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der Act April 8, 1833, enacting that no will by, and entirely satisfactory to, the other, in writing concerning any real estate shall who neither entertains nor manifests any be repealed otherwise than by some other desire that the separation, or the cause will or codicil in writing, or some other which brought it about, should cease. And a writing declaring the same, executed and wife who is prosecuting an action against proved in the same manner as therein before her husband for divorce cannot maintain that provided, or by burning, canceling, obliterat- separation during the pendency of such suit ing, or destroying the same by the testator is obstinate on his part. Chipchase v. Chiphimself, or by some one in his presence, or chase, 48 N. J. Eq. (3 Dick.) 549, 22 Atl. by his express direction. Lewis v. Lewis 588. (Pa.) 2 Watts & S. 455, 457. See, also, Jack v. Shoenberger, 22 Pa. (10 Harris) 416, 420.

OBSTINATE DESERTION.

Where a husband and wife separated by mutual agreement that the husband, who was not able to support his wife, should go to a distant place and build up a medical practice, and, when able to maintain the wife, should send for her, and he did not do so, and, though having an opportunity to communicate with him, the wife did not, on her part, terminate the agreement, and it did not appear that the husband was at any time during the separation able to support his wife, whereby the agreement would terminate by its own limitation, the separation is not an obstinate desertion by the husband, within the meaning of the statute allowing a divorce for such cause; nor, if the husband did nothing to induce the wife to return, even if her separation from him was without sufficient cause, her desertion is not deemed obstinate. Costill v. Costill, 21 Atl. 35, 37, 47 N. J. Eq. 346.

"Obstinate desertion," within the meaning of a divorce statute which provides that divorce may be decreed for willful, continued, and obstinate desertion for the term of two years, means a desertion which has resisted such effort or concession as the party alleging desertion ought, under the particular circumstances of the case, to have made to bring it to an end. A wife's desertion is not obstinate where the husband was partly to blame, and where he made no effort to prevent her going on the day of her departure, nor any subsequent effort to induce her to return, though they met several times thereafter on friendly terms. Van Wart v. Van Wart, 41 Atl. 965, 57 N. J. Eq. 598. See, also, Cornish v. Cornish, 23 N. J. Eq. (8 C. E. Green) 208; Bowlby v. Bowlby, 25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Green) 406, 410; Payne v. Payne OBSTRUCT-OBSTRUCTION. (N. J.) 28 Atl. 449; Trall v. Trall, 32 N. J. Eq. (5 Stew.) 231, 232.

The law as to what constitutes desertion is well settled. Chancellor Green, in

See "Willful Obstruction."

Hinder synonymous, see "Hinder."

"Obstruct, hinder, and prevent" are com

Moores v. Moores, 16 N. J. Eq. (1 C. E. Green) monly used as synonymous, and are given as 275, 280, said: "To constitute desertion, a such in the dictionary. But they are of difwife must absent herself from her husband ferent roots, and are employed conventionof her own accord, without his consent and ally to express varying shades of meaning. against his will. The simple inquiry is, Speaking etymologically, to obstruct “obhas the wife for three years absented her- struo" (Latin), is to build or set up something self from her husband without his consent in the way; to hinder, "hind" (Anglo-Saxon), and against his will? If she has not, the as in "behind," "hindmost," is to pull back; desertion is not, within the contemplation to prevent, "prævenio" (Latin), is to come beof law, willful and obstinate. And the prin- fore; to thwart by anticipating. In a more ciple is firmly established that if a wife critical acceptation, "obstruct" implies oppoleaves her husband without cause, and with sition without active force, and does not imintent to throw off her marital duty, and aft-ply that the opposition was, in the end, erwards realizes that she has acted hastily effective; "hinder" implies action, and, to or foolishly, and would return if the way was open to her, and her husband refrains from doing anything to induce her to return, for the purpose of making her absence a ground of divorce, her desertion in such case is neither obstinate nor against his will." The essence of the wrong of desertion by a wife consists in the refusal by her, against the will and contrary to the wishes of her husband, to perform her marital duties and her obligations. Newing v. Newing, 45 N. J. Eq. (17 Stew.) 498, 18 Atl. 166.

