the sisters threatened to dispose of her share in order to defeat her son's interest therein, she could be enjoined from so doing, and re quired to give security for the protection of the remainder-men. Sherman v. Sherman, 36 N. J. Eq. (9 Stew.) 125, 126.

ON TRIAL.

The term "on trial," in St. 1863, c. 33, that "hereafter, on the trial of any person providing that, whenever any criminal case

shall be on trial at the end of any term, such term shall be continued until such case is finished, is to be taken in its literal meaning, and requires that the case must be actually on trial before the court and jury at the end of the term. Commonwealth v. MacLellan, 121 Mass. 31, 32.

ON A VOYAGE.

The phrases "at sea" or "on a voyage" or "on a passage" are equivalent in meaning; and, when either of them is used in a marine policy to describe the time during which the liability of the insurer continues, it operates to continue the risk until the arrival of the vessel at the port of destination. Wales v. China Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 380, 383.

ONCE.

See "At Once."

Act Cong. July 7, 1838 (5 Stat. 288), relating to steamboats, and providing that an examination of their boilers must be made at least "once in every six months," should be construed to mean that more than six months must not elapse after one examination before another is made. There must not at any time of the year be a period of six months within which an examination has not been made. It is not sufficient if an examination is made once in each six months of the year. Virginia & M. Steam. Nav. Co. v. United States (U. S.) 28 Fed. Cas. 1229, 1230.

ONCE A WEEK.

1 Rev. St. N. Y. c. 767, § 24, requiring notice of dissolution of a limited partnership, previous to the time specified in the certificate of its formation, to be published once in each week for four weeks, requires one publication, and then a repetition three times after the first publication, at an interval of seven days between each of the four times. In re King (U. S.) 14 Fed. Cas. 502.

Code, 135, providing that publication of a summons shall not be made less than once a week for six weeks, does not limit the publication to any particular day of the week; and, where the first publication was made on Monday, it is not fatal to the publication if the next publication is not made until Tuesday or any other day of the succeeding week. Steinle v. Bell (N. Y.) 12 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 171, 176; Ronkendorff v. Taylor, 29 U. S. (4 Pet.) 349, 361, 7 L. Ed. 882.

As requiring full number of weeks.

"Once a week" means once in a week; once at any time within the week. A pub

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lication of notice once a week for a tain number of weeks may not cover number of weeks equal to the number of times of publication. Thus, if the first day of the week should be the 1st day of the month, and if the notice should be published on the 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th, it would be once a week for four weeks successively, although it would not cover a period of four weeks. Ratliff v. Magee, 65 S. W. 713, 714, 165 Mo. 461.

Where St. 1864-65, p. 422, c. 145, § 35, provided that, to impose an additional school tax, an election should be called by posting notices for 20 days, and, if there is a newspaper in the county, by advertisement therein once a week for three weeks, the words "once a week for three weeks" do not require the call to be published 21 days before the day of election, but three insertions upon three successive weeks, and at any time in any of such weeks before the election, are sufficient. State v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co., 5 Nev. 415, 431.

Act June 16, 1836, § 33, providing that notice of a sheriff's sale by advertisement shall be inserted "once a week during three successive weeks" previous to the sale, requires the first notice to be at least 21 days before the day of the sale; and hence a notice published any time in each week for 3 weeks before the sale, in which the first was less than 21 days before the date of the sale, did not constitute a compliance with the statute. Erie Saving Fund & Building Ass'n v. Thompson (Pa.) 13 Phila. 511; Francis v. Norris (Pa.) 2 Miles, 150, 151.

Where a statute provided that public notice of the time and place of the sale of real property for taxes due to the city of Washington shall be given by advertisement inserted in some newspaper published in said city "once in each week for at least 12 successive weeks," it must be advertised for 12 full weeks, or 84 days. Early v. Homans, 57 U. S. (16 How.) 610, 613, 14 L Ed. 1079.

St. 1864-65, p. 422, c. 145, § 35, providing that, in order to impose an additional school tax, an election should be called by advertisement in a newspaper once a week for three weeks, meant once during each week, con, sisting of seven days, commencing with Sunday and ending with Saturday, on any day of such week, and not that it should be published 21 days before the election. State v. Yellow Jacket Silver Min. Co., 5 Nev. 415, 430.

ONCE IN JEOPARDY.
See "Jeopardy."

The plea of once in jeopardy stands on narrower, more technical, and less substan

within the state shall be confined to one class or kind of business, is equivalent to one class or kind of insurance, as used in St. 1887, c. 214, § 80; and the issuance of policies insuring against accidents to the person of the assured, and of employer's liability policies, is not the transaction of more than one class or kind of business, or one class or kind of insurance. Employer's Lia bility Assur. Corp. v. Merrill, 29 N. E. 529, 531, 155 Mass. 404.

tial ground than a plea of former acquittal foreign insurance companies doing business and conviction. It only alleges that there might have been a conviction or an acquittal if the judge trying the cause had not made a mistake in law which prevented a verdict. It is of no consequence how many mistakes he makes, if the trial results in a conviction. Mistakes can be corrected on a writ of error, and the defendant tried over again; but, if the mistake results in closing the trial without a verdict, this is remediless. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 15 Atl 466, 468, 121 Pa. 109, 1 L. R. A. 451, 6 Am. St. Rep. 757.

