held insufficient, as it did not appear that the plaintiff lost any emolument thereby. Hopwood v. Thorn, 8 C. B. 293; 19 L. J. C. P. 94; 14 Jur. 87. But see Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130, post, p. 364. If a divine is to be presented to a benefice, and one, to defeat him of it, says to the patron, that he is a heretic, or a bastard, or that he is excommunicated,' by which the patron refuses to present him (as he well might if the imputations were true), and he loses his preferment, he shall have his action on the case for those slanders tending to such end." Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Rep. 17. Loss of a situation will constitute special damage. Martin v. Strong, 5 A. & E. 535; 1 N. & P. 29; 2 H. & W. 336. Or of a chaplaincy. Payne v. Beuwmorris, 1 Lev. 248. If, however, the dismissal from service be colourable only, the master intending to take the plaintiff back again, as soon as the action is over, and having dismissed him solely in order that he might show special damage at the trial; this is no evidence that the plaintiff's reputation has been impaired, but rather the contrary. If, therefore, no other special damage can be proved, the plaintiff must fail in his action. Coward v. Wellington, 7 C. & P. 531. If a man be refused employment through the defendant's slander, this is sufficient special damage. Sterry v. Foreman, 2 C. & P. 592. So, if a person who formerly had dealt with the plaintiff on credit refuses, in consequence of the defendant's words, to deliver to the plaintiff certain goods he had ordered until the plaintiff has paid for them. Brown v. Smith, 13 C. B. 596; 22 L. J. C. P. 151; 17 Jur. 807; 1 King v. Wutts, 8 C. & P. 614. So, if the agent of a certain firm going to deal with the plaintiff be stopped and dissuaded by the defendant, and this, although such firm subsequently became bankrupt, and paid but 12s. 6d. in the £, so that had the plaintiff obtained the order he would have lost money by it. Storey v. Challands, 8 C. & P. 234. The loss of the hospitality of friends gratuitously afforded is sufficient special damage. Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39; 3 Smith 135. Davies and wife v. Solomon, L. R. 7 Q. B. 112; 41 L. J. Q. B. 10; 20 W. R. 167; 25 L. T. 799. So is the loss of any gratuity or present, if it be clear that the slander alone prevented its receipt. Bracebridge v. Watson, Lilly, Entr. 61. Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130. In consequence of the defendant's words, a friend who had previously voluntarily promised to give the plaintiff, a married woman, money to enable her to join her husband in Australia, whither he had emigrated three years before, refused to do so. Held, sufficient special damage. Corcoran and wife v. Corcoran, 7 Ir. C. L. R. 272. The defendant said of a married man that he had had two bastards: "by reason of which words discord arose between him and his wife, and they were likely to have been divorced." Held, that this constituted no special damage. Barmund's Case, Cro. Jac. 473. The plaintiff was a candidate for membership of the Reform Club, but upon a ballot of the members was not elected; subsequently a meeting of the members was called to consider an alteration of the rules regarding the election of members; before the day fixed for the meeting, the defendant spoke certain words concerning the plaintiff which, "induced or contributed to inducing a majority of the members of the club to retain the regulations under which the plaintiff had been rejected, and thereby prevented the plaintiff from again seeking to be elected to the club." Held, that the damage alleged was not pecuniary or capable of being estimated in money, and was not the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's words. Chamberlain v. Boyd, 11 Q. B. D. 407; 52 L. J. Q. B. 277; 31 W. R. 48 L. T. 328; 47 J. P. 372. 572; So where the words are not actionable per se, and no pecuniary damage has followed, no compensation can be given for outraged feelings, nor for sickness induced by such mental distress, even though followed by a doctor's bill. Allsop v. Allsop, 5 H. &. N. 534; 29 L. J. Ex. 315; 6 Jur. N. S. 433; 8 W. R. 449; 36 L. T. (Old S.) 290. Lynch v. Knight and wife, 9 H. L. C. 577; 8 Jur. N. S. 724; 5 L. T. 291. Dulieu v. White & Sons, (1901) 2 K. B. 669; 70 L. J. K. B. 837; 50 Loss of the consortium of a husband or of a wife is special damage. Per Lords Campbell and Cranworth in Lynch v. Knight and wife, 9 H. L. C. at p. 589. Winsmore v. Greenbank, (1745) Willes' Rep. (Common Pleas), 577. But not merely of the society of friends and neighbours. Medhurst v. Balam, cited in 1 Siderfin, 397. Barnes v. Prudlin or Bruddel, 1 Lev. 261; 1 Sid. 396; 1 Ventr. 4; 2 Keb. 451. Hence, even the fact that the plaintiff has been expelled from a religious society of which she was a member, will not constitute special damage. Roberts et ux. v. Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384; 33 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Jur. Though there is an old case in which a vicar in open church falsely declared that the plaintiff, one of his parishioners, was excommunicated, and refused to celebrate divine service till the plaintiff departed out of the church, whereby the plaintiff was compelled to quit the church, and was scandalised, and was hindered of hearing divine service for a long time; and it was held that an action lay. Barnabas v. Traunter, (1641) 1 Vin. Abr. 396. This case was not cited to the Court in Roberts v. Roberts. The plaintiff alleged that in consequence of the defendant's words "she had suffered considerable annoyance, trouble, disgrace, loss of friends, credit, and reputation." Held, that this was no special damage. Weldon v. De Bathe, 33 W. R. 328; 14 Q. B. D. 339; 54 L. J. Q. B. 113; 53 L. T. 520. So in Ireland. The plaintiff alleged that she had been a novice in a convent, and left in order to nurse a sick relative; that defendant said she had left because she was preg nant; whereby the plaintiff alleged she was prevented from returning to the convent and becoming a nun, when she would have been maintained and supported by the society; and had also been brought into disgrace among her neighbours and friends, and had been deprived of and ceased to receive their hospitality. Held, that no action lay, as the plaintiff was neither a nun nor a novice at the time the words were spoken, and there was no evidence of special damage sufficient in law to maintain the action. Dwyer v. Meehan, 18 L. R. Ir. 138. The law is the same in America. The refusal of civil entertainment at a public-house was held sufficient special damage. Olmsted v. Miller, 1 Wend. 506. So was the fact that the plaintiff was turned away from the house of her uncle, where she had previously been a welcome visitor, and charged not to return till she had cleared up her character. Williams v. Hill, 19 Wend. 305. So was the circumstance that persons who had been in the habit of so doing refused any longer to provide food and clothing for the plaintiff. Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 309. The defendant told Neiper that the plaintiff committed adultery with Mrs. Fuller. Neiper had married Mrs. Fuller's sister, and was an intimate friend of the plaintiff's. Neiper thought it his duty to tell the plaintiff what people were saying of him. The plaintiff, who was hoeing at the time, turned pale, felt bad, flung down his hoe, and left the field; lost his appetite, turned melancholy, could not work as he used to, and had to hire more help. Held, that such mental distress and physical illness were not sufficient to constitute special damage; for they did not result from any injury to the plaintiff's reputation, which had affected the conduct of others towards him. The Court said, in giving judgment, "It would be highly impolitic to hold all language, wounding the feelings and affecting unfavourably the health and ability to labour, of another, a ground of action for that would be to make the right of action depend often upon whether the sensibilities of a person spoken of are easily excited or otherwise, his strength of mind to disregard abusive insulting remarks concerning him, and his physical strength and ability to bear them. Words which would make hardly an impression on most persons, and would be thought by them, and should be by all, undeserving of notice, might be exceedingly painful to some, occasioning sickness. and an interruption of ability to attend to their ordinary avocations." Terwilliger v. Wands, 3 Smith (17 N. Y. R.), 54, overruling Bradt v. Towsley, 13 Wend. 253, and Fuller v. Fenner, 16 Barb. 333. So, too, a husband cannot maintain an action for the loss of his wife's services caused by illness or mental depression resulting from defamatory words not actionable per se being spoken of her by the defendant. For the wife, if sole, could have maintained no action. "The facility with which a right to damages could be established by pretended illness where none exists, constitutes a serious objection to such an action as this." Per Denio, J., in Wilson v. Goit, 3 (1858) Smith, (17 N. Y. R.), 445. But it is not sufficient for the plaintiff merely to prove the existence of such a loss; he must go further and show clearly that the loss is the direct result of the defendant's words, and not the consequence of some independent act, some spontaneous resolve, of a third person. As a rule, where the words are not actionable per se, he can only do this by calling as his witnesses at the trial the persons who ceased to employ him, or who were prevented by the defendant from dealing with him; and they must state in the box their reason for not employing or not dealing with the plaintiff. Else it will not be clear that they did so in consequence of the defendant's words; their conduct might well be due to some other cause. (Per Lord Kenyon, C.J., in Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp., at p. 50; per Best, C.J., in Tilk v. Parsons, 2 C. & P. 201.) But it is not always necessary for the plaintiff to call as his witnesses those who have ceased to deal with him. He may be able to show by his account-books or otherwise, a general diminution of business as distinct from the loss of particular known customers or promised orders. He has still to connect that diminution of business with the defendant's words. Such a connection may sometimes be established by the nature of the words themselves. Where the defendant has published a statement about the plaintiff's business, which is intended or reasonably calculated to produce, and in the ordinary course. of things does produce, a general loss of business, evidence of such loss of business is admissible, and sufficient special damage to support the action, although the words are not actionable per se, and although no specific evidence is given at the trial of the loss of any particular customer or order by reason of such publication. (Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q. B. 524; 61 L. J. Q. B. 535; 40 W. R. 578; 66 L. T. 794.) Note the distinction between the loss of individual customers and a general diminution in annual profits. Loss of custom must be specifically alleged; the customers' names must be stated on the pleadings, or in the particulars; and they must be called at the trial to state why they ceased to deal with the plaintiff. A general loss of business, on the other hand, is proved by the plaintiff himself; he produces his books, and shows that fewer orders have been received, and less profit made, since the words were published than before. This is not necessary where the words are actionable per se; for the law presumes that such words must injure the plaintiff in his business; and there is no need, therefore, for him to call such evidence. And it has been decided that where the words in their very nature are "intended or reasonably likely to produce, and which in the ordinary course of things do produce, a general loss of business," no further evidence is necessary to connect the decline in the plaintiff's business with the defendant's words. (See Ratcliffe v. Evans, suprà.) But in all other cases of words not actionable per se, some evidence must be given to connect the plaintiff's loss of business with the defendant's words. Special damage must always be explicitly claimed and particulars given on the pleadings. It must be alleged with certainty and precision. If the plaintiff relies on the loss of particular customers, he must set out their names in the Statement of Claim. If he relies on a diminution in the profits of his business, he must state on his pleading the fact that he has lost profits, showing by figures how much he alleges he has lost. See Precedents, Nos. 12, 16, 17. "The character of the acts themselves which produce the damage, and the circumstances under which these acts are done, must regulate the degree of certainty and particularity with which the damage done ought to be stated and proved. As much certainty and particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts themselves by which the damage is done. To insist upon less would be to relax old and intelligible principles. To insist upon more would be the vainest pedantry." Per cur. in Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q. B. at pp. 532, 533.) Illustrations. The plaintiff alleged that in consequence of the defendant's slander, she had "lost several suitors." This was held too general an allegation; for the names |