in the cause against Wilson, when he interposed, and, in an unbecoming manner, protested against the competency of the Court, his own counsel being present and silent. Wilson had previously been repeatedly warned that his conduct was disrespectful. The Court thereupon, after giving Wilson full opportunity to explain or apologise for his conduct, sentenced him to pay a fine of 107. and apologise to the Court, and in default to be imprisoned till obedience. This sentence was duly recorded in the judgment book, and read aloud to Wilson and his counsel then and there; but Wilson wholly refused either to pay or to apologise, and was accordingly at once arrested by the viscount of the island, whose duty it was to carry into effect the sentences of the Royal Court, and lodged in her Majesty's gaol. A writ of habeas corpus was obtained, on the ground that there was no written warrant for his arrest or detainer. The return to the writ set out all the facts, and also stated that by the law and practice of the Island of Jersey no written warrant was necessary or usual, but that the sentence duly recorded was of itself a sufficient authority, justifying and compelling the viscount to arrest, and the gaoler to detain, the offender. Held, by Lord Denman, C.J., Patteson, Williams, and Wightman, JJ., that affidavits could not be received on behalf of Wilson to show that such was not the law or practice of Jersey, or that in other respects the Royal Court had acted inconsistently with its own law; that no written warrant was necessary; that the contempt was a matter which the Royal Court had to decide for itself; that its decision, being the decision of a competent Court, could not be reviewed by the Queen's Bench; and Wilson was accordingly, on April 22nd, 1845, remanded to Her Majesty's prison in Jersey. Carus Wilson's Case, (1845) 7 Q. B. 984. As to some Inferior Courts special statutes have been passed. Thus, by sections 162 and 163 of the County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), a limited power of committal is given to the judge of any County Court in case he, or any juror or witness, or any of the officers of the court, be wilfully insulted, or the proceedings of the court wilfully interrupted. (See Levy v. Moylan, 10 C. B. 189; 19 L. J. C. P. 308; 1 L. M. & P. 307; R. v. Jordan, 57 L. J. Q. B. 483; 36 W. R. 797.) The judge of a County Court sitting in bankruptcy has a wider power (Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 100; R. v. Judge of County Court of Surrey, 13 Q. B. D. 963; 53 L. J. Q. B. 545; 33 W. R. 68; 51 L. T. 102; Skinner v. Northallerton County Court Judge, (1899) A. C. 439; 68 L. J. Q. B. 896; 80 L. T. 814); so when exercising the powers conferred on him by the Companies (Winding-up) Act, 1890, s. 1, sub.-s. 6 (In re New Par Consols, Ltd., (No. 2), (1898) 1 Q. B. 669; 67 L. J. Q. B. 598; 46 W. R. 369; 78 L. T. 312). A County Court judge has no power to commit in any case not within these sections. (R. v. Lefroy, Ex parte Jolliffe, L. R. 8 Q. B. 134; 42 L. J. Q. B. 121; 21 W. R. 332; 28 L. T. 132; R. v. Judge of Brompton County Court, (1893) 2 Q. B. 195; 62 L. J. Q. B. 604; 41 W. R. 648; 68 L. T. 829.) Except, of course, for breach of injunction, and in other cases of ordinary civil procedure coming within Rules 57 and 59 of Order XXV. of the County Court Rules, 1903. (Martin v. Bannister, 4 Q. B. D. 212, 491; 48 L. J. Ex. 300; 27 W. R. 431; and see section 48 of the County Courts Act, 1888; Lewis v. Owen, (1894) 1 Q. B. 102; 63 L. J. Q. B. 233; and R. v. Judge of County Court of Surrey, 13 Q. B. D. 963.) Illustrations. A solicitor called Turner applied to Judge Jordan to grant a new trial in a County Court case. His Honour refused the application, and in the course of his judgment made certain remarks which Turner considered to be reflections on his personal character. Turner therefore interrupted the judge by calling out, "That is a most unjust remark." The judge at once committed him for contempt; and the Court of Appeal upheld the committal. R. v. Jordan, (1888) 57 L. J. Q. B. 483; 36 W. R. 797. Many acts may come within the provisions of section 162 of the County Courts Act, 1888, which it would be impossible adequately to describe in the warrant; hence it is unnecessary for the judge to say more in the warrant than that he has been wilfully insulted or interrupted (using the words of the section). Levy v. Moylan, (1850) 10 C. B. 211; 19 L. J. C. P. 308; 1 L. M. & P. 307. (b) Inferior Courts not of Record. An Inferior Court not of Record has at common law no power to commit for contempt; in some few cases such a power has been expressly conferred by statute. (McDermott v. Judges of British Guiana, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 341; 38 L. J. P. C. 1; 20 L. T. 47.) It has, however, power to require an offender to find sureties for his good behaviour, as to which see ante, p. 497. It may also enforce order by ejecting any offender whose misconduct obstructs the business of the court. By the County Voters Registration Act, 1865 (28 Vict. c. 36), s. 16, power is given to every revising barrister "to order any person to be removed from his court who shall interrupt the business of the court, or refuse to obey his lawful orders in respect of the same." By the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 93), s. 9, it is enacted that if any person shall wilfully insult any justice or justices. sitting in any . . court or place, or shall commit any contempt of any such court it shall be lawful for such justice or justices by any verbal order, either to direct such