depriving him of costs, and this exercise of his discretion was approved both in the Divisional Court and in the Court of Appeal. Harnett v. Vise and wife, 5 Ex. D. 307; 29 W. R. 7. Whenever a defendant by his misstatements, made under circumstances which impose an obligation upon him to be truthful, brings litigation on himself and renders an action against him reasonable, there is "good cause" to deprive him of costs. Sutcliffe v. Smith, (1886) 2 Times L. R. 881. If the action is unfairly or oppressively brought, or is unfairly or oppressively persisted in, good cause will exist for depriving the plaintiff of the ordinary costs. Per Lord Esher, M.R., in Barnes v. Maltby, (1889) 3 Times L.R. 207. But bringing an action to recover money which is, in fact, due to the plaintiff cannot be said to be oppressive. Per Lord Esher, M.R., in The Wilts, &c., Dairy Association v. Hammond, (1889) 5 Times L. R. 196. The mere fact that a plaintiff in an action for unliquidated damages claimed 6001. and only recovered 507. is no ground for depriving him of costs. Per Lord Esher, M.R., in Pearman v. Baroness Burdett-Coutts, (1887) 3 Times L. R. at p. 720. But where a plaintiff preferred an extravagant and an extortionate claim, supported it by fraudulent statements and dishonest acts, and endeavoured to substantiate it before the jury, by evidence which they very properly disbelieved, the judge at the trial, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords all agreed that there was perfectly good cause for depriving him of his costs, although he had recovered 507. damages. Huxley v. West London Extension Ry. Co., 17 Q. B. D. 373; 55 L. J. Q. B. 506; 14 App. Cas. 26; 58 L. J. Q. B. 305; 37 W. R. 625; 60 L. T. 642. Where the jury was apparently satisfied that, though the plaintiff had not been guilty of any misconduct on the two occasions mentioned in the libel, he had been guilty of misconduct of the kind alleged on many other occasions, and bore an evil reputation in consequence, and therefore awarded him only a farthing damages, it was held that there was good cause for depriving the plaintiff of costs. Wood v. Cox, (1889) 5 Times L. R. 272. Where a plaintiff allowed her name to be used by A. for the purpose of raising a political controversy and injuring A.'s political opponents, and signed a letter written by A., the publication of which produced a newspaper warfare, in the course of which the plaintiff was libelled, and the jury awarded her one shilling damages, it was held by the Court of Appeal that there was good cause for which the judge at the trial might, in the exercise of his discretion, deprive the plaintiff of costs. O'Connor v. The Star Newspaper Co., Ld., (1893) 68 L. T. 146; 9 Times [Note, that in this case the late Lord Justice Bowen expressed his private opinion that "when one farthing only is given as damages for a libel, there is prima facie reasonable ground for saying that there was no good cause for bringing the action." But the other members of the Court did not share this. view] Letters or conversations written or declared to be "without prejudice" cannot be taken into consideration in determining whether there is good cause for depriving a successful litigant of costs. Walker v. Wilsher, 23 Q. B. D. 335; 58 L. J. Q. B. 501; 37 W. R. 723. The unsuccessful defendant will, in ordinary course of taxation, be credited with the costs which he has incurred on any issue which he won. (See post, p. 418). Hence, where a taxation on that principle will meet the justice of the case, there is no necessity, and therefore no good cause, for the judge at the trial to make any special order. Jones v. Curling and another, 13 Q. B. D. 262; 53 L. J. Q. B. 373; 32 W. R. 651; 50 L. T. 349. If the judge makes an order under Order LXV. r. 1, he is not bound to deal with the whole costs of the action. He may, for good cause, deprive a successful party of a portion of his costs, leaving the rest of the costs to follow the event. Illustrations. The judge may order a successful plaintiff to pay the costs occasioned by a claim for special damage which he has failed to substantiate. Forster v. Farquhar, (1893) 1 Q. B. 564; 62 L. J. Q. B. 296; 41 W. R. 425; 68 L. T. 308; 4 R. 346. Or any costs unnecessarily inflicted on the defendant by the