may be outside the geographical area over which the Court can exercise its powers.

(i) Choice of Court.

The County Court has no jurisdiction in actions of libel or slander, except by consent of both parties (County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), ss. 56, 64); although an action commenced in the High Court may subsequently be remitted to the County Court under s. 66 of that Act. (See post, p. 575.)

Many inferior Courts of Record, such as the Mayor's Court, London, Liverpool Court of Passage, the Salford Hundred Court and the Tolzey Court of Bristol, can try actions of libel or slander. But in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary, it is necessary that the whole cause of action should arise within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of such inferior Court. Hence, if the words be actionable per se, they must be published within the territorial jurisdiction; if they are not actionable without proof of special damage, both the publication and the accrual of special damage must take place within the limits of such jurisdiction. (Littleboy v. Wright, 1 Lev. 69; 1 Sid. 95.) A letter is deemed to be published both where it is posted and where it is received and opened. (R. v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95.)

The High Court of Justice has jurisdiction over all libels and slanders published within its territorial jurisdiction; and also over all libels and slanders published abroad, provided proceedings either civil or criminal can be taken for the publication of such words in the country in which they were published. (Machado v. Fontes, (1897) 2 Q. B. 231; 66 L. J. Q. B. 542; 45 W. R. 565; 76 L. T. 588; Carr v. Fracis Times & Co., (1902) A. C. 176; 71 L. J. K. B. 361; 50 W. R. 257; 85 L. T. 144.) The writ should be issued in the King's Bench Division. Although the Chancery Division has jurisdiction to hear a case of libel or slander, such an action is rarely tried there, as no cases are tried in that Division with a jury. An injunction can be obtained as readily in one Division as the other.

If the defendant be an undergraduate resident within the University of Oxford or Cambridge, he must be sued in the University Court, although the plaintiff be in no way connected with the University or resident within its limits, and although the libels. complained of appeared in several London newspapers. (Ginnett v. Whittingham, 16 Q. B. D. 761; 55 L. J. Q. B. 409; 34 W. R. 565.)

(ii) Service of Writ out of Jurisdiction.

In actions in the High Court there remains the further question, Is the proposed defendant within jurisdiction so that he can be served with the process of the Court? If he is, it does not matter whether he is a British subject or an alien. But if he is not, leave must be obtained from a judge of the High Court to serve the writ, or notice of it, out of jurisdiction. Such leave must be applied for before the writ is issued; and it will only be granted in the cases specified under Order XI., which forms a complete and exhaustive code upon this subject. (In re Eager, Eager v. Johnstone, 22 Ch. D. 86; 52 L. J. Ch. 56; 31 W. R. 33; 47 L. T. 685.)

This Order greatly limits the powers formerly possessed by the Court; it practically prevents any action being brought here for damages for any libel or slander published abroad, and also for any libel or slander published here by a person ordinarily resident abroad, unless he happens to come to England, so that personal service can be effected. And if the words be spoken out of jurisdiction, the fact that they incidentally affect property within jurisdiction is not sufficient to bring the case within Order XI. (Casey v. Arnott, 2 C. P. D. 24; 46 L. J. C. P. 3; 25 W. R. 46; 35 L. T. 424.) If two or more persons carry on business together in partnership within the jurisdiction under a firm name, they may, by virtue of Order XLVIIIA. r. 1, be sued here under that firm name without leave, although all the partners reside out of jurisdiction. (Worcester Banking Co. v. Firbank, Pauling & Co., (1894) 1 Q. B. 784; 63 L. J. Q. B. 542; MacIver v. Burns, (1895) 2 Ch. 630; 64 L. J. Ch. 681.) But if one man carries on business within jurisdiction, whether in his own name or under any other style or firm, he cannot be sued here if he reside abroad. (Field v. Bennett, 56 L. J. Q. B. 89; De Bernales v. New York Herald, (1893) 2 Q. B. 97, n.; 62 L. J. Q. B. 385; 41 W. R. 481; 68 L. T. 658; De Bernales v. Bennett, (1894) 10 Times L. R. 419.) A foreign company may be sued here if it carries on business so as to be resident within the jurisdiction (La Bourgogne, (1899) A. C. 431; 68 L. J. P. 104; 80 L. T. 845; 8 Asp. M. C. 550); but the mere fact that it has a branch office in this country will not entitle a plaintiff to serve a writ at the branch office. (Jones v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co., Limited, 17 Q. B. D. 421; 55 L. J. Q. B. 415; 55 L. T. 218; O'Connor v. Star Newspaper Co., Limited, 30 L. R. Ir. 1.) And there can be no substituted service of a writ in an action in which there cannot in law be personal service. (Field v. Bennett, 56 L. J. Q. B. 89; Wilding v. Bean, (1891)

