OFFAL In an ordinance prohibiting the deposit of garbage or offal in certain places, the words "garbage" and "offal" were defined to include every refuse accumulation of animal, fruit, or vegetable matter, liquid or otherwise, that attends preparation, use, cooking, dealing in, or storing of meat, fish, fowl, fruit, or vegetable. City of Grand Rapids v. De Vries, 82 N. W. 269, 270, 123 Mich. 570. Where a fishing lease stipulated that the lessor, as a consideration for the lease, shall be entitled to all the offal, the word "offal" means that portion of the product of the seine which is not fit for food or is sold or consumed for that purpose. Read v. Granberry, 30 N. C. 109, 112. "Offal" is defined in the Century Dictionary as: "(1) That which falls off, as a chip or chips in dressing wood or stone; that which (2) is to fall off as of little value or use. Waste meat; the parts of a butchered animal (3) which are rejected as unfit for use. Refuse of any kind; rubbage." The heads and feet, and bones of beef cattle from which the flesh and skin have been removed, and which are fresh and clean, and emit no offensive odor, do not come within the meaning of “offal" as used in an ordinance regulating the hauling of the same in the public streets. City of St. Louis v. Robinson, 37 S. W. 110, 113, 135 Mo. 460. Offal is refuse anima! matter, and is garbage. City of St. Louis v. Weitzel, 31 S. W. 1045, 1050, 130 Mo. 600 (citing Cent. Dict). OFFENDER. The word "offender," as used in 2 Rev. St. p. 669, § 21, declaring the term "felony," when used therein, to mean an offense for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison, is not employed as a word of limitation, making it dependent on the personal status of the criminal or his exemption from a particular punishment by reason of mental capacity, youth, etc., where the offense for which he is convicted is a felony, but as a word of general application, in a general sense to define the punishment defining the crime. People v. Park, 41 N. Y. 21, 24, 1 Cow. Cr. R. 227, 228. OFFENSE. See "Capital Crime or Offense"; "Combined Offense"; "Compound Offense"; "Continuing Offense"; "Criminal Of fense"; "Cumulative Offense"; "Indictable Offense"; "International Offense"; "Malum in Se"; "Malum Prohibitum"; "Municipal Offense"; "Public Offense"; "Same Offense." Any offense, see "Any." "An 'offense,' in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law." Moore v. State of Illinois, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 13, 19, 14 L. Ed. 306; People v. Welch, 9 N. Y. Cr. R. 144, 149, 26 N. Y. Supp. 694. As synonymous with the word "offense," Webster gives "misdemeanor," "transgression," "delinquency." State ex rel. Reid v. Walbridge, 24 S. W. 457, 458, 119 Mo. 383, 41 Am. St. Rep. 663. "Offense" is defined by Bouvier to mean the doing of that which a penal law forbids to be done, or omitting to do what it commands. It has been held that the terms "offense" and "crime" are synonymous. People v. Police Com'rs of City of New York, 4 N. Y. Cr. R. 300, 302, 39 Hun, 507; Same v. French, 102 N. Y. 583, 7 N. E. 913. Abbott's Law Dictionary says: "An offense is a breach of the laws established for the protection of the public as distinguished from an infringement of mere private rights. A punishable violation of law; a crime; also, demeanor." In Moore v. Illinois, 55 U. S. sometimes, a crime of lesser grade; a mis(14 How.) 13, 14 L. Ed. 306, the court said: "An 'offense,' in its legal signification, means the transgression of the law. The terms 'crime,' 'offense,' and 'criminal offense,' are all held, in the appeal of State v. West, 42 Minn. 147, 43 N. W. 845, to be synonymous." Cruthers v. State, 67 N. E. 930, 932, 161 Ind. 139. An offense is defined to be an act com mitted against the law, or omitted where the law requires it, and punishable by it; and where the statute speaks of a party as having committed an offense we understand a crime, and when it employs the words "crime" and "offense" we understand these as mere synonymous terms, or as an expression of different degrees of crime. To commit an offense is in legal parlance to be guilty of crime. The words "crime" and "offense" are used in the lawbooks as vertible terms, and the latter word is often employed both in the common and our statute law as crime of every degree. Illies v. Knight, 3 Tex. 312, 314. con The word "offense," as used in Excise Act 1857, § 17, as amended by Laws 1869, c. 856, making the offense of intoxication an offense against the provisions of the act, and providing for its punishment, is synonymous with "crime," and a conviction therefor is a conviction of a crime, within the meaning of Consolidation Act, § 268 (Laws 1882, c. 410), providing that no person should be appointed to membership in the police force who has been convicted of any crime. People v. French, 7 N. E. 913, 915, 102 N. Y. 583. "An offense," says Mr. Wharton, "which may be the subject of criminal procedure, is an act committed or omitted in violation of the public law, either forbidding or com manding." United States v. Chapel (U. S.), person for the purpose of harassing him, the 25 Fed. Cas. 395. The term "offense," when used in any statute, shall mean any violation of law liable to punishment by criminal prosecution. Code Miss. 1892, § 1511. The term "offense," when used in any statute, is to be construed to mean any offense for which any criminal punishment may be inflicted. 