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JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS

OF

WORDS AND PHRASES.

VOLUME 6.

OBEY.

A condition to obey and perform the judgments of the court, in a bond conditioned so to do in case the principal obligee is not arrested by plaintiff, is sufficient to require the payment of the judgments. Claflin v. Ball, 43 N. Y. 481, 486,

OBITER DICTUM.

See "Dictum."

OBJECT.

See "Natural Object."
Other object, see "Other."

their respective counties to any object not authorized by law, and in section 1386, making members liable personally for any such sum of money as the boards shall appropriate to any object not authorized by law, signifies the thing aimed at the thing sought to be accomplished. The objects to which money in the county treasury may be appropriated are designated by law, and it is not legally appropriable to any other purpose. It is for a diversion of money from legitimate objects, and not for appropriation to a proper object, although in an irregular and unauthorized manner, that liability is imposed on members personally. It is what the money is appropriated to and not how it is applied that furnishes the test of personal liability under it. Paxton v. Baum, 59 Miss. 531, 536.

Of action.

The "object of an action" is the thing sought to be attained by the action. Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan. 399, 406.

Act Cong. July 13, 1866, amending Act March 10, 1866, declaring it to be the duty of all persons required to make returns or lists of income, articles, or objects charged with an internal tax, to declare, etc., should be construed comprehensively, and to include the gross receipts of express companies and The "object of the action" is not the the gross receipts of stage proprietors. The cause of action or the subject of the action. words "objects charged with an internal tax" The object of the action is brought into existare used in a general sense, as equivalent ence by the commencement of the action, to "subjects of taxation." The word "ob- which is long after the subject of action and jects" will not be regarded as having refer- the causes of action have had an existence. ence only to something tangible or having The object of the action is the thing sought an existence in form. In this statute "lists to be obtained by the action. It is the remof income" has a meaning distinct from gross receipts. "Articles" might be deemed to apply to enumerated goods in use or on sale, or produced by manufacture, and the word "objects" should be construed as a more general term, which includes what was not embraced in either of the others. Wells v. Shook (U. 8.) 25 Fed. Cas. 679.

edy demanded and the relief prayed for, and is no part of the subject of action or the cause of action. Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan. 399, 406.

Of contract.

The object of a contract is the thing which it is agreed on the part of the parThe word "object," in Code 1871, § 1378, ty receiving the consideration to do or not providing that boards of supervisors shall to do. Civ. Code Cal. 1903, § 1595. The ob not appropriate money in the treasuries of ject of a contract must be lawful when the 6 WDS. & P.-1

(4875)

contract is made, and possible and ascertainable by the time the contract is to be performed. Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, §§ 3866, 3867; Civ. Code S. D. 1903, §§ 1219, 1220.

of statute or ordinance.

The object of a statute is the aim or purpose of the enactment. Allopathic State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 24 South. 809, 813, 50 La. Ann. 1358; State v. De Hart, 33 South. 605, 606, 109 La. 570. While the subject is the matter to which it relates and with which it deals. McNeeley v. South. Penn Oil Co., 44 S. E. 508, 518, 52 W. Va. 616 (citing State v. Ferguson, 104 La. 249, 28 South. 917, 81 Am. St. Rep. 123). The word "object" is so used in the clause of the Constitution providing that every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one object, and that shall be explained in the title. State v. Ferguson, 28 South, 917, 918, 104 La. 249, 81 Am. St. Rep.

123.

In the Constitution, requiring that the object of all laws shall be stated in the title, the word "object" means more nearly the same as "end" or "purpose" than does the word "subject." Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 4 S. W. 865, 872, 68 Tex. 542.

The object of legislation is to be determined by its natural and reasonable effect, and not by what may be supposed to have been the motives upon which the legislators acted. People v. Roberts, 19 Sup. Ct. 70, 76,

171 U. S. 658, 43 L. Ed. 323

The word "object," as used in Const. art. 5, § 17, providing that "no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title," means the same and has the same signification as the word "subject." Ingles v. Straus, 21 S. E. 490, 492, 91 Va. 209.