successful plaintiff's conduct of the action. Roberts v. Jones, (1891) 2 Q. B. 194; 64 L. J. Q. B. 441. Hill v. Morris, (1891) 8 Times L. R. 55. So, too, the judge "has power to order a successful defendant to pay such part of the plaintiff's costs as has been caused by the defendant's misconduct in the action." Per Channell, J., in Andrew v. Grove, (1902) 1 K. B. at p. 628. E.g., where the costs have been increased by the defendants improperly severing in their defences. In re Isaac, (1897) 1 Ch. 251; 66 L. J. Ch. 160; 45 W. R. 262; 75 Bagshaw v. Pimm, (1900) P. 148; 69 L. J. P. 45; 48 W. R. 422; 82 If the judge at the trial declines to make an order depriving the plaintiff of his costs, there is no appeal from his decision. (Moore v. Gill, (1888) 4 Times L. R. 738.) But if he decides to make an order as to costs, then there is an appeal to the Court of Appeal on the question whether any "good cause" existed upon which the judge "good could exercise his discretion. If there was cause," the judge had no jurisdiction to make any order as to costs, and the Court of Appeal will set the order aside. If there was anything which could amount to "good cause," then the Court of Appeal will not interfere with the judge's discretion, even though they do not approve of the way in which he has exercised it. (Jones v. Curling and another, 13 Q. B. D. 262; 53 L. J. Q. B. 373; 32 W. R. 651; 50 L. T. 349; Huxley v. West London Extension Ry. Co., 14 App. Cas. 26; 58 L. J. Q. B. 305; 37 W. R. 625; 60 L. T. 642.) If there are any facts before the judge or the Court which may properly be considered as affording a reason for disallowing costs, "the sufficiency or insufficiency of these considerations are matters of which they are constituted sole arbiters; they are acting within their jurisdiction, and their decisions are final and conclusive. On the other hand, if they give effect to considerations which do not constitute 'good cause' within the meaning of the rule, they exceed the limits of their jurisdiction; and on that ground their decisions are not protected from review." (Per Lord Watson in Huxley v. West London Extension Ry. Co., 14 App. Cas. at pp. 33, 34.) "The judge has no jurisdiction to interfere with the costs, unless there is good cause for his interference. The question whether there was good cause is a matter of appeal; but when there is an appeal the only question for this Court to consider is, whether this Court thinks that there was 'good cause' for depriving the plaintiff of his costs upon which the judge might exercise his discretion." (Per Lord Esher, M.R., in O'Connor v. The Star Newspaper Co., Ld., 68 L. T. at p. 147.) "Whether or not there was 'good cause is subject to appeal, but the Court of Appeal cannot bring the same knowledge to bear on the case as the judge who heard all the witnesses, and therefore the Court will be slow to say there was not 'good cause.' (Per Bowen, L.J., in Sutcliffe v. Smith, (1886) 2 Times L. R. at p. 882.) On such an application the Court of Appeal will assume that the verdict is right, and was obtained by right and lawful means, and will not go into the question whether evidence was rightly or wrongly received, or whether the direction to the jury was right or wrong. (Per Lord Esher, M.R., in Wood v. Cox, (1889) 5 Times L. R. at p. 273.) O.L.S. E E Special Costs. Application for any special costs, such as those of a special jury, of a commission abroad, of photographic copies of the libel, or any costs reserved to be dealt with by the judge at the trial (British Provident Association v. Bywater, (1897) 2 Ch. 531; 66 L. J. Ch. 787; 46 W. R. 28; 77 L. T. 22), should be made when judgment is delivered. No order will be made as to such costs after the judgment has been drawn up; they must be borne by the party who has incurred them. (Ashworth v. Outram, 9 Ch. D. 483; 27 W. R. 98; 39 L. T. 441; Executors of Sir Rowland Hill v. Metropolitan District Asylum, 49 L. J. Q. B. 668; 43 L. T. 462; W. N. 1880, p. 98; Davey v. Pemberton, 11 C. B. N. S. 629; In re St. Nazaire Co., 12 Ch. D. 88; 27 W. R. 854; 41 L. T. 110.) Costs of Separate Issues. The costs of separate issues, unless otherwise ordered, do not necessarily follow the event of the whole action. Such costs follow the event each of its own issue. The party