when they are not, his comments, though still strictly a contempt, may be excused, provided they are such as would have been legitimate had the case been at an end. But if the writer knew the proceedings were still pending, then the fact that he did not desire or intend to prejudice the case is immaterial (except as to the extent of his punishment), if the Court be satisfied that such was the obvious and necessary result of his words. (Daw v. Eley, L. R. 7 Eq. at p. 59; In re Martindale, (1894) 3 Ch. at p. 200.) Illustrations. In an action of libel, the plaintiff obtained an interim injunction at chambers. The defendant appealed to a Divisional Court, and the injunction was dissolved. The editor of a newspaper read a report of this application, took it to be the trial of the action, and honestly believing that the action was at an end, he proceeded to comment on the conduct of the parties and the decision of the Court, in a manner calculated to prejudice the approaching trial. On a motion to commit the editor, the Court, being satisfied of his bona fides, made no order except that each party should pay his own costs of the motion. (Mathew and Henn Collins, JJ.) In re Food and Sanitation Journal, (Feb. 1st, 1894) (not reported). So, where the defendant did not know any action had been commenced and the words complained of were but a continuation of previous attacks. In re Labouchere, (1901) 18 Times L. R. 208. If a person innocently lends to another a newspaper containing words which are a contempt of court, not knowing that the newspaper contains such words, he is not guilty of a contempt. McLeod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) A. C. 549 ; 68 L. J. P. C. 137 ; 48 W. R. 173; 81 L. T. 158; 15 Times L. R. 487. The liquidator of a company issued a circular to the shareholders with reference to the affairs of the company, stating inter alia that he had obtained leave to bring an action against L., the promoter of the company. The respondent published this circular in his newspaper, not knowing that any action had been actually commenced. A motion to commit the respondent for contempt was refused with costs. Metropolitan Music Hall Co., Ltd. v. Lake, (1889) 58 L. J. Ch. 513; 60 In an action for libel against the proprietor of the Era, the jury found a verdict for 40s. damages, and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for that amount. The defendant gave notice of motion for a new trial; and then published in his paper an article commenting on the verdict in a manner which would admittedly have been legitimate if the action had been at an end. Held, that the mere fact that a notice of a motion for a new trial had been given did not make the article a contempt of court. Dallas v. Ledger, (1888) 52 J. P. 328; 4 Times L. R. 432. But where on the trial of a criminal charge the jury disagree, it is a contempt to publish words calculated to prejudice the future trial, unless it has been formally stated that a fresh jury will not be empannelled. R. v. Freeman's Journal, (1902) 2 Ir. R. 82. On March 9th, 1895, the plaintiffs sent out amongst the defendants' customers circulars commenting on the pending action. On March 22nd, 1895, the action was settled on terms arranged between the parties. On May 10th, 1895, the defendants moved to commit the plaintiffs for the contempt which they had committed while the action was still pending. Chitty, J., dismissed the motion with costs, as there was no longer anything to be tried. Kelly & Co. v. Pole and others, (1895) 11 Times L. R. 405. But the rule that, on a motion to commit, the applicant must show that a proceeding is still pending, does not apply in three cases : (i) Where the words amount to a scandalising of the Court itself; (ii) Where the words are a report of, or comment on, proceedings purposely taken by a judge in camerâ. (iii) Where the words are a report of proceedings, of which the Court has forbidden that any report should be published. Illustrations. Mr. Justice North heard an application relating to a ward of Court in his private room. A report of what transpired there was published in several newspapers. Held, that such publication was a contempt of court. In re Martindale, (1894) 3 Ch. 193; 64 L. J. Ch. 9; 43 W. R. 53; 71 It would have been otherwise if merely the result of the proceedings-the decision of the judge-had been reported. Lawrence v. Ambery, 91 L. T. Journal, 230. It is a contempt of court to publish prematurely, and without the consent of