Court officer or employé.

The post of a president Judge is within the common-law definition of an "office." Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62 Pa. (12 P. F. Smith) 343, 349, 1 Am. Rep. 422.

An attendant upon the Supreme Court, to attend upon it and to perform the duties required to be performed by him at a fixed salary, is "in office," within the meaning of the statute providing that "the board of supervisors of the county of New York are hereby prohibited from creating any new office or department, or increasing the salaries of those now in office or their successors." Rowland v. City of New York, 83 N. Y. 372, 375, 376.

An attendant of the Marine Court of the City of New York holds an "office," within the meaning of that term as used in section 3 of chapter 382, Laws of 1870, prohibiting any increase in the salaries "of persons then in office or their successors." Moser v. City of New York (N. Y.) 21 Hun, 163, 164.

clude officers de facto. An officer de facto as

clearly holds an office as an officer de jure. The term "officer" is generic, and when used in the statute, and there is nothing in the context or authority to indicate that it is used in a different sense, it should be held to include all classes of officers, officers de facto as well as officers de jure, and there is no good reason why an officer de facto should not be punished for embezzlement as well as an officer de jure. State v. Goss, 69 Me. 22, 28.

Depository.

See "Depository."

Deputy.

The bond of a deputy sheriff was conditioned that he should well and faithfully perform "all the duties of the said office as deputy sheriff." It was objected that there was no such office as deputy sheriff. The court said that a "deputy sheriff performs the functions of the office of sheriff. He occupies the place and performs the duties of an officer, and it does not matter whether he in fact is an officer, or only occupies the place and performs the duties. Such deputies are generally known and designated as officers,

Const. art. 5, § 3, which declares that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend over the state, and the judges thereof shall have original jurisdiction of quo warranto as to all "officers of the commonwealth" whose jurisdiction extends over the state, includes judges and associate judges of the court of common pleas. Common-v. Hoffman, 105 Ill. 147, 153. wealth v. Dumbauld, 97 Pa. 293, 295.

"Public officers," within the rule that statutes directing the mode of proceedings by public officers are directory, and are not regarded as essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves unless it be so declared in the statutes, includes a judge of a court. In re Hennesy, 58 N. E. 446, 447, 164 N. Y. 393.

but the word 'office,' used in the condition, may refer as well or better to the office of sheriff as to that of deputy." Gradle

The office of deputy sheriff, appointed by the sheriff under Rev. St. 1889, §§ 8181, 8182, requiring them to take the oath of office and to perform the duties prescribed by law to be performed by the sheriff, is a public office. State ex rel. Walker v. Bus, 36 S. W. 636, 637, 135 Mo. 325, 33 L. R. A. 616.

A deputy sheriff is an officer of the government, within a statute punishing embezThe municipal court of the city of Wil-zlement by officers of the government. State mington, under 17 Laws, c. 207, § 14 et seq., v. Brooks, 42 Tex. 62, 66. creating it and defining its jurisdiction, being an "inferior court" within the meaning of Const. art. 4, § 30, the judge of such court is a "public officer" within Const. art. 3, § 9. State v. Churchman (Del.) 49 Atl. 381, 385, 3 Pennewill, 167.

The term "public officer," in Cr. Code, & 3931, providing that any public officer who deals in claims against the county shall be fined, includes a probate judge's clerk appointed in pursuance of Acts 1893, p. 1190. Scruggs v. State, 20 South. 642, 643, 111 Ala. 60.

De facto officer.

The word "officer" is defined in Webster's Dictionary as one who holds an office; a person lawfully invested with an office. The latter branch of this definition would seem to embrace only officers de jure, but the first is clearly comprehensive enough to in

Acts 1847, c. 40, § 3, providing that all redemptions that shall hereafter be made on or after the last day of the 15 months by any creditor shall be made at the sheriff's office of the county in which the sale took place, and it shall be the duty of the "officer making such sale" to attend at such office during the last day, etc., applies either to the sheriff, the undersheriff, or to a deputy sheriff. People v. Lynch, 68 N. Y. 473, 478 (cited and approved in Wilson v. Russell, 31 N. W. 645, 652, 4 Dak. 376); Livingston v. Arnoux, 56 N. Y. 507, 517.

A special deputy sheriff is not an officer, but is merely the agent of the sheriff. Prince Dickson, 18 S. E. 33, 34, 39 S. O. 477; Kavanaugh v. State, 41 Ala. 399.