person to be removed from such court or place, or to be taken into custody, and at any time before the rising of such court, by warrant, to commit such person to gaol for any period not exceeding seven days, or to fine such person in any sum not exceeding 40s. Illustrations. Langley said to the Mayor of Salisbury whilst in the execution of his office, "Mr. Mayor, I do not care for you; you are a rogue and a rascal." Held, that the words were not indictable; but that the mayor might have bound him over then and there to be of good behaviour, and ought to have done so instantly. R. v. Langley, (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 1029; 6 Mod. 125; 2 Salk. 697; Rogers spoke unmannerly words to Sir Robert Jeffryes, an Alderman of the City of London, while he was holding a wardmote in a church. Holt, C.J., said "No information or indictment will lie for these words. For the common law has provided a proper method for punishment of scandalous words, viz., binding to the good behaviour; such words being a breach of the peace." R. v. Rogers, (1702) 2 Ld. Raym. 777; 7 Mod. 28. A material witness against a prisoner committed for trial on a charge of felony refused to be bound over to appear at the quarter sessions to give evidence against him, saying that she would not go to Maidstone, and nobody should make her. After fully explaining the matter, and expending nearly an hour in the attempt to persuade her to go, the committing magistrate issued a warrant by virtue of which she was taken to Maidstone, and gave her evidence, and the prisoner was convicted; without her evidence he could not have been convicted. Held, that the arrest was lawful, by necessary implication from 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 13. Bennet and wife v. Watson and another, (1814) 3 M. & S. 1. To persist, in spite of repeated remonstrance, in interrupting and insulting a Court of petty sessions in Ireland by shouting at the bench in the most violent and unseemly manner, so that none of the justices could speak a word, is a contempt for which the Court may commit to prison even a solicitor practising before them. In re John Rea, (1878) 2 L. R. Ir. 429; 14 Cox, C. C. 139. Where, at petty sessions in Ireland, a contempt committed in court is brought to the notice of the justices there sitting, and while the offender is still in court, the justices can order that he be attached to answer there and then for such alleged contempt; the mere fact that the order so made is carried out after the offender, in order to evade arrest, has left the court, is not sufficient to render his arrest illegal. Mitchell v. Smyth (1), (1894) 2 Ir. R. 351. In 1874 Thomas Willis claimed to vote as a freeholder; but the revising barrister on the meagre evidence before him held that the property in respect of which he claimed was copyhold and disallowed the vote. His cousin, William Willis, who was present in court as agent for the opposite political party, knew perfectly well that it was really freehold, but held his tongue. In 1875 Thomas Willis accordingly claimed as a copyholder. Then William came forward and produced the family title-deeds and proved clearly that the land was freehold. The revising barrister was compelled again to disallow Thomas's vote; but ordered William to be turned out of the room for not having produced this evidence in 1874. Held, that such expulsion was wrongful, as William's conduct in 1874, though possibly deserving of moral reprobation, was certainly no "interruption" of the proceedings of the court then being held in 1875. Willis v. Maclachlan, (1876) 1 Ex. D. 376; 45 L. J. Ex. 689; 35 The Ecclesiastical Courts have no power to commit for contempt at all. All that such Courts can do is to signify such contempt to the Lord Chancellor, who thereupon, under 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 93, issues a writ de contumace capiendo for taking the offender into custody. (Adlam v. Colthurst, L. R. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 30; 36 L. J. Ec. Cas. 14; Ex parte Dale, 43 L. T. 534.) But such writ will not issue if the alleged offender be a peer, a lord of Parliament, or a member of the House of Commons (sect. 2). Note, that both Mr. Long Wellesley and Mr. Lechmere Charlton were members of Parliament, and yet both were committed to the Fleet for contempt of the Court of Chancery. (2 Russ. & Mylne, 639; 2 Mylne & Cr. 316.) And see the remarks of Cockburn, C.J., in Onslow's and Whalley's Cases, L. R. 9 Q. B. 228, 229; 12 Cox, C. C. 369. CHAPTER XXI. THE LAW OF PERSONS IN BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES. I HAVE hitherto dealt with the plaintiff and defendant as individuals under no disability, who sue and are sued singly and in their own right. I propose in this chapter to show how rights and liabilities are affected by personal disability or special personal relations with others, both in civil and criminal cases. It will be convenient to divide this chapter into the following heads : 1. Husband and Wife. 2. Infants. 3. Lunatics. 4. Bankrupts. 5. Receivers. 6. Executors and Administrators. 7. Trustees. 8. Aliens. 9. Master and Servant; Principal and Agent. 10. Partners. 11. Corporations and Companies. 12. Trade Unions. 1. Husband and Wife. When words actionable per se are spoken of a married woman, she may either sue alone, or she may join her husband as co-plaintiff; in the latter case, he will be entitled to recover in the same action for any special damage that may have occurred to him. When the words are not actionable per se, she may sue, provided she can O.L.S. M M |