and perfected on the books." Northop v. Curtis, 5 Conn. 246, 253. ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD. The phrase "on both sides of the road," found in a statute providing that every rail road must maintain fences on both sides of the road, means the margin or border of the entire ground used as a roadway, and does not mean any place between the track and margin of the right of way. People v. Ohio & M. R. Co., 21 Ill. App. 23, 27. ON CALL. "On call," as used in an instrument payable on call, is equivalent to the expression "on demand" or "when demanded." Territory v. Hopkins, 59 Pac. 976, 982, 9 Okl. 133; Mobile Sav. Bank v. McDonnell, 4 South. 346, 347, 83 Ala. 595; Meador v. Dollar Savings Bank, 56 Ga. 605, 608. “On call,” as used in a bond which by its terms is payable on call, signifies that it is payable immediately. Bowman v. McChesney (Va.) 22 Grat. 609, 612. So, also, as used in a certificate payable on call. Meador v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 56 Ga. 605, 608. ON A DAY CERTAIN. See "Day Certain." ON DEMAND. Where it appears from a contract that it was the intention of the parties thereto that the money was to be paid upon demand, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until an actual demand of payment is made. Horton v. Seymore, 85 N. W. 551, 82 Minn. 535; Portner v. Wilfahrt, 88 N. W. 418, 419, 85 Minn. 73. "Payment of a sum of money to be made on demand, as a condition upon which a mortgage upon real estate shall be discharged, means payment by the mortgagor upon a demand made upon him, and not payment by a stranger to the deed with or without a demand." Popple v. Day, 123 Mass. 520, 522. c. 564, § 58, providing that no stockholder of a corporation shall be personally liable for any debt of the corporation payable within two years from the time it is contracted, nor unless an action for its collection shall be brought within two years after the debt becomes due. Barnes v. Arnold, 61 N. Y. Supp. 85, 90, 45 App. Div. 314. In notes or bonds. A bond which by its terms is payable on demand is payable immediately. Bowman v. McChesney (Va.) 22 Grat. 609, 612. The words "on demand," in a promissory note payable on demand, do not mean forthwith, but have several significations, and mean an actual call or demand for payment, and are not merely governed by the law controlling an ordinary negotiable instrument. Crofoot v. Thatcher, 57 Pac. 171, 174, 19 Utah, 212, 75 Am. St. Rep. 725. The word "on demand" in a note should not make the demand a condition precedent to a right of action, but import that a debt is due and demandable immediately, or at least that the commencement of a suit therefor is a sufficient demand. Appeal of Andress, 99 Pa. 421, 424. When a note or bill is payable on demand, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the instrument, and not from the time of demand, because the right of action accrues immediately upon giving the note, and it makes no difference whether the note is payable with interest or with interest after six months. Young v. Weston, 39 Me. 492, 494. The words "on demand" have a precise legal meaning. They do not limit the obligation to pay presently, but are used to show that the debt is due. A note payable on demand after three months' notice is due, and the statute of limitations begins to run against it forthwith, the provision as to notice being merely a limitation of the payee's right to sue. Knapp v. Greene, 29 N. Y. Supp. 350, 351, 79 Hun, 264. ON DEMAND AFTER DATE. The expression "on demand after date" in a note is deemed equivalent to the words "on demand," with the exception that the note is not immediately due, but some time must elapse before demand can be made, and therefore before the note becomes due. Foley v. Emerald & Phoenix Brewing Co., 39 Atl. 650, 651, 61 N. J. Law, 428. A contract to furnish coal "on demand" to a certain mine, but that the daily demand shall not exceed one-half the daily output of the mine, indicates that the coal shall be delivered when required by the plaintiff, and that no more than half of the daily product of the mine can be required by plaintiff. The demand required by the contract need not be made daily as the coal is mined, but may be made for the future. Watson Coal & Min. Co. v. James, 33 N. W. 622, 625, 72 and the statute of limitation begins to run Iowa, 184. A bank deposit payable on demand is a debt payable in two years, within Laws 1890, A note made payable on demand after date is payable immediately. Such a note is due at once without an actual demand, against it