Heirs of Bryan vs. Dennis, et al.-Opinion of Court. these two negroes are not within the letter of the law, is conceded, but non constat, they are not within its policy and spirit. By reference to the well settled rules of law in the construction of statutes, and in view of the policy of this State in regard to the manumission of slaves, it will become manifest that the interpretation we have given this act is sound and legitimate. In the construction of a statute, all laws in pari materia should be considered in order to ascertain the will of the Legislature; for that which is within the intention of the makers of the law, is as much within the statute as if in the letter; and the intention of the Legislature may often be collected from the cause of necessity of enacting the law. Hence the proposition is indisputable, that a statute often times comprehends within its spirit a case not within its letter, because it is within the mischief for which a remedy is provided. And to the same effect, whatever is within the equity of a statute should be considered a part of it, though to effect this it may become necessary to enlarge or restrain particular words. It is held by all legal writers that laws which have reference to the public welfare, or the policy of a State, should be construed liberally, and with a view to carry out, as far as practicable, the design of the law; and although the natural import of the words used in a statute is to be considered as expressing the intention of the Legislature, yet where such import is repugnant to the principles of national policy, it is the duty of the court to enlarge or restrain the words, by such construction as will repress the mischief and advance the remedy. See 7 Mass. Rep., 523. As to the policy of this State in reference to free negroes, it is well defined and well settled. From her early history as a Territory, she has been opposed to the settlement of this class of persons within her borders, and as a conse Heirs of Bryan vs. Dennis, et al.-Opinion of Court. quence, to the unrestricted right of her citizens to manumit their slaves. The repeated action of the Legislature in reference to this subject, is a sufficient indication of public sentiment and the policy of the State. The conviction upon the public mind is settled and unalterable as to the evil necessarily attendant upon this class of population, and although treated by our laws humanely, they have ever been regarded with a distrust bordering on apprehension a class of people who are neither freemen nor slaves, their presence at all times deleterious and often dangerous to the public welfare. In 1832, the Legislature of the then Territory were compelled to enact the most stringent laws to arrest the evil, by prohibiting the further migration of free negroes within her limits; and the emphatic language of the Constitution of the State, depriving the Legislature of the power of passing laws for the manumission of slaves, was but carrying out the principles of that policy settled upon by the previous Legislation of the country. By the act of 1829, the Territorial Legislature, in giving the right to emancipate slaves, provided at the same time a remedy for the evil necessarily growing out of an unrestricted exercise of the right, by compelling the owner forthwith to transport them beyond the limits of the State. If we construe this law so as to restrict its application to slaves brought into the State, and not include their descendants within its provisions, we at once lose sight of the whole policy of the law, and entail upon the State an evil of the most dangerous character, and which it is manifest it was the design of the Legislature to suppress. The act of 1829 being, in our opinion, in force at the time the deed of manumission was executed, and its provisions embracing all the negroes mentioned in said petition, was the act of manumission contemplated by the grantor consummated by the deed? Or had the deed at Heirs of Bryan vs. Dennis, et al.-Opinion of Court. its execution any vitality? It is not pretended that the grantor ever gave bond, as required by the first section of the act. The bond is a condition precedent to the act of manumission, and without it the deed has no legal existence, and consequently is inoperative in vesting in the contemplated beneficiaries any rights whatsoever. . But it is said that though the State may have claimed a forfeiture of this property, yet the deed is good as against the grantor and his heirs, and that the latter are estopped, by the act of their ancestor, from asserting any property in these slaves. The law is otherwise. The deed, upon its execution, was absolutely void, for all purposes-a mere gratuity, made in contravention of law, and imposing no disabilities on the grantor over this property, further than it remained in possession, liable to the claim of the State. Though the statute contains no prohibitory clause, yet it inflicts a penalty, and every contract having the subject matter for its consideration or object, is invalid. 4 Serg. & R., 159. Formerly it was held that unless the statute contained a prohibitory clause, the contract was not void. But in the more recent case of Bartlett Vinor, Holt, C. J., held, that every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited and made unlawful by any statute, is a void contract, though the statute itself does not mention it shall be so, but only inflicts a penalty; because a penalty implies a prohibition, though there are no prohibitory words in the statute. And such is the law as recognized both by the English and American Courts. See 1 Binn., 118, 4 Dall., 269, 10 Bing., 107, 5 B & Ald., 335. VS. Independent of this, the statute itself expressly declares that all slaves manumitted contrary to its provisions, shall not be deemed free-terms emphatic and comprehensive enough to dispel all doubts as to the condition of these ne Heirs of Bryan vs. Dennis, et al.-Opinion of Court. groes. The deed being void, the title to the slaves remained unaffected. It continued in Bryan during his life, and descended to his heirs on his death. The title did not, as contended by counsel, at any time vest in the State, but remained undisturbed in Bryan, subject to be divested by the State upon seizure and sale. It is true, on the execution of the deed, the State had an inchoate right to the property, under the statute, to be consummated or relinquished at her pleasure. The act of 1850, is a full relinquishment and renunciation of this right, in favor of the heirs of Bryan. A general release or relinquishment, upon the part of the State, of her claim, would have enured to the benefit of these heirs, the title being in them. Before the passage of this act for their relief, the appellants had the right to reduce this property to possession, and since its passage, their right of possession and right of property is paramount and complete. And we do not understand the necessity that existed of instituting the proceedings in this case in their behalf, or of invoking in any way the action of the Circuit Court in asserting their rights over this property. TERM AT TAMPA. SOUTHERN DIVISION. THOMAS P. KENNEDY, APPELLANT, VS. THOMAS MITCHELL, APPELLEE. A defendant in attachment, under the statute of this State, has at all times, up to the trial of the suit upon its merits, the right to traverse the allegations in the plaintiff's affidavit, either as to the debt or the cause of suing out the attachment. This right is available to the defendant as well after as before plea to the action. But if the motion to dissolve be made after the defendant has appeared and pleaded to the action, the plaintiff amy still proceed in his suit, and prosecute his claim to final judgment, though the attachment may be dissolved --otherwise, if the attachment is dissolved before plea to the motion. In the latter case, the suit abates. The proviso in the seventh section of the act of 1834, (Art.5, Thomp. Dig.,370,) which requires motions to dissolve attachments to be made at or before the first term of the court, &c., has reference only to causes pending at the time of the passage of the act. The nature of the case and the questions involved are stated in the opinion of the court. Gettis and Pearson for Appellant. Magbee for Appellee. SEMMES, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court. This suit was commenced by attachment in the Circuit Court for the county of Hillsborough, by the appellant, Thomas P. Kennedy, against Thomas Mitchell, the respondent. The writ of attachment was sued out on the 26th of March, 1851, and made returnable to the following Spring |