2 Rev. St. p. 886, § 37; Behan v. People (N. Y.) 3 Parker, Cr. R. 686, 690. The word "offense" includes every act or omission for which a fine, forfeiture, or punishment is imposed by law. Code W. Va. 1899, p. 134, c. 13, § 17. An offense is an act or omission forbidden by positive law, and to which is annexed, on conviction, any punishment prescribed in this Code. Pen. Code Tex. 1895, art. 53; Hardin v. State, 46 S. W. 803, 806, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 426. All offenses against persons or property are in some sense offenses against the injured individual, but they are also offenses against the public. State v. Corliss, 85 Iowa, 18, 51 N. W. 1154. As used in Rev. St. art. 1198, subd. 8, providing that where the foundation of the action is some crime, offense, or trespass for which a civil action in damages will lie, the suit may be brought in the county where such crime, offense, or trespass was committed, the term "offense" means an offense punishable by law. Austin v. Cameron, 18 S. W. 437, 438, 83 Tex. 351. The terms "crime," "offense," and "criminal offense" are all synonymous, and are ordinarily used interchangeably, and include any breach of law established for the protection of the public as distinguished from an enforcement of mere private rights, for which a penalty is imposed or punishment inflicted in any judicial proceeding. State v. West, 43 N. W. 845, 847, 42 Minn. 147. The word "offense," as used in the Declaration of Rights, art. 12, declaring that no subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offenses until the same is fully and plainly and formally described to him, does not embrace the affidavit and proof required by Gen. St. c. 124, § 5, before a person can be arrested in a civil action. In re Frost, 127 Mass. 550, 554. Under Cr. Code, making it an offense to institute a criminal prosecution against any offense consists in instituting the prosecution or causing it to be instituted; and where the process was issued in D. county, and the arrest was made in W. county, the arrest did not constitute the offense, but the offense was committed when the preliminary steps, including the issuance of the warrant, were taken. Hubbard v. Lord, 59 Tex. 384, 385. "Offense," as used in the statute which points out the penalty to be imposed for a third offense against the liquor law, means the third offense which has been legally ascertained and determined, and is synonymous with third conviction. In re Buddington, 29 Mich. 472, 475. As act or transaction. "Offense," as used in Rev. St. § 4499 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3060], authorizing a seizure in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of an offense for the purpose of the collection of a penalty, "has no precise or technical signification, and is used generally and loosely in the sense of the transaction which constitutes the subject or cause of the suit." The Idaho (U. S.) 29 Fed. 187, 189, 192. The word "offense," as used in Const. U. S. art. 1, § 7, providing that no person for the same offense shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, is not identical in meaning with the word “act." It imports. in legal sense, any infraction or transgression of a law-the willful doing of an act which is forbidden by law, or omitting to do what it commands. State v. Oleson, 5 N. W. 959, 969, 26 Minn. 507. Contempt of court. Act Cong. March 3, 1875, c. 145, 18 Stat. 479, 1 Supp. Rev. St. p. 89 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3722], declares that any person convicted of an offense against the laws of the United States, and confined in any prison or penitentiary of any state or territory which has no system of commutation for its own prisoners, shall be allowed a deduction of five days in each calendar month during which no charge of misconduct has been charged against him. Held, that the term "convicted of an offense against the laws of the United States" meant an offense for which the person charged was entitled to be proceeded against by indictment, information, or written complaint, and to be tried by a jury, and hence such statute had no application to an imprisonment for contempt, that not being an "offense," as that term was