of the record, and prima facie a correct statement of the testimony and proceedings on the trial, and is entitled to effect and credit as such in the Appellate Court. Tallmadge v. Hooper, 61 Pac. 349, 352, 37 Or. 503. OFFICIAL TERM. Const. art. 4, § 19, forbidding the increase or diminution of the salary of any executive officer during his "official term," means the term for which the officer is chosen or the whole period of time during which the officer may occupy or hold his office. Carlile v. Henderson, 31 Pac. 117, 118, 17 Colo. 532. OFFICIAL TITLE. to sell Under the occupying claimant's act (Gen. St. 1878, c. 75, § 15), providing for two classes Secof occupants, to wit: "First. ond, those who have taken possession of any land under the official deed of any person or officer employed by law land," etc.—the second class may be defined as those who go into possession under color of what may be called “official title." Pfefferle v. Wieland, 55 Minn. 202, 209, 56 N. W. 824, 825. OFFICINA JUSTITIÆ. In the ordinary or legal court the officina justitiæ is kept, out of which issue all original writs that pass under the great seal. Those writs that related to the subject were originally kept in a hamper, and those that related to the interests of the crown were kept in a little bag. Hence arose the distinction between the "hanaper office" and the "petty-bag office." Those offices are at all times open to the subject, who may at any time demand and have, ex debito justitiæ, any writ that he may call for. The denomination "officina justitiæ" was adopted to signify that all justice between man and man proceeded from that source; it being, as it is styled in the books, the shop, mint, or manufactory of justice. Yates v. People (N. Y.) 6 Johns. 337, 363. OFFSET. An offset does not deny the existence or the merits of a claim, but is a contrary sum or claim, by which a given claim may be lessened or canceled. Leonard v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 33 Atl. 511, 513, 65 Conn. 529. ages, as a separate and distinct defense by way of offset to plaintiff's claim, was construed to be used as equivalent to the word "counterclaim," as the facts set forth in the answer show a counterclaim, within the definition given in Code Civ. Proc. § 501, subd. 2, providing that a counterclaim must tend to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recov ery. Cable Flax Mills v. Early, 76 N. Y. Supp. 191, 193, 72 App. Div. 213. The word "offsets," as used in a mechanic's lien law requiring the notice or statement of the demand for a lien to state the sum demanded over and above all credits and offsets, is substantially the same as "effects," as used in the notice or statement of the demand for a sum over and above all credits and effects. Merchant v. Humeston, 7 Pac. 903, 904, 2 Wash. T. 433. "Offset," as used in a negotiable note purporting on its face to be payable without offset as against the holder by indorsement." offset, should be construed to mean "without The sole purpose and effect of offsets is to give negotiability and credit to the paper. They are not treated by the courts as having any effect between the maker and the original payee of the paper. Harmanson v. Bain (U. S.) 11 Fed. Cas. 539, 541. OFFSPRING. The term "offspring," in a mortgage on mares and their offspring, includes increase. King v. Lacrosse, 44 N. W. 517, 518, 42 Minn. 488. The word "offspring," by the commonlaw interpretation, embraces any heirs of a given description collectively as a class of persons, unless there is a direct intention plainly and clearly expressed to the contrary. Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. (2 Cushm.) 343, 365. certain disposition of property in case of "Offspring," as used in a will making a testator's daughter dying without offspring by her husband, is a synonym for "issue," and issue cannot be lawful without marriage. Mitchell v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. Ry., 31 Atl. 67, 68, 165 Pa. 645. In a devise to a girl of five years, of certain lots, and providing that in the event of her dying unmarried, or, if marrying, dying without offspring, then these lots were to be sold and the proceeds to be divided equally among certain other persons, the word "offspring" here used is but a synonym for "issue." Barber v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co., 17 Sup. Ct. 488, 494, 166 U. S. 83, 41 L. Ed. 925. The word "offset," in an answer which first denied the allegations of the complaint, and then set out facts showing the breach of a contract on the plaintiff's part, separate and distinct from the one sued upon, The word "offspring," in a will devising by reason of which defendants suffered dam- testator's real estate to his son during his 6 WDS. & P.