whether the person solicited commit the crime or not. (R. v. Higgins, 2 East, 5.)

It is also said to be a misdemeanour to fabricate and publish false news in writing (Dig. L. L. 23), or to endeavour, by spreading false rumours, to raise or lower the price of food or merchandise. (See R. v. Waddington, (1800) 1 East, 143). According to Scroggs, J., it is a misdemeanour to publish any news at all, though true and harmless. (See 11 Hargrave's St. Tr. 322.) Where eight persons combined to raise the price of Government stocks on Feb. 21st, 1814, by spreading a false rumour of the death of Napoleon Buonaparte, they were indicted and convicted of a conspiracy, for their common purpose was illegal. (R. v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67.) But this is scarcely an authority for holding that the merely spreading a false rumour is in itself indictable. The statutes of Scandalum Magnatum, 3 Edw. I. c. 34; 2 Rich. II. st. 1, c. 5; and 12 Rich. II. c. 11, which had long been practically obsolete, were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 59).

In all the above cases of misdemeanour at common law, the defendant may be fined or imprisoned, or both; but he cannot be sentenced to hard labour. He may also be required to find sureties to keep the peace and to be of good behaviour for any length of time. A married woman could not, before the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, be fined, but she could be required to find sureties, though she could not enter into recognizances herself.

None of the above offences can be tried at quarter sessions, except an indictment for obscene words; post, p. 473.

Certain statutes have been passed in aid of the common law :

By section 3 of Lord Campbell's Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96), it is a misdemeanour to publish, or threaten to publish, any libel upon any other person, or to threaten to print or publish, or propose to abstain from printing or publishing, or to offer to prevent the printing or publishing of, any matter or thing touching another, with intent to extort money or gain, or to procure for anyone any appointment

or office of profit. The offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years, either with or without hard labour.

Except under the first clause of the section, the matter or thing threatened to be published need not be libellous; the intent to extort money is the gist of the offence; and to demand money. which the defendant honestly believes to be due and owing to him. is no evidence of such an intent. (R. v. Coghlan, 4 F. & F. 316.) Threatening to commence, or offering to prevent, legal proceedings of any kind is not an offence within the section. (R. v. Yates and another, 6 Cox, C. C. 441.) A corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of this section. (R. v. M'Laughlin, 14 J. P. 291.)

By section 4 of the same Act, it is a misdemeanour to maliciously publish any defamatory libel knowing the same to be false; the punishment may be fine or imprisonment, or both, such imprisonment not to exceed two years.

By section 5 of the same Act, it is a misdemeanour to maliciously publish any defamatory libel; the punishment may be fine or imprisonment, or both, such imprisonment not to exceed one year. This section does not create any new offence, or attempt to define any existing offence; it merely fixes the punishment to be awarded for the existing common misdemeanour of maliciously publishing a libel. (R. v. Munslow, (1895) 1 Q. B. 758; 64 L. J. M. C. 138; 43 W. R. 495; 72 L. T. 301.)

See the whole statute in Appendix C., post, pp. 775-778. By section 44 of the Larceny Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), it is a felony for anyone knowing the contents thereof, to send, deliver, or utter, or cause to be received, any letter or writing, demanding of any person with menaces and without any reasonable or probable cause, any property or money. Such menace need not necessarily be either a threat of injury to the person or property of the prosecutor, or a threat to accuse him of a crime; a threat to accuse him of immorality or misconduct may be sufficient. (R. v. Tomlinson, (1895) 1 Q. B. 706; 64 L. J. M. C. 97; 43 W. R. 544; 72 L. T. 155.)

By sections 46 and 47 of the same Act it is a felony to accuse or threaten to accuse another of any infamous crime, whether by letter or otherwise, with intent to extort money or gain. The offender may be sentenced to penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than three years [now five years, 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47, s. 2], or to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding two years. (See R. v. Redman, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 12; 39 L. J. M. C. 89; R. v. Ward, 10 Cox, C. C. 42.)

