Treason: Sir William Waldegrave v. Ralph Agas, Cro. Eliz. 191. Fry v. Carne, 8 Mod. 283. Unnatural offences: Thompson v. Nye, 16 Q. B. 175; 20 L. J. Q. B. 85, 15 Jur. 285 Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East, 463; 2 Smith, 28. Colman v. Godwin, 3 Dougl. 90; 2 B. & C. 285, n. So it is actionable without proof of special damage to charge another with the commission of the following misdemeanours : Bribery and corruption : Bendish v. Lindsay, 11 Mod. 194. Cheating at cards : Gordon Cumming v. Green and others (1891) 7 Times L. R. 408. Sir William Russell v. Ligon, 1 Roll. Abr. 46; 1 Vin. Abr. 423. Perjury: Ceely v. Hoskins, Cro. Car. 509. Holt v. Scholefield, 6 T. R. 691. Even in an ecclesiastical Court. Shaw v. Thompson, Cro. Eliz. 609. Soliciting another to commit a crime : Sir Thomas Cockaine and wife v. Witnam, Cro. Eliz. 49. Tibbott v. Haynes, Cro. Eliz. 191. Passie v. Mondford, Cro. Eliz. 747. Deane v. Eton, 1 Buls. 201. Sir Harbert Crofts v. Brown, 3 Buls. 167. Subornation of perjury : Guerdon v. Winterstud, Cro. Eliz. 308. Harris v. Dixon, Cro. Jac. 158. Bridges v. Playdel, Brownl. & Golds. 2. Harrison v. Thornborough, 10 Mod. 196; Gilbert's Cases in Law & Where the words impute merely a trespass in pursuit of game, punishable primarily by fine alone, no action lies without proof of special damage, although imprisonment in the pillory may be inflicted in default of payment of the fine (3 Wm. & M. c. 10). Ogden v. Turner (1705), 6 Mod. 104; 2 Salk. 696; Holt, 40. [Certain dicta in this case which appear to go further, were disapproved of by De Grey, C.J., in 3 Wils. 186, and must be now considered as bad law.] Where the words imputed an offence against the Fishery Acts, punishable only by fine and forfeiture of the nets and instruments used: Held, that no action lay without proof of special damage. McCabe v. Foot, 18 Ir. Jur. (Vol. xi. N. S.) 287; 15 L. T. 115. Defendant charged plaintiff with a breach of the 9th bye-law of the Great Western Railway Company, which is punishable with a penalty of 428. only. Field, J., held that no action lay. Preston v. De Windt, Times, July 7th, 1884. In Maryland adultery is still an offence against the State; but punishable only by fine. Hence to impute adultery to a married woman is not actionable there. (I believe this is the only one of the United States in which the law is so.) Griffin v. Moore, 43 Maryland, 246. Shafer v. Ahalt, 48 Maryland, 171; 30 Amer. Rep. 456. Words which merely impute a criminal intention, not yet put into action, are not actionable. Guilty thoughts are not a crime. But as soon as sufficient steps have been taken to carry out such intention, an attempt to commit a crime has been made; and every attempt to commit an indictable offence is at common law a misdemeanour, and in itself indictable. To impute such an attempt is therefore clearly actionable. Harrison v. Stratton, 4 Esp. 217. Words imputing a purely military offence are not actionable without proof of special damage. Hollingsworth v. Shaw, 19 Ohio St. 430. But where the speaker makes no definite charge of crime but uses words which merely disclose a doubt or suspicion that is in his mind, no action lies, without proof of special damage. Illustrations. The clerk of the Crown for the Island of Grenada said of the plaintiff, "He lies here under suspicion of having murdered a man named Emanuel Vancrossen at the Spout some years ago," and also, "Haven't you heard that Charles Simmons is suspected of having murdered one Vancrossen, his brother-in-law? A proclamation offering a reward for the apprehension of the murderer is now in my office, and there is only one link wanting to complete the case." Held, that this amounted at the most to words of mere suspicion, and that no action lay. Simmons v. Mitchell, 6 App. Cas. 156; 50 L. J. P. C. 11; 29 W. R. 401 ; 43 L. T. 710; 45 J. P. 237. The following words do not amount to a charge of larceny :— "You as good as stole the canoe," Stokes v. Arey, 8 Jones (North Carolina) 66. Or, "A man that would do that would steal.” So, to Stees V. say, Kemble, 3 Casey (27 Penns. St.) 112. "You will be a thief ere long" is not actionable. Per Tirrell, J., in Annison v. Blofeld, Carter, 214. The words, "I will take him to Bow Street on a charge of forgery," are not actionable, for they do not necessarily mean that the plaintiff had committed any felony. Harrison v. King, 4 Price, 46; 7 Taunt. 