-6 natural life, and, at his decease, to his legit- OIL. "Offspring" is a word of limitation, not 501, 504. OFTEN. Barber v. A testator directed that the whole of his property, real and personal, be equally divided between his wife and children, and be kept together by his executor and executrix during the widowhood of his wife, or until his children became of age or married, and then, and not till then, "dividends take place as often as they become of age or marry." It was held that the word "often" implied a repetition of the act of division, and hence that the period of division was not to be delayed till all the children became of mature age or all were married. Charles v. Stickney, 50 Ala. 86, 88. The words "often or daily" in an application for a life policy, requiring the applicant to state whether he uses intoxicating stimulants often or daily, is an inquiry as to his habit in that regard; not whether he uses such stimulants at all, but whether he uses any of them habitually. Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Davey, 8 Sup. Ct. 331, 332, 123 U. S. 739, 31 L. Ed. 315. OHIO. "Ohio," as used in descriptions of the surveys of the townships of land in Indiana bordering on the Ohio, means the Ohio river. City of Madison v. Hildreth, 2 Ind. (2 Cart.) 274, 283. ΟΙΚΕΙ ΜΑΝΙΑ. See "Coal Oil." See, also, "Mineral"; "Petroleum." Oil is a mineral. Jennings v. Bloomfield, 49 Atl. 135, 136, 199 Pa. 638 (citing Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 Atl. 564; Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 36 Atl. 201, 35 L. R. A. 816, 57 Am. St. Rep. 601). Oil is a mineral, and, being a mineral, is part of the realty. Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. (3 P. F. Smith) 229. In this it is like coal or any other natural product which in situ forms part of the land. It may become, by severance, personalty, or there may be a right to use or take it originating in custom or prescription, as the right of a life tenant to work opened mines, or to use timber for a farm. repairing buildings or fences on Nevertheless, whenever conveyance is made of it, whether that conveyance is called a lease or a deed, it is, in effect, the grant of part of the corpus of the estate, and not of a mere incorporeal right. Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198, 201. "Oil," as used in a lease of property to be occupied and worked for petroleum, rock or carbon oil, and not for any other purpose, and, if no oil was found in paying quantities within four years, the lease should be null and void, is not synonymous with "gas." Truby v. Palmer (Pa.) 6 Atl. 74. OIL IN BARRELS. Where a fire policy was on refined "oil in barrels" at a refinery, such phrase could not by any construction be held to include oil in a cooling and settling tank. Weisenberger v. Harmony Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 56 Pa. (6 P. F. Smith) 442, 444. OIL LEASE. An oil lease investing the lessee with the right to remove all the oil in place in the premises was said by Chief Justice Sterrett, in Blakley v. Marshall, 34 Atl. 564, 174 Pa. 425, to be in legal effect a sale of a portion of the land. To the same effect are Kier V. Peterson, 41 Pa. (5 Wright) 357, and Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198; Jennings v. Bloomfield, 49 Atl. 135, 136, 199 Pa. 638; Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 69 S. W. 169171, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 292. OIL REFINERY. As building, see "Building (In Lien Oikei mania is a form of insanity manIfesting itself in a morbid state of the do mestic affections, as an unreasonable dislike OIL TANKS. of wife or child without cause or provocation. Ekin's Heirs v. McCracken (Pa.) 11 Phila. 