A deputy county clerk is not an "officer" within the meaning of Const. art. 11, § 5, requiring the Legislature to provide for the

"County officers," as used in the consti- The term "public officers," as used in tutional provision that such officers, under the Constitution and statutes, does not inthe laws of the territory when the Con- clude jurors, although they serve the public, stitution shall take effect, shall continue in and perform important duties in the adminis office until a certain date fixed, means offi-tration of justice. State v. Bradley, 48 Conn. cers who may be exercising the functions 535, 536. of the office when the Constitution takes effect. Those who have been elected but not inducted into office are, properly speaking, “officers elect." Those in office are simply "officers." Those who have been in office but have gone out are properly "exofficers." But where the term "officer" is used in a sentence where there is nothing to qualify or control its meaning, it refers to an officer then holding and enjoying the office. It means neither an ex-officer nor an officer elect. Cordiell v. Frizell, 1 Nev. 130, 132.

of its legal orders would arrest the course of justice and produce infinite inconvenience to the community. Such commissioners are chosen by the people to execute this duty, among others. They undertake to perform it by accepting the office, and become thereby

er officers, to the proper discharge of their duty. In re Hummell (Pa.) 9 Watts, 416, 431.

Justice of the peace.

A public officer is one who has "the right, and corresponding duty, to execute a public or privileged trust, and to take the emoluments belonging to it." 3 Kent, Comm. 454. Justices of the peace and constables are "public officers" within the meaning of Const. art. 3, § 13, providing that "no law shall extend the term of any public officer or increase or diminish his salary or emoluments after his election or appointment." Rupert v. Chester Co., 13 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 342,

gible for election or appointment to, or be entitled to hold, any "office" or place of public trust, honor, or emolument in, under, or for any such territory or place, or under the United States, "office" cannot be construed to include the right to sit on a jury. An office is a public station or employ-public officers, and as such assigned, like othment conferred by the appointment of government, and embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, employment, and duties. It is the right to exercise a public function or employment, and to take the fees and emoluments belonging to it. Jury duty is in the nature of service due from the citizen to the government, necessarily required in the administration of its laws. Its character has but little similarity to tenure, duration, power, and the right to exercise powers conferred by the appointment of government, which are essential characteristics of office, and not mere transient, occasional, or incidental. It is true a person summoned to appear as a juror has a duty of a public nature to perform, and for it he is compensated out of the public treasury; but in no other respect does his position or his duties corre spond with the essential elements of office. He has no certain term of office. He has no right to, and has no power to enforce a right to, the performance of any act or service which constitutes the performance of official duty. He is liable at any moment to be discharged by the court from all service, and to be excused by either party from serving in the trial of any cause, without con

sulting his wishes or interests. The oath he takes, in its terms and scope, limits his duty to the facts of the particular case then on trial, and is not the oath required by the laws of this territory, or by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to be taken by public officers." People v. Hopt, 4 Pac. 250, 254, 3 Utah, 396.

343.

Magistrate.

The general term "officers" includes both Proc. Tex. 1895, art. 61. Code Cr. magistrates and peace officers.

Minister.

It was decided in Commonwealth v. Cuyler (Pa.) 5 Watts & S. 275, that a minister in an unincorporated society is not an officer whose salary is liable to taxation.

Conceding that he may be in some senses an "officer," it is plain that he is not an officer within the meaning of the law regulating taxation. Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 29 Pa. (5 Casey) 226, 230.

Municipal officer or employé.

It cannot be doubted, as a general proposition of law applying to the construction of statutory and constitutional provisions alike, that the word "offices" or "officers," taken by themselves, in a statute or Constitution, means state or county offices or officers only, and cannot be construed to mean the offices or officers of municipal or other corporations, unless there be language, ex

Police jurymen are the officers of a political corporation, and they continue in office, after the expiration of their terms, until their successors are chosen and inducted into office, under Rev. St. 1870, § 2608, providing that "all officers, whether appointed or elected, shall hold their offices and discharge the duty thereof until their suc-pressly or by necessary implication, extendcessors are elected or appointed, as the case may be, and duly qualify." Because the office of a police juror is not a constitutional office, it by no means follows that it is no office at all. State ex rel. Gorham v. Montgomery, 25 La. Ann. 138, 139.

ing their meaning to corporation officers. Thus Const. 1897, art. 3, § 9, requiring the consent of the Senate to the appointment by the Governor of such "officers" as he is authorized by law to appoint, does not require the appointment of a city officer, reGovernor, to be confirmed by the Senate. quired by the city charter to be made by the State v. Churchman, 51 Atl. 49, 50, 3 Penne will, 361.

The term "officers" includes county commissioners charged with a duty of electing jurors for the courts of the counties, within the meaning of Act June 16, 1836, restricting the powers of the several courts to issue An officer of a municipal corporation is attachments and to inflict summary punish- a "public officer," within 2 Rev. St. 696, ments for contempts of court, as without 38, punishing delinquency of a public offisuch officers a court could not discharge its cer as a misdemeanor. People v. Bedell functions, and their disobedience or neglect (N. Y.) 2 Hill, 196, 199.

which shall not have been created in consequence of a defalcation, as a public officer, or an executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, or while acting in any other fiduciary capacity. Morse v. City of Lowell, 48 Mass. (7 Metc.) 152, 154.