in whose favour final judgment is entered is entitled to the general costs of the action but the other party will be entitled to the costs of any issues found for him. This is what is meant by the rule that the word "event" must be "read distributively." The general costs of the action will, however, be found, as a rule, to exceed the costs of any number of issues. If the judge makes an order giving a party costs, "except so far as they have been occasioned or incurred by or relate to some particular issue," that party will be entitled to all the general costs of the action, minus only the amount by which the costs have been increased by such issue. Or the judge may direct taxation of the whole costs of the action en bloc, and award to one party half or a third or some other proportion of the total amount. (Order LXV. r. 2, as amended in 1902.) Illustrations. If a plaintiff sues for several libels, or several slanders, or for libel, slander. and assault, or any other cause of action, and succeeds on one cause of action but fails on others, each party is entitled to judgment with costs on the cause of action which he has won, without any special order under Order LXV. r. 1. Myers v. Defries, 5 Ex. D. 15, 180; 49 L. J. Ex. 266; 28 W. R. 258, 406; 41 L. T. 659; 42 L. T. 137. Todd and others v. N. E. Ry. Co., (1903) 88 L. T. 112. But if there be only one cause of action, and several issues raised concerning it, then if the plaintiff recovers damages on any issue, he will be entitled to judgment, and such judgment will, in the absence of any special order, carry with it the general costs of the action, leaving the defendant the right only to deduct the costs of any issue which he has won. Jones v. Curling, 13 Q. B. D. 262; 53 L. J. Q. B. 373; 32 W. R. 651 ; 50 L. T. 349. So, if a defendant in an action of defamation both justifies and pleads privilege, and fails on the first plea and wins on the second, he will be entitled to the general costs of the action, minus such costs as the plaintiff can prove to have been occasioned by the plea of justification, and by that exclusively. Skinner v. Shoppee, 6 Bing. N. C. 131; 8 Scott, 275. Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 99; 2 Jur. N. S. 90. Sparrow v. Hill, 8 Q. B. D. 479; 50 L. J. Q. B. 675; 29 W. R. 705; 44 L. T. 917. Brown v. Houston, (1901) 2 K. B. 855; 70 L. J. K. B. 902; 85 L. T. 160; 17 Times L. R. 683. In re Wright, Crossley & Co., 86 L. T. 280; W. N. (1902) 54. The same rule was followed where the jury found that the words were false but that the defendant had never published them, and that they were no libel. Empson v. Fairfax & Weaver, 8 A. & E. 296; 3 N. & P. 385. Where a libel consists of two severable portions, each making a separate charge against the plaintiff, the defendant may justify the one without the other; and if he raise the issue by a proper plea and succeed on it, he will be entitled to the costs of proving the one charge true, though he has to pay damages for the other. But if the defendant in such a case foolishly pleads that the whole libel is true, and fails to prove more than half of it true, the plaintiff will be entitled to a general verdict in his favour, and the defendant will be entitled to no costs without a special order, because no issue has been found for him. Biddulph v. Chamberlayne, 17 Q. B. 351; as explained in Reynolds v. So where the defendant pleads and proves that one half of the libel does not refer to the plaintiff, he will be entitled to any costs occasioned by that half of the libel having been included in the action. Prudhomme v. Fraser, 2 A. & E. 645. Where immaterial issues are found in favour of one party, and judgment is afterwards entered for the other, neither party is entitled to the costs of the immaterial issues. Goodburne v. Bowman, 9 Bing. 667. Items of damage are not separate issues: so the judge must be asked to make a special order as to these. Forster v. Farquhar, (1893) 1 Q. B. 564; 62 L. J. Q. B. 296; 41 W. R. 425; 68 L. T. 308. Costs of Introductory Averments, &c. A successful plaintiff is entitled to his costs of proving all "matters of inducement" which were reasonably necessary to explain the meaning of the words complained of, or to show the extent of the damage caused thereby. "We ought not to be too |