or a duplicate thereof, and a copy or copies of any affidavit or affidavits on which the order was made, and a statement of the names and addresses of the several parties to the action, and their solicitors, if any, and also a concise statement of the particulars of claim, signed by the plaintiff or his solicitor, such as would be required upon entering a plaint in the County Court. The registrar must thereupon enter the action for trial, and give notice to the parties of the day appointed for such trial, by post or otherwise, ten clear days before such day; and must annex to the notice to the defendant a copy of the particulars. Such statement of the plaintiff's particulars should be in the form given in Precedent No. 67. The registrar must forthwith indorse on the order or duplicate thereof the date on which the same was lodged, and file the same; and the action will proceed in all things as if it were an ordinary action in the County Court. (County Court Order XXXIII. r. 2.)

The defendant upon being served with such a notice of trial must proceed in all things in the same way as if the action had been brought in the County Court, and the notice so served upon him was an ordinary summons. (County Court Order XXXIII. r. 3.)

Thus he may, five clear days at least before the day named in such notice of trial, pay money into Court, either generally or under Lord Campbell's Act, paying a Court fee proportionate to the amount paid in. (County Court Order IX. r. 12.) Or he may set up a counterclaim (County Court Order X. rr. 2, 11), or plead the Statute of Limitations (Ib. r. 14, a), or any other special defence. This he does by sending in to the registrar five clear days at least before the day named for trial a concise statement of the grounds of such special defence. (See Precedent No. 68.) If the defendant omit to send such statement, he will not be allowed to avail himself of the defence, unless the plaintiff consents thereto; but the judge will in a proper case adjourn the trial of the action to enable the defendant to give such notice. (County Court Order X. r. 10.) So, too, if the defendant intends to avail himself of the provisions of sects. 1 and 2 of Lord Campbell's Libel Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96), he must give to the registrar five clear days before the day appointed for the trial notice in writing of such intention, signed by himself or his solicitor. (County Court Order XXXIII. r. 4.) Such notice should be in form (ii) of Precedent No. 68, if under sect. 1 of Lord Campbell's Libel Act; in form (iii) of the same Precedent, if under sect. 2. And see County Court Order IX. r. 12, as to the necessary payment into Court.

Where in any action of libel or slander the defendant relies as a

defence upon the fact that the libel or slander is true, he must in his statement set forth that the libel or slander complained of is true in substance (County Court Order X. r. 16), unless he has already done so in a Defence delivered in the High Court. Such statement should be in form (i) of Precedent No. 68. Where in any action of libel or slander the defendant does not rely as a defence upon the fact that the libel or slander is true, but relies in mitigation of damages on the circumstances under which the libel or slander was published, or the character of the plaintiff, he must in his statement give particulars of the matters relating thereto as to which he intends to give evidence. (Ib. r. 17.)

Interrogatories may be administered in the County Court by leave of the judge or registrar. (County Court Order XVI. r. 1.) Any objection to answer must be taken in the affidavit in answer. Discovery and inspection of documents may also be obtained as in the High Court.

If either party desires to have the action tried by a jury, he must proceed in the manner indicated by sects. 101 and 102 of the County Courts Act, 1888, and County Court Order XXII. r. 1. And where no demand for a jury has been so made, but at the trial both parties desire one, the judge may adjourn the trial upon terms in order that notice for a jury may be given. (County Court Order XXII. r. 2.) It is generally desirable to have a jury in an action of libel or slander.

The trial takes place in all respects as in an ordinary County Court cause; save that if any pleadings were delivered in the action in the High Court before the order was made remitting it to the County Court, the judge must not disregard them. Thus, if a plaintiff has shaped his action differently on his Statement of Claim and on his writ, the judge must look rather to the Statement of Claim than to the writ. (Johnson v. Palmer, 4 C. P. D. 258; 27 W. R. 941; Large v. Large, W. N. 1877, p. 198.) Care should be taken to ask the judge before delivering judgment to make a note of any point of law on which either party relies. (Rhodes v. Liverpool Investment Co., 4 C. P. D. 425; Pierpoint v. Cartwright, 5 C. P. D. 139; 28 W. R. 583; 42 L. T. 295; Seymour v. Coulson, 28 W. R. 664.)

Judgment is entered and all subsequent proceedings taken as in an ordinary County Court action. Any motion for a new trial must be made to the judge in the County Court (County Court Order XXXI.); any appeal must be had in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of the Supreme Court, Order LIX. rr. 9-18. (County Court Order XXXII.) The costs will follow the event, unless the judge at

the trial make any order to the contrary; he has full power to make any order as to costs which he "shall think just." (County Courts Act, 1888, s. 113.) In taxing the costs incurred in the High Court of Justice previous to the transmission of the action to the County Court, the registrar must tax the same according to the scale of costs in use in the High Court; the costs subsequent to the order remitting the action will be taxed according to the scale in use in the County Courts. (County Courts Act, 1888, s. 66.) The High Court has no jurisdiction to make any order as to the costs of a remitted action. (Moody v. Steward, L. R. 6 Ex. 35; 40 L. J. Ex. 25; 19 W. R. 161; 23 L. T. 465.)

Other Inferior Courts.

