Illustrations.

Thus it is actionable without proof of special damage:—

To say of a physician that "he is no scholar," "because no man can be a good physician, unless he be a scholar."

Cawdry v. Highley al. Tythay, Cro. Car. 270; Godb. 441.

To accuse any physician, surgeon, accoucheur, midwife or apothecary, with having caused the death of any patient through his ignorance or culpable negligence.

Poe v. Mondford, Cro. Eliz. 620.

Watson v. Vanderlash, Hetl. 71.

Edsall v. Russell, 4 M. & Gr. 1090; 12 L. J. C. P. 4; 5 Scott, N. R. 801; 2 Dowl. N. S. 641; 6 Jur. 996.

Foster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376; 33 Amer. R. 403.

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To call a practising medical man "a quack-salver," or an empiric," or a "mountebank."

Allen v. Eaton, 1 Roll. Abr. 54.

Goddart v. Haselfoot, 1 Viner's Abr. (S. a.), pl. 12; 1 Roll. Abr. 54. To say of a surgeon to his patient :-"I wonder you had him to attend you. Do you know him? He is not an apothecary; he has not passed any examination; he is a bad character; none of the medical men here will meet him. Several persons have died that he had attended, and there have been inquests held on them," was held actionable in

Southee v. Denny, 1 Exch. 196; 17 L. J. Ex. 151.

The Court, in this case, inclined to think the words, "He is a bad character; none of the medical men here will meet him," were actionable by themselves. But see Clay v. Roberts, 9 Jur. N. S. 580; 11 W. R. 649; 8 L. T. 397. Ramadge v. Ryan, 9 Bing. 333; 2 M. & Sc. 421.

To charge any medical man or apothecary with either ignorantly or unskilfully administering the wrong medicines or medicine in excessive doses.

To

Collier, M.D. v. Simpson, 5 C. & P. 73.

Tutty v. Alewin, 11 Mod. 221.

Secor v. Harris, 18 Barb. 425.

Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. 615; 42 N. Y. 161.

March v. Davison, 9 Paige, 580.

Edsall v. Russell, 4 M. & Gr. 1090; 5 Scott, N. R. 801; 2 Dowl.

N. S. 641; 12 L. J. C. P. 4; 6 Jur. 996.

say of a midwife, "Many have perished for her want of skill."
Flowers' Case, Cro. Car. 211.

But it is not actionable per se :—

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To of a surgeon, say He did poison the wound of his patient; " without some averment that this was improper treatment of the wound; for else "it might be for the cure of it."

Suegos' Case, Hetl. 175.

To call a person who practises medicine without full legal qualification "a quack," or "an impostor; " for the law only protects lawful employments. Collins v. Carnegie, 1 A. & E. 695; 3 N. & M. 703.

It is for the jury and not the judge to decide what is the meaning of the word "quack."

Dakhyl v. Labouchere, Times, July 29th, 1904.

To charge a physician with adultery unconnected with his professional conduct. It would be otherwise if he had been accused of seducing, or committing adultery with, one of his patients.

Ayre v. Craven, 2 A. & E. 2; 4 N. & M. 220.

To charge a physician or surgeon generally with "malpractice; " not stating that he caused his patient's death by malpractice.

at

Rodgers v. Kline, 56 Miss. 808; 31 Amer. R. 389.

To say of an "accoucheuse," "A lady who has established a medical college has issued a prospectus, in which my name appears as president. I have sanctioned the issue of no prospectus with my name in it. I wish to know what remedy I have,” was held no slander on her in the way of her trade. Brent v. Spratt, Times, Feb. 3rd, 1882.

The plaintiff was a surgeon and accoucheur; the defendant told one of his patients that the plaintiff's female servant had had a child by the plaintiff; and the patient consequently ceased to employ the plaintiff. Held, that special damage being proved, the action lay.

Dixon v. Smith, 5 H. & N. 450; 29 L. J. Ex. 125.

Other Professions.

So, to impute incompetency to any one practising an art, as a dentist, a schoolmaster, a land surveyor, or an architect, is actionable per se.

Illustrations.

Thus, it is actionable without proof of special damage :—

To say of a schoolmaster, "Put not your son to him, for he will come away as very a dunce as he went."

Watson v. Vanderlash, Hetl. 71.

To accuse a schoolmaster of habitual drunkenness.

Hume v. Marshall, 42 J. P. 136.