Desertion cannot be considered as obstinate when the separation is acquiesced in

some extent, effectiveness; to "prevent" is to be effective, but not necessarily by force, either active or inert. Thus it may be that an officer of the law was obstructed in his duty, and hindered, perhaps, for a long time, but not finally prevented, from performing it. So, too, he may have been obstructed; but, surmounting or avoiding the obstruction,

he may have been not even hindered. Again,

he may be prevented by stratagem, though stratagem alone can neither hinder nor ob struct him: and yet, should the success of the stratagem involve action, as it would almost necessarily, it might be very questiona

ble whether the act ought not to be regarded as a hindrance. These distinctions are, however, the appropriate subjects of scholastic, rather than juridical, disquisition. Statutes defining crimes, unless the phraseology they employ has been itself legally defined, must be interpreted as their language is understood by mankind at large, according to the everyday import of the words. I shall therefore charge you that the words "obstruct," "hinder," and "prevent," in the act before us (Fugitive Slave Law, § 7), making it a criminal offense knowingly and willfully to frustrate or retard the attempted recapture of a fugitive slave by his master, mean substantially the same thing. United States v. Williams (U. S.) 28 Fed. Cas. 631, 633.

Gen. St. 1878, c. 32, § 78, authorizing a person who is hindered and obstructed, in driving logs, by the logs of another, to drive such obstructing or hindering logs to some point where they can be conveniently separated, and to recover a reasonable compensation for so driving from the owner, should be construed to mean that if the logs of one person are in the way of the logs of another, so that such other cannot drive his logs until they are gotten out of the way, he is hindered or obstructed. It is not necessary, to constitute such hindrance or obstruction, that the logs should have come in actual contact. Anderson v. Maloy, 19 N. W. 387, 32 Minn. 76.

Of due administration of justice.

The words "obstruct the due administration of justice therein," used in a penal enactment, necessarily limit the offense there denounced to cases therein-in the court, still "before the same"-and exclude past cases. They do not cover misbehavior which, though not directed to a particular case, affects all cases alike in the general administration of justice. The words "obstruct the administration of justice," in a section not penal, regarding a power to preserve the purity and independence of the court, and thereby promote the dispensation of justice, are broad enough to include not only improper acts in particular, but those which undermine the general administration of justice as well. Ex parte McLeod (U. S.) 120 Fed. 130, 139, 140.

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An obstruction, within the act of incorporation of a railroad company providing that it should be so constructed as not to obstruct or impede the free use of any public road, street, lane, or bridge, is anything set in the way, whether it totally closes the passage, or only hinders and retards progress. A road may be obstructed more or less. Such word, understood in its ordinary import, would make a railroad per se an obstruction to the free use of a street by the public. Under the charter, a railroad cannot be built on a street in such a manner as to cause any material obstruction. Commonwealth v. Erie & N. E. R. Co., 27 Pa. (3 Casey) 339, 355, 67 Am. Dec. 471.

To obstruct a highway means to stop up and wholly prevent travel upon a road, or render it unfit for travel. Newburyport Turnpike Corp. v. Eastern R. Co., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 326, 328.

"Obstruction," as used with respect to a highway, is applied to impediments to travel and passage placed in the open street, and tending to make its use difficult and dangerous. Gorham v. Withey, 17 N. W. 272, 52 Mich. 50.

A fence along a highway is an obstruction, if it prevents public travel from being perfectly safe, although it does not extend across the track. Mosher v. Vincent, 39 Iowa, 607, 609.

"Obstruction," as used in Code, § 993,

providing that the supervisors shall remove obstructions in the highways caused by fences or otherwise, means an obstacle; an impediment; a hindrance; that which impedes progress. In order to obstruct a highway, it is not necessary that it should be rendered impassable. Hence it would include trees growing within the limits of

Of highway. Encroachment distinguished, see "En- the road or highway which interfere with croachment."

An obstruction is a blocking up-filling with obstacles or impediments, and impeding, embarrassing, or opposing passage along and over the street-and, to constitute it such, it need not be such as to stop travel. Shade trees from 25 to 40 feet high, and about 12 inches in diameter, standing within the sidewalk, from 8 to 15 inches from the curb of a street, are obstructions. Chase v. 6 WDS. & P.-2

travel. Patterson v. Vail, 43 Iowa, 142, 145.

Rev. St. 1326, providing that whoever shall obstruct any highway, or fill up or place any obstruction in any ditch constructed for the draining of water from any highway, shall forfeit a certain sum, should be construed to include a barn occupying nearly one-half of the width of a highway in a populous village, and impeding and interfering with travel on such highway. The fact

that a portion of the width of the street was left open, so that travelers thereon could conveniently pass the structure, does not make it an encroachment, instead of an obstruction of the street. It is difficult to lay down any general rule by which to determine, in any given case, whether an object placed in a highway is an obstruction or an encroachment. It may safely be said that

an object or structure, to be an obstruction, need not necessarily be such as to stop travel on the highway. State v. Leaver, 22 N. W. 576, 578, 62 Wis. 387.

