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of; seize; take up; employ; to take posses- , meaning of the chapter relating to occupying sion of and retain or keep; enter upon the claimants. Rev. St. Utab 1898, § 2025. possession and use of; bold and use; espe cially to take possession of a place as a place of residence, or, in warfare, a town OCCUR. or country, and to become established in it; to be in possession or occupation; hold pos

The word "occur," as used in a policy session; be an occupant; bave possession of fire insurance providing that no action and use.” Lyons v. Audry, 31 South. 38, 39, can be maintained on such policy unless 106 La. 356, 55 L. R. A. 724, 87 Am. st. commenced within the term of 12 months Rep. 299.

next after such loss or damage shall occur,

must be construed as synonymous with “ac“To occupy" means “to hold in posses- crue”; meaning that the limitation comsion; to hold or keep for use, as to occupy mences when the loss is due and payable, an apartment.” Missionary Soc. of M. E. and not from the time of the physical burnChurch v. Dalles City, 2 Sup. Ct. 672, 674, ing of the property. Though there is 107 U. S. 336, 27 L. Ed. 545 (citing Webst doubtedly a difference in the derivation and Dict.).

etymological meaning of the words “ac“To occupy” means to take; to seize; to crue” and “occur,” yet, as used by insurers

in contracts of insurance, they have the hold or get possession of; to have in possession and use of a thing—and is applicable ing of an event from which a claim arises.

same signification; representing the bappen. to personal property as well as to realty. Moreover, this construction accords with Herman v. Katz, 47 S. W. 86, 87, 101 Tenn. the general rule which regards the statute 118, 41 L. R. A. 700; Coleman v. Eberly, 76 of limitations as beginning to run on a conPa. (26 P. F. Smith) 197, 201.

tract of indemnity from the time at which The use of the words "hold and oc- the plaintiff actually damaged, and not cupy" in a lease which recites that the les from the happening of the event from see shall hold and occupy the premises for which the loss arises. Steen v. Niagaa term of years amounts to a general cove- ra Fire Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, 324, 42 Am. nant for quiet enjoyment during the term. Rep. 297; Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 246-250, 4 Am. Dec. Y. 235, 243, 33 Am. Rep. 607; Chandler v. 122.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 21 Minn.

85, 86, 18 Am. Rep. 385. See, also, Steen "Occupied by me," as used in the follow

V. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y.) 61 How. ing devise, “I give to my dear wife, E. B.

Prac. 144, 146. F., during her natural lifetime, the house and lot occupied by me in Market street, "Occur," as used in a fire insurance pol. in the city of Camden, together with the lot icy requiring an action to be commenced adjoining the same on the east”—are used thereon within 12 months after the loss shall merely to identify the corporeal heredita- occur, is not to be construed in the sense ment devised. Fetters v. Humphreys, 19 of "accrue.” The word "occur" means to N, J. Eq. (4 C. E. Green) 471, 480.

happen, in its general and most popular Where a municipal provision provides sense, while the word “accrue” is to be addthat no one shall occupy any stand within ed or attached to something else, in its gena certain market without permission from

erally received sense. The loss occurred the clerk, etc., a stand may be occupied, at the time the fire destroyed the property. within the meaning of the regulation, by a Johnson v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 91 Ill. 92, 94, person having a box within the limits of 33 Am. Rep. 47. the market containing articles for sale, and offering them for sale. Commonwealth v.

OCEAN. Rice, 50 Mass. (9 Metc.) 253, 256.

See "Western Ocean." OCCUPYING CLAIMANT.

The open sea, the high seas, the ocean, When any person has settled upon any is that which is the common highway of real estate, and occupied the same for three nations, the common domain, within the years, under or by virtue of any law or con- body of no country, and under the purtract with the proper officers of the state ticular right or jurisdiction of no sovereign, for the purchase thereof, or under any law but open, free, and common to all alike, as of, or by virtue of any purchase from, the a common and equal right. United States United States, and shall have made valuable v. Morel (U. S.) 26 Fed. Cas. 1310, 1312. improvements thereon, and shall be found not to be the owner thereof, or not to have The term “ocean," when used acquired a right to purchase the same from boundary of land granted, means the ocean the state or the United States, such person at the ordinary high-water mark. Seaman shall be an occupying claimant, within the v. Smith, 24 Ill. 521, 524.

