The law is the same in Ireland. (Punch v. Boyd and others, 16 L. R. Ir. 476. The decision in Hammersmith Skating Rink Co. v. Dublin Skating Rink Co., 10 Ir. R. Eq. 235, is no longer followed.) "Prior to the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, no Court could grant any injunction in a case of libel. The Court of Chancery could grant no injunction in such a case, because it could not try a libel. Neither could Courts of Common Law until the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, because they had no power to grant injunctions. Whether they had power to grant an interlocutory injunction after 1854 I think doubtful. As a matter of practice they never did. The Judicature Act of 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 8, confers a larger jurisdiction to grant injunctions than existed before. It says, A mandamus or an injunction may be granted, or a receiver appointed by an interlocutory order of the Court in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court to be just or convenient that such order should be made.'" (Per Lopes, L.J., in Monson v. Tussauds, Limited, suprà.) It is under this section that orders now are made, sections 79 and 82 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, being repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 49). Illustrations. Where a circular was sent by one shareholder to his brother-shareholders, containing statements as to the financial position of the company which were not positively proved to be untrue, and inviting all the shareholders to take some joint action with reference to the company, it was held that though the Court had jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the publication, yet it would not do so when the circular was, as here, primâ facie a privileged communication. Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Beall, 20 Ch. D. 501; 51 L. J. A member of a friendly society issued to persons not members of the society circulars containing inaccurate statements as to the financial condition of the society. Kay, J., on motion, granted an injunction to restrain "the further issuing of this circular, or any other circular or letter containing false or inaccurate representations as to the credit or financial condition of the said society." Hill v. Hart Davies, 21 Ch. D. 798; 51 L. J. Ch. 845; 31 W. R. 22. In a subsequent case, Cotton, L.J., questioned the power of the learned judge to insert in his order the words printed above in italics. Liverpool Household Stores v. Smith, 37 Ch. D. at p. 182. The plaintiff dismissed one of his managers, the defendant, from his employ, who thereupon went about among the plaintiff's customers, making oral statements reflecting on the solvency of the plaintiff, and advised some of them not to pay the plaintiff for machines which had been supplied through himself. The plaintiff brought an action to restrain the defendant from making statements to the customers or any other person or persons that the plaintiff was about to stop payment, or was in difficulties or insolvent, and from in any manner slandering the plaintiff or injuring his reputation or business. No special damage was proved; but it was held both by Pearson, J., and the Court of Appeal, that the Court has jurisdiction to restrain a person from making slanderous statements calculated to injure the business of another person, and that this jurisdiction extends to oral as well as written statements, though it requires to be exercised with great caution as regards oral statements, and that in the present case an injunction ought to be granted. Hermann Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. D. 306; 53 L. J. Ch. 1128; 32 W. R. 994; 51 L. T. 442; 48 J. P. 708. The coopers of Cork and Limerick, who made butter-firkins by hand, were much annoyed at the plaintiff's starting a manufactory near Limerick for making similar firkins by machinery; and they induced the butter merchants of Limerick to print and widely distribute a Notice to Farmers" stating that they would not purchase any butter packed in machine-made firkins, as they found them" to be most injurious to the keeping qualities of butter," to the great injury of the plaintiff's business. The Queen's Bench Division in Ireland granted an injunction to restrain the publication of this notice. Punch v. Boyd and others, 16 L. R. Ir. 476. A newspaper article, commenting on alleged irregularities in the Ordnance Department of the War Office, whereby defective guns, &c. had been supplied to the nation and accepted without sufficient trial, asserted that the plaintiffs, a gun-manufacturing company, had obtained contracts from Government officials by corrupt means. The plaintiffs brought an action for damages, and also applied for an injunction to restrain the editor and printer of the paper from further publishing libellous matter of the plaintiffs pending the action. The Court (Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Denman, J.) refused the application, as the subject-matter of the article