wished to curry favour at Court, or was influenced by fear of the Government or of any great man, or by any motive other than a simple desire to arrive at the truth and to mete out justice impartially, is seditious.

See R. v. Lord George Gordon, 22 Howell's St. Tr. 177.

To call the Lord Chief Justice "a traitor and a perjured judge," and to allege that a recent judgment delivered by him was treason, is a misdemeanour. R. v. Jeff, (1630) 15 Vin. Abr. 89.

Hutton, J. v. Harrison, Hutton, 131.

To say that the Lord Chief Justice disgraces his high station and prevents justice being done, is a misdemeanour.

R. v. Hart and White, (1808) 30 How. St. Tr. 1168, 1345; 10 East, 94.
R. v. Wrennum, (1619) Popham, 135.

Butt v. Conant, 1 Brod. & Bing. 548; 4 Moore, 195; Gow, 84.

Hurry sued Watson for a malicious prosecution, and recovered damages 3,000l.: the corporation of which Watson was a member thereupon resolved "that Mr. Watson had been actuated by motives of public justice in prosecuting Hurry,' and voted him 2,300l. towards payment of his damages. The Court of King's Bench granted an information against the members of the corporation.

R. v. Watson and others, (1788) 2 T. R. 199.

[That the vote of money was an improper employment of the corporate funds is very probable; but it is doubtful whether an information would be granted for such words in these days.]

The term " Superior Court" includes the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal, the High Court of Justice, and any Divisional Court thereof, and any judge of any Division sitting in Court alone (Jud. Act, 1873, s. 39). Also the Central Criminal Court, and all Courts held under any Commission of Oyer and Terminer, Assize, Gaol Delivery, or Nisi Prius. (Ex parte Fernandez, 6 H. & N. 717; 10 C. B. N. S. 3; 30 L. J. C. P. 321; 7 Jur. N. S. 529, 571; 9 W. R. 832; 4 L. T. 296, 324; In re McAleece, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 146.) And the Superior Courts of Law and Equity in Dublin, and the Court of Session in Scotland. Colonial Courts of Record are also Superior Courts. (Crawford's Case, 13 Q. B. 613; 18 L. J. Q. B. 225; 13 Jur. 955; In re McDermott, L. R. 1 P. C. 260; L. R. 2 P. C. 341; 38 L. J. P. C. 1; 20 L. T. 47; Hughes v. Porral and others, 4 Moore, P. C. C. 41.)

(b) Inferior Courts.

The judge of an Inferior Court is in no better position than any other public officer, so far as words written

and published are concerned. It is a misdemeanour to write and publish concerning him in the execution of his office any words which would be libellous and actionable. per se.

It is not indictable to speak disrespectful and abusive words of the judge of an Inferior Court behind his back, or even to his face, provided he be out of court.

But it is indictable to speak aloud in open court, when the judge is present in the discharge of his duty, words reflecting upon him in his official capacity.

Hence words which would be indictable if published with respect to a Superior Court may not be indictable if they refer merely to an Inferior Court.

It is indictable

Illustrations.

to give the lie to the steward of a manor holding a court leet,

Earl of Lincoln v. Fisher, Cro. Eliz. 581; Ow. 113; Moore, 470;

to put on your hat in the presence of the lord of a court leet and refuse to take it off, saying, "I care not what you can do,"

Bathurst v. Coxe, 1 Keb. 451, 465; Sir T. Raym. 68;

to rise up in court and say to the justices in session, "Though I cannot have justice here, I will have it elsewhere,"

R. v. Mayo, 1 Keb. 508; 1 Sid. 144 (although Twisden, J., mercifully endeavoured to construe the words to mean merely, "I propose to appeal from your decision");

to say to a justice of the peace in the execution of his office, "You are a rogue and a liar,"

R. v. Revel, 1 Str. 420;

to call the Mayor of Yarmouth in his court, in the hearing of the suitors, a puppy and a fool,

Ex parte The Mayor of Yarmouth, 1 Cox, C. C. 122.

nor to say that a justice is a fool, or an ass, or a coxcomb, or a blockhead, or a bufflehead. Per Holt. C.J., in

R. v. Wrightson, 2 Salk. 698; 11 Mod. 166; 2 Roll. Rep. 78; 4 Inst. 181;

nor to say of an alderman of Hull, that " Whenever he comes to put on his gown, Satan enters into him,”

R. v. Baker, 1 Mod. 35;

nor to say of a justice of the peace in his absence that he is a scoundrel and a liar. Per Lord Ellenborough in

R. v. Weltje, 2 Camp. 142;

nor to accuse a justice of partiality or corruption, unless the words were uttered at a time when the magistrate was in the actual execution of his office, Ex parte The Duke of Marlborough, 5 Q. B. 955; 1 Dav. & Mer. 720; nor to tell a borough magistrate, out of court but to his face, that he is a liar, and unfit to be a magistrate, and that he will hear the same every time he comes into town; unless, indeed, the words can be construed as tending to provoke a breach of the peace.

