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land itself. Uhl v. Ohio River R. Co., 41 | clude the idea of crossing highways on the S. E. 340, 341, 51 W. Va. 106.

As in case of.

surface thereof, and also running upon them lengthwise. Gear v. C. C. & D. R. Co., 43 Iowa, 83, 84; City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids

As used in a will providing that, upon & M. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455, 472.

the death of either of the testator's children leaving issue, the principal of such child's share should go to and be distributed among the issue of such deceased, "upon" is equivalent to the phrase "in case of." Appeal of Roberts, 59 Pa. (9 P. F. Smith) 70, 98 Am. Dec. 312. It is intended to fix the time of the vesting of devises by deceased children of their shares. Appeal of Conrow (Pa.) 3 Atl. 13, 14.

As on surface of.

"The court in Arbenz v. Wheeling & H. R. R. Co., 10 S. E. 14, 33 W. Va. 1, 5 L. R. A. 371, in holding that a statute giving a railroad company the right to construct its railway across, along, or upon any street, highway, road, or turnpike, but requiring such corporation to restore the street, highway, road, or turnpike to its former state, or to such state as not to have impaired its usefulness, did not preclude the railroad company from making a cut or excavation in the street in such a manner as to appropriate a portion of the street to its exclusive use, if the excavation did not occupy the entire street or such substantial portion thereof as would substantially prevent the use of the street by the public as a highway, said, in answer to the contention that by the use of the words 'across, along, or upon,' the Legislature intended to limit the road to a surface use of the street in a manner not precluding the use of the entire street by the public, that the word 'upon' in the statute does not necessarily mean upon the common grade of the street, and that the words 'upon and along must be construed with reference to the context and the subject in controversy. They must be understood to mean along, in the street, at, above, or below the common level of the existing or changed surface of the street, according as the particular facts and circumstances may require." Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 1 Ohio Probate, 269, 276.

As over.

The word "on," as used in the compact entered into between Pennsylvania and New Jersey providing for jurisdiction over offenses committed on the Delaware river, is used in the sense of "over." Commonwealth V. Hoyt, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 414, 416.

In the case of Milburn v. City of Cedar Rapids, 12 Iowa, 246, in construing a statute authorizing railroad corporations to raise or lower any turnpike, plank road, or other way for the purpose of having their railroad pass over or under the same, it was held that in the sense of the statute the words "over and upon" are synonymous, and in

As within a reasonable time after.

"On," as used in Gen. St. c. 25, § 6, providing that it shall be the duty of commissioners, on receiving the report of viewers for the opening of a road, to cause the same to be read before their meeting, etc., should not be construed to mean "immediately on," but to mean "on or within a reasonable time thereafter," so that the commissioners are not compelled to take final action at their first meeting, but may postpone such action until some subsequent meeting. Masters v. McHolland, 12 Kan. 17, 25.

Crossing.

Within the meaning of Const. art. 3, § 18, and Laws 1890, c. 565, §§ 90, 91, prohibiting the construction or operation of street railroads upon streets or highways without the consent of the local authorities, a street railroad crossing a street or highway is constructed upon such street or highway as well as when it follows the course thereof. A road across a railway is built upon it. In re Syracuse & S. B. Ry. Co., 68 N. Y. Supp. 881, 882, 33 Misc. Rep. 510.

The statutory authority given by Laws 1899, c. 712, authorizing the taxation of special franchises of railroads situated in, upon, under, or above any highway, includes the franchise of a railroad in a highway crossing, though the word "across" was in the original draft of the act, and omitted on its final passage, as the word "upon" had been formally construed to include a highway crossing when used in connection with it. Judge Cullen, in Osborne v. Jersey City & A. Ry. Co. (N. Y.) 27 Hun, 589, in considering the question whether an order of the Supreme Court was necessary to authorize the construction of a railroad across a highway, and in construing the act of 1864, which provided that nothing therein contained

should be construed to authorize the construction upon and along any highway without an order of the Supreme Court authorizing the same, said: "We think that wherever a railroad is constructed on the surface