534, 540. As building, see "Building (In Lien OIL WELL. The term "oil well," as used in the pleadings in an action for a mechanic's lien for material furnished for an oil well, etc., will be construed to embrace not only the mere hole in the earth, in the drilling of which the plaintiffs performed labor or furnished material, but also the derrick engine, boiler pump, piping, and appliances attached thereto. Haskell v. Gallagher, 50 N. E. 485, 486, 20 Ind. App. 224, 67 Am. St. Rep. 250. The term "oil well," in Rev. St. § 3184, giving a mechanic's lien on oil wells, consists, in addition to the excavation or hole in the ground, of the drive pipe which is inserted in the ground, and the casing and iron tubing, but does not include the derrick or other things used in connection with the well. Devine v. Taylor (Ohio) 4 O. C. D. 248, 250. There is no failure of consideration good as a defense against notes given for an oil well, by reason of the fact that the oil well does not produce oil sufficient to pay for its operation. Penniman v. Winner, 54 Md. 127, 135. OILCLOTH FOUNDATION. The terms "oilcloth foundations" and "floor cloth canvas," as used in Act June 6, 1872, 4, imposing a duty on such materials, are convertible terms designating the same article. Arthur v. Cumming, 91 U. S. 362, 364, 23 L. Ed. 438. OLD. OLD COUNTRY. "Old country" is a term in common use to designate a country occupied by civilized man before the American continent was. It plainly means a different country from our country, just as the "old continent" means the continent of Europe as distinguished from our continent. It is both a geographical term and a term in common use to designate a country, and therefore it cannot be used as a trade-mark. Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co. (U. S.) 122 Fed. 796, 797, 59 C. C. A. 54. OLD METAL. In an action on a fire policy against loss on a junk dealer's stock of old metals, etc., it was proper to admit evidence that the phrase "old metals" had acquired a broader signification than belonged to such words ordinarily, and to permit plaintiff to prove that old metals, in the understanding of the trade, included old rubber and old glass. Mooney v. Howard Ins. Co., 138 Mass. 375, 52 Am. Rep. 277. OLDEST IN OFFICE. Hill's Code, 2601, providing that the "oldest in office" of the school directors present shall be chairman of all school meetings, means the director who has held office for the longest time under an election. State. v. McKee, 25 Pac. 292, 293, 20 Or. 120. OLEINE. In Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U S. 707, 26 L. Ed. 279, the court said: "It was dis covered by Chevreul, an eminent French "Old,” as used in 1 Rev. St. p. 502, § 2, authorizing commissioners of highways to lay out new roads and discontinue old ones, does chemist, as early as 1813, that ordinary fat, not necessarily mean an ancient or long ex-sisting of a base which has been termed glyctallow, and oil are chemical compounds conIsting road. The phrase "new road" means erin, and of different acids, termed genera road newly laid out where one was not, and the words "old road" are opposite there ally fat acids, but specifically stearic, marto, and mean one laid out and used, whether garic, and oleic acids. These acids, in com long ago or of more recent date. People v. in, margarin, and olein. They are found in bination severally with glycerin, form stearGriswold, 67 N. Y. 59, 61. different proportions in the various neutral fats and oils; stearin predominating in some, margarin in others, and olein in others. When separated from their base (glycerin), they take up an equivalent of water, and are called free-fat acids." Tilghman v. Proctor, 8 Sup. Ct. 894, 895, 125 U. S. 136, 31 L. Ed. 664. The words "old road," as used in 1 Rev. St. p. 517, § 81, authorizing the discontinuance of an old road where it has become useless and unnecessary, implies a road for a time open to the public for its use, but by change of circumstances, and of local needs and habits of trade and intercourse, losing its usefulness. It does not mean a useless ness existing at the laying out of it. People OLEOMARGARINE. V. Griswold, 67 N. Y. 59, 62. Extrinsic evidence is admissible, in the construction of a building contract, to show that a clause in it requiring "old style roofing tin," had acquired a peculiar signification in the trade. Storck v. Mesker, 55 Mo. App. 26. 