immediately. O'Neil v. Magner, 22 Pac. 876, 877, 81 Cal. 631, 15 Am. St. Rep. 88. ON DEPOSIT. "Money on deposit," says the Court of Appeals of New York, is, ex vi termini, money placed where the owner can command it at any time." Long v. Straus, 6 N. E. 123, 125, 7 N. E. 763, 766, 107 Ind. 94, 57 Am. Rep. 87 (citing Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9). Where a depositary acknowledges in writing to have received a certain number of dollars "on deposit to be paid on demand," such phrase imports not a contract of bailment, but a loan of money payable presently or on demand. Wright v. Paine, 62 Ala. 340, 344, 34 Am. Rep. 24. ON THE DOOR. The phrase "on the door," in a statute requiring notice of a tax sale to be posted on the courthouse door, does not necessarily mean on the swinging panel which fills the opening or entrance to the building, but a conspicuous posting upon the building at the side of the opening, or upon a separate board or panel or bulletin kept there for that purpose, is sufficient, to all reasonable intents and purposes. Hoskins v. Iowa Land Co., 96 N. W. 977, 978, 121 Iowa, 299. ON EACH ENTRY. 13 Stat. 214, providing that on the entry of any goods the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount of duties to be paid on such goods shall be final and conclusive ON THE EXPRESS CONDITION. ON FAILURE OF ISSUE. ON FILE. Every paper once legally filed in the general land office prior to the adoption of Act Nov. 29, 1871, and not withdrawn under a law authorizing it, and by one having authority to withdraw it was in contemplation of that law, on file in that office. Snider v. Methvin, 60 Tex. 487, 493. The words "on file," used in a deed in reference to a plat, will be taken to mean deposited, as distinguished from a technical filing of the plat. Slosson v. Hall, 17 Minn. 95 (Gil. 71, 74). ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITION. The words "provided nevertheless" and "upon the following conditions," occurring in a deed, are appropriate words to create a condition, but they do not of necessity create such an estate. They will give way when the intention of the grantor, as manifested by the whole deed, is otherwise, and they have frequently been explained and applied tion in trust. Consequently, where it was as expressing simply a covenant or limitarecited after the habendum clause of a deed, "provided nevertheless, and upon the followafter the ascertainment and liquidation of the duties by the proper officers of the cus-ing conditions," that if the grantor survives toms, give notice in writing to the collector "on each entry," means that in all cases, whether of entry in bond or for consumption, the owner shall give notice in writing on each entry to the collector, etc., not meaning on the paper or record called the entry, but ruff, 16 Atl. 4, 6, 44 N. J. Eq. (17 Stew.) 349, unless the importer shall, within 10 days in respect of each entry. Ullman v. Murphy (U. 8.) 24 Fed. Cas. 506, 508, ON EXPENSE. the grantee he shall have the right within a specified time to buy back the estate at a creates a covenant in spite of the words with price to be fixed by arbitration, such clause which it was introduced. Woodruff v. Wood. 1 L. R. A. 380. ON FOOT. See "Pork on Foot." Where the selectmen of a town notified the selectmen of another town that a certain ON FREIGHT. person was on the expense of the former town, the expression "on expense" was a sufficient notification that the person referred to was a pauper. Town of Hamden v. Town of Bethany, 43 Conn. 212, 216. A notice of support furnished paupers, sent by the selectmen of a town, stating that certain persons were "on expense in this town" should be construed to fairly import that the persons named were paupers, that they were then residing in such town, were chargeable to the town, and that the town was incurring expense in their support. Town of Bethlehem v. Town of Watertown, 51 Conn. 490, 492. 6 WDS. & P.-7 A firm in the habit of receiving grain in store to be shipped to the New York market received plaintiff's grain, which was deposited with that of other customers in a common bin. A memorandum was given to plaintiff acknowledging the receipt of the grain on freight. Held, that the words "on freight" should be held to import a bailment, and not a sale. Dawson v Kittle (N. Y.) 4 Hill, 107, 108. A receipt reciting that corn was delivered to a certain person "on freight," and not to be sold, means left to be disposed of according to the usage of the place and of the parties themselves. Outwater v. Nelson (N. | ON A JOURNEY. Y.) 20 Barb. 29, 31. ON HAND. See "Cash on Hand"; "Goods on Hand"; "Stock on Hand." A will providing that all of the testator's money on hand or in bank at the time of his decease should go to his daughter includes money in the hands of an agent, though the agent had a claim on such sum for his commission, and the legacy included the entire sum, and is not to be reduced by the commission due the agent. In re Copia's Estate (Pa.) 5 Phila. 