be actionable, because no overt act was alleged to have followed the solicitation. They would be held actionable now. Sir Edward Bray v. Andrews, (1564) Moore, 63. Sir Harbert Crofts v. Brown, (1617) 3 Buls. 167. It was held in 1602 that no action lay for saying "Master Barham did burn my barn with his own hands;" for at that date it was not felony to burn a barn unless it were either full of corn or parcel of a mansion-house; and the defendant had not stated that his barn was either. Barham's Case, (1602) 4 Rep. 20; Yelv. 21. So it was in 1602 held not actionable to say:-"Thou hast received stolen swine, and thou knowest they were stolen;" for receiving is not a common law offence, unless it amounts to comforting and assisting the felon as an accessory after the fact. But ever since 3 Wm. & M. c. 9, s. 4, and 4 Geo. I. c. 11, such words would be clearly actionable. Dawes v. Bolton or Boughton, Cro. Eliz. 888; 1 Roll. Abr. 68. Cox v. Humphrey, Cro. Eliz. 889. A charge of deer stealing would be actionable now, although in 1705 it was held not actionable, because it was subject only to a penalty of 301. Ogden v. Turner, 2 Salk. 696; Holt, 40; 6 Mod. 104. So now it would of course be actionable to accuse a man of secreting a will; though such an accusation was held not actionable in Godfrey v. Owen, Palm. 21; 3 Salk. 327. And is still apparently not actionable in America. O'Hanlon v. Myers, 10 Rich. 128. Where a vicar of a parish falsely declared that the plaintiff, a parishioner, was excommunicated, it was held an action lay; possibly because the person excommunicated was at that date liable to imprisonment under the writ de excommunicato capiendo; but there seems to have been some allegation of special damage in the declaration. Barnabas v. Traunter, 1 Vin. Abr. 396. In South Carolina it was formerly actionable to call a white or his wife a mulatto. Eden v. Legare, 1 Bay, 171. Atkinson v. Hartley, 8 McCord, 203. King v. Wood, 1 Nott & M. 184. The words must clearly impute a crime punishable with imprisonment, although they need not state the charge with all the precision of an indictment. If merely fraud, dishonesty, or vice, not amounting to crime, be imputed, no action lies without proof of special damage. And even where words of specific import are employed (such as "thief" or "traitor"), still no action lies if the defendant can satisfy the jury that they were not intended to impute a crime, but merely as general terms of abuse, and meant no more than "rogue" or "scoundrel," and were so understood by all who heard the conversation. But if the bystanders reasonably understand the words as definitely charging the plaintiff with the commission of a crime, an action lies. Illustrations. "You forged my name:" these words are actionable, although it is not stated to what deed or instrument. Jones v. Herne, 2 Wils. 87. Overruling Anon., 3 Leon. 231; 1 Roll. Abr. 65. To say that a man is "forsworn" or "has taken a false oath" is not a sufficiently definite charge of perjury; for there is no reference to any judicial proceeding. But to say "Thou art forsworn in a Court of record" is a sufficient charge of perjury; for this will be taken to mean that he was forsworn while giving evidence in a Court of record. To say Stanhope v. Blith, (1585) 4 Rep. 15. Ceely v. Hoskins, Cro. Car. 509. "I have been robbed of three dozen winches; you bought two, one at 3s., one at 2s.; you knew well when you bought them that they cost me three times as much making as you gave for them, and that they could not have been honestly come by," is a sufficient charge of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen. [An indictment which merely alleged that the prisoner knew the goods were not honestly come by would be bad. R.v. Wilson, 2 Mood. C. C. 52.] Alfred v. Farlow, 8 Q. B. 854; 15 L. J. Q. B. 258; 10 Jur. 714. "He is a pickpocket; he picked my pocket of my money," was once held an insufficient charge of larceny. Walls or Watts v. Rymes, 2 Lev. 51; 1 Ventr. 213; 3 Salk. 325. But now this would clearly be held sufficient. Baker v. Pierce, 2 Ld. Raym. 959; Holt, 654; 6 Mod. 23; 2 Salk. 695. "He has defrauded a mealman of a roan horse" held not to imply a criminal act of fraud; as it is not stated that the mealman was induced to part with his property by means of any false pretence. Richardson v. Allen, 2 Chit. 657. Needham v. Dowling, 15 L. J. C. P. 9. To say of a barman that he removed from his house owing a month's rent, and that his landlord could not get the money from him, is not actionable without proof of special damage. Speake v. Hughes, (1904) 1 K. B. 138; 73 L. J. K. B. 172; 89 L. T. 576. It is not actionable without proof of special damage to say of a man that he has not paid his bets. Smith and another v. Willoughby, (1899) 15 Times L. R. 314. So none of the following words are actionable without proof of special damage: "Cheat": Savage v. Robery, 2 Salk. 694; 5 Mod. 398. Davis v. Miller et ux., 2 Str. 1169. Brunkard v. Segar, Cro. Jac. 427; Hutt. 13; 1 Vin. Abr. 427. "Common-filcher": Goodale v. Castle, Cro. Eliz. 554. "Welcher": Blackman v. Bryant, 27 L. T. 491. But "welcher" is actionable, if the jury are satisfied the word means "one who takes money from those who make bets with him, intending to keep such money for himself and never to part with it again," for such conduct is criminal. Williams v. Magyer, Times, March 1st, 1883. R. v. Buckmaster, 20 Q. B. D. 182; 57 L. J. M. C. 25; 36 W. R. 701 ; 57 L. T. 720. The words " 66 'gambler," black-leg," "black-sheep," are not actionable unless it can be shown that the bystanders understood them to mean "a cheating gambler punishable by the criminal