Ex parte Chapman, 4 A. & E. 773.
See also Anon., (1650) Style, 251.
Simmons v. Sweete, Cro. Eliz. 78.

Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 93, 95; 1 Roll. Rep. 79, 173, 224.

R. v. Burford, 1 Ventris, 16.

R. v. Leafe, Andrews, 226.

R. v. Penny, 1 Ld. Raym. 153.

R. v. Langley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1029; 2 Salk. 697; 6 Mod. 125; Holt, 654.

R. v. Rogers, 2 Ld. Raym. 777; 7 Mod. 28.

R. v. Nun, 10 Mod. 186.

R. v. Granfield, 12 Mod. 98.

R. v. Pocock, 2 Str. 1157.

R. v. Burn, 7 A. & E. 190.

These cases overrule R. v. Darby, 3 Mod. 139; Comb. 65; Carth. 14. Some Inferior Courts are Courts of Record, others are not. Thus the Mayor's Court, London; the City of London Court, the Tolzey Court of Bristol, the Salford Hundred Court, the Court of Passage, Liverpool, all County Courts and Courts of Quarter Sessions, and Coroners' Courts are Inferior Courts of Record; while Courts of Petty Sessions and of Revising Barristers are Inferior Courts not of record.

An Inferior Court of Record has in some cases power to commit for contempt. These cases are dealt with in the

next chapter (post, p. 522).

An Inferior Court not of record has no power to fine or commit for contempt, unless such power be conferred by statute. (McDermott v. Judges of British Guiana, L. R. 2 P. C. 341; 20 L. T. 47.) But it has another remedy: the offender may be required to find sureties for his good behaviour,

(i) If he use any disrespectful or unmannerly expressions in the face of the Court. (1 Lev. 107; 1 Keb. 558.)

O.L.S.

K K

(ii) If, out of court, he uses words disparaging the judge or magistrate in relation to his office.

(iii) If, out of court, he obstruct or insult an officer of the court in the execution of his duty.

P. C. c. 61, ss. 2, 3.)

(Hawk.

(iv) And generally, if he use any words which directly tend to a breach of the peace.

But not for contemptuous and uncivil words spoken of the judge in his private capacity.

Such binding over should be done as soon as possible after the contempt is committed; and in the case of petty sessions, it should be done, not by the justice specially attacked, but by one of his brethren. (R. v. Lee, 12 Mod. 514.) The person accused may call evidence to disprove the matters charged against him (which he could not do in a case of "articles to keep the peace"), and he may now give evidence himself. (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 25.) In default of sureties being provided, the justices may commit either to the common gaol or to the House of Correction (6 Geo. I. c. 19, s. 2); but it should appear clearly upon the face of their warrant that the committal is for want of sureties, and not merely for contempt. (Dean's Case, Cro. Eliz. 689.) And the committal should be for a time certain, not " until he shall find such sureties," else a poor and friendless man might be imprisoned for life. (Prickett v. Gratrex, 8 Q. B. 1020.)

CHAPTER XX.

WORDS WHICH ARE A CONTEMPT OF COURT.

It is a contempt of court to publish words which tend to bring the administration of justice into contempt, to prejudice the fair trial of any cause or matter which is the subject of civil or criminal proceedings, or in any way to obstruct the course of justice. Thus it is a contempt of court to insult the judge, jury or witnesses, to obstruct any officer of the court, to calumniate the parties or prejudice. the minds of the judge, jury or general public against them, or in any way to taint the source of justice or to divert or interrupt its ordinary course.

"There are three different sorts of contempt.

'One kind of contempt is, scandalising the Court itself. "There may be likewise a contempt of this Court, in abusing parties who are concerned in causes here.

"There may be also a contempt of this Court, in prejudicing mankind against persons, before the cause is heard.

"There cannot be anything of greater consequence, than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters." (Per Lord Hardwicke, L.C., in Roach v. Garvan, Re Read and Huggonson, (1742) 2 Atk., p. 471.)

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Nothing is more incumbent upon Courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented; nor is there anything of more pernicious consequence, than to prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned as parties in causes, before the cause is finally heard." (Ib. p. 469.)

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Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his