The word "object" is not synonymous with "subject," as used in Const, art. 3, § 21, providing that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title; for the object is the aim or purpose of the enactment, while the subject of a statute is the matter of public or private concern for which the law is enacted. State v. Morgan, 48 N. W. 314, 317, 2 S. D. 32.

"Object," as used in the organic act of Washington Territory, providing that every law shall embrace but one "object," and that shall be expressed in the title, is for all practical purposes synonymous with "subject." If any distinction is to be made between "subject" and "object," in the connection used, "object" is obviously of broader significance than the word “subject.” "Object" may be used as having the sense of "effect," the thing intended to be accomplished, not the means by which it is to be For instance, the object of an act is to conaccomplished, which is properly the subject. fer the elective franchise on females. subject is the subject-matter on which, in accomplishing that object, the legislative will operated, namely the section of the Code defining the qualification of electors. land v. Territory, 13 Pac. 453, 457, 8 Wash. T. 131.

Of tax.

Its

Har

The word "object," as used in Const. art.

The word "object," as used in a provision of a city charter that every ordinance shall contain but one object, expressed in the title, was not used in the sense of "number" or "variety"; nor was it intended to require a distinct legislative act for each particular 7, § 13, requiring every law which imposes, matter legislated upon. It was intended to continues, or revises a tax to distinctly prevent the union in one act of diverse, in-state the tax and the object to which it is congruous, and disconnected matters having no relation to or connection with each other, but was not intended to prevent the lawmaking power from enacting under a general title provisions affecting a variety of matters, so long as there is a natural connection between the several matters and the object named in the title. City of Seattle ▾. Barto, 71 Pac. 735, 31 Wash. 141.

Same-As subject.

Instead of the word "subject," in Const. art. 5, § 21, providing that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, the Constitutions of some of the states have, in like provisions, the word "object." Some states, as Texas and New York, give to "subject" a less restricted meaning than "object." Others, like Michigan, regard these words as substantially synonymous. In re House Bill, 39 Pac. 1096, 1098, 21 Colo. 46.

to be applied, should not be construed so narrowly as to restrict its meaning to a particular person or a particular appropriation. Its use is to require the Legislature, in imposing taxes, to specify one or another of the classes of expenditure which they are obliged or allowed to incur. It may be a wholly contingent or discretionary class, and yet be one of the objects to which the revenues of the state may be applied. The term is to be construed as intended to require the Legis

lature to indicate the general design with which a tax is laid, and for which it is to be used, and not to specify either a person or thing on which it is to be expended. The it is required to be paid into the treasury of object of a tax is sufficiently stated where the state to the credit of the general fund. People v. Orange County Sup'rs (N. Y.) 27

Barb. 557, 582.

In considering the provision of Const. art. 9, 84, "that no tax shall be levied, except

The conversion of a private dwelling into a public boarding house is using it for a "public or objectionable purpose," within the meaning of a lease providing that the lessor had a right to insist that the house should be occupied as a residence, and used strictly as a private dwelling, and not for any "public or objectionable purpose.” Gannett v. Albree, 103 Mass. 372, 374.

in pursuance of a law which distinctly states conveyance. Osborn v. Crisp, 8 Adol. & E. the object of the same, to which object such 779. tax shall be applied," the court said: "It is very clear that what constitutes the ob- OBJECTIONABLE PURPOSE. ject, in the sense of the Constitution, is some legal occasion that calls for the expenditure of money; that is, some obligation, present or prospective, created by law. Clearly the Constitution did not intend that the money raised under a special tax shall be applied toward the purposes cited in such tax law, independent of there being any law constituting an appropriation for its disbursement. Suppose, for instance, that money is raised to erect a public building, and no act for the erection of such building was passed during the fiscal year for which it was raised. Clearly there was no authority to be gathered from that provision of the Constitution that could warrant the disbursement of such a fund toward such purpose without such a law. This shows clearly that the object intended by the Constitution is that which is created by some law, or, in other words, some obligation, present or prospective, created and sanctioned by law." State v. Leaphart, 11 S. C. 458, 470.

