editing what was called the literary department was left by them entirely to an editor whom they had appointed, named Green. A libel was inserted in the paper by Green without the express authority, consent, or knowledge of the defendants. At the trial of a criminal information the judge directed a verdict of guilty against the defendants. Held, by Cockburn, C.J., and Lush, J., that there must be a new trial; for upon the true construction of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, the libel was published without the defendants' authority, consent, or knowledge, and it was a question for the jury whether the publication arose from any want of due care and caution on their part: by Mellor, J., dissenting, that the defendants, having for their own benefit employed an editor to manage a particular department of the newspaper, and given him full direction as to the articles to be inserted in it, must be taken to have consented to the publication of the libel by him; that, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, had no application to the facts proved, and that the case was properly withdrawn from the jury. R. v. Holbrook and others, 3 Q. B. D. 60; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 26 W. R. 144; 37 L. T. 530; 13 Cox, C. C. 650. On the new trial Green was called as a witness, and stated that he had general authority to conduct the paper, that the defendants left it entirely to his discretion to insert what he pleased, and that he had allowed the letter complained of to appear in the paper without the knowledge or express authority of the defendants, one of whom was absent from Portsmouth at the time. The jury found all the defendants guilty. On a motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against evidence, and of misdirection, held (by Cockburn, C.J., and Lush, J., Mellor, J., still dissenting), that the general authority given to the editor was not per se evidence that the defendants had authorised or consented to the publication of the libel, within the meaning of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, and that as the learned judge at the trial had summed up in terms which might have led the jury to suppose that it was, and the jury had apparently given their verdict on that footing, there must be another new trial. R. v. Holbrook and others, 4 Q. B. D. 42; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113; 27 W. R. 313; 39 L. T. 536; 14 Cox, C. C. 185. The prosecutor, Mr. John Howard, Clerk of the Peace for the borough of Portsmouth, died shortly afterwards, so the proceedings dropped, and no third trial ever took place. And see R. v. Bradlaugh and others, 15 Cox, C. C. 217, ante, p. 443. The liability of a candidate at a parliamentary election for false statements made and published by his agents in relation to the personal character or conduct of his opponent is very clearly defined by Sect. 4 of the 58 & 59 Vict. c. 40. See Borough of Sunderland Election Petition, (1896) 5 O'M. & H. 53 ; ante, p. 409. 10. Partners. Partners could always jointly sue for a libel defamatory of the firm. (Ward and another v. Smith, 6 Bing. 749; 4 C. & P. 302; Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, 1 H. L. C. 637.) But in such an action no damages could formerly have been given for any private injury thereby caused to any individual partner; nor for the injury to the feelings of each member of the firm. Only joint damages could be recovered in the joint action; for the basis of such action. was the injury to their joint trade. (Haythorn v. Lawson, 3 C. & P. 196; Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134.) But now, by virtue of Order XVIII. r. 6, "claims by plaintiffs jointly may be joined with claims by them or any of them separately against the same defendant." (And see Order XVI. r. 1.) Hence it is no longer necessary to bring two actions for the same words. Each individual partner who is named on the writ can recover separate damages for any special injury done to himself, the firm at the same time recovering their joint damages. If a partner in conducting the business of a firm causes a libel to be published, the firm will be liable as well as the individual partner. So, if any agent or servant of the firm defames anyone by the express direction of the firm, or in accordance with the general orders given by the firm for the conduct of their business; ante, p. 545. But if there be any doubt as to the liability of the firm, it is always safer to join the individual partner or agent or servant as a co-defendant with the firm. (See Order XVI. rr. 4, 7.) Illustrations. If one partner be libelled in his private capacity he cannot recover for any special damage which has resulted to the business of the firm. All the partners should sue for that jointly. They may now do so in the same action. Solomons and others v. Medex, 1 Stark. 191. Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 134; 10 Jur. 156. Maitland and others v. Goldney and another, 2 East, 426. Similarly, if the firm be libelled as a body, they cannot jointly recover for any private injury to a single partner; though that partner may now recover his individual damages in the same action. Haythorn v. Lawson, 3 C. & P. 196. Le Fanu v. Malcolmson, 1 H. L. C. 637; 13 L. T. (Old S.) 61; 8 But if insolvency be imputed to one member of the firm, this is a reflection on the credit of the firm as well: therefore either he, or the firm, or both may sue, each for their own damages. Harrison v. Berington, 8 C. & P. 708. Forster and others v. Lawson, 3 Bing. 452; 11 Moore, 360. But if one partner be defamed as to his private life, the conduct of the firm not being attacked directly or indirectly, nor any special damage resulting to them from the defendant's words, then the individual partner must sue alone. 