Gambar halaman

and perfected on the books." Northop v. c. 564, $ 58, providing that no stockholder of Curtis, 5 Conn. 246, 253.

a corporation shall be personally liable for

any debt of the corporation payable within ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD.

two years from the time it is contracted, nor

unless an action for its collection shall be The phrase "on both sides of the road," brought within two years after the debt befound in a statute providing that every rail- comes due. Barnes v. Arnold, 61 N. Y. Supp. road must maintain fences on both sides of 85, 90, 45 App. Div. 314. the road, means the margin or border of the entire ground used as a roadway, and does In notes or bonds. not mean any place between the track and

A bond which by its terms is payable on margin of the right of way. People v. Ohio demand is payable immediately. Bowman & M. R. Co., 21 Ill. App. 23, 27.

v. McChesney (Va.) 22 Grat, 609, 612.

The words "on demand,” in a promissory ON CALL.

note payable on demand, do not mean forth"On call," as used in an instrument pay- with, but have several significations, and able on call, is equivalent to the expression mean an actual call or demand for payment, "on demand” or “when demanded." Terri- and are not merely governed by the law contory v. Hopkins, 59 Pac. 976, 982, 9 Okl. 133; trolling an ordinary negotiable instrument. Mobile Sav. Bank v. McDonnell, 4 South. 346, Crofoot v. Thatcher, 57 Pac. 171, 174, 19 347, 83 Ala. 595; Meador v. Dollar Savings Utah, 212, 75 Am. St. Rep. 725. Bank, 56 Ga. 605, 608.

The word "on demand" in a note should "On call," as used in a bond which by not make the demand a condition precedent its terms is payable on call, signifies that it to a right of action, but import that a debt is payable immediately. Bowman V. Mc- is due and demandable immediately, or at Chesney (Va.) 22 Grat. 609, 612. So, also, as least that the commencement of a suit there used in a certificate payable on call. Meador for is a sufficient demand. Appeal of Anv. Dollar Sav. Bank, 56 Ga. 605, 608.

dress, 99 Pa. 421, 424.

When a note or bill is payable on deON A DAY CERTAIN.

mand, the statute of limitations runs from See “Day Certain."

the date of the instrument, and not from the time of demand, because the right of ac

tion accrues immediately upon giving the ON DEMAND,

note, and it makes no difference whether the Where it appears from a contract that it note is payable with interest or with interest was the intention of the parties thereto that after six months. Young v. Weston, 39 Me. the money was to be paid upon demand, the 492, 494. statute of limitations does not begin to run

The words "on demand" have a precise until an actual demand of payment is made. legal meaning. They do not limit the obHorton v. Seymore, 85 N. W. 551, 82 Minn. ligation to pay presently, but are used to 535; Portner v. Wilfahrt, 88 N. W. 418, 419, show that the debt is due. A note payable 85 Minn. 73.

on demand after three months' notice is due, “Payment of a sum of money to be made and the statute of limitations begins to run on demand, as a condition upon which a against it forthwith, the provision as to nomortgage upon real estate shall be dischar- tice being merely a limitation of the payee's ged, means payment by the mortgagor upon right to sue. Knapp v. Greene, 29 N. Y. a demand made upon him, and not payment Supp. 350, 351, 79 Hun, 264. by a stranger to the deed with or without a demand.” Popple v. Day, 123 Mass. 520, ON DEMAND AFTER DATE. 522.

The expression "on demand after date" A contract to furnish coal "on demand" in a note is deemed equivalent to the words to a certain mine, but that the daily demand "on demand,” with the exception that the shall not exceed one-half the daily output note is not immediately due, but some time of the mine, indicates that the coal shall be must elapse before demand can be made, and delivered when required by the plaintiff, and therefore before the note becomes due. Fo that no more than half of the daily product ley v. Emerald & Phænix Brewing Co., 39 of the mine can be required by plaintiff. Atl. 650, 651, 61 N. J. Law, 428. The demand required by the contract need not be made daily as the coal is mined, but

A note made payable on demand after may be made for the future. Watson Coal date is payable immediately. Such a note & Min. Co. v. James, 33 N. W. 622, 625, 72 is due at once without an actual demand, Iowa, 184.

and the statute of limitation begins to run

against it immediately. O'Neil v. Magner, 22 A bank deposit payable on demand is a Pac. 876, 877, 81 Cal. 631, 15 Am. St. Rep. debt payable in two years, within Laws 1890, 88

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ON THE EXPRESS CONDITION. "Money on deposit,” says the Court of See “Express Condition," Appeals of New York, is, ex vi termini, money placed where the owner can command it

ON FAILURE OF ISSUE. at any time." Long v. Straus, 6 N. E. 123, 125, 7 N. E. 763, 766, 107 Ind. 94, 57 Am. See "Failure of Issue." Rep. 87 (citing Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9).