of the highway it is along and upon so much of the highway as is occupied by it." In the 125 N. Y. 93, 26 N. E. 25, 10 L. R. A. 728, case of People's Rapid Transit Co. v. Dash, the Court of Appeals was called upon to construe an act which prohibited the building of a railroad in, upon, or along any or either of the streets or avenues of the city of New York, except under the authority and subject to such regulations as the Legislature might thereafter provide. It is urged that this act only prohibited the building of a railroad through a portion of the length of the street,

but did not apply to the crossing of the street. The court refused to consent to such a construction of the statute, and Judge Peckham says: "If the road were built through the length of the street, its location might be easily described by the use of any one of the three words contained in the statute-'in,' 'upon,' or 'along' such street. But to describe a road which simply crossed a street as being built along such street would be using language neither appropriate nor exact. To say of such a road that it would be in or upon that street at the point where the road crossed it would be both appropriate and exact. There is a difference in the meaning of these three words as used in the statute, and some effect should be given to such difference. If their meaning be construed to simply prohibit a railroad along the length of the street, no effect whatever is given to this difference. The words used are certainly apt to describe a railroad which crosses the street. Such railroad is plainly for that distance both in and upon the street which it crosses. If not in or upon it at that point, where is it? No description of its whereabouts at that particular point is better than to say that it is in or upon the street where It is sufficient, and it is true. It is not necessary that the railroad should pass along the surface of the street in order to be in or upon it." New York, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Roll, 66 N. Y. Supp. 748, 751, 32 Misc. Rep. 321.

it crosses.

ON OR ABOUT.

The phrase "on or about" a certain day is not a sufficiently definite description as to time and place of the occurrence of an accident to constitute a compliance with Laws 1889, c. 440, providing that no action shall be maintained against a village unless the claim shall have been presented and notice of the time and place at which the injuries were received filed with the village clerk. Lee v. Village of Greenwich, 63 N. Y. Supp. 160, 161, 48 App. Div. 391.

"On or about," as used in a finding that a building on which a mechanic's lien was claimed was completed on or about a certain date, is a relative term, and, the filing of the notice of a mechanic's lien being required to be made within a certain number of days after the completion of the building, it is uncertain and indefinite. "On or about" is sufficiently definite in certain connections, but in cases of this kind, where the right of a person depends upon his doing a particular thing within a definite number of days after a certain event, it is necessary for him to allege and prove that the acts were performed within the time required by law. Cohn v. Wright, 26 Pac. 643, 89 Cal. 86.

The use of the words "on or about" in a statement filed by the claimant of a mechanic's lien with the clerk of a district

court in order to preserve his lien, that the contract under which he claims was made on or about a certain day, does not preclude the claimant, in a contest with a mortgagee of the property on which the lien is claimed, from introducing evidence showing the exact date of the contract. Mitchell v. Penfield, 8 Kan. 186, 188.

A statement for mechanic's lien that certain materials were furnished "on or

about" the 1st day of July, though somewhat indefinite and uncertain as to time, will not be held to extend as far back as May 24th. Santa Monica Lumber & Mill Co. v. Hege (Cal.) 48 Pac. 69, 71.

A contract for the sale of oil provided that the same was to be sent by a vessel sailing "on or about" the 15th of March. Held, that such term, referring to the time of sailing, did not constitute a warranty, and the buyer was therefore not discharged from his obligation to pay for and receive the oil because the vessel did not sail until March 26th. Hawes v. Lawrence, 4 N. Y. 345, 346.

The expression "on or about" a certain

date is held to be just as consistent with a day or two after the date as before. Paine

v. State Land Office Com'r, 66 Mich. 245,

248, 33 N. W. 491.

The words "on or about," in a lease of a mill privilege, consisting of land, water power, etc., and giving the lessee the priv ilege of laying logs, boards, and other lumber on or about said privilege, does not operate as a permission for the lessee to occupy lands of the lessor lying outside the mill privilege. Thompson v. Banks, 43 N. H. 540, 541.

In civil pleadings.

A complaint in an action on a fire policy, alleging that plaintiff gave notice to defend ant of the loss within 60 days after the fire, as required by the policy, is not rendered sufficient, as a compliance with the policy, by the fact that in alleging the date of the fire and date of the giving of notice it states that such events occurred "on or about" certain dates. National Wall Paper Co. v. Associated Manufacturers' Mut. Fire Ins. Corp., 70 N. Y. Supp. 124, 126, 60 App. Div. 222.