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The ocean was thought by Sir Mat-, free from an atmosphere impregnated with thew Hale to include only that portion of malice or corrupting prejudices. Brow v. the sea which lies without the body of a Levy, 29 N. E. 417, 418, 3 Ind. App. 464. county, and not to include "the arms branches of the sea lying within the fauces terræ, where a man may reasonably dis- OF. cern between shore and shore, which is or may be within the body of a county.

A contract for the sale of "mess pork of De Jure Mar. c. 4. United States v. Rod. Scott & Co." means pork manufactured by gers, 14 Sup. Ct. 109, 111, 150 U. S. 249, 37 Scott & Co. Powell v. Horton, 2 Bing. N. C. L. Ed. 1071; United States v. Grush (U. S.) 668, 675. 26 Fed. Cas. 48, 51.

Acts La. 1887, § 1, provides that “the “In other matters than crimes connected circuit court shall not have cognizance of with admiralty Jurisdiction, it may be im- any suit, except upon foreign bills of exportant at times to discriminate between the change, to recover the contents of any promseas and the high seas, but I apprehend issory note, or other chose in action, in favor that in crimes 'the seas' or 'the high seas' of any assignee or of any subsequent holder or 'the ocean' means much the same.” United of such instrument, to be payable to bearer, States v. New Bedford Bridge (U. S.) 27 and be not made by any corporation, unless Fed. Cas. 91, 120.

such suit," etc. Held, that the word "of,"

in the phrase "or of any subsequent holder The term “ocean" has the same mean- of such instrument,” should be construed to ing as the term “main sea," and is used to

mean "it"; the word “of” being erroneously designate that portion of the sea which used in its stead. Newgass v. City of New lies outside the body of the county, and is Orleans (U. S.) 33 Fed. 196, 198. distinguished from the term "sea,” in that the latter includes arms or branches of

As belonging to. the sea which may be wit] the body of the county. De Lovio v. Boit (U. S.) 7 Fed.

The "property of another," within the Cas. 418, 428.

meaning of the embezzlement statutes of many of the states in which the subject of

the offense is required to be the “property OCEAN WATERS.

of another," has been construed almost uniThe phrase "ocean waters" embraces versally to mean that it must be wholly

It has resulted all waters opening directly or indirectly the property of another. into the ocean, and navigable by ships, for that, as a rule, a member of an ordinary eign or domestic, coming in from the ocean, partnership could not be convicted of emof draft as great as is drawn by the larger

bezzlement of partnership property. State ships which traverse the open sea The

v. Kusnick, 15 N. E. 481, 482, 45 Ohio St. Victory (U. S.) 63 Fed. 631, 636.

535, 4 Am. St. Rep. 564; State v. Reddick,

48 N. W. 846, 847, 2 S. D. 124. OCTB.

Money or property of another, within

the meaning of Gen. St. c. 95, $ 23, authorThe objection that “Octb.,” in a writizing the punishment of any clerk, agent, commanding the sheriff to summon the de- servant, etc., for embezzling, without the fendant “to appear before the judges on consent of his employer, or master, any the first day of their next octb. term, to be money or property of another, means any holden on the third Monday of said month," money or property not belonging to the deexpressed no particular month, is too slight,

fendant. State v. Kent, 22 Minn. 41, 42, 21 as the abbreviated word could not be mis- | Am. Rep. 764. taken. Kearns v. State (Ind.) 3 Blackf. 334,

"Among the definitions of the preposi337.

tion 'of' as given by Webster's International

Dictionary is belonging to,' and another is ODIUM.

*denoting possession or ownership.” Thus

the word "of," in an indictment for larceny, "Odium" means hatred, dislike, and it is alleging the property to be the goods and used in such sense in Rev. St. 1881, 8 412, chattels of J., imports ownership of such providing that the court in term, or the goods and chattels in the said J. State v. judge in vacation, shall change the venue of King, 51 Atl. 1102, 1103, 95 Md. 125. any civil cause upon application, supported by affidavit, showing, among other things, that the accused burglariously broke and

“Of," as used in an indictment charging that an odium attaches to the applicant, or to his cause of action or defense, on account entered into the infirmary of Morgan county, of local prejudices. It implies such a gen

is equivalent to "the property of” or “beeral ill feeling toward a party to an action longing to." Davis v. State, 38 Ohio St. 505. as will render it uncertain, at least, whether The use of the word "of" in an indict. the cause can be tried by impartial triers, ment for arson, describing the burned build.

