OCCUR.

"To occupy" means "to hold in possession; to hold or keep for use, as to occupy an apartment." Missionary Soc. of M. E. Church v. Dalles City, 2 Sup. Ct. 672, 674, 107 U. S. 336, 27 L. Ed. 545 (citing Webst. Dict.).

"To occupy" means to take; to seize; to hold or get possession of; to have in possession and use of a thing—and is applicable to personal property as well as to realty. Herman v. Katz, 47 S. W. 86, 87, 101 Tenn. 118, 41 L. R. A. 700; Coleman v. Eberly, 76 Pa. (26 P. F. Smith) 197, 201.

The use of the words "hold and occupy" in a lease which recites that the lessee shall hold and occupy the premises for a term of years amounts to a general covenant for quiet enjoyment during the term. Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 246-250, 4 Am. Dec. 122.

"Occupied by me," as used in the following devise, "I give to my dear wife, E. B. F., during her natural lifetime, the house and lot occupied by me in Market street, in the city of Camden, together with the lot adjoining the same on the east"-are used merely to identify the corporeal hereditament devised. Fetters v. Humphreys, 19 N. J. Eq. (4 C. E. Green) 471, 480.

Where a municipal provision provides that no one shall occupy any stand within a certain market without permission from the clerk, etc., a stand may be occupied, within the meaning of the regulation, by a

person having a box within the limits of the market containing articles for sale, and offering them for sale. Commonwealth v. Rice, 50 Mass. (9 Metc.) 253, 256.

OCCUPYING CLAIMANT.

When any person has settled upon any real estate, and occupied the same for three years, under or by virtue of any law or contract with the proper officers of the state for the purchase thereof, or under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from, the United States, and shall have made valuable improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be the owner thereof, or not to have acquired a right to purchase the same from the state or the United States, such person shall be an occupying claimant, within the

The word "occur," as used in a policy of fire insurance providing that no action can be maintained on such policy unless commenced within the term of 12 months next after such loss or damage shall occur, must be construed as synonymous with "accrue"; meaning that the limitation commences when the loss is due and payable, and not from the time of the physical burning of the property. Though there is undoubtedly a difference in the derivation and etymological meaning of the words "acin contracts of insurance, they have the crue" and "occur," yet, as used by insurers ing of an event from which a claim arises. same signification; representing the happenMoreover, this construction accords with the general rule which regards the statute of limitations as beginning to run on a contract of indemnity from the time at which the plaintiff is actually damaged, and not from the happening of the event from which the loss arises. Steen V. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, 324, 42 Am. Rep. 297; Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 235, 243, 33 Am. Rep. 607; Chandler v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 21 Minn. See, also, Steen 85, 86, 18 Am. Rep. 385. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 61 How. Prac. 144, 146.

"Occur," as used in a fire insurance policy requiring an action to be commenced thereon within 12 months after the loss shall occur, is not to be construed in the sense of "accrue." The word "occur" means to happen, in its general and most popular sense, while the word "accrue" is to be added or attached to something else, in its generally received sense. The loss occurred at the time the fire destroyed the property. Johnson v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 91 Ill. 92, 94, 33 Am. Rep. 47.

OCEAN.

See "Western Ocean."

The open sea, the high seas, the ocean, is that which is the common highway of nations, the common domain, within the body of no country, and under the pr ticular right or jurisdiction of no sovereign, but open, free, and common to all alike, as a common and equal right. United States v. Morel (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas. 1310, 1312.

The term "ocean," when used as boundary of land granted, means the ocean at the ordinary high-water mark. Seaman v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 524.

ing as the house of a certain person, renders the allegation a sufficient statement of the person to whom the property belonged.

"owned by." Borough of Carlisle v. Mar shall, 36 Pa. 397, 401.

Rev. St. c. 103, § 14, providing that a

422.

"Of another," as used in Code, 283, providing that every person who shall set fire to the dwelling house of another shall be guilty of arson, is employed in the sense of ownership of property; and an indictment for burning a dwelling house, which alleged that it was used and occupied as a place of abode by anybody, was sufficient. McClaine v. Territory, 25 Pac. 453, 455, 1 Wash. St. 345.

The words "right of way of such railroad company," in a conveyance of "all the line of railroad heretofore belonging to the S. Railroad Company, together with the right of way," etc., "of the said railroad company," are to be construed as meaning "right of way owned by such company," as the phrases "property of" and the "property owned by" an individual or corporation, as commonly used and understood, mean precisely the same thing. Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Barker, 17 N. E. 797, 799, 125 Ill. 303.

"Of them," as used in 20 Stat. p. 141, c. 259, providing that no postmaster intrusted with the sale or custody of postage stamps shall use or dispose of them in the payment of debts or purchase of merchandise, confines the operation of the statute to stamps intrusted to the postmaster by the government. United States v. Williamson (U. S.) 26 Fed. 690, 691.

The words "land of," in a description of land in a deed as being bounded westerly by the land of L., means land belonging to or owned by L. Segar v. Babcock, 26 Atl. 257, 18 R. I. 203.

Under a statute providing that judgments shall be liens on the real estate of a debtor, the term "real estate of the debtor" means that which is in fact of or belonging to the debtor, irrespective of the fact whether the legal title appears in the debtor or another. Burke v. Johnson, 15 Pac. 204, 207, 37 Kan. 337, 1 Am. St. Rep. 252.