Where a statute required a claim for lands to be presented within six months, a bill alleging that the papers were filed "on or about" the day when the time of presentation was over should be construed as rendering the pleading defective, the words being just as consistent with a day or two after as before. Paine v. State Land Office Com'r, 33 N. W. 491, 493, 66 Mich. 245.

In indictments or informations.

Where it is necessary to define the time of the commission of an offense in an indictment, the use of the term "on or about" a certain day rendered the indictment void for

uncertainty. United States v. Winslow (U. S.) 28 Fed. Cas. 737, 738; United States v. Crittenden (U. S.) 25 Fed. Cas. 694.

sale of liquor by any person on or about his premises without first procuring a license therefor, etc., includes a sale from a jug which defendant had in a field where he was Working with others, more than a mile from his house, and in the plantation of another person over which he had no control. Powell v. State, 63 Ala. 177.

"On or about," in Code 1886, § 4036, prohibiting the sale of liquor to be drunk on or about the premises of the seller, characterizes a place four or five steps from defendant's store, although in a public highway. Whaley v. State, 6 South. 380, 381, 87 Ala. 83.

Cr. Prac. Act, § 166, declares that the precise time of the commission of an offense need not be stated in the indictment, but it is sufficient if shown to be before the finding of the indictment, and within the period of limitations, except where time is an indispensable ingredient of the offense. Held, that the use of the words "on or about" a certain day within the period of limitations, defining the time of the commission of a rape, did not render the indictment bad for uncertainty. State v. Thompson, 27 Pac. 349, 350, 10 Mont. 549. Where an information in a prosecution ON OR BEFORE. for murder alleged that on or about a certain time the murder was committed, the words "or about" should be treated as without meaning and as surplusage, and hence "on or about" August 11, 1882, should be construed to mean August 11, 1882, and was sufficiently definite. State v. Harp, 3 Pac. 432, 433, 31 Kan. 496.

The term "on or about," used in a complaint for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors in the allegation of the time of the sale, renders the complaint void for uncertainty. Nor can such words be treated as surplusage and stricken out, for, if that were allowed, the complaint would allege an exact day, which the allegation appears was not the intention. State v. Baker, 34 Me. 52, 53.

The term "on or about," as used in a warrant alleging that the offense was committed on or about January 2, 1891, did not render the allegation as to time indefinite, so as to require the proceedings to be quashed, where the information based on the warrant alleged that the crime was committed on January 2, 1891. People v. Flock, 59 N. W. 237, 100 Mich. 512.

The use of the phrase "on or about" in an indictment charging defendant with committing the offense of arson on or about a specified date does not render the information fatally defective for uncertainty, since Comp. Laws, § 7245, provides that the precise time when an offense is committed need not be specified in the indictment, except when time is a material ingredient. State v. McDonald (S. D.) 91 N. W. 447.

When, with reference to a particular day, the words "on or about" are used in an indictment or information, the last two words shall be regarded as mere surplusage. Horner's Rev. St. Ind. 1901, § 1738.

ON OR ABOUT THE PREMISES.

See "On the Premises."

"On or about his premises," as used in Code, 4204, providing a penalty for the

"On or before," as used in a contract entitling a party to a conveyance of a tract of real estate on the payment of a certain sum on or before a certain date, is to be construed as authorizing a payment on any date before the specified day. Wall v. Simpson, 29 Ky. (6 J. J. Marsh.) 155, 156, 22 Am. Dec. 72.

"On or before," as used in a notice by a comptroller requiring a bank to pay to the treasurer of the state, on or before the 1st day of January then next, one-half of 1 per cent. of its capital stock, such sum to continue payable each year until the safety fund should be reimbursed, means that the payment may be made any indefinite time, no matter how long, before January 1st, and necessarily implies that the ground or cause of payment, the consideration or indebtedness, was, prior to the time, complete. People v. Walker (N. Y.) 21 Barb. 630, 643.

"On or before," as used in a policy declaring that it shall determine if the premium is not paid on or before the day fixed, means at any time in advance of the instant of the expiration of the policy. Sheerer v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. (U. S.) 20 Fed. 886, 888.