ing as the house of a certain person, ren., "owned by." Borough of Carlisle v. Mar ders the allegation a sufficient statement of shall, 36 Pa. 397, 401. the person to whom the property belonged. Jordan v. State, 41 N. E. 817, 818, 142 Ind. widow may remain in the “house of her

Rev. St. c. 103, § 14, providing that a 422.

husband" 90 days next after his death with“Of another,” as used in Code, § 283, out being chargeable with rent therefor, providing that every person who shall set means the house in which her husband ownfire to the dwelling house of another shall ed the fee at the time of his decease. Young be guilty of arson, is employed in the sense v. Estes, 59 Me. 441. of ownership of property; and an indict

Gen. St. C. 118, § 44, providing that an ment for burning a dwelling house, which

assignment under the insolvent laws shall alleged that it was used and occupied as a place of abode by anybody, was sufficient, debtor” real and personal, which he could

vest in the assignee all the “property of the McClaine v. Territory, 25 Pac. 453, 455, 1 Wash. St. 345.

have lawfully sold, assigned or conveyed, or

which might have been taken on execution The words "right of way of such rall, or judgment against him, cannot be conroad company,” in a conveyance of "all strued to include property held in trust by the line of railroad heretofore belonging to the debtor. Silbey V. Quinsigamond Nat. the S. Railroad Company, together with the Bank, 133 Mass. 515, 517. right of way,” etc., "of the said railroad company," are to be construed as meaning

As by. "right of way owned by such company," as "Or," as used in a deed of land described the phrases “property of” and the “property as "all the land situate and lying north of owned by" an individual or corporation, as the road aforesaid, bounded north of the commonly used and understood, mean pre- heirs of Matthew Clark's land," should be cisely the same thing. Ohio & M. Ry. Co. construed in its obsolete, but perfectly gramv. Barker, 17 N. E. 797, 799, 125 Ill. 303. matical, meaning of "by," as in the familiar “Of them,” as used in 20 Stat. p. 141, c. examples, "seen of men," "led of the spirit,”

Hannum v. Kings259, providing that no postmaster intrusted tempted of the devil.” with the sale or custody of postage stamps ley, 107 Mass. 355, 361. shall use or dispose of them in the payment

As for. of debts or purchase of merchandise, confines the operation of the statute to stamps

The words “of the county," as used in a intrusted to the postmaster by the govern- statute in reference to the clerks of the counment. United States v. Williamson (U. S.) ty, is synonymous with the phrase "for the 26 Fed. 690, 691.

county,” as used in the statute with refer

ence to such clerks. Slymer v. Maryland, 62 The words “land of,” in a description Md. 237. of land in a deed as being bounded westerly by the land of L., means land belonging to As from or off. or owned by L. Segar v. Babcock, 26 Atl.

The word “of," in a requested instruc 257, 18 R. I. 203.

tion that the “defendants were discharged Under a statute providing that judg. from all liability on the note sued on, the ments shall be liens on the real estate of a plaintiffs not having used due diligence in debtor, the term “real estate of the debtor" collecting said note of Burke," was construed means that which is in fact of or belonging to have been used in the sense of the word to the debtor, irrespective of the fact wheth- “from.” Rives v. McLosky (Ala.) 5 Stew. er the legal title appears in the debtor or & P. 330, 338. another. Burke v. Johnson, 15 Pac. 204, 207, 37 Kan. 337, 1 Am. St. Rep. 252.

Act June 30, 1885, $ 4, requiring the

treasurer of every private corporation, upon The preposition "of," in Act April 7, payment of interest, to assess the tax pro1852, which provides that "all personal vided in the act, and that he shall deduct property, moneys at interest, bonds, and three mills on every dollar of the interest mortgages of the taxable inhabitants of the paid as aforesaid, means that he shall deduct borough of Carlisle, county of Chamberlain, the tax off the interest paid. Commonwealth now taxable for state, county, and schoolv. Delaware Division Canal Co., 16 Atl. 584, purposes, shall hereafter be taxable for bor- 585, 123 Pa. 594, 2 L R. A. 798. ough purposes," expresses the relation of