By section 1 of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1895, "any person who, or the directors of any body or association corporate which, before or during any parliamentary election, shall, for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at such election, make or publish any false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of such candidate shall be guilty of an illegal practice within the meaning of the provisions of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 51), and shall be subject to all the penalties for and consequences of committing an illegal practice in the said Act mentioned; " that is to say, he is on summary conviction liable to a fine not exceeding 1007., and will be incapable of voting at any election in the same constituency for five years. Such conduct may also render the election void (see section 4). The form of petition is given in Precedent No. 87, post, p. 758. But by section 2, "no person shall be deemed to be guilty of such illegal practice if he can show that he had reasonable grounds for believing, and did believe, the statement made by him to be true." (See ante, pp. 408, 409.) It had already been provided by section 9 sub-section (2) of the Act of 1883, that " any person who, before or during an election, knowingly publishes a false statement of the withdrawal of a candidate at such election for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of another candidate, shall be guilty of an illegal practice."

Criminal Informations.

In some cases of indictable words, the prosecutor may also, if he prefer, proceed by way of criminal information. Criminal informations are of two kinds :

(i.) Those filed by the Attorney-General himself, usually called ex officio informations.

(ii.) Those filed by the King's coroner and attorney by the direction of the King's Bench Division at the instance of some private individual, who is called the "relator."

The first class is, as a rule, confined to libels of so dangerous a nature as to call for immediate suppression by the officers of the State; especially blasphemous, obscene, or seditious libels, or such as are likely to cause immediate outrage and public riot and disturbance. In these cases, therefore, the Attorney-General himself takes the initiative. There has, I believe, been no ex officio information for libel filed in England since 1887.

(ii.) In the second class of informations the relator is generally some private individual who has been defamed. But still the words complained of must be such as call for the prompt and immediate interference of the Court. It must be shown that the ordinary remedies by action or indictment are insufficient in the particular case. The Court, moreover, always looks at all the circumstances which occasioned or provoked the libel. Thus, no information will be granted if the relator has himself libelled the defendant (R. v. Nottingham Journal, 9 Dowl. 1042), or in any way invited the publication of the libel of which he now complains (R. v. Larrieu, 7 A. & E. 277), or had an opportunity of expressing his disapproval of its terms, of which he did not avail himself (R. v. Lawson, 1 Q. B. 486; 1 Gale & D. 15), or has demanded and received explanations from the defendant (Ex parte Doveton, 7 Cox, C. C. 16; 26 L. T. (Old S.) 73; 19 J. P. 741; Ex parte Haviland, 41 J. P. 789), or has demanded an apology and threatened an

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action for damages (Ex parte Pollard, (1901) 17 Times L. R. 773), or has himself written to the papers or published a pamphlet provoking the libel (R. v. Hall, 1 Cox, C. C. 344), or replying to it (Ex parte Rowe, 20 L. T. (Old S.) 115; 17 J. P. 25). And generally, if the relator has been guilty of any misconduct in relation to the matter, a rule will be refused, except in cases where the public have a direct and independent interest in the prompt suppression of such libels. (R. v. Casey, 13 Cox, C. C. 310; following R. v. Norris, 2 Lord Kenyon, 300.)

It is not necessary that the libel should charge a criminal offence to induce the Court to grant a criminal information. It is enough that the libel, though on a private individual, is one requiring prompt suppression. So, if there be general reflections on a body or class, no particular individual being especially attacked; still, if the words are likely to cause outrage and violence, the Court will grant an information: as where the libel was on the Jews, and certain Jews in consequence had been ill-used by the mob (Anon., 2 Barnard. 138; R. v. Osborn, ib. 166; ante, p. 429); so where the general body of clergymen in a particular diocese were libelled (R. v. Williams, 5 B. & Ald. 595); or a public body, such as the directors of the East India Company (R. v. Jenour, 7 Mod. 400).

The rank and dignity of the person libelled was formerly taken into consideration; and informations have been granted for imputing that the children of a marquis were bastards (R. v. Gregory, 8 A. & E. 907; 1 P. & D. 110); that a peer had married an actress (R. v. Kinnersley, 1 Wm. Bl. 294); that a naval captain was a coward, a bishop a bankrupt, a peer a perjurer, &c. But now it is settled that rank confers no superior claim to the summary interference of the Court. A peer is no more entitled to a criminal information when his private character is attacked than the humblest subject of the King. (R. pros. Vallombrosa v. Labouchere, 12 Q. B. D. 320; 53 L. J. Q. B. 362; 32 W. R. 861; 50 L. T. 177; 15 Cox, C. C. 415;