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ONE DAY.

St. 1877, c. 250, § 1, relating to the arrest of debtors, and providing that notice be issued by a magistrate to the debtor to appear and submit himself to an examinather that such notice may be served by tion touching his estate, and providing furleaving the same at his last and usual place of abode not less than three days before the time fixed for the examination, and "one day additional for every 24 miles' travel," means at the rate of one day additional for every 24 miles traveled; and hence, where the distance traveled is only a fraction of a mile, the time allowed need not be more than the corresponding fraction of an hour. Stewart v. Griswold, 134 Mass. 391, 392.

Notice of taxation given before 9 o'clock p. m. of any day for the day following at 12 is "one day's notice," within the rule of T. T. 1 Will. 4, § 12, requiring that, before taxation of costs, "one day's notice" shall be given to the opposite party. Edmunds v. Cates, 4 Mees. & W. 66.

Code Cr. Proc. art. 554, directs that no

defendant in a capital case shall be brought to trial until he has had one day's service of a copy of the names of persons summoned under a special venire facias. Held, that "one day's service" meant that both

"One building," as used in a reinsurance compact limiting the amount of insurance on any one building or risk, in the ordinary sense of that term, should be construed to include a building five stories in height, containing three stores, the outer wall of which building was common to each of the stores, the several floors being on the same level; and, while two partition walls divided the building into three rooms or compartments on each floor, there were large doors in each of these walls be tween the several compartments in each 2 Tex. App. 246, 253. of the five stories, used for the purpose

the day of the service and the day of the trial must be excluded; that at least one entire day must intervene between the day on which the service was had and the day on which the trial begins. Speer v. State,

of the passage of persons and the removal ONE DAY AFTER.
of goods from one store to another or others
on each floor, the whole structure being un-
der one management and devoted to the
same uses, the storage of non-fibrous mer-
chandise. German-American Ins. Co. V.
Commercial Fire Ins. Co., 11 South. 117, 118,
95 Ala. 469, 16 L. R. A. 291.

ONE CLASS OR KIND OF BUSINESS.
"One class or kind of business," as used
in Pub. St. c. 119, 201, providing that

The declaration set out a note payable "one day after date," and the note preduced read, "Payable one day after," the word date being omitted. In considering the objection that this was not the note declared on, the court said: "This variance is altogether too immaterial to be regarded. The court will supply the word 'date,' and intend that the note was payable one day after its date." White v. Word, 22 Ala. 442,

445.

ONE DRINK.

and complete the building, to furnish all the material, and to do all the work on it. Where a defendant was charged with The word "general" is used with reference selling intoxicating liquor at retail, with- to two or more separate buildings, so that, out a license, in less quantities than a quart, to support a claim of lien on all of them, and the evidence of the prosecuting witness the contract must be entire, so as to include was that defendant sold to him one drink them all, in order to connect them and make of whisky, the jury were entitled to find them one for the purpose of the lien. Menthat "one drink of whisky" meant a quanti-zel v. Tubbs, 53 N. W. 653, 654, 51 Minn. 364, ty less than a quart, without evidence of 17 L. R. A. 815. that fact; and therefore an instruction that the jury must find, before they could convict, that one drink was a less quantity than a quart, and that, if there was no evidence of that fact, they could not convict defendant, was properly refused. Feigel v. State, 85 Ind. 580; Hamilton v. State, 103 Ind. 96, 100, 2 N. E. 299, 302, 53 Am. Rep.

491.

ONE FOOT HIGH.

The term "one general contract," in a mechanic's lien law, providing that only one mechanic's lien shall be necessary where the separate buildings on which the lien is claimed shall be erected upon one general contract, includes a contract to roof 29 houses, more or less, at $170 each, and the fixing of the rate of compensation does not convert it into various distinct and separate contracts. Bulger v. Robertson, 50 Mo. App. 449, 503.

A contract to deliver a number of trees not less than one foot high is ambiguous, ONE-HORSE CART. as to whether the trees should be measured in length only to the top of the ripe wood, rejecting the green, immature tops, or whether the measurement should include such green, immature tops, and hence evidence of a custom is admissible to explain such ambiguity. Barton v. McKelway, 22 N. J. Law (2 Zab.) 165, 174.

ONE-FOURTH.

The conveyance of one-fourth of a tract of land, without designating by metes and bounds or otherwise locating the part conveyed, vests in the grantee, and those claiming under him, the title to one-undivided fourth of the whole tract, as tenant in common with the grantor. McCaul v. Kilpatrick, 46 Mo. 434, 437.

ONE FULL YEAR.

