state commerce act forbidding the giving of passes, that nothing in the act shall be construed to prevent railroads from giving free carriage to their own officers and employés, cannot be construed to include the families of officers or employés. Ex parte Koehler (U. S.) 31 Fed. 315, 321. Under a statutory provision (Rev. St. c. 126, § 27) providing for the punishment of embezzlement committed by any cashier or "other officer" of a bank, it is held that the phrase "other officer" includes the presi dent and directors of the bank. Common wealth v. Wyman, 49 Mass. (8 Metc.) 247, 253. General agent or attorney. Professors and instructors are not members of the corporation of a college, but are "officers" of the college, within the meaning of the statute exempting from taxation the real estate of the college when occupied by it or by its officers. From the nature of the institution, the members of the board of trustees, except the president, usually would not occupy real estate in person for the purpose of instruction. Professors or instructors impliedly are called “officers" of the college in the charter, and, when they occupy real estate for the purposes of the college, the occupation may be said to be by the college, or by them as its officers. Williams College v. Assessors of Williamstown, 46 N. E. 394, 395, 167 Mass. 505. Code, 525, providing that the petition A professor in a college is not properly an "officer" of the corporation, but a perfor condemnation of property, where the petitioner is a domestic corporation, shall be son in its employment, within Act April verified in its behalf by an "officer of the 29, 1849, regulating the taxation of officers corporation," does not mean a general offi- of a corporation. Union County v. James, cer, but should be construed to include a duly 21 Pa. (9 Harris) 525. authorized attorney and agent appointed A professor in the University of Wisconby the corporation to verify petitions and sin is not a "public officer" in such a sense pleadings in its behalf for the institution as prevents his employment as such creatof condemnation proceedings and otherwise, ing a contract relation between himself and and who was its agent for the purpose of ac- the board of regents. He stands in the same quiring real estate by condemnation proceed-relation to the board that a teacher in a ings. His relation to the company was that of a general agent in respect to those matters, acting under an appointment from the corporation. He was not simply an attorney acting under an ordinary retainer, but was engaged in a special department of the corporate business, having the general management thereof. In re St. Lawrence & A. R. Co., 31 N. E. 218, 220, 133 N. Y. 270. Manager or managing director. Code Civ. Proc. § 525, subd. 1, providing that, where the party is a domestic corporation, pleadings must be verified by an "officer" thereof, does not mean a general manager or managing agent, since the word "manager" is not synonymous with "officer." Thomas F. Meton & Sons v. Isham Wagon Co., 4 N. Y. Supp. 215, 216, 15 Civ. Proc. R. 259. The managing director of a foreign corporation is an "officer" within Code, § 258, providing that, when a corporation is a party, the verification of pleadings may be made by an officer thereof. Best v. British & American Mortg. Co., 42 S. E. 456, 131 N. C. 70. Minister or teacher. The term "office under a corporation," in a statute authorizing the assessment of a tax on the salary of any one holding of fice under a corporation, does not include ministers of incorporated congregations or teachers in the common schools. Commonwealth v. Cuyler (Pa.) 5 Watts & S. 275, 276. public school occupies with respect to the school district by which such teacher is employed, and that is purely a contract relation. Butler v. Regents of the University, 32 Wis. 124, 131. As public officer. The office of the chief engineer of a railroad company is not a public office, though the power to make all necessary by-laws and regulations is invested in the company by its charter, and the stockholders have, under its authority, created the office and declared the salary. Eliason v. Coleman, 86 N. C. 235, 240. A director of an ordinary business corporation is not a public officer, but is merely an agent of the shareholders, selected, conformably to the organic law of the company, to represent them in the management of its affairs. Unless there is some provision in the charter or by-laws to the contrary, like the agent of an ordinary partnership, he can renounce his agency at will, and can manifest his purpose by oral notice as well as by a formal written resignation, and can terminate the relation without the consent of his principal. A statute giving stockholders authority in general meeting to remove any director to fill the vacancy, and