intended in the statute. In re Terry (U. S.) 37 Fed. 649, 651. Violation of city ordinance. The word "offenses," as used in Const. ' art. 5, § 8, providing that the Governor shall A Felonies and misdemeanors. The word "offenses," as used in Cr. Code, 54, entitled "An act to provide for prosecuting offenses on information," embraces all infractions of the Criminal Code of the grade of felonies. Bolln v. State, 71 N. W. 444, 445, 448, 51 Neb. 581. "Bouvier defines 'offense' as the doing that which a penal law forbids to be done, or omitting what it commands. In this sense it is nearly synonymous with 'crime.' In a more confined sense it may be considered as having the same meaning as a misdemeanor, but it differs from this in this: that it is not indictable, but punishable summarily by forfeiture or a penalty. In re Terry (U. S.) 37 Fed. 649, 650. The terms "crime," "offense," and "criminal offense," when used in any statute, shall be construed to mean every offense, as well misdemeanor as felony, for which any punishment by imprisonment, or fine, or both, may by law be inflicted. Gen. St. Kan. 1901, § 2311; Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 2396; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. State, 22 Kan. 1, 15; State v. Blitz, 71 S. W. 1027, 1030, 171 Mo. 530. Omission of duty. The Pennsylvania statute which requires real estate brokers to pay a yearly license, and imposes a penalty, to be recovered in an action at law as debts are, for each offense, does not mean a crime, but only an omission or failure of duty year by year. Angell v. Van Schaick, 9 N. Y. Supp. 568, 569, 56 Hun, 247. Act April 12, 1859, declares that it shall not be lawful for any person, within the limits of certain counties, to expose to sale at auction, etc., any goods, wares, or merchandise manufactured within the limits of such counties. It is also provided that each and every person "offending against the provisions of this act shall for every such offense forfeit and pay the sum of fifty dollars, to be recovered in an action of debt." Held, that the words "offending" and "offense," as used in the statute, were not used in any criminal sense, but in the sense of breaking or violating the prohibitory injunction of the statute. Ott v. Jordan, 9 Atl. 321, 323, 116 Pa. 218. Vagrancy or incorrigibility. Rev. St. § 2071, providing that the ex penses of maintaining infants, committed to a house of refuge and correction for "offenses against a law of the state," does not include infants committed to a house of refuge and correction under Rev. St. § 2050, providing for the incarceration of infants in conse quence of vagrancy or of any incorrigible or vicious conduct, since an offense against a law of the state must be an act punishable as a crime. State v. Schlatterbeck, 39 Ohio St. 268, 270. OFFENSE CHARGED. In a prosecution for homicide the court instructed that the defendant was presumed to be innocent of the offense charged, and that before conviction the state must overcome that presumption by proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The specific offense charged in the indictment was murder in the first degree. Held that, inasmuch as an indictment for murder in the first degree embraces all grades of homicide, the words "offense charged" would also include all grades of homicide, and not first-degree murder only. State v. Smith, 65 S. W. 270, 273, 164 Mo. 567. Under St. 1867, p. 126, providing that the indictment "must be direct and contain the offense charged," and St. 1861, p. 479, § 412, providing that "in all cases the defendant may be found guilty of any of fense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment," a person charged in the indictment with assault with intent to kill is also charged with simple assault, for an indictment charging an offense of a higher grade, as an assault with intent to kill, also charges, by operation of law, every less offense that may be included under the charge of assault with intent to kill. State v. Quinn, 16 Nev. 89, 90. Under the Constitution giving an appeal in all criminal cases in which the offense charged amounts to a felony, the judgment appealed from determines the offense charged. If punished as a felony, that is the offense charged, and an appeal may be taken, and, if punished as a misdemeanor, that is the offense charged, and an appeal will not lie. State v. McCormick, 14 Nev. 347, 349. OFFENSE OF POLITICAL CHARACTER. During a revolution in the republic of Salvador the killing of persons because of their actual or supposed enmity to the government by the president and his officers, and the capture or the taking possession of funds of a bank by way of a forced loan to obtain money with which to protect the gov-| business which would be offensive to people ernment, are offenses of a political charac-in