son from obtaining work or employment, or continuing in his said work and employment, is synonymous with "continue." The two words convey a conjunctive, and not a disjunctive, meaning. Any other signification than that the conspiracy was to prevent the person from having employment would be forced and unnatural. State v. Dyer, 32 Atl. $14, 818, 67 Vt. 690.

As issuance of patent.

"Obtain," as used in St. 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c. 83, § 4, providing that "if any person who now hath or shall hereafter obtain any letters patent as aforesaid, shall advertise," etc.. on petition the crown may grant an extension of the patent, means to become possessed of it either by original grant, by assignment, or by any other title, and does not refer solely to those originally had from the crown. Russell v. Ledsam, 14 Mees. & W. 573, 588.

"Obtained,” as used in St. 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c. 83, § 1, authorizing any person who, as grantee, assignee, or otherwise, "hath obtained" letters patent for using an invention, to disclaim any part of the title of such invention or of the specification, means only the party who obtains letters patent from the crown, not simply one who has possession of them by assignment or otherwise. Spillsbury v. Clough, 2 Q. B. 466, 471.

As obtaining in person.

Code, § 4370, declaring that any person who by any false pretense obtains from another any money, etc., is not limited in its meaning to an obtaining in person by the accused, but money paid to another at his request is obtained, within the meaning of the statute. Sandy v. State, 60 Ala. 58, 60.

"Obtains," as used in Comp. Laws 1879, p. 339, c. 31, § 94, providing for the punishment of any one obtaining money by false pretenses, means getting possession of something purposely by effort; that is, by false pretense. It is not alleged that money was obtained when it is said that, upon false representations and pretenses, certain liens and incumbrances were paid. State v. Lewis, 26 Kan. 123, 129.

Delivery.

As used in an information charging that defendant obtained complainant's signature by fraud, "obtain" means to get hold of, to get possession of, or to acquire, and hence includes the idea of delivery, so that an allegation of the delivery of the note containing the signature was not necessary. People v. Kinney, 67 N. W. 1089, 1090, 110 Mich. 97.

"Obtain," as used in a statute providing for the punishment of any person who by false pretense or pretenses shall obtain from any other person any money, goods, merchandise, or effects whatever, with intent to

cheat and defraud such person, in its primary meaning, as given by Webster, is to get hold of by effort. There is a difference between frauds which are perpetrated by means of the abuse of the forms of legitimate commercial transactions, and those which consist of personations and so-called confidence games and tricks. In either case, and by whatever means accomplished, the crime consists in the obtaining of the property; getting hold of the property. That is the corpus delicti. In this case, the goods not being delivered to defendants, they were held not to have obtained them. Ex parte Parker, 9 N. W. 33, 34, 11 Neb. 309.

Retention.

An indictment for conspiracy to obtain from the Ansonia Clock Company, by false pretenses, money, etc., is not sustained by proof that the accused was an agent of the clock company, and as such collected money belonging to it, which he retained, and, by falsification of his accounts, concealed the The word "obtain," fact of such retention. in the statute and in the indictment, is not used in any antiquated and obsolete sense, but in its ordinary and popular signification, as an active verb, meaning to acquire. Watson v. People, 27 Ill. App. 493, 497.

OBVIOUS.

Giving a copy of the writ to one of defendant's negro servants in the piazza of his dwelling house is a good service, under a statute requiring it to be left at some "obvious" part of the house. Bowers v. Alsten's Ex'rs (S. C.) 1 Nott & McC. 458.

"Obvious" is defined as meaning readily perceived by the eye. In an action for injuries alleged to have been caused by the absence of lights at an excavation in a street, a charge that, to render defendant free from negligence, the lights must have been such that the ditch could have been readily seen, was equivalent to an instruction that the lights should have been sufficient to make the excavation obvious. Missouri, K. & T R. Co. v. Johnson, 67 S. W. 768, 769, 771, 95 Tex. 409.