The term "obstruction" will not include the rightful use of a highway by individuals, which is itself in reasonably safe and fit condition, or their misconduct upon it, though such misconduct may amount to a public nuisance, as used in Rev. St. c. 5701, making persons causing an obstruction on a highway liable for damages arising therefrom. Ray v. City of Manchester, 46 N. H. 59, 60, 88 Am. Dec. 192.

The obstruction of a public road is a public nuisance, but private individuals cannot complain of such a matter unless they can show an injury peculiar to themselves. Hill v. Hoffman (Tenn.) 58 8. W. 929, 931.

Of mails.

"Obstructing the mails," as used in Rev. St. U. S. § 3995 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2716], providing that any one guilty of obstructing the mails shall be punished, etc., includes the placing of obstructions by boys on the track of an electric railway whereon the United States mails are carried, by which the mail is delayed or forced to be carried in some other way. United States v. Thomas (U. S.) 55 Fed. 380.

Within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 3995 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2716], which provides that any person who shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or any carriage horse, driver, or carrier carrying the same, for every such offense shall be punishable, etc., would include the stopping of a train carrying United States mail, although the person stopping the same had a judgment and writ of possession from a state court against the railroad company in respect to the lands about to be crossed by such train. United States v. De Mott (U. S.) 3 Fed. 478.

Of navigation.

degree of obstruction will vary with the character and extent of the navigation. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Inman & I. S. S. Co. (U. S.) 59 Fed. 365, 367, 8 C. C. A. 152.

As applied to navigation, there cannot be a distinction between an obstruction and an interference. Where submarine telegraph cables, laid in the soft mud at the bottom of a navigable river, whatever their exact posi

tion was, were in a permanent position, if they interfered at all with the rightful or necessary use of steamers in that locality, the interference was also permanent; and a permanent interference which prevents a vessel from going where she ordinarily has the right to go, and wherever in her maneuvers she may find it necessary to go, whether the necessity be constant or frequent, or only occasional, as emergencies may compel her, constitutes obstruction. In re City of Richmond (U. S.) 43 Fed. 85, 88.

By an "obstruction" to the navigation of a river is meant such an impediment to the navigation that boats, in passing along the stream, cannot, by the use of skill and care, avoid being injured. Terre Haute Drawbridge Co. v. Halliday, 4 Ind. 36, 41.

The prohibition contained in Act Cong. Sept. 19, 1890, 26 Stat, 454, prohibiting creating an obstruction in navigable waters, is general in its terms. Where, by reason of the plastic nature of a substratum of clay under a railroad right of way located some distance from a navigable river, the track of the road settled, and the additional weight of an embankment built by the company forced the clay onto the bed of the river, causing a bar which obstructed navigation, such

a bar was an obstruction, within the meaning of the statute. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States (U. S.) 104 Fed. 691, 694, 44 C. C. A. 135, 59 L. R. A. 80.

What is an unlawful obstruction to navi

gation must always depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. In a sense, every vessel that is launched upon a river is an obstruction to its navigation, but such obstruction is not an unlawful one. So long as the vessel, however guided or propelled, does not actually prevent or render hazardous the navigation of the river by others, it cannot be considered an obstruction to navigation in the ordinary sense of the term. The Vancouver (U. S.) 28 Fed. Cas. 958, 960.

The word "obstruction," in Act Feb. 2, 1854, § 28, making it the duty of the city of Philadelphia to keep the navigable waters construed not to include a rock in the bottom within such city free from obstruction, was of the river, of which no notice had been given to the city authorities. Snyder v. City of Philadelphia, 78 Pa. (28 P. F. Smith) 23, 25.

The meaning to be given to the words 'not to obstruct the navigation," as used in Rev. St. § 5263 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, P. 3579], requiring cable companies constructing a submarine cable to so construct and maintain it as "not to obstruct navigation," must depend upon each individual case, and must be disposed of upon its own facts; The term "obstruction," employed in refand it may be taken as a safe rule that the erence to navigation, includes a rope stretch

ed across the archway of a bridge over a navigable river, and over the principal channel of the river crossed. The Swan (U. S.) 19 Fed. 455.