11. Corporations and Companies. A corporation or company may sue for any words which affect its property, or injure its trade or business (South Hetton Coal Co., Ltd. v. North-Eastern News Association, Ltd., (1894) 1 Q. B. 133; 63 L. J. Q. B. 293; 42 W. R. 322; 69 L. T. 844; 9 R. 240). Whether it can sue for words which merely affect its honour or dignity is not clear; it has been doubted whether a corporation has a reputation apart from its property or trade (Mayor, &c., of Manchester v. Williams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 94; 60 L. J. Q. B. 23; 39 W. R. 302; 63 L. T. 805. But see South Hetton Coal Co., Ltd. v. NorthEastern News Association, Ltd., suprà). But it clearly cannot sue for any words which are a libel or slander, not on it, but on its members individually (unless special damage has thereby been caused to it, ante, p. 545). Nor can it bring an action in respect of any words which impute to it conduct of which a corporation physically cannot be guilty. A corporation "could not sue in respect of an imputation of murder, or incest, or adultery, because it could not commit those crimes. Nor could it sue in respect of a charge of corruption; for a corporation cannot be guilty of corruption, although the individuals composing it may be." (Per Pollock, C.B., 4 H. & N. 90; and Lopes, L.J., (1894) 1 Q. B. at p. 141.) The law is the same with regard to unincorporated trading companies, which may sue for libel in the manner directed by the special Act creating them, or any statute applicable to them. (Williams v. Beaumont, 10 Bing. 260; 3 M. & Scott, 705.) Corporations and companies may maintain actions for slander of their title, whether the slander be uttered by one of their own members or by a stranger. (Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Ex. 201; 5 Jur. N. S. 226; 7 W. R. 265; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 281; Trenton Insurance Co. v. Perrine, 3 Zab. (New Jersey) 402.) A corporation will be liable to an action for a libel published by its servants or agents, whenever such publication comes within the scope of the general duties of such servants or agents, or whenever the corporation has expressly authorised or directed such publication. (See ante, Master and Servant, p. 545; Yarborough v. Bank of England, 16 East, 6; R. v. City of London, E. B. & E. 122, n.; Latimer v. Western Morning News Co., 25 L. T. 44; Abrath v. North-Eastern Ry. Co., 11 App. Cas. 253, 254; 55 L. J. Q. B. 460; 55 L. T. 65, 66. And in America, Aldrich v. Press Printing Co., 9 Min. 133; Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Missouri, 539; 2 M. App. R. 565; 27 Amer. R. 293.) It has now been decided that a corporation may be rendered liable for words published on a privileged occasion, by proving malice in its servant who published them, provided the servant was acting within the scope of his employment. (Citizens' Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423; 73 L. J. P. C. 102; 90 L. T. 739; 20 Times L. R. 497.) This was formerly much doubted (see the remarks of Lord Campbell, C.J., in E. B. & E. at p. 121; 27 L. J. Q. B. at p. 231, and of Lord Bramwell in Abrath v. North-Eastern Ry. Co., 11 App. Cas. 253, 254). A corporation can be indicted for libel and fined. (Per Lord Blackburn in Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association, 5 App. Cas. 869, 870; 49 L. J. Q. B. 742; 28 W. R. 960; 43 L. T. 389; dissenting from the remarks of Bramwell, L.J., in the Court below, 5 Q. B. D. 313; 49 L. J. Q. B. 338; 28 W. R. 608; 42 L. T. 569.) Illustrations. A joint-stock company, incorporated under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, may sue in its own corporate name for words imputing to it insolvency, dishonesty, and mismanagement of its affairs, and this although the defendant be one of its own shareholders. Metropolitan Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, (1859) 4 H. & N. 87; 28 L. J. Where, before the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, a joint-stock insurance company, though not incorporated, was authorised by statute to sue in the name of its chairman, it was held that the chairman might bring an action for a libel which attacked the mode in which the company carried on its business. Williams v. Beaumont, (1833) 10 Bing. 260; 3 M. & Scott, 705. An action of libel will lie at the suit of an incorporated trading company in respect of a libel calculated to injure its reputation in the way of its business without proof of special damage. Hence, where the defendants published a sensational article, headed, "The Homes of the Pitmen," giving an exaggerated description of the sanitary condition of a large number of cottages let by an incorporated colliery to their workmen, it was held that the colliery could sue. South Hetton Coal Co., Ltd. v. North-Eastern News Association, Ltd., (1894) 1 Q. B. 133; 63 L. J. Q. B. 293; 42 W. R. 322; 69 L. T. 844; 9 R. 240. But where the defendant published in a newspaper a letter asserting that bribery and corruption existed in "two, if not three departments of our Manchester City Council," a Divisional Court held that these words were only a libel on the individual members or officials of the council, and that therefore the corporation itself could not sue. Mayor, &c., of Manchester v. Williams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 94; 60 L. J. Q. B. 23; 39 W. R. 302; 63 L. T. 805; 54 J. P. 712. A railway company was held liable for transmitting a telegram to the effect that the plaintiffs' bank had stopped payment. Whitfield and others v. South Eastern Railway Co., (1858) E. B. & E. 115; 27 L. J. Q. B. 229; 4 Jur. N. S. 688. Fitzpatrick was the superintendent of a life assurance company. He sent to several persons insured in the company a circular libelling the plaintiff, who had formerly been in its employ, but who was now canvassing for a rival company. Fitzpatrick wrote this circular in the interests of his company and in answer to attacks made upon it by the plaintiff; but it contained statements which he knew to be untrue. The jury found that "Fitzpatrick was acting in publishing the libel within the scope of his employment and in the course of his employment." Verdict for the plaintiff for 6507. damages. On appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that although the occasion was privileged, and although Fitzpatrick had no actual authority, express or implied, to write the libel, still the company was liable if in so doing he was acting in the course of his employment. Citizens' Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Brown, (1904) A. C. 423; 73 12. Trade Unions. It has now been decided that a trade union, though not a corporation, may be sued whether it be registered or unregistered. (Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, (1901) A. C. 426; 70 L. J. K. B. 905 ; 50 W. R. 44; 85 L. T. 147.) An action may even be brought |