general, and thus render the neighborhood ter, and as such the authors of such acts to such people undesirable as a place of resishould not be subject to extradition. In re dence.'" Moller v. Presbyterian Hospital, 72 Ezeta (U. S.) 62 Fed, 972, 997. N. Y. Supp. 483, 485, 65 App. Div. 134. OFFENSIVE. Anything that is hurtful, disturbs happiness, impairs rights, or prevents the enjoyment of them is injurious, and if it causes displeasure, gives pain, or unpleasant sensations, it is offensive. The disturbing cause must be real, not fanciful; something more than mere delicacy or fastidiousness; but it need not necessarily be apparent to the senses of sight, smell, or hearing, for it may be injurious without offending either. Thus, by the general principles of equity, the continuance of a powder, dynamite, or fire establishment, or a house of ill fame, will be enjoined at the suit of one who is deprived of the comfortable enjoyment of his property by the close proximity of such a nuisance. The use of premises as an undertaker's establishment for the sale of caskets and furnishing goods for funerals, also for embalming bodies, for autopsies, and post mortem examinations, and for the reception and temporary deposit of human remains awaiting burial, is offensive and injurious, within the meaning of a covenant that such premises shall not be used for any trade or business injurious or offensive to the neighboring inhabitants. Rowland v. Miller, 15 N. Y. Supp. 701. "Offensive business," within the meaning of a covenant in a lease not to employ the leased tenement in a business that may be offensive, does not include the opening of the tenement as a public house. Jones v. Thorne, 1 Barn. & C. 715. A mutual covenant between grantors and grantees, providing that the premises conveyed should not be used for any business offensive to the neighboring inhabitants, prohibits the establishment of a coal yard on a part of the premises conveyed, since nothing would be more offensive to the ladies of the neighborhood than the filthy coal dust, which settles on their doorsteps, thresholds, and windows, and enters into their dwellings, and into their carpets, their cups, their kneading troughs, their beds, and their lungs, discoloring their linen and their robes of beauty and comfort, defacing their furniture, and blackening and besmearing and injuring every object of utility, of beauty, and of taste. Barrow v. Richard (N. Y.) 8 Paige, 351, 360, 35 Am. Dec. 713. Bats, which are long poles used by smugglers to carry tubs of spirits, are not "offensive weapons," within 6 Geo. IV, c. 108, § 56, providing that if any persons to the number of three or more, armed with firearms or other offensive weapons, shall be assembled in order to be aiding and assisting in the illegal landing of uncustomed goods, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a felony and suffer death. Rex v. Noakes, 5 Car. & P. 326. The term "noxious or offensive," in a "Offensive weapons," as used in 9 Geo. conveyance of property which contains a pro- IV, c. 69, § 9, relating to night poaching, vision that the premises are not to be used would include large stones capable of infor any trade or business which may be nox-flicting serious injury if used offensively, ious or offensive to neighboring inhabitants, and which were brought and used by the dewill not be construed to include a building fendants for that purpose. Rex v. Grice, 7 thereon for use as a residence for nurses, Car. & P. 803. without evidence justifying a conclusion that the building so used will be more noxious to neighboring inhabitants than a building used as a common residence for any other class of persons. "To be included within the general terms mentioned it must be found as a fact that it is the business which may be in any wise noxious or offensive to the neighboring inhabitants. The definition given to such a covenant by the Court of Appeals (Rowland v. Miller, 34 N. E. 765, 139 N. Y. 93, 22 L. R. A. 182) would seem to include the use to which the defendant intends to put these premises. In that case the court said: 'We cannot suppose that the parties had in mind any business which might be offensive to a person of supersensitive organization or to one of a peculiar or abnormal temperament, or to the small class of persons who are generally annoyed by sights, sounds, and objects not offensive to other people. They undoubtedly had in mind ordinary, normal people, and meant to prohibit trades and OFFER. To offer to do a thing is to bring to or before; to present for acceptance or re jection; to exhibit something that may be taken or received, or not. Morrison V. Springer, 15 Iowa, 304, 346. An offer, without more, is an offer in the present, to be accepted or refused when made. Vincent v. Woodland Oil Co., 30 Atl. 991, OFFER (In Evidence). 