law." Barnett v. Allen, 3 H. & N. 376; 27 L. J. Ex. 412; 1 F. & F. 125; 4 Jur. N. S. 488. Gordon Cumming v. Green and others, (1891) 7 Times L. R. 408. But it is actionable to say of A. that he has brought a blackmailing action against B. Marks v. Samuel, (1904) 2 K. B. 287; 73 L. J. K. B. 587; 53 W. R. 88; 90 L. T. 590; 20 Times L. R. 430. If the crime imputed be one of which the plaintiff could not by any possibility be guilty, and all who heard the imputation knew that he could not by any possibility be guilty of it, no action lies, for the plaintiff is never in jeopardy, nor is his reputation in any way impaired. (Buller's N. P. 5.) In America this doctrine was carried to great lengths. If one joint owner accused his partner of stealing the joint property no action lay, because a joint owner cannot steal the joint property. But now the more sensible rule prevails, that if the words would convey an imputation of felony to the minds of ordinary hearers unversed in legal technicalities, an action lies, e.g., where an infant is accused of a crime, and nothing said about special malice. (Stewart v. Howe, 17 Ill. 71; and see Chambers v. White, 2 Jones, 383, as to physical inability to commit the crime alleged.) The words are actionable if they are calculated to induce the belief that the plaintiff had committed a crime. (Drummond v. Leslie, 5 Blackf. (Indiana) 453.) Illustrations. Words complained of:-" "Thou hast killed my wife." Everyone who heard the words knew at the time that defendant's wife was still alive: they could not therefore understand the word "kill" to mean 66 murder." Snag v. Gee, 4 Rep. 16, as explained by Parke, B., in Heming v. Power, 10 M. & W. 569. And see Web v. Poor, Cro. Eliz. 569. Talbot v. Case, Cro. Eliz. 823. Dacy v. Clinch, Sid. 53. Jacob v. Mills, 1 Ventr. 117; Cro. Jac. 343. It is no slander to say of a churchwarden that he stole the bell-ropes of his parish church; for they are officially his property; and a man cannot steal his own goods. [But such words might be actionable as a charge on him in his office.] Jackson v. Adams, 2 Bing. N. C. 402; 2 Scott, 599; 1 Hodges, 339. It is no slander to say of a husband: "He robbed his wife of 751. ;" because at common law no such offence can be committed. It would be a slander, however, if the words imputed that he stole his wife's money while they were living apart, or when he was about to desert her; as then criminal proceedings would be possible under section 12 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. Lemon v. Simmons, (1888) 57 L. J. Q. B. 260; 36 W. R. 351; 4 But where a married woman said, "You stole my faggots," and it was argued for the defendant that a married woman could not own faggots, and therefore no one could steal faggots of hers: the Court construed the words according to common sense and ordinary usage to mean, "You stole my husband's faggots." Stamp and wife v. White and wife, Cro. Jac. 600. Charnel's Case, Cro. Eliz. 279. So it is not actionable for A. to charge a man who is not A.'s clerk or servant with embezzling A.'s money; for no indictment for embezzlement would lie. [But surely this can only be the case where the bystanders are aware of the exact relationship between A. and the plaintiff. And now see the Larceny Act, 1901, (1 Edw. VII.) c. 10.] Williams v. Stott, (1833) 1 C. & M. 675; 3 Tyrw. 688. II. Where the Words impute a Contagious Disease. Words imputing to the plaintiff that he has an infectious or contagious disease are actionable without proof of special damage. For the effect of such an imputation is naturally to exclude the plaintiff from society. Such disease may be either leprosy, venereal disease, or, it seems, the plague (Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403); but not the itch, the falling sickness, or the small-pox. The words must distinctly impute that the plaintiff has the disease at the time of publication: an assertion that he has had such a disease would not cause him to be shunned. (Carslake v. Mapledoram, 2 T. R. 473; Taylor v. Hall, 2 Str. 1189.) Any words which the hearers would naturally understand as conveying that the plaintiff then has such a disease are sufficient. Many distinctions are drawn in old cases about the pox, a word which may imply either the actionable syphilis, or the less objectionable smallpox. It has been decided that "he has the pox" (simpliciter) shall be taken to mean "he has the small-pox;" but that if any other words be used referring to the effects of the disease, or the way in which it was caught, or even the medicine taken to cure it, these may be referred to as determining which pox was meant. То say of a person, Illustrations. "He hath the falling sickness" is not actionable unless it be spoken of him in the way of his profession or trade. Taylor v. Perr, (1607) 1 Rolle's Abr. 44. To say to the plaintiff in the presence of others, "Thou art a leprous knave," is actionable. Taylor v. Perkins, (1607) Cro. Jac. 144; 1 Rolle's Abr. 44. To say of the plaintiff that "He hath the pox" is actionable, whenever the word "wench or "whore" occurs in the same sentence. Brook v. Wise, (1601) Cro. Eliz. 878. Pye v. Wallis, (1658) Carter, 55. Grimes v. Lovel, 12 Mod. 242. Whitfield v. Powel, 12 Mod. 248. Clifton v. Wells, 12 Mod. 634. Bloodworth v. Gray, 7 M. & Gr. 334; 8 Scott, N. R. 9. And see Clerk v. Dyer, 8 Mod. 290. III. PUBLIC OFFICES, PROFESSIONS, AND TRADES. Words which disparage the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, or trade are actionable without proof of any special damage. It must injure the plaintiff's reputation to disparage him in his very means of livelihood. Where the O.L.S. E |