214, 215. See, also, "Journey." Gantt's Dig. 1517, made it a misdemeanor to wear any pistol concealed as a weapon unless on a journey. Held, that the words "on a journey" contemplated a traveler bona fide going from one place to another, and that a traveler was on a journey, within the meaning of the law, while stopping at a town on his way, if he was in fact and in good faith prosecuting his journey, and only stopped for a temporary purpose, and did not stop to stay or mingle generally with the citizens of the place either for business or pleasure. Carr v. State, 34 Ark. 448, 36 Am. Rep. 15. ON LAKES OR RIVERS. A lease of a sawmill provided that, on a termination thereof by the lessor on the sale of the property, the lessee should have two months' notice to "saw out" a water Where a bill of lading given by a railterm, and then, if any logs remained over, road company to a shipper of freight providhe should either have the privilege to con- ed that the railroad should not be responsitinue in possession at option of the lessor ble, in the absence of negligence, for loss at the same rate rent until logs on hand were or damage on lakes or rivers, the phrase “on sawed, or should be allowed the extra cost of lakes or rivers" meant that the carrier was teaming said logs to another mill, etc. Held, not to be responsible for loss or damage octhat the words "logs on hand" meant those curring in the navigation of the lakes or rivbought and provided in the regular course of ers; and hence where the goods shipped were business, and not simply those in the mill-lost while stored on a wharfboat which yard, and that he was not precluded from recovering the extra expense of sawing at another mill those that remained over after two months' notice, which necessarily re mained over as those bought in the regular course of business, but that he was not entitled to recover the extra expense for the sawing out of logs the result of neglect of use of the mill for other than ordinary purposes. Crouch v. Parker, 56 N. Y. 597, 598. ON HER OWN ACCOUNT. A declaration that a married woman intends to carry on business "in her own name" is not synonymous with a declaration that she intends to carry on business "on her own account," and hence the sole traders' act, requiring the filing of a declaration that she intends to carry on business in her own name and on her own account is not satisfied by a declaration stating that a married woman intends to carry on business in her own name. Manton v. Tyler, 1 Pac. 743, 744, 4 Mont. 364. ON ITS FACE. Rev. St. art. 2181, declaring that, when an alias or pluries execution is issued, it shall show "upon its face" the number of previous executions, means that such facts shall be shown in the execution itself, and the statute is not complied with by a mention of previous executions in a bill of costs attached to an execution. Driscoll v. Morris, 21 S. W. 629, 631, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 603. floated on the waters of a river awaiting the arrival of a packet on which the goods were to have been shipped, the wharfboat serving as a storehouse in the meanwhile, the navigation of the river had not commenced, and the carrier was liable. St. Louis & S. E. R. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302, 308. ON THE LINE. "On the line thereof," as used in 13 Stat. 356, granting to a railroad company every alternate section of public lands designated by odd numbers to the amount of 10 sections per mile on each side of the road "on the line thereof," do not mean contiguous to the roadbed or to the land taken for the roadbed, but that the land shall be taken along a parallel to the general direction of the road on each side of it, and within lines perpendicular to its terminus at each end. United States v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. (U. S.) 24 Fed. Cas. 1305, 1306. The preposition "on" has an almost inexhaustible variety of meanings. One is "conforming to or agreeing with, as on the line." Hence, in a description of a boundary, to start from the N. E. corner of the N. E. quarter of the S. E. quarter of section 8, and to run thence