providing that, unless so removed, the directors shall continue in office until the next annual meeting of the stockholders and until their successors shall be appointed, does not prevent a director from resigning at any time. Fearing v. Glenn (U. S.) 73 Fed. 116, 119, 19 C. C. A. 388. Secretary. A secretary is not necessarily an "officer" of the corporation. He may hold such position and yet be without authority to bind the corporation. Karsch v. Pottier & Stymus Mfg. & Imp. Co., 81 N. Y. Supp. 782, 783, 82 App. Div. 230. OFFICER, CIVIL OR MILITARY. By an "officer of the law," as used in an article designating all offenses committed by officers of the law as "malfeasance in office," unless otherwise designated, is meant any magistrate, peace officer, or clerk of the court. Pen. Code Tex. 1895, art. 297. A magistrate is included under the term "officer of the law." Gordon v. State, 2 Tex. App. 154, 158 (citing Pen. Code, art. 351). OFFICER OF THE POLICE. The court of claims is not an "officer, civil or military," within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 5438 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3674], prohibiting every person from presenting for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States any claim against the government of the United States, knowing the same to be false, etc. United States v. Moore (D. C.) 3 MacArthur, OFFICER OF SCHOOLS. 226, 235. OFFICER MAKING SALE. "Officer making such sale," as used in statutes in reference to execution sales, which speaks of the "officer making such sale," "refers to an officer legally authorized to sell." It does not include a deputy sheriff, as the latter cannot act in his own right, but only for the sheriff. Wilson v. Russell, 31 N. W. 645, 650, 4 Dak. 376. OFFICER OF COURT. OFFICER OF THE REVENUE. See "School Officers." OFFICIAL. While the term "official" sometimes applies to persons holding fiduciary positions, to distinguish their transactions in such relations from their purely private business, yet in the statutes relating to official bonds the word is clearly confined to the bonds of public officers. Bissell v. Durfee, 24 N. W. 886, 887, 58 Mich. 237. Statutes, in speaking of the "official Attorney at law as, see "Attorney at who levies" executions or attachments, "reLaw." fer to an officer authorized by law to levy Clerk of court as, see "Clerk of Court." upon property. It does not include a deputy Executor as, see "Executor." OFFICER OF THE CUSTOMS. OFFICER OF THE LAW. Receiver as, see "Receiver." "Officers of the law," as used in Pub. Laws, c. 508, § 31, which gives permission to officers of the law to bring complaints for the violation of said chapter (508) without giving recognizance for costs, refers only to such officers as are designated in other sections of the same chapter, and does not include a deputy chief of police. State v. Collins, 12 R. I. 478. Pen. An "officer of the law" is any magistrate, peace officer, or clerk of a court. Code, art. 351. A sheriff is a peace officer. Code Cr. Proc. art. 53. Therefore a sheriff is included in the phrase "officer of the law" as used in Pasch. Dig. art. 348a, providing that if any officer of the law shall willfully or negligently fail to perform any duty imposed on him, etc., he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Gordon v. State, 2 Tex. App. 154, 158. sheriff, as the latter can only act for and in the name of the sheriff." Wilson v. Russell, 31 N. W. 645, 650, 4 Dak. 376. Public officials are merely agents of the state for the carrying out of public purposes, and their selection and the fixing of the time for which they shall serve are matters of public convenience, and do not fall within the scope of the term "contract" as applied to individuals. Duer v. Dashiell, 47 Atl. 1040, 1041, 91 Md. 660. OFFICIAL ACT. "Official act," within the object of a bond given by a deputy sheriff to make the sureties responsible for the due performance of his official acts, does not mean a lawful act of the officer in the service of process. If so, the sureties would never be responsible. official capacity under color and by virtue It means any act done by the officer in his of his office. 191, 192. Turner v. Sisson, 137 Mass. By an official act is not meant the lawful act of an officer in the service of process, for if this were so the sureties who became liable for his official acts would never be responsible. It means any act done by the officer in his official capacity, under color of title and by virtue of his office. Turner v. Sisson, 137 Mass. 191. The distinction originally made between acts done by virtue of an office and acts done by color of office has been entirely disregarded by leading authorities within the last few years. Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U. S. 17, 4 Sup. Ct. 286, 28 L. Ed. 337. The object of an official bond is to obtain indemnity against the misuse of an official position for wrong purposes; and that which is done under color of office, and which would obtain no credit, except for its appearing to be a regular official act, is within the protection of the bond. Hall V. Tierney, 95 N. W. 219, 220, 89 Minn. 407 (citing Murfree, Off. Bonds, § 211). Under Rev. St. art. 4897, making the sheriff responsible for the official acts of their deputies, the Legislature, in the use of the term "official," will be presumed to have had knowledge of the well-defined distinction between official acts and acts done colore officii-a distinction on which many of the apparently conflicting cases may perhaps be reconciled-and to have intended to include responsibility for mere usurpation of authority on the part of the deputy. Maddox v. Hudgeons, 72 S. W. 414, 415, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 291. An official bond is an obligation under which the sureties may, on default of their principal, become liable to pay money to another. Connor v. Corson, 83 N. W. 588, 591, 13 S. D. 550. The term "official bond," as used in Act March 21, 1871, providing that the remedy against the sheriff for failure to collect and pay over the tax listed to him by the tax collector shall be by motion or suit on his "official bond," should be construed to include every bond executed by the sheriff in obedience to law, by which his sureties un dertake that he shall discharge a public duty imposed on him by law as sheriff, and is not limited to the bond executed by him at the time he takes the oath of office. Anderson v. Thompson, 73 Ky. (10 Bush) 132, 136. OFFICIAL CAPACITY. The commissioner of pensions has the authority to appoint examining surgeons and to organize boards of surgeons. Therefore the person thus appointed acts under or by virtue of the authority lawfully exercised by the pension office through its head, the commissioner, the same being an office of the government. The authority under which they act is derived from the office of pensions, and their action is official in that they act on behalf of an office of the government; and they act in an official capacity because they are representatives of the pension office, and their services are in aid of the official duties committed to that office. A person may act in an official capacity because he is an officer lawfully appointed and qualified and acts as such, or he may act in an official capacity because he lawfully performs duties which are of an official character. Therefore members of boards of surgeons come within the provisions of section 5501, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3709], which impose a penalty on any one accepting a bribe while acting in an official capacity. United States v. Van Leuven (U. S.) 62 Fed. 62, 65. Code, 92, subd. 1, requiring actions against a sheriff in respect to liabilities incurred by reason of acts in his official capacity to be brought within three years, construed to include a trespass by the sheriff in levying on property not belonging to the judgment debtor, though the liability arises in tort. Cumming v. Brown, 43 N. Y. 514, 515. Code Civ. Proc. 385, which provides that an action against a sheriff or coroner upon a liability incurred by him by doing an act in his official capacity, or by the omisment of money collected upon an execution, sion of an official duty, except the nonpaymust be brought within one year, refers to a liability incurred by official malfeasance or misfeasance, but not to a liability arising out of a mutual contract voluntarily entered into by a sheriff or coroner, for his own convenience, with another. Rice v. Penfield, 2 N. Y. Supp. 641, 49 Hun, 368. The fact that a schedule of fees has been prescribed for the services of an officer is not an invariable test that the enumerated services are the only ones rendered in his "official capacity," within the meaning of an act providing that his salary shall be in full for all services rendered in his "official capacity." Hennepin County Com'rs v. Dickey, 90 N. W. 775, 776, 86 Minn. 331. OFFICIAL CERTIFICATE. The certificate of an invoice for the convenience and security of the collector of customs and the government, which was a memorandum between the officers in the customhouse as a part of their system of checks and authentications, and was not an official document required by the merchant, nor given to him, is not an official certificate, for which the collector is entitled to fees. Cochran v. Schell, 2 Sup. Ct. 301, 307, 107 U. S. 617, 27 L. Ed. 490. OFFICIAL DEED. A certificate of the county auditor executed under section 19, c. 2, Gen. Laws 1874, assigning the right of the state to lands bid in at tax sale, is an "official deed," within the meaning