The preposition "of," in Act April 7, 1852, which provides that "all personal property, moneys at interest, bonds, and mortgages of the taxable inhabitants of the borough of Carlisle, county of Chamberlain, now taxable for state, county, and school purposes, shall hereafter be taxable for borough purposes," expresses the relation of ownership or property, and the whole section means that the inhabitants of Carlisle shall pay taxes to the borough on the same description of property owned by them as is taxed for county and school purposes. The word "of," in such connection, is to be construed as meaning "belonging to" and

husband" 90 days next after his death without being chargeable with rent therefor, means the house in which her husband owned the fee at the time of his decease. Young v. Estes, 59 Me. 441.

Gen. St. c. 118, § 44, providing that an assignment under the insolvent laws shall Vest in the assignee all the "property of the debtor" real and personal, which he could have lawfully sold, assigned or conveyed, or which might have been taken on execution or judgment against him, cannot be construed to include property held in trust by the debtor. Silbey v. Quinsigamond Nat. Bank, 133 Mass. 515, 517.

The word "of," in a requested instruc tion that the "defendants were discharged from all liability on the note sued on, the plaintiffs not having used due diligence in collecting said note of Burke," was construed to have been used in the sense of the word "from." Rives v. McLosky (Ala.) 5 Stew. & P. 330, 338.

Act June 30, 1885, § 4, requiring the treasurer of every private corporation, upon payment of interest, to assess the tax provided in the act, and that he shall deduct three mills on every dollar of the interest paid as aforesaid, means that he shall deduct the tax off the interest paid. Commonwealth v. Delaware Division Canal Co., 16 Atl. 584, 585, 123 Pa. 594, 2 L. R. A. 798.

As in.

The word "of," in Act Aug. 14, 1885, to establish the city court of Macon, was construed as synonymous with the preposition "in," and to have been used to indicate that the city court should be located in the city. These prepositions are frequently used as

synonymous. When we speak of A. of Macon, we mean that he is a resident of Macon and lives in Macon. When the defendant is alleged to be of a certain county, the allegation is sufficient to show that he is a resident in that county. Ivey v. State, 37 S. E. 398, 399, 112 Ga. 175.

As portion or part of.

"Of," as used in a declaration in ejectment describing the lands as "lots 1 and 2 of range 31 east, 19 south, and fractional section 30," means portion or part of the township. Wade v. Doyle, 18 Fla. 630, 633. "Of and concerning," as used in an allegation of libel declaring that the words were used of and concerning different matters alleged to be libelous, should not be construed to mean that the libel is stated to be of and concerning all of such matters, so that it would be necessary to prove a libel relating specifically to every one of the matters alleged, and that there would be a failure of proof if such was not the case, but the words only require that plaintiff prove the libel relating to those matters, so far as they are concerned with the libel, in respect either to the particular defamatory character ascribed to it in the declaration, or of the manner in which it is afterwards set out. May v. Brown, 3 Barn, & C. 113, 125.

Where testator by his will devised his property to his wife for life, with power to appoint the remainder "to whom she thinks proper of her heirs," the testator only meant that she might appoint to any one or more of her legal heirs. Her selection was limited to that class. She could select among them. This is the import of the word in the portion of the will above quoted. She could not, in executing this power, go out of this class of her legal heirs. Milhollen's Adm'r v. Rice, 13 W. Va. 510, 513.

Residence in place implied.

Certain English statutes direct that the maintenance of parents by children who have a sufficiency shall be according to that rate prescribed by the justices of the peace of such county where that person dwells. Thereunder an order was duly entered on Thomas Gilbert, "of the parish of Mersham in the county of Kent, for the maintenance of his destitute father, and it was objected that the order did not show that Gilbert dwelt within the county of Kent, and was therefore within the jurisdiction of the justices." Held, that "of," in such connection, generally imports dwelling, and that it was sufficiently averred that the man dwelt in the parish of M., and that the words "of a parish" in Kent sufficiently denotes that the person identified resides in that parish. Reg. V. Toke, 8 Adol. & E. 227.

name of the party's attorney or agent, together with the place of his abode, is sufficiently complied with by an endorsement of the attorney's name with the words "of Birmingham," the same being a sufficient description of the attorney's place of abode. Osborn v. Gough, 3 Bos. & P. 551, 554.

"Of Brooklyn," as used in a certificate of the formation of a partnership declaring that the general partners interested therein were two certain persons, "both of Brooklyn," is a precise equivalent to "both residents of Brooklyn," which conveys the same idea. It is universally so understood. It is the better mode of indicating a man's residence, and it means present residence. Where a former residence is described, the term is "from Brooklyn," or "late of Brooklyn," while "of Brooklyn" has no appropriate signification but that the person resides there. Lachaise v. Marks (N. Y.) 4 E. D. Smith, 610, 616.

An affidavit stating that "G. S., 'of the city of Albany, being duly sworn, says," etc., does not sufficiently indicate that the affiant was a resident of Albany. Staples v. Fairchild, 3 N. Y. (3 Comst.) 41, 44.

A notice by the selectmen of one town to those of another town stating that "paupers of your town are here, poor and unable to support themselves," means that they were paupers who were supported by the town to which they belonged, and did not imply that they were being supported as paupers by the town in which they were residing. Town of Beacon Falls v. Town of Seymour, 46 Conn, 281, 283.

As word of exclusion.