Where the defendant in an action for a

malicious prosecution claimed that, in order to entitle plaintiff to a recovery, the malice of the defendant and the innocence of the plaintiff must be obvious to the jury, and prayed the court so to instruct them, which was not done, it was held that such omis

sion was no ground for a new trial, the instruction shown not being sufficiently precise and definite; the court saying: "The word 'obvious' might have received different interpretations by different jurors. Some of them might have supposed it meant the highest attainable certainty; others, that it was to be understood to mean absolute cer

tainty; and others might suppose it meant reasonable certainty." Stone v. Stevens, 12 Conn. 219, 229, 30 Am. Dec. 611.

OBVIOUS RISKS.

The phrase "obvious risk," in an accident policy excepting an insurer from liability in case injuries result from exposure to an obvious risk, includes not only a risk which may be readily perceived by the eye or senses, but one also that may be perceived by the intellect. Small v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America, 45 S. E. 706, 708, 118 Ga. 900, 63 L. R. A. 510.

The obvious dangers of an employment are those which are apparent. They are the apparent risks of the work. They are the risks which are apparent in the exercise of ordinary observation, and which are disclosed by the use of the eyes and other senses. If the servant fails to observe what is obvious, and suffers, he cannot charge the consequences on his master. The risk so taken is impliedly assumed by him. Dillenberger v. Weingartner, 45 Atl. 638, 640, 64 N. J. Law, 292; Foley v. Jersey City Electric Light Co., 54 N. J. Law, 411, 24 Atl. 487; Chandler v. Atlantic Coast Electric Ry. Co., 39 Atl. 674, 61 N. J. Law, 380.

In an action for an injury to a servant while operating a machine, in which defendant contended the plaintiff had assumed the risk, it was said that risks which are incident to the business must not be confounded with such as are denominated obvious. "The former sort comprises those which accompany or arise from the natural or usual method of conducting the particular business, and has more special relation to perils which attend the business generally, while the latter includes such as are manifest to the sense of observation, open, and readily discernible, whether they arise from the nature of the business, the particular manner in which it is conducted, or the use of defective or unsafe appliances." Stager v. Troy Laundry Co., 63 Pac. 645, 647, 38 Or. 480, 53

L. R. A. 459.

Under an accident insurance policy providing that it should be void if the accident occurred from voluntary or unnecessary exposure to danger or to obvious risk of injury,

it is held that jumping from a moving train

after it had passed a station was an exposure to obvious risk of injury, within the meaning of the policy. Smith v. Preferred Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 104 Mich. 634, 635, 62 N. W.

990.

OCCASION.

See "Solemn Occasion."

The word "occasion" signifies necessity or need as well as a particular time. In a

as

personal injury action against a railroad, a charge that "the only question, so far the negligence of the defendant was concerned, was, was the brake defective, out of order, not in reasonable repair, not reasonable for the occasion?" correctly used the word in either sense. Mackey v. Baltimore & P. R. Co., 19 D. C. 282, 301.

The use of the word "occasion" in the

report of the viewers of a private road, that

"there is occasion for it," is a sufficient compliance with the statute requiring them to report whether it is necessary, for, though mere convenience is perhaps not sufficient to authorize such road, the report is never drawn with the precision of an indictment, and, in the apprehension of the mass, the terms "necessary” and “occasion" are convertible. In re Pocopson Road, 16 Pa. (4 Harris) 15, 17.

Where the husband, without further consideration, conveyed land in trust that it should be conveyed to his wife, and the trustee, without consideration, conveyed it to the wife accordingly, the conveyance to the wife was occasioned by a payment or pledge of the property of the husband, within the meaning of those terms as used in the statute providing that every married woman shall hold to her own use, and free from the control of her husband, the property inherited by her, provided the conveyance or bequest is not occasioned by payment or pledge of the property of the husband. Vogt v. Ticknor, 48 N. H. 242.

The word "occasioned," as used in an instruction in an action for injuries that, if the jury could find the injuries were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant, they should find for the plaintiff, is used as a synonym of "caused," and the jury would not be misled thereby. Union Gold Min. Co. v. Crawford, 69 Pac. 600, 603, 29 Colo. 511.

the delay resulted in loss, the loss was occasioned by the injunctions, though they might not be the direct cause of the loss. Meysenberg v. Schlieper, 48 Mo. 426, 434.