of Gen. St. 1878, c. 75, § 15. Pfefferle v. Wieland, 56 N. W. 824, 55 Minn. 202. OFFICIAL DUTY. formance of the duties of his office," was complied with by a bond conditioned that he should "faithfully perform all the duties of his office according to law and the bylaws of the institution," as the condition required nothing which could not have been required under the statutory bond. Bank of Carlisle v. Hopkins, 17 Ky. (1 T. B. Mon.) 245, 246, 15 Am. Dec. 113. The words "duties" and "duties of their office" as used in the act of 1868 relating to elections and electors-section 18 providing for the punishment of any person who, without just and reasonable cause, neglects or refuses to perform any of the duties required of him by the act, and section 3 providing that all registrars and deputy registrars shall, before entering on the duties of their office, take the oath by law provided for executive and judicial officers have the same meaning, and comprehend only official acts to be done by the officer after being duly sworn, and do not include the taking of the oath by a registrar of election, the refusal to take which does not render him liable 540, 541. Official duties are the duties imposed on to the penalty. State v. Maynard, 41 Conn. officers of the government. In Owners of Land v. People, 113 Ill. 296, it is said official A secret service operative, employed by duties are supposed to be susceptible of OFFICIAL FUNCTION. classification under three heads of legislative, executive, and judicial, corresponding to the three departments of government bear the Secretary of the Treasury to aid in the ing the same designation; but the classifica- detection, prosecution, and suppression of tion cannot be very exact, and there are crimes against revenue laws, with which many officers whose duties cannot be prop-duty the secretary is charged while in the erly, or at least exclusively, arranged under either of these heads. People v. Hoffman, 5 N. E. 596, 603, 116 Ill. 587, 56 Am. Rep. 793. The phrase "faithful performance of of ficial duty," as used in a bond requiring a faithful performance of official duty, should be construed as equivalent to a recital of all the statutory duties of the officer in the bond, and is as binding on the principal and sure ties as if such duties were inserted. State v. Nevin, 7 Pac. 650, 651, 19 Nev. 162, 3 Am. St. Rep. 873. Where a law requires surveyors to give bond for the faithful disbursement of public money, it is evident that it contemplates such surveyors as disbursing officers. Nev ertheless, where the statute requires that bond be given both for the disbursement of money and for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office, and in fact the bond is conditioned only on the latter, a serious question arises as to whether it was not open to prove that the disbursement of money was not known as one of the "duties of the office," and included in the general words. Farrar v. United States, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 373, 388, 8 L. Ed. 159. An act requiring a bond by the cashier of a bank, conditioned for "the faithful per performance of such service, is acting, on behalf of the United States, in an "official function" of the Secretary, within Rev. St. § 5451 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3680], making it a criminal offense to bribe, or attempt to bribe, any officer of the United States or any person acting for or on behalf of the United States in an official function under or by authority of a department or office of the government thereof. It does not require that one who exercises an official function should be an officer of the United States. The official function is not necessarily a function belonging to the office, held by the person acting on behalf of the United States. It may also be a function belonging to the office held by his superior, which function has been committed to the subordinate, whether to a lower officer or to a mere employé for the purpose of being executed. United States v. Ingham (U. S.) 97 Fed. 935, 936. OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT. See, also, "Misconduct in Office." trict court shall have original jurisdiction Const. art. 5, § 8, provides that the disin cases of misdemeanor involving official misconduct. Rev. St. art. 3393, declares that "by 'official misconduct,' as used in this title with reference to county officers, is meant viction involving misconduct which not only any unlawful behavior in relation to the warrants, but demands, his removal from duties of his office, willful in its character, office. Brackenridge v. State, 11 S. W. 630, of any officer intrusted in any manner with 633, 27 Tex. App. 513, 531, 4 L. R. A. 360. the administration of justice or the execution lic officials who shall be guilty of any