"Obstruction by ice," within the meaning of a clause in a charter party that during the obstruction of the navigation by ice the lay days are not to be counted, applies to such obstructions as prevent the loading of a vessel, as well as those which prevent her from going to sea. Ladd v. Wilson (U. S.) 14 Fed. Cas. 926.

Of officer.

"Obstruct," as used in Code, 4476, providing for the punishment of any person who shall knowingly and willfully obstruct, resist, or oppose any sheriff, coroner, or other officer or person duly authorized, in serving or attempting to serve or execute any lawful process, means to oppose. According to Webster, "to obstruct an officer" means to oppose that officer. It does not mean to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed, or to defeat its execution, but that the officer himself shall be obstruct

ed. It is opposition to the officer, and the words "obstruct, resist, or oppose" have nearly the same meaning, and the word "oppose" would cover the meaning of the words "re sist or obstruct," and they all mean the same thing. Davis v. State, 76 Ga. 721, 722.

Of prosecution of action.

"Defeat or obstruct," within the statute providing that if any surety shall abscond, or otherwise defeat or obstruct any person from bringing suit, signifies the performance of some act on the part of the surety which will amount to the prevention or hindrance of a suit in opposition to the will and right of a creditor, such as he cannot with reasonable diligence obstruct. The terms import resistance and obstruction in his rights, and unless the acts complained of are, in point of fact, such as would hinder and prevent him from bringing suit notwithstanding his desire to do so, they cannot be properly said to defeat or obstruct such suit. Walker v. Sayers, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 579.

Persistent legal resistance to a judgment is not an obstruction, within Gen. St. c. 71, art. 4, § 9, providing that, if a defendant by any indirect means obstructs the prosecution of an action, the time of the obstruction shall not be computed as part of the period within which the action may be commenced. Phillips v. Shipp, 81 Ky. 436, 442.

Of railroad track or train.

his foot, but could remove with his hands, is not such an obstruction. Bullion v. State, 7 Tex. App. 462, 463.

The term "obstruction," as used by railroad men, means that which may obstruct or hinder the free and safe passage of a train, or that which may receive an injury or damage such as would be unlawful to inflict if run over or against by the train, as in case of stock or a man approaching on the track. Nashville & C. R. Co. v. Carroll, 53 Tenn. (6 Heisk.) 347, 368.

To constitute an obstruction, within the meaning of a statute prescribing the duties of a railroad company when a person, animal, or other obstruction appears on the road, the animal must be in a position to be struck or directly injured by the train while moving Where the animal appears on on the rails. some other part of the company's right of way, it is not an obstruction. Louisville, N. & G. R. Co. v. Reidmond, 79 Tenn. (11 Lea) 205, 208; Alabama G. S. Ry. Co. v. Chapman, 80 Ala. 615, 619, 2 South. 738.

Under a statute requiring a locomotive engineer, on perceiving any obstruction on the track of the road, to use all means in his power, known to skillful engineers, in order to stop the train, and making the railroad company liable for damages to persons, stock, or property, resulting from a failure to comply with such requirements, where plaintiff's mule was killed by defendant's train the burden was upon defendant to show a compliance with such statute. A mule is a pretty large object. All trains running at night carry headlights casting bright light on the track before them, and an engineer keeping a proper lookout will perceive so large an obstruction as a mule on the track some time before encountering it. It then becomes his duty to use all means in his power to stop the train. South & North Alabama R. Co. v. Williams, 65 Ala. 74, 77.

Gen. St. §§ 63, 107, making it an offense for any one to obstruct a railroad train, does not apply to a passenger who, from whatever motive, pulls a signal rope to a train to be stopped, and the safety of the bell upon the engine, and thereby causes the v. Killian, 109 Mass. 345, 347, 12 Am. Rep. passengers to be endangered. Commonwealth

714.

Gen. St. 1878, c. 94, § 63, providing for the punishment of any one who shall willfully obstruct any engine or carriage passing on any railroad so as to endanger the safety of any person conveyed in or on the same, does Pen. Code, art. 678, punishing any per- not mean the actual stoppage or impeding son who shall willfully place "any obstruc- the passage of such engine or carriage by its tion upon the track of any railroad," means coming in collision with some obstacle placed an obstruction such as might have endan-in the way, but means the placing of an obgered human life; and a piece of iron bar, stacle on a railway in such a manner that which a person was unable to remove with any train, in passing, may strike it, and of

such a character that the safety of persons | execution is returned unsatisfied, an alias conveyed will be endangered if a train come execution, etc., may issue, is to be construed in collision with it. State v. Kilty, 10 N. as having a prospective operation only, and W. 475, 28 Minn. 421. is to be read as "hereafter obtained." McGovern v. Connell, 43 N. J. Law (14 Vroom) 106, 109.