Where injunctions caused delay, and

The statute giving a right of action for all damages occasioned by laying out, making, and maintaining a railroad, etc., refers to any damage which may be directly or indirectly caused by the railroad. Parker v. Boston & M. R. Co., 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 107, 50 Am. Dec. 709; Rand v. City of Boston, 41 N. E. 485, 487, 164 Mass. 354.

"The Legislature meant to protect the man who owned his land and occupied it in good faith. Their protection cannot extend to the man who becomes an occupant for the mere purpose of defeating public improvements, or for the purpose of extorting excessive compensations." Hagner v. Pennsylvania S. V. R. R., 25 Atl. 1082, 1084, 154 Pa. 475.

The term "occupancy," as used in a fire insurance policy, requires a living in, and not a supervision over, so that where the assured, a farmer, rented his place to a tenant, and left the house four weeks before the fire, visiting it at intervals, and removing all the stock, but leaving most of the wearing apparel and a portion of the household articles, there was no occupancy. Craig v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 34 Mo. App. 481.

(Of Land).

See "Actual Occupancy"; "Actual Occupation"; "Actually Occupy"; "Cease to Occupy"; "Constructive Occupancy." Change in occupation, see "Change." Occupied for unlawful purpose, see "Unlawful Purpose."

Otherwise occupied, see "Otherwise.".

"Occupy," as used in General Indian Protection Act March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 980, 1005), relating to the opening to settlement of certain Oklahoma lands, and providing that, until such lands are open for settlement by proclamation of the President, no person shall be permitted to enter upon and occupy the same, and no person violating such provision should ever be permitted to enter any of said lands or acquire any right thereto, are used in the ordinary sense of the words, and have no technical significance. Smith v. Townsend, 13 Sup. Ct. 634, 635, 148 U. S. 490, 37 L. Ed. 533.

One's occupancy of land being in its nature a continuing act, every day's occupancy thereof by him is, in legal contemplation, a new and independent act of occupation, so that under Pen. Code, 250, making it an offense to occupy land under a forged title, knowing the same to be forged, a prosecution is not barred if the accused was in possession of the land within the time of the statute of limitations, though the occupancy was taken first prior to such time. Coker v. State, 41 S. E. 684, 115 Ga. 210.

"Occupy," as used in 11 Geo. III, c. 12, § 36, relating to rates to be paid by any person who shall "inhabit, hold, occupy, be in possession of, or enjoy" any lands, etc., would include water or gas companies in respect of their pipes which are laid beneath the soil. Reg. v. Waterworks Co., 18 Q. B. 705, 715.

or has had actual possession of the same. Hall v. Roberts (Ky.) 74 S. W. 199, 200.

The term "occupancy," as used in the homestead exemption laws of this state, has invariably been construed as meaning an actual occupancy of the premises. Quehl v. Peterson, 49 N. W. 390, 391, 47 Minn. 13.

A will providing that the testator's wife should hold, use, occupy, and enjoy his entire estate, both real and personal, as he had done before, during her natural life, means that she is to live on it with her children, servants, and employés. Rountree v. Dixon, 11 S. E. 158, 159, 105 N. C. 350.

"Occupy" as used in the possessory act (St. 1852, p. 158), relating to actions for the recovery of possession of real estate, and providing that no person can maintain an action thereunder unless he occupy the land, is equivalent to the term "reside upon." Wolfskill v. Malajowich, 39 Cal. 276, 279.

The term "occupy," as used in the homestead statutes, does not require continuous actual possession. In discussing the meaning of the term, the court says: "What is the meaning of 'occupy,' or 'continuing to occupy,' within the meaning of the Legislature? In common parlance, and in reference to housekeeping, we at once attach the idea of actual residence, dwelling, abiding on; the place of bed, board, and washingthree acts of constant recurrence to supply the necessaries of life and renew the physical

man.

This is the second sense given it by Webster, but it is used also in the sense of possess generally; and Webster also uses the word 'possess' in the same variety of senses, in the main, as is given to occupy' or 'occupancy.' Turn to 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 240, 'Occupancy,' 336, 'Possess,' and we find the words used and understood in the same great variety of senses. If a man go abroad, animo revertendi, and reside for temporary pur

poses of trade or business, he will not lose his domicile, and yet we know that the party's domicile follows his actual residence. So it is with foreign ministers and diplomatic agents. In contemplation of law, they continue to occupy their mansions or dwellings in their own country, though actually resident abroad for years. A person may have a constructive possession or occupancy, and he may have a possessio pedis by tenants or actual inclosures, and, in contemplation and within the meaning of the law, he may have actual possession, actual occupation, without residence." Tumlinson v. Swinney, 22 Ark. 400, 405, 76 Am. Dec. 432.