The term "on or before" in a teacher's contract, requiring payment on or before the end of the term, may, as a matter of strict interpretation, only require payment at the end of the term; but where the compensation is rated in the contract by the month, and it appears that it was understood between the teacher and the majority of the board that it should be paid monthly, and that such is the common and convenient usage, we are not prepared to say that the refusal of payment by the school director might not be regarded, if willful or proceeding from some motive beyond a desire to do his duty, as an abuse deserving censure. Geddes v. Town Board, 9 N. W. 431, 432, 46 Mich. 316.

A notice by a landlord to his tenant to move "on or before" the date when the lease

expires means that the landlord will insist | preceding the sale or transfer of the emon his legal right to have the tenant move ployer's property, on account of insolvency or out before the last day of the term, and is death of such employer, preferred liens on not a continuing offer to accept a surrender such property, means by reason of; because of the existing lease whenever the tenant of the one or the other. Brown v. Germanelects to make it. Koehler v. Scheider, 10 American Title & Trust Co., 34 Atl. 335, 343, N. Y. Supp. 101, 102, 16 Daly, 235. 174 Pa. 443.

As at or before.

Within a certain period "on or before" a day named, and "at or before" a certain day, are equivalent terms, and the rules of construction apply to each alike. Leader V. Plante, 50 Atl. 54, 95 Me. 339, 85 Am. St. Rep. 415.

As between.

"On or before," as used in the return of surveyors of a public road, reciting that the road should be opened on or before the 1st day of September next, in their natural, le gal, and correct construction mean that the surveyors shall open the road between the day of the return and the 1st day of September. In re Public Road in Middlesex and Monmouth Counties, 4 N. J. Law (1 Southard, 290, 292.

As rendering note nonnegotiable.

"On or before the day named," as used in a note, did not render the same nonnegotiable by reason of the fact that the date of payment was uncertain, since the day of payment was certain to arrive; for, while it was true the maker might pay sooner if he chose, such option, if exercised, would be a payment in advance of the legal liability to pay, and nothing more, such provision having no effect on the negotiability of a note. Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 10 Sup. Ct. 999, 1003, 136 U. S. 268, 34 L. Ed. 349.

As giving option as to payment of note. Promissory notes due on or before certain dates are due and payable at any time not later than such dates, when the maker may elect to treat them as due. Burlington Ins. Co. v. McLeod, 8 Pac. 124, 126, 34 Kan. 189; Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421, 422, 18 Am. Rep. 197.

A note payable on or before a certain day is payable on that day so far as the maker is concerned, and means that he may pay it before if he wishes to, but may put it off until the day named. The use of the words "on or before" does not render the note ambiguous as to its legal effect, or render parol testimony admissible to show that it was to be paid before the day named. James v. Benjamin, 72 Ga. 185.

ON ACCOUNT OF.

"On account of," as used in Act May 12, 1891 (P. L. 54), making moneys due for labor and services accruing within six months

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"On account of," used in a receipt, "Re ceived of Capt. E. Smith 50 barrels of provisions on account of K.,” did not mean that the provisions had been sold, nor that they were received by the receiptor, on an account due from K., but rather that K. owned the property; and hence parol evidence was admissible to show that the receiptor received the provisions to sell as a commission merchant, and that he sold the same in the usual course of business. McKinstry Pearsall (N. Y.) 3 Johns. 319.

V.

A policy of insurance on a vessel "on account of -" is equivalent to a policy "for whom it may concern," and hence, in an action on such a policy, proof aliunde may be given to show the real parties in interest. Burrows v. Turner (N. Y.) 24 Wend. 276, 278, 35 Am. Dec. 622.

ON ACCOUNT OF COLOR.

Act Cong. 1863, giving certain privileges to the Alexandria & W. R. Co., provided that "no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of color." Held, that this meant that persons of color should travel in the same cars that white ones did, and along with them in such cars, and that the company's providing cars assigned exclu sively to colored people, although such cars were as good as those assigned exclusively to white persons, and in fact the very cars which were at a certain time assigned exclusively to white persons, was not a compliance with the provision. Washington, A. & G. R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U. S. (17 Wall.) 445, 452, 21 L. Ed. 675.

ON ACCOUNT OF FREIGHT.