1 Q. B. 100; 60 L. J. Q. B. 10; 39 W. R. 40; 64 L. T. 41; Jay v. Budd, (1898) 1 Q. B. 12; 66 L. J. Q. B. 863; 46 W. R. 34; 77 L. T. 335.)

In actions of libel or slander leave will only be granted under Order XI. if the case falls within one or other of clauses (c), (f), (g), of r. 1 of that Order. The plaintiff may obtain leave under Order XI. r. 1 (f) if he adds a claim for an injunction on his writ (Tozier and wife v. Hawkins, 15 Q. B. D. 650, 680; 55 L. J. Q. B. 152; 34 W. R. 223), provided that the judge is satisfied that the claim for an injunction is made in good faith. And it has been held that it is not necessary that he should ask for an injunction only; he may claim other relief as well. (LisbonBerlyn Gold Fields, Limited v. Heddle, 52 L. T. 796.) But the judge at chambers, when granting leave to serve the writ out of jurisdiction, may, if he think fit, limit the plaintiff to that portion of his claim in respect of which it shall appear at the trial that the writ could have been properly served out of jurisdiction. (Thomas v. Duchess Dowager of Hamilton, 17 Q. B. D. 592; 55 L. J. Q. B. 555; 35 W. R. 22; 55 L. T. 219, 385.) As to clause (g), where the writ has already been duly served on a defendant within jurisdiction, leave will be given in a proper case to serve another defendant who is outside jurisdiction, provided he be a necessary and proper party to the action. (Croft v. King, (1893) 1 Q. B. 419; 62 L. J. Q. B. 242; 41 W. R. 394; 68 L. T. 296; Williams v. Cartwright and others, (1895) 1 Q. B. 142; 64 L. J. Q. B. 92 ; 43 W. R. 145 ; 71 L. T. 834; Chance v. Beveridge and Freeman's Journal, (1895) 11 Times L. R. 528; Joynt v. M'Crum, (1899) 1 Ir. R. 217.) The Court will, in a proper case, give leave for the issue of a concurrent writ for service. out of jurisdiction, although the original writ was issued for service. within jurisdiction. (Smalpage v. Tonge, 17 Q. B. D. 644; 55 L. J. Q. B. 518; 34 W. R. 768; 55 L. T. 44.)

Statutes of Limitation.

It is seldom that a plaintiff in an action of defamation allows his remedy to be barred by lapse of time. He is generally too eager to commence proceedings, and will not wait till his special damage has fully accrued. (See Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 8 Scott, 471; 9 C. & P. 326; 4 Jur. 151; Goslin v. Corry, 7 M. & Gr. 342; 8 Scott, N. R. 21.) Still, the Duke of Brunswick waited nearly eighteen years; it may be as well, therefore, to state that an action of slander for words actionable per se must be brought "within two years next after the words spoken, and not after" (21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 3), and that an action for libel must be brought "within six

years next after the cause of such action," i.e., from the date of publication. Whenever the words are actionable only by reason of special damage, the time does not begin to run till the damage has actually been sustained. (Saunders v. Edwards, 1 Sid. 95; 1 Keble, 389; Sir T. Raym. 61; Littleboy v. Wright, 1 Lev. 69; 1 Sid. 95; Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, 11 App. Cas. 127; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; 54 L. T. 882.) And then the plaintiff has six years within which to sue and not merely two, for as the case is taken out of the clause "within two years next after the words spoken," it must fall within the general clause as to actions on the case. (Saunders v. Edwards, suprà.) In all other cases time runs from the date of publication; unless the plaintiff be then an infant or a lunatic or the defendant be beyond the seas, when time begins to run from the infant coming of age, or the lunatic becoming of sane memory, or the defendant returning from beyond the seas. (21 Jac. I. c. 16, s. 7; 4 & 5 Anne, c. 3 (al. c. 16), s. 19; 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 7 ; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, ss. 10, 12.) But if once such disability be removed and the time begin to run, nothing afterwards can stop it.