official must be construed as not to embrace the misconduct shall be liable to indictment, case provided for in section 308, providing that any judge of probate who shall willfully fail or neglect to discharge the duties and perform all the services which are required of him by law shall be indicted. State v. Green, 30 S. E. 683, 684, 52 S. C. 520. The phrase "official misconduct," in Rev. St. arts. 3388, 3389, authorizing removal from office on account of official misconduct, does not include drunkenness, inasmuch as drunkenness in itself does not indicate corruption or neglect of duty. Craig v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 29, 30, 19 S. W. 504. of the laws; and under this head of official in Code, § 305, which provides that only pubThe words "official misconduct," as used misconduct are included any willful or corrupt failure, refusal, or neglect of an officer to perform any duty enjoined on him by law." In construing these provisions as applied to an indictment of a sheriff that charged him with negligently permitting the escape of persons in his legal custody, who were charged or convicted of felonies less than capital, the court said: "The Legislature having defined 'official misconduct,' such definition materially restricts the general signification of the term as used in the Constitution, if it was so used in its common acceptation, and thus limits the jurisdiction of the district court to that class of misde meanors which involve unlawful official behavior on the part of a county officer, willful or corrupt in its character, no matter whether it is an act or omission. It was not the intention of the Constitution to burden the district court with every possible act or omission of the officer for which the law fixed no penalty, and the omission of which may have been prompted by casual inadvertence instead of corrupt or willful design or negligence"-and held that the indictment did not charge an offense of which the district court had any jurisdiction. Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 212, 214, 216, 217. By "official misconduct," as used in the title relating to the removal of officers, with reference to county officers, is meant any unlawful behavior in relation to the duties of his office, willful in its character, of any officer intrusted in any manner with the administration of justice or the execution of the laws; and under this head of official misconduct are included any willful or corrupt failure, refusal, or neglect of an officer to perform any duty enjoined on him by law. Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 3534. Where a jailer, being an officer, is charged with the custody and safe-keeping of a person who has been accused or convicted of a capital offense, he is charged with the performance of a duty imposed by law, and, if he negligently permits such person to escape, he is guilty of a violation of the law, constituting a misdemeanor involving "official misconduct," within the meaning of the Constitution, declaring that the district court shall have original jurisdiction in cases of misdemeanors involving official misconduct. Hatch v. State, 10 Tex. App. 515, 517. Under such statutory definition of “offcial misconduct" an officer who willfully demands fees not allowed by law is guilty of official misconduct, willful in its character, and a conviction of that offense is a con OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER. Official newspapers are those designated by state or municipal legislative bodies, or agents empowered by them, in which the public acts, resolves, advertisements, and notices are required to be published. Albany County Com'rs v. Chaplin, 37 Pac. 370, 372, 5 Wyo. 74. OFFICIAL RECORDS. Certificates of death filed in the health Code Civ. Proc. § 959, providing that cerdepartment are "official records," within tain official records shall be presumptive evidence of their contents. Robinson v. Su79 N. Y. Supp. 13, 16, 77 App. Div. 215. preme Commandery, Order of Golden Cross, OFFICIAL SERVICE. The term "official service," as used in acts of Congress and the regulations of United States consuls, and providing that only the prescribed fees may be collected for official service, includes only such services required by law or by the regulations, and such services specified in any tariff of fees or official service. United States v. Mosby, 10 Sup. Ct. 327, 330, 133 U. S. 273, 33 L. Ed. 625. OFFICIAL STENOGRAPHER. An official stenographer is an officer of the court charged with the duty of carefully reporting all the proceedings on the trial, and his certificate is entitled to the same force and credit as that of any other officer. The transcription of his notes, when certified to by him and filed by the clerk of the court where the cause was tried, becomes a part |