a liquidator, a report of the examination of a witness taken privately under section 115 of the Companies Act, 1862. The American Exchange Co., Ltd. v. Gillig, (1889) 58 L. J. Ch. 706; 61 L. T. 502. As to comments on proceedings taken in chambers in the King's Bench Division, see Peters v. Bradlaugh, (1888) 4 Times L. R. 414. A Court of general gaol delivery has undoubtedly the power to make an order prohibiting the publication of its proceedings pending a trial which is likely to last for several successive days, and to punish those who disobey such order by fine. Abbott, C.J., made such an order on the trial of Thistlewood and others for treason in 1820. He announced in open Court that he prohibited the publication of any of the proceedings until the trial of all the prisoners should be concluded. In spite of this prohibition, the Observer published a report of the trial of the first two prisoners tried. The proprietor of the Observer was summoned for the contempt, and, failing to appear, was fined 5007. in his absence. R. v. Clement, (1821) 4 B. & Ald. 218; 11 Price, 68. At the Birmingham Assizes one W. was about to be tried for publishing an obscene libel. Darling, J., before the trial commenced, stated that it was inexpedient that a full or detailed account of the proceedings should be published, and that if his advice were disregarded he should make it his business to see that the law in that respect was enforced. After the trial was concluded, the Birmingham Daily Argus published a violent attack on the learned judge, abusing him for having supposed that it was necessary to warn the Birmingham Press not to publish obscene matter, and containing also scurrilous remarks about the judge personally. The Court held this a contempt and fined the writer of the article, who had apologized and admitted his offence, 100l. and 251. for costs. R. v. Gray, (1900) 2 Q. B. 36; 69 L. J. Q. B. 502; 48 W. R. 474; 82 L. T. 534; 64 J. P. 484. When the words which are alleged to be a contempt of court relate to a pending legal proceeding, the motion to commit must be made to the Court in which the proceeding is pending. The Court can only punish for contempt of itself." (Per Hawkins, J., in Ex parte Burns, (1886) 2 Times L. R. at p. 352.) 66 Illustrations. Where proceedings are pending before a police magistrate, the High Court will not commit for a contempt of the police court. Ex parte Burns, (1886) 2 Times L. R. 351. But if a prisoner is charged before a Court of Petty Sessions with a crime which can only be tried at the Assizes; the High Court has power to commit for a contempt consisting of words tending to prejudice the fair trial of the prisoner at the Assizes. R. v. Parke, (1903) 2 K. B. 432; 72 L. J. K. B. 839; 89 L. T. 439; 67 J. P. 421. The King's Bench Division of the High Court will not commit for a contempt of the Probate Division. Cook v. Cook, (1885) 2 Times L. R. 10. If the contempt is committed in open court and in presence of the judge, he may commit the offender instanter, and without any prior notice. (Watt v. Ligertwood, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 361.) A written warrant is not essential to such a committal, though it is usual. (Per Wightman, J., in Carus Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 1017.) But when the offender is not present, and the contempt is committed by words spoken or published out of court, the Court still has power, on clear and satisfactory evidence, to grant an attachment in the first instance, and issue its warrant, so that the offender shall answer for his contempt in custody. (Anon., (1711) 1 Salk. 84 ; R. v. Jones, (1719) 1 Stra. 185.) But such power would only be exercised in very flagrant cases. The usual course is for the applicant to serve the person alleged to have been guilty of a contempt of court with a notice of motion, similar in form to that set out in Precedent No. 66. The applicant usually files affidavits in support of his motion, though in special cases the Court may proceed on its own knowledge, without any suggestion. (In re The Sheriff of Surrey, 2 F. & F. 236; Skipworth's and Castro's Cases, L. R. 9 Q. B. 230; 12 Cox, C. C. 358.) If the offender fails to appear and show cause, a warrant may issue for his apprehension (Lechmere Charlton's Case, 2 Myl. & Cr. 316); or he may be fined in his absence (R. v. Clement, 4 B. & Ald. 218). If he appears, he in his turn usually files affidavits, either disputing the facts alleged against him or endeavouring