Where a depositary acknowledges in ON FILE.
writing to have received a certain number
of dollars “on deposit to be paid on demand," Every paper once legally Aled in the gen-
such phrase imports not a contract of bail- eral land office prior to the adoption of Act
ment, but a loan of money payable presently Nov. 29, 1871, and not withdrawn under a
or on demand. Wright v. Paide, 62 Ala. 340, law authorizing it, and by one having author-
344, 34 Am. Rep. 24,

ity to withdraw it was in contemplation of
that law, on file in that office. Snider V.

Methvin, 60 Tex. 487, 493.

The words "on file," used in a deed in The phrase "on the door,” in a statute reference to a plat, will be taken to mean requiring notice of a tax sale to be posted deposited, as distinguished from a technical on the courthouse door, does not necessarily filing of the plat Slosson v. Hall, 17 Minn. mean on the swinging panel which fills the 95 (Gil. 71, 74). opening or entrance to the building, but a conspicuous posting upon the building at the side of the opening, or upon a separate board ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITION. or panel or bulletin kept there for that purpose, is sufficient to all reasonable intents "upon the following conditions,” occurring in

The words “provided nevertheless" and and purposes. Hoskins v. Iowa Land Co., a deed, are appropriate words to create a 96 N. W. 977, 978, 121 Iowa, 299.

condition, but they do not of necessity create

such an estate. They will give way when ON EACH ENTRY.

the intention of the grantor, as manifested 13 Stat. 214, providing that on the entry by the whole deed, is otherwise, and they of any goods the decision of the collector as

have frequently been explained and applied to the rate and amount of duties to be paid as expressing simply a covenant or limitaon such goods shall be final and conclusive tion in trust. Consequently, where it was onless the importer shall, within 10 days recited after the habendum clause of a deed, after the ascertainment and liquidation of provided nevertheless, and upon the followthe duties by the proper officers of the cus

ing conditions,” that if the grantor survives toms, give notice in writing to the collector the grantee he shall have the right within a "on each entry,” means that in all cases, specified time to buy back the estate at a whether of entry in bond or for consumption, price to be fixed by arbitration, such clause the owner shall give notice in writing on

creates a covenant in spite of the words with each entry to the collector, etc., not meaning which it was introduced. Woodruff v. Wood. on the paper or record called the entry, but ruff, 16 Atl. 4, 6, 44 N. J. Eq. (17 Stew.) 349,

1 L, R. A, 380. in respect of each entry. Ullman v. Murphy (U. 8.) 24 Fed. Cas. 506, 508


See "Pork on Foot." Where the selectmen of a town notified the selectmen of another town that a certain ON FREIGHT. person was on the expense of the former town, the expression “on expense" was

A firm in the habit of receiving grain sufficient notification that the person referred in store to be shipped to the New York marto was a pauper. Town of Hamden y. Town ket received plaintiff's grain, which was de of Bethany, 43 Conn, 212, 216.

posited with that of other customers in a

common bin. A memorandum was given to A notice of support furnished paupers, plaintiff acknowledging the receipt of the sent by the selectmen of a town, stating that grain on freight Held, that the words “on certain persons were “on expense in this freight should be held to import a bailment, town” should be construed to fairly import and not a sale. Dawson v Kittle (N. Y.) 4 that the persons named were paupers, that Hill, 107, 108. they were then residing in such town, were ebargeable to the town, and that the town A receipt reciting that corn was deliverwas incurring expense in their support. ed to a certain person “on freight,” and not Town of Bethlehem v. Town of Watertown, to be sold, means left to be disposed of ac51 Conn. 490, 492.

cording to the usage of the place and of the 6 WDS. & P.-7

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parties themselves. Outwater 1, Nelson (N. ON A JOURNEY. Y.) 20 Barb. 29, 81

See, also, "Journey." ON HAND.

