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6.

The defendants published an advertisement in the following terms:-"Caution: Delmonico Champagne. Messrs. D. & Co. finding that wine stated to be Delmonico Champagne is being advertised for sale in Great Britain, hereby give notice that such wine cannot be the wine it is represented to be, as no champagne shipped under that name can be genuine unless it has their names on the labels." They further announced that if such wines were shipped from France they should take legal proceedings. Held, that this was a libel on the plaintiff, as charging him with being a dishonest man, and a libel on him in the way of his trade as being a dishonest wine merchant.

Hatchard v. Mège, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 771; 56 L. J. Q. B. 397;

35 W. R. 576; 56 L. T. 662.

It is libellous to write and publish of a colliery company that the cottages let by them to their workmen are situate in a highly insanitary village, and are for the most part unfit for human habitation, from absence of proper and decent conveniences, from inadequate accommodation for the occupants, and from want of sufficient water supply.

South Hetton Coal Co., Limited v. North Eastern News Association, Limited, (1894) 1 Q. B. 133; 63 L. J. Q. B. 293; 42 W. R. 322; 69 L. T. 844.

The plaintiff was the manager, conductor, and part-proprietor of a newspaper, printed and published in Market Street, Sydney, and known as the Evening News. The defendants conducted a rival newspaper. The Evening News contained an account of a boat-race, in which it was stated that the race had been won by M., whereas, as appeared from the context, it had been won by K. The defendants thereupon in their newspaper published this paragraph :"According to the Market Street Ananias, both K. and M. won the boat-race yesterday. Poor little silly Noozy." Held, that as the word Ananias" was used in relation to the newspaper and not to the plaintiff individually, there was no personal imputation on the plaintiff, and that the jury had properly found a verdict for the defendants.

Australian Newspaper Co. v. Bennett, (1894) A. C. 284; 63 L. J. P. C. 105; 70 L. T. 597.

The plaintiffs carried on the business of paint manufacturers, and exported a large quantity of zinc to the East. The defendants, who carried on a similar business, published a report, saying that their white zinc was superior to that of the plaintiffs, which was headed:-"Copy of a report of a trial of Bell Brand Genuine White Zinc in comparison with Hubbuck's Patent White Zinc," which the plaintiffs alleged to mean that the defendants' white zinc was genuine, but the plaintiffs' was not genuine. Held, that these words did not amount to a defamatory libel.

Hubbuck and Sons v. Wilkinson, Heywood and Clark, (1899) 1 Q. B. 86; 68 L. J. Q. B. 34; 79 L. T. 429.

But see Alcott v. Millar's Karri & Jarrah Forests, Ltd., and another, (1904) 21 Times L. R. 30.

The plaintiffs and defendants were rival manufacturers of type-setting machinery. The defendants sent to a newspaper for publication the following paragraph:-" The Empire Type-setter in America: The Union Printer and American Craftsman, the most wideawake and spirited of American trade journals, has recently contained several references to the Empire composing

machines, which were installed in the office of the New York Evening Sun with such a flourish of trumpets. From these paragraphs we gather that five machines altogether have been employed in this office-the first being introduced some time in the month of February last, and the other four commencing operations on the 9th March last. So short-lived, however, does this installation appear to have been, that we learn the machines were discontinued on Wednesday, the 29th April, and now the Empire Company is in receipt of notice to remove them altogether in the course of a few days. This will be a very serious blow for this machine." The jury found that these words meant to impute that the plaintiffs were knowingly selling worthless machines. Verdict for the plaintiffs for 500l. Held, by the House of Lords, that as the words imputed that the plaintiffs sold bad and worthless machines, and as such an imputation was capable of being a libel on the plaintiffs in the way of their trade, the question was properly left to the jury, and that their verdict could not be disturbed.

Linotype Co., Limited v. British Empire Type-setting Machine Co.,
Limited, (1899) 81 L. T. 331; 15 Times L. R. 524.

CHAPTER III.

SLANDER.

WORDS which are clearly defamatory when written and published may not be actionable when merely spoken. The reasons for the distinction have been already discussed, ante, pp. 2-4. Spoken defamatory words are actionable whenever special damage has in fact resulted from their use. They are also actionable when the imputation cast by them on the plaintiff is on the face of it so injurious that the Court will presume, without any proof, that his reputation has been thereby impaired. And the Court will so presume in four cases :

I. Where the words charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime; or,

II. Impute to him a contagious disease tending to exclude him from society; or,

III. Are spoken of him in the way of his office, profession, or trade; or,

IV. Impute unchastity or adultery to any woman or girl.

In no other case are spoken words actionable, unless they have caused some special damage to the plaintiff.