was clearly one of great public interest, and the comments thereon were not proved to be malâ fide. Armstrong and others v. Armit and others, (1886) 2 Times L. R. 887. The firm of William Coulson & Sons became bankrupt, and the plaintiff purchased their business, goodwill, and the right to use the name of the firm. Three months afterwards the defendants (another firm with a similar name) issued a circular in these terms: "James Coulson & Co. beg to state that their establishment is not in any way connected with the firm of William Coulson & Sons, now in bankruptcy." The Court of Appeal dissolved an interim injunction which had been granted by the Divisional Court. [The judgment of the Master of the Rolls in this case is especially valuable.] Coulson v. Coulson, (1887) 3 Times L. R. 846. The defendant having published a document containing charges of fraud, perjury, and conspiracy against the plaintiff, the plaintiff brought an action for libel, and recovered judgment for 1,000l. damages, of no part of which could he obtain payment. The defendant continued to publish documents repeating the same charges, and the plaintiff brought a second action claiming an injunction and damages. Held, by North, J., and by the Court of Appeal, that though the Court had jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain further O.L.S. D D publication of the libel, there was in this case no reason to apprehend any such danger of injury to the plaintiff in person or property as to make it right to grant one. Salomons v. Knight, (1891) 2 Ch. 294; 60 L. J. Ch. 743; 39 W. R. 506; 64 L. T. 589. Subsequently no proper defence being pleaded the plaintiff obtained a final judgment for an injunction, with costs. S. C., (1892) 8 Times L. R. 472. The General Medical Council, under s. 29 of the Medical Act of 1858 ordered the name of Allinson to be erased from the register of recognised medical practitioners, and published the fact in their proceedings. Allinson applied unsuccessfully for an order to restrain such publication. Allinson v. General Medical Council, (1892) 8 Times L. R. 727, 784. The plaintiffs were manufacturers of pianofortes. The secretary of a trades union circulated amongst french-polishers, and amongst the plaintiffs' customers, the statement that the plaintiffs carried on a "pernicious system of sweating," &c. On motion for an injunction, the defendant did not suggest that he could produce any further evidence at the trial than that set out in his affidavit; and was willing to treat the motion as the trial of the action; but the plaintiffs would not consent to this course. The Court, being satisfied that the statement was false, granted an injunction to restrain its further circulation until the trial. Collard v. Marshall, (1892) 1 Ch. 571; 61 L. J. Ch. 268; 40 W. R. 473; 66 L. T. 248; 8 Times L. R. 265. A newspaper published reports and correspondence containing unfavourable statements as to the position and solvency of a joint stock company, which applied for an injunction to restrain the publication of any future articles reflecting unfavourably upon it. Kekewich, J., and the Court of Appeal refused the application, on the ground that it was very difficult to grant an injunction which would not include matters that might turn out not to be libellous; and because if the injunction was granted in terms to restrain what was libellous, the question of libel or no libel would have to be tried on affidavit on the motion to commit, which would be a most inconvenient course. Liverpool Household Stores Association v. Smith, 37 Ch. D. 170; 57 L. J. Ch. 85; 36 W. R. 485; 58 L. T. 204; 4 Times L. R. 28, 93. The defendant published in his paper, the Financial Observer, a gross libel on the plaintiff, who applied for an interim injunction to restrain the circulation of the paper. The defendant in his affidavit in answer swore that the statements were true, and that he would be able to prove them true at the trial by calling witnesses and by cross-examination of the plaintiff. Per cur.: "We cannot feel sure that the defence of justification is one which, on the facts which may be before them, the jury may find to be wholly unfounded." Injunction refused. Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch. 269; 60 L. J. Ch. 617; 39 W. R. 435; 65 L. T. 506. A retail trader was summoned for selling adulterated vinegar; he stated it was manufactured by the plaintiffs; the case was adjourned for the plaintiffs to appear and defend their vinegar, if they thought fit; they did not appear at the adjournment, and the retailer was convicted. A fair and accurate report of these proceedings appeared in the Grocers' Journal. The defendants (rival manufacturers of vinegar) had this report reprinted on loose slips, which the travellers distributed among grocers, many of whom were customers of the plaintiffs. The Divisional Court (Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Henn Collins, J.) dissolved an interim injunction which had been obtained at chambers. At the trial the plaintiffs recovered 