431. The words "I charge him with felony," were held insufficient in three cases. Poland v. Mason, (1620) Hob. 305, 326. Wheeler v. Poplestone, (1624) 1 Roll. Abr. 72. King v. Merrick, (1626) Popham, 210; Latch, 175; 1 Roll. Abr. 73. But, "Bear witness, my masters, I arrest him of felony," was held sufficient in Serle v. Maunder, (1620) 1 Roll. Abr. 72. The words were, "I have a suspicion that you and Bone have robbed my house, and therefore I take you into custody." At the trial, Pollock, C.B., told the jury that if they found that the defendant meant to impute to the plaintiff an absolute charge of felony, in such case the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict; but, on the other hand, if they should think that he imputed a mere suspicion of felony, the defendant would be entitled to the verdict. Verdict for defendant. Held, that the direction and the verdict were right. Tozer v. Mashford, 6 Exch. 539; 20 L. J. Ex. 225. But the words "I have got a warrant for Tempest. I will advertise a reward for 20 guineas to apprehend him. I shall transport him for felony," were properly found by the jury to amount to a substantive charge of felony. Tempest v. Chambers, 1 Stark. 67. An action lies for these words: " Many an honester man has been hanged; and a robbery hath been committed, and I think he was at it; and I think he is a horse-stealer." Stich v. Wisedome, Cro. Eliz. 348. And for these: "I think in my conscience if Sir John might have his will, he would kill the king." Sidnam v. Mayo, 1 Roll. Rep. 427; Cro. Jac. 407. Peake v. Oldham, Cowp. 275; 2 Wm. Bl. 959, post, p. 134. The words were: "He is under a charge of a prosecution for perjury. Griffith Williams (meaning an attorney of that name) has the Attorney-General's directions to prosecute for perjury." Defendant did not justify. After verdict for the plaintiff it was moved in arrest of judgment that the words were not actionable, as they do not amount to an assertion that the charge is well founded. Lord Ellenborough, C.J., said: "These words fairly and naturally construed, appear to us to have been meant, and to be calculated to convey the imputation of perjury actually committed by the person of whom they are spoken;" and the verdict and judgment stood. Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 93. It is not necessary that the words should accuse the plaintiff of some fresh, undiscovered crime, so as to put him in jeopardy or cause his arrest. or cause his arrest. Of course, if such consequences have followed, they may be alleged as special damage, but where such consequences are impossible, the words are still actionable. Thus, to call a man a returned convict, or otherwise to falsely impute that he has been tried and convicted of a criminal offence, is actionable. without proof of special damage. It is at least quite as injurious to the plaintiff's reputation, to say that he has in fact been convicted, as to say that he will be, or ought to be, convicted. Many think that such statements should be actionable, even when true, if they are maliciously or unnecessarily volunteered. See post, p. 183. Illustrations. It is actionable without proof of special damage to say of the plaintiff that— He had been in Launceston gaol and was burnt in the hand for coining. Gainford v. Tuke, Cro. Jac. 536. He "was in Winchester gaol, and tried for his life, and would have been hanged, had it not been for Leggatt, for breaking open the granary of Farmer A. and stealing his bacon." [Note here that the speaker appears to admit that the plaintiff was acquitted, but still asserts that he was in fact guilty.] Carpenter v. Tarrant, Cas. temp. Hardwicke, 339. "He was a thief and stole