Gantt's Dig. $ 1517, made it a misde See “Cash on Hand"; "Goods on Hand"; meanor to wear any pistol concealed as a "Stock on Hand.”

weapon unless on a journey. Held, that the

words “on a journey" contemplated a travelA will providing that all of the testator's er bona fide going from one place to another, money on hand or in bank at the time of his and that a traveler was on a journey, withdecease should go to his daughter includes in the meaning of the law, while stopping money in the hands of an agent, though the at a town on his way, if he was in fact and agent had a claim on such sum for his com- in good faith prosecuting his journey, and mission, and the legacy included the entire only stopped for a temporary purpose, and sum, and is not to be reduced by the com- did not stop to stay or mingle generally with mission due the agent. In re Copia's Estate the citizens of the place either for business (Pa.) 5 Phila. 214, 215.

or pleasure. Carr v. State, 34 Ark. 448, 36

Am, Rep. 15. A lease of a sawmill provided that, on a termination thereof by the lessor on the sale of the property, the lessee should have ON LAKES OR RIVERS. two months' notice to "saw out" a water

Where a bill of lading given by a rallterm, and then, if any logs remained over, road company to a shipper of freight providhe should either have the privilege to con-ed that the railroad should not be responsitinue in possession at option of the lessor ble, in the absence of negligence, for loss at the same rate rent until logs on hand were or damage on lakes or rivers, the phrase "on sawed, or should be allowed the extra cost of lakes or rivers” meant that the carrier was teaming said logs to another mill, etc. Held, not to be responsible for loss or damage octhat the words “logs on hand” meant those curring in the navigation of the lakes or riv. bought and provided in the regular course of ers; and hence where the goods shipped were business, and not simply those in the mill- lost while stored on a wharfboat which yard, and that he was not precluded from floated on the waters of a river awaiting the recovering the extra expense of sawing at arrival of a packet on which the goods were another mill those that remained over after to have been shipped, the wharfboat serving two months' notice, which necessarily re

as a storehouse in the meanwhile, the navimained over as those bought in the regular gation of the river had not commenced, and course of business, but that he was not enti- the carrier was liable. St. Louis & S. E. R. tled to recover the extra expense for the saw. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302, 308 ing out of logs the result of neglect of use of the mill for other than ordinary purposes. Crouch v. Parker, 56 N. Y. 597, 598.


“On the line thereof," as used in 13 Stat ON HER OWN ACCOUNT.

356, granting to a railroad company every

alternate section of public lands designatA declaration that a married woman in-ed by odd numbers to the amount of 10 sectends to carry on business “in her own tions per mile on each side of the road "on name” is not synonymous with a declaration the line thereof," do not mean contiguous that she intends to carry on business “on her to the roadbed or to the land taken for own account,” and hence the sole traders’ the roadbed, but that the land shall be taken act, requiring the filing of a declaration that along a parallel to the general direction of she intends to carry on business in her own the road on each side of it, and within lines name and on her own account is not satis- perpendicular to its terminus at each end. fied by a declaration stating that a married United States v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. woman intends to carry on business in her (U. S.) 24 Fed. Cas. 1305, 1306. own name. Manton v. Tyler, 1 Pac. 743, 744, 4 Mont. 364.

The preposition "on" has an almost in

exhaustible variety of meanings. One is ON ITS FACE.

"conforming to or agreeing with, as on the

line.” Hence, in a description of a boundRev. St. art. 2181, declaring that, when ary, to start from the N. E. corner of the N. an alias or pluries execution is issued, it shall E. quarter of the S. E. quarter of section show "upon its face" the number of previous 8, and to run thence west on the section line executions, means that such facts shall be to the N. W. corner of the N. W. quarter of shown in the execution itself, and the stat- the S. W. quarter, the words “on the section ute is not complied with by a mention of line" will be held to express relative as well previous executions in a bill of costs attached as absolute position, and to mean that the to an execution. Driscoll v. Morris, 21 S. W. line shall run parallel with the section line, 629, 631, 2 Tex, Civ. App. 603.