Of sidewalk.

It is not necessarily an obstruction to a sidewalk to cover it by a roof 12 or 15 feet above it. Beecher v. People, 38 Mich. 289, 291, 31 Am. Rep. 316.

OBTAIN.

In shipping articles by which seamen engaged to perform a whaling voyage in consideration of the shares or lays to be paid for all that was obtained during the voyage, as soon after the return of the ship to a certain port as the oil could be sold and the voyage be made up, "obtained" means the products brought safety to the port of destination. It does not mean that the seamen shall have a right to be paid their lays in all the oil taken on board the ship during the fishing voyage. Reed v. Hussey (U. S.) 20 Fed. Cas. 440, 444.

Though the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Barnes v. Hayes, 1 Swan, 304, said that an execution related to the date of the teste, which is the first day of the term from which it issues, and operates as if it were actually running from the date of its return, and is a lien on all the goods owned by the defendant during that time, yet a lien of a judgment may be said to have been obtained

A landowner signed an agreement with a railroad company by which he relinquished to such company the right of way for its railroad through his land "in consideration of the prospective advantages which may accrue to him, arising from the road's location through such county." The company surveyed a road across such land, and did some work thereon within the six years thereafter, but did not complete the road, and for more than 25 years did no work upon such land, nor asserted any dominion over the right of way. During such time such landowner cultivated the land as the rest of his farm. The statute provided that "no railroad company shall be barred or presumed to have convey-within four months, within the meaning of ed any right of way, easement, or other interest in the soil which may have been condemned or otherwise obtained for its use as a right of way by any statute of limitations, or by occupation of the same by any person whatsoever." The court, in construing this statute, held that the word "obtained" must have been used in the sense of "secured" or "acquired," and that by mere survey and preliminary work the railroad company had not obtained the right of way across such land, so as to prevent loss of its right thereto by the adverse occupation of the landBeattie v. Carolina Cent. Ry. Co., 108 N. C. 425, 432, 12 S. E. 913, 915.

owner.

"Obtaining," as used in an indictment charging a person with obtaining money under false pretenses, means the same as the word "get," in its sense of "acquire"; that is, the word means not so much a defrauding or depriving another of his property, as the obtaining of some benefit by the defendant. People v. General Sessions of New York County (N. Y.) 13 Hun, 395, 400.

"Obtaining goods by false pretenses" is defined by statute in New York as follows: "Every person who, with intent to cheat or defraud, shall designedly, by color of any false token in writing, or by any other false pretense, obtain from any person any money, personal property, or valuable thing, shall be guilty of obtaining goods by false pretenses." Baldwin v. Need (N. Y.) 17 Wend. 224, 229.

the bankruptcy act, where the judgment was obtained in Tennessee, and the lien of the execution related back to the teste thereof, which was more than four months prior to the petition in bankruptcy. In re Darwin (U. S.) 117 Fed. 407, 408, 54 C. C. A. 581.

As acquire possession of.

"Obtain," as used in a charge stating that defendant may be convicted of larceny if he obtains property with intent to steal sion of." State v. Will, 22 South. 378, 379, it, is synonymous with "to acquire posses49 La. Ann. 1337.

"Obtain," as used in an instruction that

certain money must have been obtained by means of force and violence, in order to constitute robbery, is equivalent to "take," as used in a statute, since "to obtain" means to get hold of by effort; to gain possession of; to acquire; and "take," as used in the statute, also means to get possession of. State v. Miller, 36 Pac. 751, 752, 53 Kan. 324.

"To obtain" is to get hold of; to obtain possession of; to acquire; to maintain a hold upon; to keep; to possess. "To contract for" does not approach it in meaning. Sundmacher v. Block, 39 Ill. App. 553, 562 (quoting Webt. Dict.); State v. McGinnis, 33 N. W. 338, 339, 71 Iowa, 685; Connor v. State, 10 South. 891, 892, 29 Fla. 455, 30 Am. St. Rep. 126.

As continue.

The word "obtain," in a statute provid- "Obtaining," as used in an averment that ing that when any judgment is obtained, and a conspiracy was to prevent a certain per

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