west on the section line to the N. W. corner of the N. W. quarter of the S. W. quarter, the words "on the section line" will be held to express relative as well as absolute position, and to mean that the line shall run parallel with the section line, since the line would have to be on the quar ter-section line. Burnham v. Police Jury of Claiborne Parish, 32 South, 87, 88, 107 La. 513. The act of 1869, authorizing residents who live upon the line of the Illinois & Michigan Canal to cut and remove ice from said canal, will be construed to include any one living so near the canal as to desire to cut and remove ice therefrom. Card v. McCaleb, 69 Ill. 314, 817. ON THE MERITS. See "Merits." ON MODERATE TERMS. See "Moderate." ON A MOUNTAIN OR RIDGE. The words "to," "on," "along," "with," er “by” a mountain or ridge mean summit point, or summit line, unless otherwise expressed. Pol. Code Cal. 1903, § 3905; Rev. St. Ariz. 1901, par. 929; Pol. Code Mont. 1895, 4105. ON THE PART OF. Gen. St. c. 31, § 5, providing that illegitimate children shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting an inheritance on the part of or to the mother, cannot be construed as meaning transmissibility of an estate not only to, but through, the mother, and on to her collateral kindred. Croan v. Phelps' Adm'x, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 915, 916, 918, 21 S. W. 874, 94 Ky. 213, 23 L. R. A. 753. The phrase "on the part of the mother," in a statute relative to descent of property, has a technical signification, referring not only to the mother, but to all ancestors of the mother. Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 586. Under Rev. St. 1899, 2916, providing that bastards shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting inheritance on the part of the mother, a bastard may, like a legitimate child, inherit from the brother of his mother dying after her, the words "on the part of the mother" meaning the mother's side of the genealogical tree. Moore v. Moore, 69 S. W. 278-281, 169 Mo. 432, 58 L. R. A. 451. Rev. Code 1845, p. 442, which declares that bastards shall be capable of "inheriting and transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother" is construed to mean that the bastards will have capacity to take real property by descent immediately or through their mother in the ascending line, and transmit the same to their line as descendants, in like manner as If they were legitimate. This provision is not to be so construed as to render a bastard capable of transmitting an estate by descent to his mother or to his illegitimate brothers. Bent's Adm'r v. St. Vrain, 30 Mo. 268, 271 (citing Stevenson v. Sullivan, 18 U. s. (5 Wheat.] 260, 5 L. Ed. 70). The phrase "on the part of the father," in a statute relative to descent of property, has a technical signification, referring not only to the father, but to all ancestors of the father, both paternal and maternal. Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 586. ON A PASSAGE. The phrases "at sea" or "on a voyage" or "on a passage" are equivalent in meaning, and, when either of them is used in a marine policy to describe the time during which the liability of the insurer continues, it operates to continue the risk until the arrival of the vessel at the port of destination. Wales v. China Mut. Ins. Co., 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 380, 383. A marine policy which provided that if, at the expiration of the policy, the vessel should be on a passage, the risk should continue, means after she has left her port of lading, prepared to proceed to her port of destination, with intent to do so; and hence she is on her passage, although she comes to anchor on account of head winds, there being an intention of proceeding as soon as the weather is permissive. Bowen v. Hope Ins. Co., 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 275, 279, 32 Am. Dec. 213. A marine policy insuring a vessel for a year, and providing that if the vessel was on a passage at the end of the term the risk could continue until arrival at port of destination, does not insure the vessel after the expiration of the year, while lying in a safe harbor, in which she had put voluntarily to obtain necessary clearance and water and crew for her further voyage. Washington Ins. Co. v. White, 103 Mass. 238, 242, 4 Am. Rep. 543. ON THE PREMISES. See "On or About the Premises." A policy describing the insured property as being situated on or confined to premises occupied by the insured, locating such premises, and an application for insurance, askwhile