The occupancy contemplated by the laws requiring notice to the occupant before a tax title could exclude a redemption is constituted by the building of a house thereon, and using it as a home. People v. Wemple, 39 N. E. 397, 398, 144 N. Y. 478.

"Occupied," as used in Laws 1849, relating to homesteads, and exempting from execution, as such, premises occupied, means something more than what is known in law as "constructive possession," as contra distinguished from "actual possession." It also means more than such possession as arises where land is cultivated, or being fenced and improved. It means premises which are used and occupied as a home; a place to abide in; a place for the family. Charless V. Lamberson, 1 Iowa (1 Clarke) 435, 443, 63 Am. Dec. 457.

"Occupied, as used in the statute exempting every homestead owned and occupied by any resident, means actual occupancy; possession of the premises as a home. McConnaughy v. Baxter, 55 Ala. 379,

382.

"Occupied," as used in Comp. St. p. 569, 92, exempting from execution the homestead occupied by a debtor and his family, should be construed to require actual residence on the premises, and not as meaning "use, tenure, possession," though such is the frequent meaning of the word. Tillotson v. Millard, 7 Minn. 513, 518 (Gil. 419, 420), 82 Am. Dec. 112.

Though the word "occupy," applied to a house, conveys to any man the meaning of living in the house, yet, in a statement of grounds of appeal made under an act of Parliament, the word "occupy" does not mean "reside in." Even actual occupation would not necessarily mean residence, because a man might dwell in one parish, and then rent a house and land in the adjoining one, occupying it by his servant. Some other words, therefore, are necessary to show residence. Per Patteson, J. A man may occupy either land or dwelling house without re siding. Per Whitman, J. Reg. v. West Riding Justices, 2 Q. B. 705, 711.

Under a statute requiring seven years' residence by adverse possession to give title, seven years' occupancy was not a bar. An occupancy may exist without a residence. Chiles v. Jones, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 479, 484.

when the lands of two persons join, and Under Gen. St. c. 39, § 1, providing that both parties shall occupy the land, it shall be the duty of each party to build one-half of the line fence, the word "occupy" does not mean actual residence upon the land, but only such occupation as makes it necessary or advantageous for the purpose thereof to fence the land. Maudlin v. Hanscombe, 20 Pac. 619, 620, 12 Colo. 204.

Occupation of land is a fact. The effect of it, when its nature and extent are shown, is a matter of law; and a witness may testify to the fact of occupation and its extent, as to time and space, without stating the particular acts of which it consists. Child v. Kingsbury. 46 Vt. 47, 55.

Adverse possession distinguished. Distinguished from adverse possession. see "Adverse Possession."

Constructive occupancy.

To occupy means to take; to hold possession of; to hold or keep for use; to possess; to use; to hold possession. The popular idea of a homestead is uniformly associated with that of the occupancy of the place so designated, either in the past, the present, or the future. The nature of the occupancy by which land may be impressed with the homestead character should always be carefully distinguished from possession such as may be sufficient to serve as evi

The

dence of notice of title in the owner. latter may be constructive, while the former must in every instance be actual, in the sense that it should not depend upon paper evidence, the mere erection of improvements, the payment of taxes, or the exercise of personal control over the property to be affected. Occupancy is essential to the existence of the homestead right, but when the premises have become invested with the homestead character, and the homestead has once been acquired, a constructive occupancy may be sufficient to retain it. Ball v. Houston, 66 Pac. 358, 359, 11 Okl. 233.

Constructive possession.

law relative to adverse possession, includes The term "occupancy," as used in the constructive possession of land adjoining a line acquiesced in. Child v. Kingsbury, 46

Vt, 47, 55.

"Occupied," as used in a notice to terminate a lease as provided by Rev. St. c. 80,

10, which notice spoke of "the premises now occupied by you" (referring to the premises occupied by the lessor), is used in the