165 Pa. 402. "Offer," as used in Pen. Code, 67, making it a felony for any one to offer any bribe to any executive officer, means a proposition to do a thing, to bring to or before, to hold out, to proffer, to make a proposal to; and hence the crime of offering to bribe an executive officer is complete under the Code without any tender or production of the money offered. People v. Ah Fook, 62 Cal. 493, 494. Act 1825, regulating the general election, which imposes a penalty on any one who shall offer any reward to a voter to bribe or influence him, means to present a reward for acceptance or rejection. State v. Harker (Del.) 4 Har. 559, 561. As attempt. Webster defines the word "offer" as (1) a proposal to be accepted or rejected; (2) first advance; (3) the art of bidding a price or sum bid; (4) attempt, endeavor. "Attempt" is defined to make an effort to effect some object; to make a trial or experiment; to direct; to endeavor; to use exertion for any purpose. Accordingly the words “offer" and "attempt" are convertible terms. Consequently, an indictment for bribery which alleged that the accused did offer to do a certain act was sufficient, as the offer to bribe was an attempt to do so, within the meaning of the statute. Commonwealth v. Harris (Pa.) 1 Leg. Gaz. R. 455, 457. As tender. "Offer," in reference to the duty of a party, seeking to rescind a contract for the purchase of goods, to restore, or offer to restore, whatever he has received under the contract, is frequently used by courts and text writers as synonymous with "tender," and it may be properly so used with reference to articles capable of manual delivery and actually produced. But with respect to heavy articles of merchandise situated at a distance from the place to which they must be transported if restored to the vendor, the phrase "offer to return" is more commonly and more aptly employed to express a willingness or to make a proposal to rescind the contract and return the goods. Milliken v. Skillings, 36 Atl. 77, 78, 89 Me. 180. As will buy. The words "we offer," as used in the following offer in writing, "For a period of six months from date we offer for the product of the Robert E. Lee mine as follows," etc., is equivalent to and synonymous with the phrase "we will buy." Robert E. Lee Silver Min. Co. v. Omaha & Grant Smelting & Refining Co., 26 Pac. 326, 330, 16 Colo. 118. "Offer," as used in an exception to a ruling allowing a person to offer certain evidence, is to be construed as meaning to read. Ansley v. Meikle, 81 Ind. 260, 261. A statement in a bill of exceptions that "the parties respectively offered the following evidence" is not equivalent to an assertion that the evidence was introduced or admitted. Lyon v. Davis, 111 Ind. 384, 386, 12 N. E. 714; National Bank of Battle Creek v. Lock, 132 Ind. 424, 425, 31 N. E. 1115, 1116; American Ins. Co. v. Gallahan, 75 Ind. 168, 171; Garrison v. State, 110 Ind. 145, 148, 11 N. E. 2; Peck v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 101 Ind. 366. The word "offered," in a bill of exceptions reciting that it contains all the evidence offered in the case, is not equivalent to the word "given," and therefore it does not purport to include all the evidence. Baltimore, O. & C. R. Co. v. Barnum, 79 Ind. 261, 263. In Goodwine v. Crane, 41 Ind. 335, it was stated in the bill of exceptions that "the finding was all the evidence offered," and this was followed in the record by what purported to be the evidence. It was held that the evidence was not in the record. Of the evidence offered, the court said, "How much of it was admitted is not shown." Fellenzer v. Van Valzah, 95 Ind. 128, 133. A record on appeal showing that a statement of evidence agreed upon by the parties was offered, together with a certificate of the judge that it was all the evidence given in the cause, should be construed to mean that such statement was introduced in evidence. Ragsdale v. Barnett, 37 N. E. 1109, 1115, 10 Ind. App. 478. The word "offered," as used in a bill of exceptions showing that, in connection with each instrument given in evidence, the word "offered" is used instead of the word be construed to be synonymous with the "introduced," which is usually used, should word "introduced," and to mean that the Harris v. Tomlinson, 30 N. E. 214, 215, 130 evidence offered was introduced in evidence. Ind. 426. OFFER FOR SALE. In United States v. Dodge (U. S.) 25 Fed. Cas. 879, Mr. Justice Deady explains very aptly and concisely what may constitute an offer of sale under the internal revenue act, defining the business of a retail dealer as a person who shall sell or offer for sale spirits in quantities of three gallons or less. He says a license must be first obtained, and then, and not before, the party is at liberty to sell, or offer for sale, liquor in less quantities than three gallons. The liquor may be |