35. made wholly or partly out of any fat, oil, The term "olemargarine" is used to designate compounds resembling butter in ao pearance and flavor, put on the market as a |OLOGY. The word "oleomargarine," as defined in section 4 of Act May 16, 1894 (91 Ohio Laws, p. 274), does not include butter made from pure milk or cream without any adulteration, though it may be deficient in butter fats. State v. Ransick, 56 N. E. 1024, 1025, 62 Ohio St. 283. Oleomargarine is usually made of leaf lard and beef fat, and churned in milk and cream, or milk, cream, and butter, to give it flavor, with the vegetable dye annotto; and a product known as "fruit of the meadow," which is composed of leaf lard and beef fat bathed in salt ice water for the purpose of taking away the fat and lard odor, and containing no mixture of cream, milk, or butter to give it a butter flavor, and no coloring matter to give it a butter appearance, is not oleomargarine, and is not taxable as such under Act Aug. 2, 1886, c. 840, 24 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2228]. Braun & Fitts v. Coyne (U. S.) 125 Fed. 331. For the purpose of the statutory provisions relative to the sale of oleomargarine, the word "oleomargarine" shall, in addition to its ordinary meaning, include "butterine," "imitation butter," and any article, substance, or compound made in imitation or semblance of butter or as a substitute for butter, and not made exclusively and wholly of milk or cream, or containing any fats, oils, or grease not produced from milk or cream. Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 547, c. 56, § 35. For the purposes of an act relating to oleomargarine, certain manufactured substances, certain extracts, and certain mixtures and compounds, including such mixtures and compounds with butter, shall be known and designated as "oleomargarine," namely: All substances heretofore known as oleomargarine, oleo, oleomargarine oil, butterine, lardine, suine, and neutral; all mixtures and compounds of oleomargarine, oleo, oleomargarine oil, butterine, lardine, suine, and neutral; all lard extracts and tallow extracts; and all mixtures and compounds of tallow, beef fat, suet, lard, lard oil, vegetable oil, annotto, and other coloring matter, intestinal fat, and offal fat made in imitation or semblance of butter, or, when so made, calculated or intended to be sold as butter or for butter. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2228. OLOGRAPHIC WILL. See "Holographic Will." "Ology" is derived from a Greek word which means a discourse or treatise, and in the English language it is used as a termination of the name of a science, or of the subject indicated by the prefix. Stockham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 63 Pac. 658, 659, 10 Kan. App. 580. OMISSION. See "Willful Omission." or The term "omission or mistake" in the statute giving the court power in any stage of the proceedings to permit amendments by changing or adding the name names of any party plaintiff or defendant, whenever it shall appear to them that a mistake or omission has been made in the name or names of any party, means "something done or left undone in the bringing of the suit, that will prevent a trial of the McLoney v. Edcause upon its merits." gar, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 27, 29. Failure to appoint commissioners for more than seven years is an "omission to appoint," within the meaning of Pub. St. c. 44, § 59, providing that the omission to appoint commissioners to allow claims against the estate of a deceased person will not prevent the prosecution of the claims against the executor, etc. Wilkinson v. Winne's Estate, 15 Minn. 159, 167 (Gil. 123, 128). The meaning of the word "omissions," in a building contract which provides that if the owner, at any time during the progress of certain buildings, desires any alterations, deviations, additions, or omissions, he shall be at liberty to do so, and the same shall in no way affect or make void the contract, but will be added to or deducted from the contract, as the case may be, is limited to things which, upon the conditions specified, may be entirely left out of the building, and does not extend to anything within the specifications which the owner may elect to take off the contractor's hands and perform himself. Shaver v. Murdock, 36 Cal. 293, 296. Code, 1990, making it criminal for public officers to willfully "omit or neglect to discharge" any of the duties of their office, will be construed not to include the acts of the county commissioners in auditing accounts for and receiving a greater amount of mileage than was due them. State v. Norris, 16 S. E. 2, 111 N. C. 652. As concealment. "Omission," as used in a policy of insurance which contained a condition that any omission to make known every fact material to the risk should avoid the policy, equivalent to "concealment." Rumsey ▼. Phoenix Ins. Co. (U. S.) 1 Fed. 396, 398; Ramsey v. Same (U. S.) 2 Fed. 429, 431. As error or mistake. Act 1854, providing that notwithstandIng any mistake in the name or names, or omission to name the real owner, an assessment shall be valid, etc., does