since the line would have to be on the quar.

ter-section line. Burnham v. Police Jury of not to be so construed as to render a bastard Claiborne Parish, 32 South, 87, 88, 107 La. capable of transmitting an estate by descent 513.

to his mother or to his illegitimate brothers. The act of 1869, authorizing residents Bent's Adm'r v. St. Vrain, 30 Mo. 268, 271 who live upon the line of the Illinois & Mich- / (citing Stevenson v. Sullivan, 18 U. & 15 igan Canal to cut and remove ice from said Wheat.] 260, 5 L. Ed. 70). canal, will be construed to include any one The phrase "on the part of the father," living so near the canal as to desire to cut in a statute relative to descent of property, and remove ice therefrom. Card v. McCaleb, has a technical signification, referring not 99 Ill. 314, 317.

only to the father, but to all ancestors of

the father, both paternal and maternal. KelON THE MERITS.

ly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 586.

See “Merita."


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The phrases "at sea" or "on a voyage" ON MODERATE TERMS.

or “on a passage” are equivalent in meaning,
See "Moderate,"

and, when either of them is used in a ma-
rine policy to describe the time during which

the liability of the insurer continues, it ON A MOUNTAIN OR RIDGE.

operates to continue the risk until the arThe words “to,” “on,” “along," "with,” rival of the vessel at the port of destination. or "by" a mountain or ridge mean summit Wales v. China Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Mass. (8 point, or summit line, unless otherwise ex

Allen) 380, 383. pressed. Pol. Code Cal. 1903, $ 3905; Rev. A marine policy which provided that if, St. Ariz. 1901, par. 929; Pol. Code Mont at the expiration of the policy, the vessel 1895, $ 4105.

should be on a passage, the risk should con

tinue, means after she bas left her port of ON THE PART OF.

lading, prepared to proceed to her port of

destination, with intent to do so; and hence
Gen. St. c. 31, $ 6, providing that Illegiti- she is on her passage, although she comes
mate children shall be capable of inheriting to anchor on account of bead winds, there
and transmitting an inheritance on the part being an intention of proceeding as soon as
of or to the mother, cannot be construed as the weather is permissive. Bowen v. Hope
meaning transmissibility of an estate not | Ins. Co., 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 275, 279, 32 Am.
only to, but through, the mother, and on to Dec. 213.
her collateral kindred. Croan V. Phelps'

A marine policy insuring & vessel for a
Adm'ı, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 915, 916, 918, 21
S. W. 874, 94 Ky. 213, 23 L. R. A. 753.

year, and providing that if the vessel was

on a passage at the end of the term the risk The phrase "on the part of the mother," could continue until arrival at port of desin a statute relative to descent of property, tination, does not insure the vessel after the has a technical signification, referring not expiration of the year, while lying in a safe only to the mother, but to all ancestors of harbor, in which she had put voluntarily to the mother. Kelly's Heirs V. McGuire, 15 obtain necessary clearance and water and Art. 555, 586.

crew for her further voyage. Washington Under Rev. St. 1899, $ 2916, providing

Ins. Co. v. White, 103 Mass. 238, 242, 4 Am. that bastards shall be capable of inheriting

Rep. 543. and transmitting inheritance on the part of the mother, a bastard may, like a legitimate ON THE PREMISES. child, inherit from the brother of his mother

See "On or About the Premises."
dying after her, the words “on the part of
the mother" meaning the mother's side of the A policy describing the insured property
genealogical tree. Moore v. Moore, 69 8. W. as being situated on or confined to premises
278-281, 169 MO. 432, 58 L. R. A. 451. occupied by the insured, locating such prem-
Rev. Code 1845, p. 442, which declares ing for it on certain parts of the property

ises, and an application for insurance, ask-
that bastards shall be capable of “inheriting while on the premises only, did not cover a
and transmitting inheritance on the part of
their mother in like manner as 1f they had ises, 20 miles distant, though being used for

loss of the property while on different prem-
been lawfully begotten of such mother" is con-
strued to mean that the bastards will have the ordinary purposes which must have been
capacity to take real property by descent contemplated when the policy was issued.
immediately or through their mother in the Lakings v. Phænix Ing. Co., 94 Iowa, 476, 62
ascending line, and transmit the same to N. W. 783, 784, 28 L. R. A. 70.
their line as descendants, in like manner as Where a fire policy on a church provided
If they were legitimate. This provision is that if naphtha be kept or used on the prem-