207. damages. Champion & Co., Limited v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co., Limited, (1893) 10 Times L. R. 164. The defendants placed a wax figure of the plaintiff at the threshold of the "Chamber of Horrors," and in close proximity to images of Mrs. Maybrick, Pigott, and Scott. Lord Halsbury would have granted an interim injunction to restrain this exhibition, but for the fact that the defendants' affidavits showed some ground for their assertion that the plaintiff at one time had through a friend consented to the exhibition. Lopes and Davey, L.JJ., refused the injunction on the ground that the case came within the rule in Bonnard v. Perryman. Monson v. Tussauds, Limited, (1894) 1 Q. B. 671; 63 L. J. Q. B. 434 ; 70 L. T. 335; 9 R. 177. The defendants printed and circulated a large poster with a black border, headed "Trollope's Black List," containing the names of all the non-union men employed by the plaintiffs, and of all union men who had disobeyed the defendants' order calling them out. Kekewich, J., granted an injunction to restrain any further circulation of this "Black List," on the ground that its publication was a purely malicious act, unnecessary for the protection of the defendants or the men whom they represented, actuated by ill-will, and intended to injure the plaintiffs and the men who still remained in their employ. The Court of Appeal with some hesitation affirmed the decision of Kekewich, J. Trollope & Sons v. London Building Trades Federation, (1895) 72 L. T. 342; 11 Times L. R. 228, 280. Same v. Same, (1896) 12 Times L. R. 373. Pink v. Federation of Trades Unions, (1892) 67 L. T. 258. In two very similar cases Jeune, J., refused to grant an interim injunction. Haile v. Lillingstone, ib. 387. Where the defendants placed the plaintiff's name on a black list, headed: "The following musicians have been expelled for assisting the theatrical manager therein named in his endeavour to crush the union. Please make a mark against their names, so that if you meet them you will remember the reason of their expulsion," but the list was marked strictly private, and for the use of members only, and published only to members of the union to which the plaintiff had belonged, Chitty, J., refused to grant an interim injunction. Newton v. Amalgamated Musicians' Union, (1896) 12 Times L. R. 623. A paragraph appeared in the Money Maker stating that the London and Northern Bank was "now in liquidation." This statement was wholly unfounded. North, J., granted an interim injunction on an ex parte application. London and Northern Bank, Limited v. George Newnes, Limited, (1899) 16 Times L. R. 76. Rival Manufacturers. Where a plaintiff applies for an interim injunction before the trial of the action to restrain the defendant from continuing to issue circulars or advertisements, asserting that the plaintiff's goods are not genuine, or are an infringement of the defendant's patent, copyright, or trade mark, or that the plaintiff is passing his goods off as the defendant's, and threatening the plaintiff or his customers with legal proceedings, the onus lies on the plaintiff throughout to prove malice, falsity, and damage. See ante, p. 73. It is for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's statements. are false, and if no mala fides is proved, so that no damages can be recovered, the Court will not grant an injunction. If, however, in a judicial proceeding the defendant's statements are proved or admitted to be false in fact, and there is any evidence that he intends to continue issuing them, an injunction may be granted restraining any further publication, which then would necessarily be malá fide. (Burnett v. Tak, 45 L. T. 743; Anderson v. Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., 45 L. T. 757.) Illustrations. A patent, so long as it subsists, is primâ facie good; but a patentee is not entitled to issue circulars stating his intention to institute legal proceedings, in order to deter persons from purchasing alleged infringements of his patent, if he has no bona fide intention to follow up his threats by taking such proceedings, and the Court will in such case restrain him from any further issue of such circulars. Rollins v. Hinks, L. R. 13 Eq. 355; 41 L. J. Ch. 358; 20 W. R. 287; 26 L. T. 56. Axmann v. Lund, L. R. 18 Eq. 330; 43 L. J. Ch. 655; 22 W. R. 789. Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio, 531. The defendant, who owned the copyright of a picture by Millais, issued a circular threatening proceedings against all persons who bought copies of the plaintiff's magazine, containing a woolwork pattern, which the defendant wrongly deemed to be an infringement of his copyright. The plaintiff brought an action for an injunction and also for damages. He failed to prove that he had sustained any damage; therefore the Court of Appeal refused to grant him any injunction. Dicks v. Brooks, (1880) 15 Ch. D. 22; 49 L. J. Ch. 812; 29 W. R. 87; 43 L. T. 71. The holder of a patent, the validity of which is not impeached, will not be |