Poor Act, § 1, Rev. 834, providing that a pauper must dwell in a township for one full year in order to obtain a legal settlement there, means a dwelling for a full year continuously and without any interruption. Eatontown V. Inhabitants of Shrewsbury, 6 Atl. 319, 320, 49 N. J. Law (20 Vroom) 188.

ONE GENERAL CONTRACT.

As used in Gen. Laws 1889, c. 200, § 7, providing that when a person shall furnish labor or material for buildings united together, and situated on the same or contiguous lots, or separate buildings on contiguous lots, pursuant to the purposes of one general contract with the owner or joint owners, it shall not be necessary to file a separate lien on each building, the phrase "one general contract" cannot be construed to mean an entire contract to wholly erect

The term "one-horse cart," as used in Act April 1, 1800, relating to tolls, does not include a light, one-horse wagon, with a firm box, swelled sides, painted in imitation of panel work, a crooked bolster, a chair seat with wooden springs, in which were two passengers, a trunk, a box, a bag of oats, and a bottle. Pardee v. Blanchard (N. Y.) 19 Johns. 442, 444.

ONE-HORSE WAGON.

A half interest in a two-horse wagon is not "one one-horse wagon," within the meaning of the statute exempting from execution one one-horse wagon. Kirksey v. Rowe, 40 S. E. 990, 114 Ga. 893, 88 Am. St. Rep. 65.

ONE LEAGUE SQUARE.

The fact that a tract of land is described as one league square refers only to contents, and not to shape. "A tract of land of one square league" does not, as a term of description, suggest any boundary whatever. Muse v. Arlington Hotel Co. (U. S.) 68 Fed. 637, 643.

ONE LOT.

The phrase "one lot," as employed in the statute exempting a homestead consisting of a quantity of land not exceeding one lot, cannot be construed as applying to an undivided half of two lots. Ward v. Huhn, 16 Minn. 159, 162 (Gil. 142, 144).

Where an act providing that a debtor's homestead should be exempt from execution stated the exemption as including one town or city lot, the word "one" should not be construed as limiting the exemption absolutely to one lot, according to the plat and survey of the town or city, but as meaning

a lot or piece of ground in the town or city on which the head of the family has its dwelling place, with the appurtenances, no matter whether it contains more or less than one of such lots. Wassell v. Tunnah, 25 Ark.

101, 103.

A memorandum of sale headed, "Invoice of Articles Purchased by A. of B," with the date, and containing the item, "One icehouse and lot, $140," is void, under the statute of frauds, as to the icehouse and lot, by reason of uncertainty in the description of the property. Pipkin v. James, 20 Tenn. (1 Humph.) 325, 326, 34 Am. Dec. 652.

ONE PINT.

An allegation in an indictment for selling liquor without a license that defendant sold one pint means that he sold that particular quantity, and no more. State v. Bach, 36 Minn. 234, 30 N. W. 764.

ONE PLACE.

Const. art. 5, § 7, providing that a district judge shall hold the regular terms of court at one place in each county in the district twice a year, does not mean one town or one house, but means the place prescribed by law-the county seat. Lytle v. Halff, 12 S. W. 610, 613, 75 Tex. 128.

ONE SITTING.

In the case of Bones v. Booth, 2 W. Bl. 1227, involving the construction of a statute making the winning of £10 at any one time or sitting a nullity, Justice Blackstone said that “one sitting" means a course of play where the company never parts, though the person may not be gaming the whole time; and it was held that playing from Monday evening to Tuesday night without interruption, except for an hour or two at dinner-the persons gaming never having parted company during such time-constituted one sitting. Trumbo v. Finley, 18 S. C. 305, 311.

ONE TAKING.

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ONE WHOLE YEAR.

Where a house was hired at 20 guineas a year, to be paid weekly, and either landlord or tenant to be at liberty to determine the tenancy at three months' notice from any quarter day, this was a renting of a tenement for "one whole year," within the meaning of St. 6 Geo. iv, c. 57, relating to a gaining of settlements by paupers by su renting. The King v. Inhabitants of Herstmonceux, 7 Barn. & C. 551.

"One whole year at the least," in a statute, has exactly the same effect as the phrase "one whole year," and in either case a portion of a day is, for the purpose of computation, to be reckoned a whole day. Reg. v. Inhabitants of St. Mary, Warwick, 1 El. & Bl. 816, 828.

"One taking," within the meaning of the rule that an indictment for larceny, of a single count, must charge but one taking, ONE YEAR. has no reference to a taking at any one time, and describes such a taking, even though a number of articles were taken at such time. State v. Newton, 42 Vt. 537, 539.

"One taking," within the meaning of the rule that but one taking can be alleged in a single count of an indictment for larceny, includes the act of taking several articles of property, though owned by different persons, if they are taken at the same time. State v. Smith, 10 Ohio Dec. 682.

"One or more years," within Act March 21, 1772, authorizing a proceeding by a landlord where a tenant under a term of one or more years holds over, includes a lease for nine months, or any time certain less than a year. The mischief which the law intended to remedy was that where tenants unjustly held possession after the expiration of their leases. The injury was fully as great if possession was withheld after a lease for nine months as after the expira

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