OBJECTION.

See "General Objection."
Exception synonymous, see "Exception."

OBJECTIONABLE THING.

"Objectionable thing," as used in an instruction in an action for damages for the taking of land by a railway for a right of way, charging that if the jury find, from a preponderance of the evidence, that the value of plaintiff's land not actually appropriated by defendant had been decreased by the existence of any stagnant pools, floods, or objectionable thing, necessarily caused by the improvement of said right of way, the jury should add such decrease in value to their verdict for the plaintiff; but, if such pool, flood, or objectionable thing be caused by the faulty and negligent construction of such right of way, then any decrease in value of the land must be disregarded-to some extent rendered the instruction too broad and not sufficiently specific. The court should have enlarged on the instruction in its statement, and enumerated the different elements of damages, instead of grouping them as it did under the head of "objectionable thing"; but, inasmuch as by the last clause of the instruction the jury were limited to damages shown by the evidence, the objection and genAn "objection to the admissibility of evi-erality of the instruction was harmless. Fredence" in any cause can only be properly mont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Bates, 58 N. W. founded on the hypothesis that such testi- 959, 961, 40 Neb. 381. mony violates the law of evidence, in this: that the law prohibits the proof in the manner proposed of the particular fact, or of its irrelevancy to the subject-matter of inquiry. Gibbs v. Gale, 7 Md. 76, 86.

The word "objection," in a statement by an attorney that he desires to renew his objection to the findings of fact, was equivalent to the word "exception"; and hence an objection that no specified exception was taken to the findings of fact was groundless. Ranahan v. Gibbons, 62 Pac. 773, 775, 23 Wash. 255.

An objection to a pleading is not equivalent to a defense to an action, but is construed as relating to some formal defect. Elfrank v. Seiler, 54 Mo. 134, 136.

As used in a will devising a copyhold to testator's daughter-in-law for life, remainder in fee to her son A., on an express condition that A. should convey certain property severally to his sisters, but, in case he should "object or refuse” to make such conveyances, then the devise to him was void, the words "object or refuse" did not necessarily express a positive act, but the testator assumed that the grandson would convey if he did not object, and the words did not imply or make necessary a request by the sisters for the

OBLIGATE.

"Obligated" means strictly, and in common parlance, to be bound. Wachter V. Famachon, 22 N. W. 160, 161, 62 Wis. 117.

The term "obligated," in Laws 1891, c. 4022, § 2, providing that it shall not be lawful to take, by any contract, contrivance, or device whatever whereby the debtor is required or obligated to pay, a greater sum than the actual principal sum received, together with interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum, is a participle from "obligate,” and has the same root as the noun "obligation." In Webster's Unabridged Dictionary "obligation" in law is a bond with a condition annexed and a penalty for nonfulfillment. In Bouvier's Law Dictionary "obligation" is defined as a bond containing a penalty, with a condition annexed for the

payment of money, performance of covenants, or the like. Maxwell v. Jacksonville Loan & Improvement Co. (Fla.) 34 South. 255, 267.

OBLIGATION.

See "Alternative Obligation"; "Condi-
tional Obligation"; "Express Obliga-
tion": "Imperfect Obligation"; "Joint
Obligation"; "Maritime Obligation";
"Moral Obligation"; "Natural Obliga-
tion"; "Pecuniary Obligation"; "Per-
fect Obligation"; "Personal Obliga-
tion"; "Primary Obligation"; "Prin-
cipal Obligation"; "Simple Obligation";
"Solidary Obligation."
All obligations, see "All."
Other obligation, see "Other."

"Obligation" is defined to be the act of obliging or binding; that which obligates; the binding power of a future promise, vow, or contract. Webst. Dict. The word is derived from the Latin "obligatio," tying up, and that from the word "obligo," to bind or tie up, to engage by the ties of a promise or oath, or form of law; and "obligo" is compounded of the verb "ligo," to tie or bind fast, and the preposition "ob," which is prefixed to increase its meaning. Blair V. Williams, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 34, 65; Lapsley v. Brashears, Id. 47, 65; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 600, 24 L. Ed. 793.