A still shorter period of limitation exists in cases to which the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), applies. If an action be brought against "any person any person" for any defamatory words published "in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament, or of any public duty or authority," the action must be commenced "within six months next after the act complained of, or in case of a continuance of injury or damage, within six months next after the ceasing thereof." (See Reid v. Blisland School Board, (1901) 17 Times L. R. 626; Carey v. Metropolitan Borough of Bermondsey, (1903) 20 Times L. R. 2.) But it would seem that an individual member of a public authority has no such protection if an action be brought against him in respect of words spoken in the intended execution of his duty. (Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 Q. B. 431; 61 L. J. Q. B. 409; 40 W. R. 450; 66 L. T. 513.)

But the publication relied on to oust the statute need not be the original or substantial publication. Thus, if any agent of the plaintiff can induce the defendant to sell him an old copy of the libel, published many years ago, such second publication, although contrived by the plaintiff for the very purpose, will be sufficient to disprove the plea of the Statute of Limitations. And that plea being once ousted, the jury will not be confined, it is said, to that single publication within the six years but may take all the circumstances into their consideration. (Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10.)

Former Proceedings.

That a previous action has already been brought and damages recovered against the same defendant for the same words is a bar to any subsequent action even although fresh damage has since arisen therefrom. For the jury in the former action must be taken to have assessed the damages once for all; and the probability or possibility that this subsequent damage would follow should have been submitted to their consideration then. Whether this is so, when the words are not actionable in themselves, may be doubted. (See ante, p. 362.) Lord Blackburn unfortunately differed from Lord Bramwell on this point in Darley Main Colliery v. Mitchell (11 App. Cas. 127; 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; 54 L. T. 882). And though the point has since been discussed it cannot be regarded as decided. (See Crumbie v. Wallsend Local Board, (1891) 1 Q. B. 503; 60 L. J. Q. B. 392; 64 L. T. 490.) If the prior action was unsuccessful, this will also be a bar to the action.

It must be clear that the cause of action is the same in both cases. Where in the first action the plaintiff sued for words imputing a felony, and in the second for words spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his trade, the Court held that recovery in the first action was no bar to the second. (Wadsworth v. Bentley, 23 L. J. Q. B. 3; 17 Jur. 1077; L. & M. 203.) But where a plaintiff brought an action on certain passages in a pamphlet which he alleged to contain libellous charges against himself, and failed, he was not allowed to bring a second action against the same defendants for other passages in the same pamphlet which expressed the same charges in other language. (MacDougall v. Knight, 25 Q. B. D. 1; 59 L. J. Q. B. 517; 38 W. R. 553; 63 L. T. 43. And see Montgomery v. Russell, (1894) 11 Times L. R. 112; Le Mesurier v. Ferguson and another, (1903) 20 Times L. R. 32.)

So, too, a previous recovery against another person may be a bar to the present action, if the former defendant was jointly concerned with the present defendant in the very publication now sued on. Thus, if A. and B. be in partnership, either as printers or publishers of a newspaper, a previous judgment recovered against A. will be a bar to any action against B. for the same libel, even though the judgment in the prior action has been fruitless. (Brown v. Wootton, Cro. Jac. 73; Yelv. 67; Moo. 762; King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, 504; Duke of Brunswick v. Pepper, 2 C. & K. 683; Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R. 7 C. P. 547; 41 L. J. C. P. 190; 20 W. R. 784; 27 L. T. 99; Munster v. Cox, 10 App. Cas. 680; 53 L. T. 474.) For both