As in. ownership or property, and the whole section means that the inhabitants of Carlisle The word "of," in Act Aug. 14, 1885, to shall pay taxes to the borough on the same establish the city court of Macon, was condescription of property owned by them as strued as synonymous with the preposition is taxed for county and school purposes. “in," and to have been used to indicate that The word "of,” in such connection, is to the city court should be located in the city. be construed as meaning "belonging to" and These prepositions are frequently used as

means

synonymous. When we speak of A. of name of the party's attorney or agent, to Macon, we mean that he is a resident of gether with the place of his abode, is sufVacon and lives in Macon. When the de- ticiently complied with by an endorsement of fendant is alleged to be of a certain county, the attorney's name with the words "of the allegation is sufficient to show that he is Birmingham," the same being a sufficient a resident in that county. Ivey v. State, description of the attorney's place of abode. 37 S. E. 398, 399, 112 Ga. 175.

Osborn v. Gough, 3 Bos. & P. 551, 554.

“Of Brooklyn," as used in a certificate As portion or part of.

of the formation of a partnership declaring "Or," as used in a declaration in eject that the general partners interested therein ment describing the lands as “lots 1 and 2 were two certain persons, “both of Brookof range 31 east, 19 south, and fractional lyn,” is a precise equivalent to "both resisection 30," means portion or part of the dents of Brooklyn,” which conveys the same township. Wade v. Doyle, 18 Fla. 630, 633. idea. It is universally so understood. It is

"Of and concerning,” as used in an al- the better mode of indicating a man's resilegation of libel declaring that the words dence, and it

present residence. were used of and concerning different mat- Where a former residence is described, the ters alleged to be libelous, should not be term is “from Brooklyn,” or “late of Brookconstrued to mean that the libel is stated lyn," while “of Brooklyn” has no appropriate to be of and concerning all of such matters, signification but that the person resides so that it would be necessary to prove a li- there. Lachaise v. Marks (N. Y.) 4 E. D. bel relating specifically to every one of the Smith, 610, 616. matters alleged, and that there would be a

An affidavit stating that "G. S., ‘of the failure of proof if such was not the case, but city of Albany, being duly sworn, says,” etc., the words only require that plaintiff prove does not sufficiently indicate that the affiant the libel relating to those matters, so far as was a resident of Albany. Staples v. Fairthey are concerned with the libel, in respect child, 3 N. Y. (3 Comst.) 41, 44. either to the particular defamatory character ascribed to it in the declaration, or of the

A notice by the selectmen of one town manner in which it is afterwards set out to those of another town stating that “pa upMay v. Brown, 3 Barn. & C. 113, 125.

ers of your town are here, poor and unable

to support themselves," means that they Where testator by his will devised his were paupers who were supported by the property to his wife for life, with power to town to which they belonged, and did not appoint the remainder “to whom she thinks imply that they were being supported as proper of her beirs," the testator only meant paupers by the town in which they were rethat she might appoint to any one or more siding. Town of Beacon Falls v. Town of of her legal heirs. Her selection was limited Seymour, 46 Conn, 281, 283. to that class. She could select among them. This is the import of the word in the por- As to. tion of the will above quoted. She could

The changing of the word "of,” as used not, in executing this power, go out of this in a bond requiring the master of a vessel class of her legal heirs. Milhollen's Adm'r

to exhibit a certified copy of the list of the v. Rice, 13 W. Va, 510, 513.

ship's company of the first boarding officer,

to the word "to," is immaterial because it Residence in place implied.

does not alter the meaning and construction Certain English statutes direct that the of the bond. United States v. Hatch (U. S.) maintenance of parents by children who 26 Fed. Cas. 220, 222, 223. have a sufficiency shall be according to that rate prescribed by the justices of the peace As with. of such county where that person dwells.