to purge his contempt. If the Court is not satisfied, it may commit him to prison for a time certain, or may impose a fine, or may do both; and in every case the Court may further order the offender to pay the costs of the proceedings. (Martin's Case, 2 Russ. & Myl. 674, n.) Where the contempt is slight or unintentional and the offender submits himself to the Court, and has done all in his power to clear his contempt, the Court often makes no other order except that he pay the costs of the motion. (See L. R. 7 Eq. 58, n.) The costs are of course in the discretion of the Court; and none will be granted where the proceedings are clearly vexatious, and the party instituting them is himself to blame. (Vernon v. Vernon, 40 L. J. Ch. 118; 19 W. R. 404; 23 L. T. 697.) (R. v. James, 5 B. & 99; In re Maria But the warrant The commitment must be for a time certain. Ald. 894; Green v. Elgie and another, 5 Q. B. Annie Davies, 21 Q. B. D. 236; 37 W. R. 57.) may be in general terms; no special grounds need be stated; nor need the facts which are the cause of the arrest be specified; it is sufficient to state that the offender is committed for contempt of court. (Howard v. Gosset, 10 Q. B. 411; Ex parte Fernandez, 6 H. & N. 717; 10 C. B. N. S. 3.) "A rule of Court of two lines" is sufficient (R. v. Paty, 2 Ld. Raym. 1108), and will justify the officer of the Court in arresting the offender, and protect him from any action of false imprisonment. It will be presumed that the Court. was acting regularly and rightly, unless, indeed, the contrary appears expressly on the face of the writ. (R. v. Evans and another, 8 Dowl. 451.) And the decision of the judge committing cannot be reviewed by any other Court. (Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East, 1; Stockdale v. Hansard, per Littledale, J., 9 A. & E. 169; Carus Wilson's Case, per Lord Denman, C.J., 7 Q. B. 1008.) If a fine is imposed, it is usual to add a sentence of imprisonment till the fine be paid, in addition to any other term of imprisonment that may have been inflicted. (L. R. 9 Q. B. 228, 229, 240.) If a plaintiff be guilty of contempt, he is liable, in addition to fine or imprisonment, to have all proceedings in his action stayed, or even the whole action dismissed, and money paid into court returned to the defendant. (Republic of Liberia v. Roye, 1 App. Cas. 139; 45 L. J. Ch. 297; 24 W. R. 967; 34 L. T. 145.) Where the period for which the offender is committed is expressed in the margin of the writ, or may be gathered from it by necessary inference, the gaoler should discharge the prisoner at the end of that period. (Moone v. Rose, L. R. 4 Q. B. 486; 38 L. J. Q. B. 236.) But if the warrant does not state the period for which he is to be kept in custody, nor refer to the nature of the contempt committed, the gaoler should not release him without an order of the Court. (Greaves v. Keene, 4 Ex. D. 73; 27 W. R. 416; 40 L. T. 216; McCombe v. Gray, 4 L. R. (Ir.) 432.) When the period assigned comes to an end, the offender may not be detained in custody merely for the costs of the application to the Court to commit. (Jackson v Mawby, 1 Ch. D. 86; 45 L. J. Ch. 53; 24 W. R. 92; Hudson v. Tooth, 2 P. D. 125; 35 L. T. 820.) A fortiori, where condemnation in costs is the only punishment inflicted, the Court has no power subsequently to commit to prison for default in payment. (Mickelthwaite v. Fletcher, 27 W. R. 793; Weldon v. Weldon, 10 P. D. 72; 54 L. J. P. & D. 26, 60; 33 W. R. 370, 427; 52 L. T. 233; 49 J. P. 517.) Formerly there was a sharp distinction between committal and attachment. Committal was the proper punishment for doing a prohibited act, and attachment for neglecting to do some act ordered to be done. But now for most purposes the distinction is of no importance. (Per Chitty, J., in Harvey v. Harvey, 26 Ch. D. at p. 654. See, however, the valuable report of Mr. Registrar Lavie, in the notes to (1893) 1 Ch. pp. 259-264.) A writ of attachment still issues to the sheriff, while an order for committal is placed in the hands of the tipstaff of the Court. "A person committed by the Court is unable to be bailed out, whereas under a writ of attachment the sheriff may accept bail." (Per Jessel, M.R., in Buist v. Bridge, 43 L. T. 432; 29 W. R. 117.) Neither attachment nor committal can now be obtained by a litigant without notice of motion, which should as a rule be personally served, though this is not indispensable. (Browning v. Sabin, 5 Ch. D. 511; 46 L. J. Ch. 728; Howarth |