"Officer," as used in Const. c. 2, § 11, | which extends to all persons owing debts providing that the Governor shall have power to commission all officers, and section 24, providing that every "officer" of the state, whether judicial or executive, shall be liable to be impeached by the General Assembly, and section 29, providing that every "officer," whether executive, judicial, or military, in authority under this state, shall take and subscribe the oath of office prescribed

board of aldermen in New York City, whose A messenger to the president of the duties were to carry messages and run errands, and who was clothed with no power to perform any official duty of the office, was not a public officer, there being no stat

therein, has reference only to such officers of the state as are either elected by the freemen at large or required to be commissioned by the Governor. Municipal officers are not included therein. Rowell v. Hor-ute creating such an office, or defining the ton, 3 Atl. 906, 907, 58 Vt. 1.

"Public officer," within the meaning of Gen. St. c. 257, § 7, providing for the punishment of any public officer, being a receiver of public money, who shall fraudulently

convert the same to his own use, includes

a selectman. State v. Boody, 53 N. H. 610,

611.

Within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 72, providing that any judicial officer, or any person who executes the functions of a public office, who receives a bribe, shall be punished, the expression of "person who executes any of the functions of a public offi

cer" includes a member of the common coun

cil or other municipal officer. People v.

Jaehne, 8 N. E. 374, 377, 103 N. Y. 182.

A chief engineer of a city fire department, appointed by the council and subject to removal by it, is not an "officer" within Const. art. 14, § 8, prohibiting an increase in the salary of any officer during his term of office. State ex rel. Kane v. Johnson, 27 S. W. 399, 401, 123 Mo. 43.

duties to be performed officially. Smith v. City of New York (N. Y.) 67 Barb. 223, 224.

iff and other county officers of Richmond Laws 1897, c. 108, constituting the shersioners for the county, does not violate the county a board to appoint police commisProvision of Const. 1895, art. 10, § 1, providing that sheriffs shall hold no other office, a membership in the board of police commissioners being held not to constitute an office. People v. Howland, 45 N. Y. Supp. 347, 350, 17 App. Div. 165.

Under Code, § 124, providing that causes against a public officer for an act done by

him in virtue of his office must be tried in thereof, arose, one appointed by Laws 1870, the county where the cause, or some part c. 382, to audit certain accounts against the city of New York, became the incumbent of an office. People v. Tweed (N. Y.) 13 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 419, 420, 424.

The commissioners of the funded debt

of San Francisco are not "officers" within the meaning of Const. art. 11, § 7, which provides that the duration of any office not "Public office," as used in Rev. St. fixed by the Constitution shall never exceed 6770, authorizing an action in quo warranto to be brought against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, includes the presidency of a city council. State v. Anderson, 12 N. E. 656, 657, 45 Ohio St. 196.

four years, and the term during which the commissioners are authorized to act is not limited to four years. People v. Middleton, 28 Cal. 603.

"Public offices" are in general, if not always, directly created by the Legislature The charter of a village authorized the itself, the municipal authorities selecting the election of certain officers, giving power to persons to perform their functions. The the trustees to appoint an attorney, street term cannot be applied to the general supercommissioner, fire wardens, and such other intendent of waterworks, employed by the officers as authorized by the act. The of water commissioners of a city for a term of fice of village collector was not named in years, the position being the creature of the any class of officers in the act, but one board of commissioners, and entirely unsection provided that the collector should col-known to the statute. Cramer v. Water lect all moneys that shall be ordered by the Com'rs of New Brunswick, 31 Atl. 384, 385, corporation to be raised by taxes. The 57 N. J. Law (28 Vroom) 478. board of trustees appointed a collector. Held, that he was a "public officer" within Rev. St. c. 120, § 7, declaring that, if a public officer embezzles any money in his position, he shall be punished, etc. State v. Walton, 62 Me. 106, 111.

A collector of city taxes is a "public officer' within Bankr. Act U. S. 1841, § 1,

ing the city of Cambridge with water, provides, in section 6, that the powers therein granted shall be exercised by such agents

St. 1865, c. 153, being an act for supply

as the city council shall direct. A water board is not provided for by any subsequent act, but subsequent ordinances of the city, in designating its agents, use the phrase

The position of chief clerk in the office such charter, recognizes the existence of the of the assessor of the city of Detroit is not water board, and makes no provision for an officer. People v. Langdon, 40 Mich. 673, the election of its members, except in sec- 682. tion 9, which provides that all officers not

A person appointed by the board of A health inspector appointed by the police of the city of Rochester as superinboard of health of the city of San Francisco, tendent of the police telegraph system of whose duties are to inspect and report con- that city, there being no office of that name or nature known to the law, is merely an cerning the premises on which nuisances are situated, and to serve notice for their abate- employé of the city, and the proper authoriment, is a public officer. Patton v. Santies of the city have the same power to disFrancisco Board of Health, 59 Pac. 702, 703, 127 Cal. 388, 78 Am. St. Rep. 66.