Bouvier says: "Obligation in its general and most extensive sense is synonymous with duty. In the more technical sense it is a tie which binds us to pay or do something agreeably to the laws and customs of the country in which the obligation is made." Webster defines "obligation" to be "the binding power of a vow, promise, or contract of law, civil, political, or moral, independent of a promise; that which constitutes legal or moral duty, and which renders a person liable to coercion and punishment for neglecting it." Crandall v. Bryan (N. Y.) 5 Abb. Prac. 162, 168, 15 How. Prac. 48. See, also, Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319, 353 (Gil. 224, 236); McRae v. Cochise County (Ariz.) 44 Pac. 299, 300.

The word "obligation" is defined to be "the constraining power or authoritative character of a duty, a moral precept, a civil law, or a promise or contract voluntarily made; that to which one is bound; that which one is obliged or bound to do, especially by moral or legal claims; a duty." Colter v. State, 39 S. W. 576, 577, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 284 (quoting Cent. Dict.).

The word "obligation" has two well-defined legal meanings: (1) Where it is the name given to the contract itself; (2) the other includes those cases where it refers to the duty imposed on a person in connec

tion with a contract to perform it, or to a liability arising from his contract, or from his actionable, tortious conduct. Exchange Bank v. Ford, 3 Pac. 449, 451, 7 Colo. 314.

The word "obligation," as used in a requested instruction in an action against a railroad company for damages by fire, that if the jury found from the evidence that the railway ran through a prairie country, with prairie and wild grass on either side, both on the railroad's right of way and outside and adjacent to its track, "the defendant was under no legal obligation to mow or cut the said wild or prairie grass outside of its road ties along its right of way," refers to the duty of defendant as respects carelessness-its duty or obligation to avoid negligently exposing the property of others to injury from its engines. It does not refer to Sibilrud v. Mina duty imposed by statute. neapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 11 N. W. 146, 29

Minn. 58.

"Obligation of the instrument," as used in superior court rule No. 7, which is as follows: "In any action brought on any deed, bond, bill, note, or other instrument of writing, a copy of which shall have been filed with the declaration, the defendant, not being an executor or administrator, shall not on the trial be allowed to deny his signature, or that of any other party to the instrument, and the execution of such instrument shall be taken to be admitted, un

less the defendant shall have filed an affldavit denying the signature or the obligation of the instrument, by reason of fraud, duress, or other legal cause," etc., means the obligation which arises solely from the free and voluntary signature of the instrument. The phrase does not relate to the existing obligation to pay the amount secured to be paid by the instrument, nor to any obligation, other than as hereinbefore mentioned, existing at the time of filing the plea. Vandergrift v. Hollis (Del.) 6 Houst. 90, 102.

An obligation is a legal duty by which a person is bound to do or not to do a certain thing. Civ. Code Cal. 1903, § 1427; Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 3762; Civ. Code S. D. 1903, § 1114; Civ. Code Mont. 1895, § 1920. It arises from (1) contract or (2) Code Civ. Proc. Cal. 1903, operation of law. $ 26; Code Civ. Proc. Mont. 1895, § 3475.

"Obligation" is, in its general and most extensive sense, synonymous with "duty." Civ. Code La. 1900, art. 1756.

Agreement in writing.

"The word 'obligation' originally meant a bond containing a penalty, with a condition for the payment of money or to do or suffer some act or thing. Co. Litt. 172a. The meaning of the word, however, has gradually been enlarged by the court, and it

The

has ceased to be restricted to a bond or writing obligatory, and has been extended to mean a paper by which some fixed duty is assumed to be performed at a certain time, or an instrument in writing whereby one party contracts with another for the payment of money at a fixed date, or for the delivery of specific articles. But, however various have been the definitions given the word, the one essential element has always been that it must be a written paper. The duty assumed by it must be a fixed duty. Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Obligations." word, as used in Stock Corp. Law, 8 48, providing that no corporation which shall have refused to pay any of its notes or other obligations may transfer property to its officers, directors, or stockholders, does not include an indebtedness for services furnished by a telegraph company under a contract providing for a fixed rental, and also compensation according to services rendered, as the amount or time of payment cannot be determined by the contract. Munzinger v. United Press Co., 65 N. Y. Supp. 194, 196, 52 App. Div. 338.