“Of his malice aforethought" is equivaThereunder an order was duly entered on lent in meaning to "with malice aforeThomas Gilbert, "of the parish of Mersham thought,” so that the use of the former exin the county of Kent, for the maintenance

pression in an indictment for murder, instead of his destitute father, and it was objected of the latter, does not invalidate the indictthat the order did not show that Gilbert dwelt within the county of Kent, and was Rocha v. State, 63 S. W. 1018, 43 Tex. Cr. R.

ment, though the latter is the statutory form. therefore within the jurisdiction of the jus

169. tices." Held, that "of,” in such connection, generally imports dwelling, and that it was

As word of exclusion. sufficiently averred that the man dwelt in the parish of m., and that the words “of a in four rods of a brook excludes the stream,

A deed describing a line as running with. parish” in Kent sufficiently denotes that the and means from the side of the stream, and person identified resides in that parish. Reg. not from the center of it. The word "of,” 1. Toke, 8 Adol. & E. 227.

as well as the word “from," is used as a 24 Geo. II, C. 44, 1, requiring that on term of exclusion. Haight v. Hamor, 22 Atl, the back of a notice shall be endorsed the 369, 372, 83 Me. 453.

OF THE BLOOD,

OF RECORD.

See “Blood."

See “Books of Record"; "Court of Rec

ord"; "Court not of Record”; “Debt

of Record"; "Matter of Record”; OF THE BODY.

"Mortgagee of Record”; “Obligation of See “Heirs of the Body"; "Issue of the Record"; "Title of Record." Body."

“Of record," as used in Crim. Code, s "of the body," usually denominated 383, providing that recognizances shall be of words of procreation, are not indispensable record, means of record in the sense that is to the creation of an estate tail by devise. taken by inferior tribunals—that they have Ewan v. Cox, 9 N. J. Law (4 Halst.) 10, 12. been taken and certified to the clerk of the

court of record and by him recorded. King

v. State, 25 N. W. 519, 523, 18 Neb. 375. OF COUNSEL.

A statute disqualifying a judge where OF UNSOUND MIND. he had been “of counsel" for either party means wbere he had been of counsel in the See "Unsound Mind." particular action in which he is sought to be disqualified, and not where he had been of counsel for either of the parties in some other OFF. and different action. The Richmond (U. S.) 9 Fed. 863, 864.

The word "off," written by the clerk of the court in preparing the court docket for

the next term under an entry showing the OF COURSE.

filing of a motion for a new trial, cannot be "Of course," as used in Prac. Act, $ 495, St. Francis Mill Co. v. Sugg, 44 S. W. 247,

regarded as an entry overruling the motion. declaring that the prevailing party shall be

248, 142 Mo. 358. entitled to costs of course, means as a matter of right. Stoddard v. Treadwell, 29 Cal. 281, 282.

OFF LARGE. The term "of course," as applied to A vessel off large is a vessel having the writs, means according to the course and wind free on either tack, which enables it practice of the court from which it issues, to take a course to either side, or proceed and it is competent for the court to prescribe straight forward, or return back to its anthe precise course in which it shall issue. chorage. It is a vessel free in the wind. Yates v. People (N. Y.) 6 Johns. 337, 359. Ward v. The Fashion (U. S.) 29 Fed. Cas. 181,

182, 188. Motions of course are those which are granted without the court being called upon to investigate the truth of any allegation or

OFF SHORE. suggestion upon which they are founded. Merchants’ Bank v. Crysler (U. 8.) 67 Fed. "loading off shore” means loading at a dis

A marine Insurance policy prohibiting 388, 390, 14 C. C. A. 444.

tance from and away from the shore while

the vessel is lying at anchor, and does not OF GRACE.

include loading at a bridge pier. A bridge

pier is really a projecting wharf, is a perThe phrase "of grace," predicated of a inanent structure attached to and firmly condecree in equity, had its origin in an age nected with the mainland, and loading from when kings dispensed their royal favors by such a place one would naturally suppose the hands of their chancellors; but, although was like taking in a cargo from shore. We it continues to be repeated occasionally, it should not understand that the words load. has no rightful place in the jurisprudence of ing off shore include or were intended to apa free commonwealth, and ought to be rele- ply to the case of loading at a bridge pier. gated to the age in which it was appropriate. In a certain sense loading at the end of a Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 557, 25 Atl. bridge pier 1,500 feet long is loading off shore 125.

or away from and distant from the main

land, but it is apparent that it is loading OF LIKE TENOR.

under quite different conditions from a ves

sel taking in a cargo from rafts and barges See “Like Tenor."

while anchored off shore, which manner of

loading is that intended to be and in fact OF MY NAME.

prohibited by the inhibition against loading

off shore. Johnson y, Northwestern Nat. Ins. See "Name."

Co., 39 Wis. 87, 89.

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