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Ises by the insured, the policy should be is not on record. Harvey v. State, 31 N. E. void, the use of a naphtha torch by a painter 835, 5 Ind. App. 422. to remove the old paint from the building, which was of wood, was a use "on the prem-ON SALE OR RETURN. ises," within the meaning of such words as used in the policy, notwithstanding the fact A contract on sale or return is defined that no napbtha was at any time inside the by Judge Story as an agreement by which building. First Congregational Church v. goods are delivered by a wholesale dealer to Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 N. E. 572, 573, a retail dealer to be paid for at a certain rate 158 Mass. 475.

if sold by the latter, and, if not sold, to be

returned. And a contract between a manuWhere a statute provided that, when- facturer and retail dealer providing that the ever the name of the owner of the lot is dealer should act as special agent in the sale stated as unknown in the assessment, then of certain patterns which the manufacturer the said contractor, or his agent or assigns, should furnish, to be paid for half in cash shall publicly demand payment on the prem- and half in interest-bearing credit; that old ises assessed, a demand pear to or in the patterns might be returned for new ones, hearing of the premises does not satisfy the but not in payment for goods; and that, if requirement of the statute providing for a the contract was terminated, the purchaser public demand on the premises, the term "on should have the right to return all patterns the premises” mea ning a person on the prem-Ion band, and receive 75 per cent of the price ises. Alameda Macadamizing Co. v. Will-paid-is not a contract of sale or return, but lams, 12 Pac. 530, 534, 70 Cal. 534.

a contract of sale. Butterick Pub. Co. v. A will in which testator left all the fur- Bailey, 75 N. W. 189, 191, 105 Iowa, 326. niture, household effects, etc., “in, upon, or about" the premises included articles which ON THE SAME STREET. had been upon the property, and had been

See “Same Street." temporarily sent away for repairs, but did not include articles which had been intended for, but which were never in, the house. ON THE SAME VOYAGE. Brooke v. Warwick, 12 Jur. 912, 913, 12 Law

See “Same Voyage." T. 41.


A contract to continue business on shares "On purpose," as used in an instruction means that the parties shall share equally. that the jury should find the defendant guilty Crittenden v. Johnston, 40 N. Y. Supp. 87, 88, of assault with intent to rob if he feloniously, 7 App. Div. 258. on purpose, and of his malice aforethought, sbot another with a loaded pistol, with intent

"Letting land on shares" is a phrase well to steal the moneys, goods, and chattels of understood among farmers. It means that such person, means intentionally, and not ac

both parties shall share equally in the cidentally. State v. Tate, 56 S. W. 1099, products of the land, to compensate the one 1100, 156 Mo. 119; State v. Musick, 14 s. w. for his labor, and the other for the use of 212, 213, 101 Mo. 260.

his land. In such cases, after the crops are harvested, and before a division is made,

each party is the owner of an undivided ON REASONABLE REQUEST.

moiety of the same, and is a tenant in com

mon with the other, unless the contract conAn agreement “to pay on reasonable request" was equivalent to an agreement to

tains some special provision taking the case

out of the general rule. Connell v. Ricbpay within a reasonable time after request, and the debt could not mature until demand mond, 11 Atl. 852, 853, 55 Conn. 401. was made, and a reasonable time for compliance had elapsed. Illinois Land & Loan ON THE SIDE OF. Co. v. Beem, 2 Ill. App. (2 Bradw.) 390, 393.

See “Side."


ON SHORE. Under Rev. St. 1881, § 629, providing "On shore," as used in 24 Geo. III, Sess. that a bill of exceptions, to be on record, 2, c. 47, § 15, giving the officers of excise aumust be presented to the judge for examina- thority while on shore to seize goods, meant tion, and, if found correct, signed and filed “on land," in contradistinction to "on board by him, a bill in which the only signature a ship"; and an officer seizing goods at an of the judge that appeared was attached to inland place at any distance from the sea the certificate of presentation, without any was within the protection of the act. The adjudication as to the correctness of the bill, King v. Brady, 1 Bos. & P. 187, 188.

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