not mean an entire omission of the owner's name, but means a mistaken name or the substitution of a wrong owner for the real owner. Tindall v. Vanderbilt, 33 N. J. Law (4 Vroom) 38, 39. make provision in the will, and has no reference to the pecuniary value of such provision. In re Callaghan's Estate, 119 Cal. 541, 51 Pac. 860. Any provision which afforded evidence that the child had not been forgotten is sufficient to prevent the application of the statute relating to pretermitted children. The statute not being intended to produce equality or diminish the power of the testator, but merely to regulate its exercise, a vested remainder carrying with it a vested right to property, though postponing its actual enjoyment, does not show an omission to provide for the child to whom it is devised. Allison v. Allison's Ex'rs (Va.) 44 S. E. 904, 917, 63 L. R. A. 920. An omnibus is a very large kind of coach, "which serves to carry passengers, newspapers, and furniture." Cincinnati, L. & S. Turnpike Co. v. Neil, 9 Ohio (9 Ham.) 11, 13. "Omission," as used in Rev. St. c. 6, 142, providing that any error, mistake, or omission by the assessors, collector, or treasurer shall not render the tax void, but any OMNIBUS. person paying such tax may bring his action against the town, and recover the sum not raised for a legal object, should be construed in connection with the words "error" and "mistake," which precede it, and be interpreted with reference to the rule of ejusdem generis. It was intended to signify an absence of the requisite formalities in assessments and commitments, and a failure to observe the regulations of the statute which were intended to promote method, system, and uniformity in the mode of proceeding. It was clearly never in the contemplation of the Legislature that it would be extended to apply to cases of omission to include in the assessment all the property which ought to be taxed. Emery v. Inhabi ing of omnibuses, or vehicles in the nature An ordinance providing for the licensthereof, applies to passenger street railway cars, as they are omnibuses, or, if not, they They are open to all and intended for all, and the change of form from that of any passed is not a change in the nature of the thing known when the act of assembly was vehicle. In one city, at least, of Europe, large conveyances intended for indiscrim are vehicles in the nature of omnibuses. tants of Sanford, 43 Atl 116, 118, 92 Me. inate public use run sometimes upon a rail 525 OMIT. The term "omit," in an insurance policy providing that, if insured shall omit to communicate any circumstances which are material to the risk, the insurance shall be of no force, has reference solely to the time when the insurance is effected, and therefore the policy is not avoided by the subsequent omission of the insured to notify the company that the risk has become more hazardous by reason of a more hazardous occupation being carried on therein. Pim v. Reid, 6 Man. & G. 1, 13. "Omission to make known," as used in a policy of fire insurance, providing that it should be void for "omission to make known a fact material to the risk," cannot be construed to include a failure to make a full disclosure of the insured's interest in the premises when he applied for insurance. Ramsey v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (U. S.) 2 Fed, 429, 431. The words "omit to provide" in Civ. Code Cal. 1307, providing that when any testator omits to provide in his will for any child, etc., means simply an omission to road track and at other times on the common pavement. The form of the wheels or the character of the roadway over which a vehicle runs does not determine its nature so much as do the uses to which it is put and for which it was designed. Frankford & P. Pass. Ry. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 58 Pa. (8 P. F. Smith) 119, 125, 98 Am. Dec. 242. OMNIBUS BILL. Bills of a multifarious character are not inappropriately called "omnibus bills." Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 193, 74 Am. Dec. 522. Bills joining a number of different subjects in one, thereby putting the executive under compulsion to accept some enactments that he cannot approve, or to defeat the whole, including others that he thinks desirable or even necessary, are popularly called "omnibus bills." Commonwealth v. Barnett, 48 Atl. 976, 977, 199 Pa. 161, 55 L. R. A. 882. The term "omnibus bills" is used to designate legislative bills which include in one act various separate and distinct matters. |