my gold." It was argued here that "was " denotes time past; so that it may have been when she was a child, and therefore no larceny; or in the time of Queen Elizabeth, since when there had been divers general pardons; Sed per cur.: "It is a great scandal to be once a thief; for pœna potest redimi, culpa perennis erit.” Boston v. Tatam, Cro. Jac. 623. It is actionable to call a man "thief" or "felon," even though he once committed larceny, if after conviction he was pardoned either under the Great Seal or by some general statute of pardon. Cuddington v. Wilkins, Hobart, 67, 81; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 37, s. 48. Leyman v. Latimer and others, 3 Ex. D. 15, 352; 46 L. J. Ex. 765; 47 L. J. Ex. 470; 25 W. R. 751; 26 W. R. 305; 37 L. T. 360, 819. It is actionable to call a man falsely "a returned convict." Fowler v. Dowdney, 2 M. & Rob. 119. And see Bell v. Byrne, 13 East, 554. In dealing with old cases on this point, care must be taken to remember the state of the criminal law as it existed at the date when the slander was uttered. Illustrations. So long as the 18 Eliz. c. 3 was in force, it was, actionable to charge a woman with being the mother, a man with being the putative father, of a bastard child, chargeable to the parish. Anne Davis's Case, 4 Rep. 17; 2 Salk. 694; 1 Roll. Abr. 38. So long as the penal statutes against Roman Catholics were in force, it was actionable to say "He goes to mass," or "He harboured his son, knowing him to be a Romish priest." Walden v. Mitchell, 2 Ventr. 263. Smith v. Flynt, Cro. Jac. 300. Secus, before such statutes were passed. Pierepoint's Case, Cro. Eliz. 308. So in many old cases such words as "She is a witch" were held actionable, the statute 1 Jac. I. c. 11, being then in force. But that statute is now repealed by the 9 Geo. II. c. 5, s. 3, which also expressly provides that no action shall lie for charging another with witchcraft, sorcery, or any such offence. Rogers v. Gravat, Cro. Eliz. 571. It was formerly the custom of the City of London, of the borough of Southwark, and also, it is said, of the City of Bristol, to cart whores. Hence, to call a woman a "whore" or "strumpet" in one of those cities is actionable, if the action be brought in the City Courts, which take notice of their own customs without proof. But no action lay in the Superior Courts at Westminster for such words, because such custom had never been certified by the Recorder, and strict proof of it was very difficult. To accuse a man of adultery or fornication was never ground for an action in the civil Courts. The person accused had a remedy in the spiritual Courts till the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 41; now he has none. See post, pp. 67-69. Oxford et ux. v. Cross, (1599) 4 Rep. 18. Hassell v. Capcot, (1639) 1 Vin. Abr. 395; 1 Roll. Abr. 36. Cook v. Wingfield, 1 Str. 555. Roberts v. Herbert, Sid. 97; 1 Keble, 418. Stainton et ux. v. Jones, 2 Selw. N. P. 1205 (13th edn.); 1 Dougl. 380, n. Theyer v. Eastwick, 4 Burr. 2032. Brand and wife v. Roberts and wife, 4 Burr. 2418. Vicars v. Worth, 1 Str. 471. So, in Queen Elizabeth's days, it was held that no action lay for saying, "He keeps a bawdy-house;" "for, by the common law, he is not punishable, but by the custom of London; and therefore this action ought to have been sued in the spiritual Court" (dissentiente Glanvile). Anon., (1598) Cro. Eliz. 643; Noy, 73. But by 1606 the opinion of Glanvile prevailed; and such words were held actionable; 66 the keeping of a brothel-house is inquirable in the leet, and so a temporal offence." Thorne v. Alice Durham, (1606) Noy, 117. And see Plunket v. Gilmore, (1724) Fortescue, 211. Grove and wife v. Hart, (1752) Sayer, 33; Buller's N. P. 7. It was not apparently clear law till the beginning of the last century (R. v. Higgins, (1801) 2 East, 5; R. v. Philipps, (1805) 6 East, 464), that it was a misdemeanour to solicit another to commit a crime, although the person solicited did nothing in consequence. Hence, in the following cases words were held not to |