on the premises only, did not cover a ing for it on certain parts of the property loss of the property while on different premises, 20 miles distant, though being used for the ordinary purposes which must have been contemplated when the policy was issued. Lakings v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 94 Iowa, 476, 62 N. W. 783, 784, 28 L. R. A. 70. Where a fire policy on a church provided that, if naphtha be kept or used on the prem ises by the insured, the policy should be | is not on record. Harvey v. State, 31 N. E. void, the use of a naphtha torch by a painter 835, 5 Ind. App. 422. to remove the old paint from the building, A contract on sale or return is defined by Judge Story as an agreement by which goods are delivered by a wholesale dealer to a retail dealer to be paid for at a certain rate if sold by the latter, and, if not sold, to be returned. And a contract between a manuWhere a statute provided that, when- facturer and retail dealer providing that the ever the name of the owner of the lot is dealer should act as special agent in the sale stated as unknown in the assessment, then of certain patterns which the manufacturer the said contractor, or his agent or assigns, should furnish, to be paid for half in cash shall publicly demand payment on the prem- and half in interest-bearing credit; that old ises assessed, a demand near to or in the patterns might be returned for new ones, hearing of the premises does not satisfy the but not in payment for goods; and that, if requirement of the statute providing for a the contract was terminated, the purchaser public demand on the premises, the term "on should have the right to return all patterns the premises" meaning a person on the prem- on hand, and receive 75 per cent. of the price ises. Alameda Macadamizing Co. v. Will-paid-is not a contract of sale or return, but iams, 12 Pac. 530, 534, 70 Cal. 534. a contract of sale. Butterick Pub. Co. V. ON THE SAME STREET. See "Same Street." A will in which testator left all the fur-Bailey, 75 N. W. 189, 191, 105 Iowa, 326. niture, household effects, etc., "in, upon, or about" the premises included articles which had been upon the property, and had been temporarily sent away for repairs, but did not include articles which had been intended for, but which were never in, the house. Brooke v. Warwick, 12 Jur. 912, 913, 12 Law T. 41. ON PURPOSE. "On purpose," as used in an instruction that the jury should find the defendant guilty of assault with intent to rob if he feloniously, on purpose, and of his malice aforethought, shot another with a loaded pistol, with intent to steal the moneys, goods, and chattels of such person, means intentionally, and not accidentally. State v. Tate, 56 S. W. 1099, 1100, 156 Mo. 119; State v. Musick, 14 S. W. 212, 213, 101 Mo. 260. ON REASONABLE REQUEST. ON THE SAME VOYAGE. ON SHARES. A contract to continue business on shares means that the parties shall share equally. Crittenden v. Johnston, 40 N. Y. Supp. 87, 88, 7 App. Div. 258. "Letting land on shares" is a phrase well understood among farmers. It means that both parties shall share equally in the products of the land, to compensate the one for his labor, and the other for the use of his land. In such cases, after the crops are harvested, and before a division is made, each party is the owner of an undivided moiety of the same, and is a tenant in common with the other, unless the contract con tains some special provision taking the case out of the general rule. Connell v. Richmond, 11 Atl. 852, 853, 55 Conn. 401. An agreement "to pay on reasonable request" was equivalent to an agreement to pay within a reasonable time after request, and the debt could not mature until demand was made, and a reasonable time for compliance had elapsed. Illinois Land & Loan ON THE SIDE OF. Co. v. Beem, 2 Ill. App. (2 Bradw.) 390, 393. ON RECORD. Under Rev. St. 1881, § 629, providing that a bill of exceptions, to be on record, must be presented to the judge for examination, and, if found correct, signed and filed by him, a bill in which the only signature of the judge that appeared was attached to the certificate of presentation, without any adjudication as to the correctness of the bill, See "Side." ON SHORE. "On shore," as used in 24 Geo. III, Sess. 2, c. 47, § 15, giving the officers of excise authority while on shore to seize goods, meant "on land," in contradistinction to "on board a ship"; and an officer seizing goods at an inland place at any distance from the sea was within the protection of the act. The King v. Brady, 1 Bos. & P. 187, 188. |