Brandrick v. Johnson, 1 Vict. L. R. C. L. 306.

And it was held a slander on a schoolmaster in the way of his profession to say:-"You had one here whom the boys say liked his glass; they smelt him continually. I saw him so that he could not walk straight."

Goslett v. Garment, (1897) 13 Times L. R. 391.

It is actionable without proof of special damage to impute drunkenness to a master mariner in command of a vessel.

Irwin v. Brandwood, 2 H. & C. 960; 33 L. J. Ex. 257; 12 W. R. 438; 9 L. T. 772; 10 Jur. N. S. 370.

Hamon v. Falle, 4 App. Cas. 247; 48 L. J. P. C. 45.

But to say that a private citizen was drunk once is not.

Warren v. Norman, Walk. (Mississippi) 387.

Buck v. Hersey, 31 Maine, 558.

And see Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 248.

Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292.

To charge a woman with being drunk is actionable in Massachusetts.

Brown v. Nickerson, 1 Gray, 1.

It is actionable without proof of special damage to say of an auctioneer or appraiser, who had valued goods for the defendant:-"He is a damned rascal, he has cheated me out of 1007, on the valuation."

Bryant v. Loxton, 11 Moore, 344.

Ramsdale v. Greenacre, 1 F. & F. 61.

Or to say of a land surveyor, in the way of his profession:-"Thou art a cozener and a cheating knave, and that I can prove."

London v. Eastgate, 2 Rolle's Rep. 72.

Or to say of a governess that she has been guilty of immorality with her employer. (Before the Slander of Women Act.)

Quinn v. Wilson, (1850) 13 Ir. L. R. 381.

And see Gillett v. Bullivant, 7 L. T. (Old S.) 490; post, p. 389.

But to say of a dancing mistress:-"She is as much a man as I am; she is an hermaphrodite," is not actionable of her in the way of her profession, for girls are taught dancing by men as often as by women.

Wetherhead v. Armitage, 2 Lev. 233; 3 Salk. 328; Freem. 277; 2 Show. 18.

Secus in America, Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio, 319.

And to say of a land speculator:-" He cheated me of 100 acres of land," was held in Canada not to touch him in his profession and therefore not actionable. Fellowes v. Hunter, 20 Up. Can. Q. B. 382.

It is not actionable to say of a trainer of race-horses that he has not paid his bets, there being no evidence that it is part of his business to make bets. Smith and another v. Willoughby, (1899) 15 Times L. R. 314.

Traders, Artisans, Servants, dc.

So if the plaintiff carry on any trade recognised by the law, or be engaged in any lawful employment, however humble, an action lies for any words which prejudice him in the way of such trade or employment. But the words must relate to his trade or employment, and "touch" him therein.

Illustrations.

Thus, it is actionable without proof of special damage:

To say of a clerk or servant that he had "cozened his master."

Seaman v. Bigg, Cro. Car. 480.

Reignald's Case, (1640) Cro. Car. 563.

To say of a gamekeeper that he trapped three foxes; for that would be clearly a breach of his duties as gamekeeper.

Foulger v. Newcomb, L. R. 2 Ex. 327; 36 L. J. Ex. 169; 15 W. R. 1181; 16 L. T. 595.

To say of a servant girl that she had had a miscarriage, and had lost her place in consequence.

Connors v. Justice, 13 Ir. C. L. R. 451.

To say to the mistress of a servant girl:-" You are not aware, Mrs. C., what

kind of a girl you have in your service; if you were, you would not keep her, for I can assure you she is often out with our married man." Coltman, J., held that these words were actionable without proof of special damage; and on a motion for a new trial, Tindal, C.J., said “The words are actionable, inasmuch as they are spoken of the plaintiff in her vocation."

Rumsey v. Webb et ux., 11 L. J. C. P. 129; Car. & M. 104.

To say to an innkeeper, "Thy house is infected with the pox, and thy wife was laid of the pox;" for even if small-pox only was meant, still "it was a discredit to the plaintiff, and guests would not resort" to his house. Damages 501.

Levet's Case, Cro. Eliz. 289.

And see the remarks of Kelly, C.B., in Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 94; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 34 L. T. 500.

To say of a watchmaker, "he is a bungler, and knows not how to make a good watch."

Redman v. Pyne, 1 Mod. 19; 3 Salk. 328.

But it is not actionable per se :—

To say of a livery stable keeper, "You are a regular prover under bankruptcies, a regular bankrupt maker;" for it is not a charge against him in the way of his trade.