Where a policy insured the owner of a ship "on account of freight" of the cargo loaded on her, such interest was thereby sufficiently described, and operated to insure the owner against liability to repay to the charterer money advanced by him in part payment of the freight which the ship was to earn for transportation of the goods loaded

which is verified by the oath of the party making it. Miller v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 17 N. W. 130, 131, 58 Wis. 310.

on her, notwithstanding the word "freight," says," etc., is not a part of the affidavit used in its technical sense, would not include such money freight, as such does not become due until completion of the voyage and delivery of the goods. Hall v. Janson, 4 EL & BL 500, 508.

Where the owners of a brig procured plaintiffs to load the same with a home cargo at a port to which the captain had been forced, and the charterers furnished the captain with money to cover disbursements under an arrangement that such advances were furnished on account of freight which the vessel was to earn, the charterer's interest in the funds so furnished was properly described in a policy issued to them as "advance on account of freight." Wilson v. Martin, 11 Exch. 684, 695.

A contract by certain parties "on behalf of" others prima facie imports that they made the contract only as agents, and cannot be said to be ambiguous. Lewis v. Nicholson, 18 Adol. & E. 503, 512.

"On behalf of," as used in a contract

stipulating that it was agreed "between J., of the first part, and C., of the other part, on behalf of the G. Ry. Co.," and signed by J. and by C., did not constitute a contract on the part of the principals alone, but the contracting party was bound notwithstanding the use of the words "on behalf of." Cooke v. Wilson, 1 C. B. (N. S.) 153, 162,

ON ACCOUNT OF WHOM IT MAY CON- ON BOARD.

CERN.

See "Whom It May Concern."

ON AN EQUAL FOOTING.

See "Equal Footing."

ON ARRIVAL.

The words "on arrival," in an instruc tion to a consignee to sell goods on arrival, do not mean that the property consigned must be sold within one minute or five minutes after its arrival, but just as soon there after as it can be sold without a manifest sacrifice; and the length of time depends upon the circumstances of the case, it being for the jury to say what is a reasonable time. Burnard v. Voss, 8 Ohio Dec. 221.

An instruction to a factor to sell goods

on arrival is to be construed as requiring an immediate sale on the arrival of the goods if possible, even though for less than the market price. Evans v. Root, 7 N. Y. 186,

188, 57 Am. Dec. 512.

Where an agreement was for the delivery of goods on arrival, to be delivered with all convenient speed, "but not to exceed a given day," arrival in time for delivery on the day given was a condition precedent. Alewyn v. Pryor, Ry. & M. 406.

ON BAIL.

When a defendant is said to be "on bail" or to have "given bail," it is intended to apply as well to recognizances as to bail bonds. Code Cr. Proc. Tex. 1895, art. 307.

ON BEHALF OF.

The words "on behalf of," in an affidavit for garnishment, stating that "A. B., on behalf of C. B., being duly sworn on oath,

See "Take on Board."

A contract for the transportation of flour from Niles to Buffalo, by which a carrier agreed to deliver the flour from Niles "on board" at Detroit for a certain amount, cannot be construed to mean that the carrier would have the property so removed from the cars into their depot at Detroit in the capacity of forwarding merchants or warehousemen, and in process of their usual custom see that. the property was put on board some suitable water craft for its transportation East, but it must be construed to mean that the carrier acted as a common carrier until the flour was delivered on board some ship, and that it did not cease to act in that capacity as soon as the property was deposited in their depot, there being a special contract to deliver the property on board.

The liability of the carrier for loss of the flour by fire while stored in its warehouse at Detroit was that of a common carrier, and Cent. R. Co., 3 Mich. 23, 24. not a warehouseman. Moore v. Michigan

Insurance was effected on freight of a vessel at and from Cadiz to a port in Sicily, and at and from thence to her port of destination in the United States. Held, that the phrase "freight on board" meant that the insurance was one entire risk intended to cover all the freight on both voyages, and was equivalent to freight to be laden on board, so that the insurance attached when the voyage commenced, though part of the cargo had not been loaded at that port. Robinson v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 42 Mass. (1 Metc.) 143, 146.

ON THE BOOKS.

A corporation's by-law providing that the shares of stock shall be transferable only on the books of the company, etc., means that the assignment "shall be literally made

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