The word "obligation" in its most technical meaning implies ex vi termini a sealed instrument, but it certainly has also a very broad and comprehensive legal signification, and embraces all instruments of writing, however informal, whereby one party contracts with another for the payment of money, or for the delivery of specific articles, whether same be under seal or not. State v. Campbell, 9 S. E. 410, 411, 103 N. C. 344.

The word "obligation," as used in Gen. St. 1834, providing that all joint obligations and covenants shall hereafter be taken and held to be joint and several obligations and covenants, means an agreement in writing, sealed or unsealed, as contradistinguished from its use with reference to legal duty or liability, arising from an oral or written contract or from actionable tortious conduct. Exchange Bank v. Ford, 3 Pac. 449, 450, 7 Colo. 314.

The word "obligation," as used in a will, reciting: "Whereas, I now hold obligations against certain of my friends, I direct my executor not to urge the payment of any such obligations before the space of two full years after my decease”-means a written instrument like a note or bond. Thorn v. Hall, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1054, 1055, 10 App. Div. 412.

The word "obligation," as used in Code, 120, providing that persons severally liable on the same obligation or instrument, including parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, may all or any of them be included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff, was intended to cover only those causes of action evidenced by a writIng. The word "obligation" is from the

Latin word "obligatio," defined to be a bond of law, by which we are necessarily bound to pay something according to the laws of our country. Strong v. Wheaton (N. Y.) 38 Barb. 616, 623, 626.

Bond.

In Webster's Unabridged Dictionary "obligation," in law, is a bond with a condition annexed and a penalty for nonfulfillment. In Bouvier's Law Dictionary "obligation" is defined as a bond containing a penalty, with a condition annexed for the payment of money, performance of covenants, or the like. Maxwell v. Jacksonville Loan & Improvement Co. (Fla.) 34 South. 255, 267.

An obligation is a bond, and must arise on a good and valid consideration between persons capable of contracting, and must be executed in the manner required by law. Pelham v. Grigg, 4 Ark. (4 Pike) 141, 143.

"Obligations," as used in Act Ky. 1878 (1 Sess. Acts 1878, p. 77), authorizing the county court of a certain county to compromise and settle with the holders of outstanding coupon bonds, and empowering the court to execute to the holders such bonds and coupons severally the "obligations" of such county, includes a coupon bond payable to the holder of the old bonds and bearer, and is not confined to an ordinary promissory note, nonnegotiable and payable to the holder of the old bonds only. "Obligations" is a generic word, and includes all kinds of contracts by which contracting parties bind themselves, and, in the absence of limiting words or the connection in which it is used, will be construed in its generic sense. Sinton v. Carter County (U. S.) 23 Fed. 535, 538.

Under Laws 1892, c. 686, §§ 69, 70, as amended by Laws 1896, c. 178, which authorized towns to borrow money to improve their highways and to issue obligations therefor, long term negotiable bonds are obligations within the meaning of the statute; "obligation" being a word of large extent, but commonly taken in the common law for a bond containing a penalty, with condition for the payment of money or to do or suffer some act or thing. Blackstone makes the word synonymous with "bond." Ghiglione v. Marsh, 48 N. Y. Supp. 604, 607, 23 App. Div. 61.

The words "obligation or other security," as used in Rev. St. § 5430 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3671], which provides that every person who has in his possession or custody, except under authority from the Secretary of the Treasury or other proper person, any obligation or other security engraved and printed under the similitude of any obligation or other security issued under the authority of the United States, with intent to sell or otherwise use the same, shall be pun

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