I. Where the Words impute a Crime.

Spoken words which impute that the plaintiff has been guilty of a crime punishable with imprisonment are actionable without proof of special damage. If the offence imputed be only punishable by penalty or fine, the words

will not be actionable per se. (Webb v. Beavan, 11 Q. B. D. 609; 52 L. J. Q. B. 544; 49 L. T. 201; 47 J. P. 488.)

It has been usual hitherto to state that words which impute an indictable offence are actionable per se, as all indictable offences are punishable with imprisonment. But there now are many offences which are not indictable and yet are punishable summarily with imprisonment in the first instance; so the above appears a more accurate statement of the law. Words which merely impute an offence for which a magistrate can only inflict imprisonment in default of payment of a fine imposed are not, I apprehend, actionable per se. Words imputing to a licensed victualler that he had been guilty of an offence against the Licensing Acts would be actionable, as spoken of him in the way of his trade; and so would words spoken of a dairyman or grocer falsely alleging that he had been convicted under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875.

There has been considerable fluctuation of opinion as to the exact limits of this rule. In Queen Elizabeth's days some judges considered that words were actionable which imputed to the plaintiff conduct which would be sufficient ground for binding him over to good behaviour. (See Sir Edward Bray v. Andrews, (1564) Moore, 63; Lady Cockaine's Case, (1586) Cro. Eliz. 49; Tibbott v. Haynes, (1590) Cro. Eliz. 191.) In Queen Anne's reign, on the other hand, Holt, C.J., in Ogden v. Turner, 6 Mod. 104; Holt, 40; 2 Salk. 696, laid it down that every charge of treason or felony was actionable, but not every charge of misdemeanour, only of such as entail a "scandalous" and "infamous" punishment. I presume, however, this would include all indictable misdemeanours, except such semicivil proceedings as an indictment for the obstruction or non-repair of a highway.

It is not necessary that the defendant should specify the crime. imputed, if it is clear that the plaintiff is accused of some crime punishable with imprisonment. An innuendo, "meaning thereby that the plaintiff had been and was guilty of having committed some criminal offence or offences," was held sufficient in Webb v. Beavan, 11 Q. B. D. 609; 52 L. J. Q. B. 544; 49 L. T. 201; 47 J. P. 488.

Illustrations.

A general charge of felony is actionable, though it does not specify any particular felony. E.g.:

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If you had had your deserts, you would have been hanged before now."

Donne's Case, Cro. Eliz. 62.

"You have committed an act for which I can transport you."

Curtis v. Curtis, 10 Bing. 477; 3 M. & Scott, 819; 4 M. & Scott, 337. "You have done many things for which you ought to be hanged, and I will have you hanged."

Francis v. Roose, 3 M. & W. 191; 1 H. & H. 36.

"I have got a warrant for Tempest. I shall transport him for felony."

Tempest v. Chambers, 1 Stark. 67.

"I will lock you up in Gloucester gaol next week. I know enough to put you there."

Webb v. Beavan, 11 Q. B. D. 609; 52 L. J. Q. B. 544; 49 L. T. 201; 47 J. P. 488.

So are all charges of specific felonies. E.g.:

Assault with intent to rob :

Lewknor v. Cruchley and wife, Cro. Car. 140.

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Baker v. Pierce, 2 Ld. Raym. 959; Holt, 654; 6 Mod. 23; 2 Salk. 695.

Slowman v. Dutton, 10 Bing. 402.

Tomlinson v. Brittlebank, 4 B. & Ad. 630; 1 N. & M. 455.

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Edsall v. Russell, 4 M. & G. 1090; 5 Scott, N. R. 801; 2 Dowl. N. S. 641; 12 L. J. C. P. 4; 6 Jur. 996.

Murder :

Peake v. Oldham, Cowp. 275; S. C. sub nom. Oldham v. Peake, 2
W. Bl. 959.

Button v. Hayward, 8 Mod. 24.

Receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen :—

Brigg's Case, Godb. 157.

Clarke's Case de Dorchester, 2 Rolle's Rep. 136.

Alfred v. Farlow, 8 Q. B. 854; 15 L. J. Q. B. 258; 10 Jur. 714.

Robbery :

Lawrence v. Woodward, Cro. Car. 277; 1 Roll. Abr. 74.

Rowcliffe v. Edmonds et ux., 7 M. & W. 12; 4 Jur. 684.

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