Angle v. Alexander, 7 Bing. 119; 1 Cr. & J. 143; 4 M. & P. 870; 1
Tyrw. 9.

Nor to say to a clerk to a gas company, "You are a fellow, a disgrace to the town, unfit to hold your situation for your conduct with whores."

Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cr. & J. 301; 1 Tyrw. 217.

And see James v. Brook, 9 Q. B. 7; 16 L. J. Q. B. 17; 10 Jur. 541. Nor to impute to a staymaker that his trade is maintained by the prostitution of his shopwoman.

Brayne v. Cooper, 5 M. & W. 249.

The defendant said of the plaintiff who was a working stone-mason :-"He has ruined the town by bringing about the nine hours' system," and "He has stopped several good jobs from being carried out, by being the ringleader of the system at Llanelly." Held, on demurrer, that no action lay, the words not being in themselves defamatory, nor connected by averment or by implication with the plaintiff's trade.

Miller v. David, L. R. 9 C. P. 118; 43 L. J. C. P. 84; 22 W. R. 332; 30 L. T. 58.

The law guards most carefully the credit of all merchants and traders; any imputation on their solvency, any suggestion that they are in pecuniary difficulties, or are attempting to evade the operation of any Bankruptcy Act, is therefore actionable per se.

Illustrations.

Thus, it is actionable without proof of special damage:

To impeach the credit of any merchant or tradesman by imputing to him bankruptcy or insolvency, either past, present or future.

Johnson v. Lemmon, 2 Rolle's Rep. 144.

Thompson v. Twenge, 2 Rolle's Rep. 433.

Vivian v. Willet, Sir T. Raym. 207; 3 Salk. 326; 2 Keble, 718.

Stanton v. Smith, 2 Ld. Raym. 1480; 2 Str. 762.

Whittington v. Gladwin, 5 B. & C. 180; 2 C. & P. 146.

Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 156.

Harrison v. Bevington, 8 C. & P. 708.

Gostling v. Brooks, 2 F. & F. 76.

Brown v. Smith, 13 C. B. 596; 22 L. J. C. P. 151; 17 Jur. 807; 1
C. L. R. 4.

To say to a tailor, "I heard you were run away," sc. from your creditors.
Davis v. Lewis, 7 T. R. 17.

And see Dobson v. Thornistone, 3 Mod. 112.

Chapman v. Lamphire, 3 Mod. 155.

Arne v. Johnson, 10 Mod. 111.

Harrison v. Thornborough, 10 Mod. 196; Gilb. Cas. 114.

And this although no

To say of a brewer that he has been arrested for debt. express reference to his trade was made at the time of publication, for such words must necessarily affect his credit therein.

Jones v. Littler, 7 M. & W. 423; 10 L. J. Ex. 171.

To assert that the plaintiff had once been bankrupt in another place, when carrying on another trade; for that may still affect him here in his present trade. Leycroft v. Dunker, Cro. Car. 317.

Hall v. Smith, 1 M. & S. 287.
Figgins v. Cogswell, 3 M. & S. 369.

To say of any trader, "He is not able to pay his debts."

Drake v. Hill, Sir T. Raym. 184; 2 Keble, 549; 1 Lev. 276; Sid.

424.

Hooker v. Tucker, Holt, 39; Carth. 330.

Morris v. Langdale, 2 Bos. & Pul. 284.

Orpwood v. Barkes (vel Parkes), 4 Bing. 261; 12 Moore, 492.

To say of a farmer, "He cannot pay his labourers."

Barnes v. Holloway, 8 T. R. 150.

To impute insolvency to an innkeeper, even though at that date innkeepers. were not subject to the bankruptcy laws.

Whittington v. Gladwin, (1825) 5 B. & C. 180; 2 C. & P. 146.

Southam v. Allen, Sir T. Raym. 231.

But it is not actionable to say merely, "A. owes me money," if no words be added imputing that A. is unable to pay the debt.

Per Bramwell, B., 4 F. & F. 321, 322.

So if the defendant's words impute to the plaintiff dishonesty and fraud in the conduct of his trade, such as knowingly selling inferior articles as superior, or wilfully adulterating his wares, they will be actionable per se. If the words merely impugn the value of the goods which the plaintiff sells, they are not actionable unless they fall within the rules relating to "Actions on the Case," post, p. 83;