There are many inferior Courts in which actions of libel and slander can be brought, such as the Mayor's Court, London, the Tolzey Court of Bristol, the Salford Hundred Court of Record, the Court of Passage, Liverpool, &c. As to the jurisdiction of such Courts generally, see ante, p. 565. The Mayor's Court, London, has jurisdiction to try actions of libel, and can award costs, even though the verdict be for less than 5l. (Hall v. Launspach, (1898) 1 Q. B. 513; 67 L. J. Q. B. 372; 78 L. T. 243.) The Salford Hundred Court has power to hear all cases of libel or slander arising within the jurisdiction of the Court, provided the damages claimed do not exceed 501. If they exceed 50l., it appears that the Court has no jurisdiction, even by consent. (9 & 10 Vict. c. cxxvi. ; Farrow v. Hague, 3 H. & C. 101; 33 L. J. Ex. 258.) The costs will follow the event, both in the Salford Hundred Court (Turner v. Heyland, 4 C. P. D. 432; 48 L. J. C. P. 535; 41 L. T. 556), and in the Liverpool Court of Passage (King and another v. Hawkesworth, 4 Q. B. D. 371; 48 L. J. Q. B. 484; 27 W. R. 660; 41 L. T. 411), and indeed wherever the case is tried by a jury; subject, however, to the power reserved to a judge by Order LXV. r. 1, to deprive a successful plaintiff of his costs on good cause shown.

Under clause 12 of the schedule to the Borough and Local Courts of Record Act, 1872 (which was applied to the Mayor's Court by Order in Council) if an action be commenced in an inferior Court the judge of a superior Court may at any time before judgment order the action to be removed into the superior Court if he be satisfied that it is more fit to be tried there. (Banks v. Hollingsworth and another, (1893) 1 Q. B. 442; 62 L. J. Q. B. 239; 41 W. R. 225; 68 L. T. 477.)

PART III.

PRACTICE AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL

CASES.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PROCEEDINGS BY WAY OF INDICTMENT.

Preliminary Application to the Judge at Chambers.

By sect. 8 of the Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1888, no criminal prosecution can be commenced "against any proprietor, publisher, editor, or any person responsible for the publication of a newspaper, for any libel published therein, without the order of a judge at Chambers being first had and obtained." This section does not apply to any criminal information, whether ex officio or otherwise. (Yates v. The Queen, 14 Q. B. D. 648; 54 L. J. Q. B. 258; 33 W. R. 482; 52 L. T. 305; 49 J. P. 436; 15 Cox, C. C. 686.) The application to the judge at Chambers for an order under this section. must be made "on notice to the person accused, who shall have an opportunity of being heard against such application." The intending prosecutor generally files affidavits, verifying a copy of the libel, proving its publication by the intended defendant, swearing to the falsity of the imputation made, and also showing reasons why it is necessary to have recourse to criminal proceedings, e.g., that the intended defendant is insolvent and cannot pay damages. The learned judge will not order a prosecution if he considers that a civil action will meet all the requirements of the case. The person whom it is proposed to prosecute must be named in the order; he must not be merely referred to in general terms as "the editor" or "the publisher" of a certain paper. (R. v. Allison, Judd and others, 37 W. R. 143; 59 L. T. 933; 53 J. P. 215; 16 Cox, C. C. 559.) No appeal can be brought from the decision of a judge at Chambers. under this section, allowing a criminal prosecution to be commenced. (Ex parte Pulbrook, (1892) 1 Q. B. 86; 61 L. J. M. C. 91; 40 W. R.

175; 66 L. T. 159; 56 J. P. 293; 17 Cox, C. C. 464.) And it would seem to follow from the judgments in this case that no appeal would lie in the converse case also, where leave to prosecute has been. refused. (See also a decision under the former Act, Ex parte Hubert, Hurter & Son, 47 J. P. 724; 15 Cox, C. C. 166.)

It is only where the libel has appeared in a newspaper that any application need be made under this section. Nor does the section. apply where criminal proceedings are about to be taken against the actual author of the libel, even though the words which he wrote be afterwards printed in a newspaper, unless the author be the proprietor, publisher, editor, or other person responsible for the publication of a newspaper. It is submitted that the printer is included in this phrase, but not the writer and composer of the libel, even though he be a reporter on the staff of the paper.

Proceedings before Magistrates.

By sect. 6 of the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, "every libel or alleged libel" is included in the Vexatious Indictments Act (22 & 23 Vict. c. 17); and this section applies to all libels, whether published in a newspaper or not. Hence, in every criminal proceeding for libel the accused must be summoned before a police or stipendiary magistrate, or before two justices of the peace. The magistrate may, indeed, if he think fit, on good cause shown and information sworn, issue a warrant for his apprehension in the first instance without any previous summons (Butt v. Conant, 1 Brod. & B. 548; 4 Moore, 195; Gow, 84; 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, ss. 1, 8); but such a step will seldom be taken on a charge of libel. If the accused does not appear in answer to the summons, the magistrate may, on proof of due service, go into the case in his absence, but he more usually issues a warrant for his apprehension. (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, ss. 1, 9.)

When the accused comes before the magistrate the prosecutor has merely to prove publication, unless it is not clear that the libel refers to the prosecutor, in which case it may be necessary to call someone acquainted with the circumstances to state that on reading the libel he understood it to refer to the prosecutor. The magistrate must decide for himself whether the written matter before him is in law capable of being a libel. Unless it is clearly no libel, he will, after proof of publication by the defendant, or some agent or servant on his behalf (see ante, pp. 545-550), commit the defendant for trial. He may not adjourn the case merely because civil proceedings are pending between other parties for a similar libel. (R. v. Erans and