with a policeman to the house of a discharged servant whom he suspected, and the servant's mother in her presence asked him what he wanted, the defendant's answer was held privileged in Brow v. Hathaway, (1866) 13 Allen (95 Mass.), 239; 19 L. T. 105. Plaintiff and defendant were neighbours and both drapers. Defendant, from facts which came to his knowledge, and which were sufficient to arouse suspicion, concluded that he was being robbed by one of his assistants with the collusion of the plaintiff. He went to A., in whose employ plaintiff had formerly been, and inquired as to plaintiff's honesty. A. asked, "What do you want to know for?" Defendant replied, "Oh, the man has robbed me; I mean to get him imprisoned." Defendant then made inquiries of B., one of his own assistants, who said she knew nothing at all of the matter, whereupon defendant repeated what he had said to A. Damages 31. Lindley, J., on further consideration, held both statements unprivileged, as neither A. nor B. was concerned in or connected with the matter. Harrison v. Fraser, 29 W. R. 652. The defendant, in the presence of his wife, accused the plaintiff, "a ladies' wardrobe dealer," of having received certain goods stolen from his house. The plaintiff denied receiving them. The defendant then said, " Would it surprise you if I could bring five people to say you had taken the things away from here?" The plaintiff said it would surprise her. Four boys and a maidservant were then sent into the room, and the defendant said to them, Is this the person who came and took the things away?" They replied, "Yes." The Court of Appeal held the whole conversation privileged. Collins v. Cooper, (1902) 19 Times L. R. 118. "The publication at the request of any Government office or department, officer of State, Commissioner of Police, or Chief Constable, of any notice or report issued by them for the information of the public, shall be privileged, unless it shall be proved that such report or publication was published or made maliciously." 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, s. 4. Charges against Public Officials. So, too, it is the duty of all who witness any misconduct on the part of a magistrate or any public officer to bring such misconduct to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish it; and, therefore, all petitions and memorials complaining of such misconduct, if forwarded to the proper authority, are privileged. And it is not necessary that the informant or memorialist should be in any way personally aggrieved or injured: for all persons have an interest in the pure administration of justice and the efficiency of our public offices in all departments of the State. So with ecclesiastical matters all good churchmen are concerned to prevent any scandal attaching to the Church. If, however, the informant be the person immediately affected by the misconduct complained of, he can claim privilege also on the ground that he is acting in selfdefence. (See the cases cited, post, p. 275.) Every communication made with a view to obtain redress for some injury received, or to prevent some public abuse, is privileged, if it be published only to persons who have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, or power to redress the grievance, or some duty or interest in connection with it. Statements made to a stranger who has nothing to do with the matter, cannot be privileged. "To protect those who are not able to protect themselves is a duty which everyone owes to society." (Per Lord Macnaghten in Jenoure v. Delmege, (1891) A. C. at p. 77; 60 L. J. P. C. at p. 13.) "In this land of law and liberty all who are aggrieved may seek redress; and the alleged misconduct of any who are clothed with public authority may be brought to the notice of those who have the power and the duty to inquire into it, and to take steps which may prevent the repetition of it." (Per Lord Campbell, C.J., in Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. at p. 349; 25 L. J. Q. B. at p. 29.) "If, without express malice, I make a defamatory charge which I bonâ fide believe to be true, against one whose conduct in the respect defamed has caused me injury, to one whose duty it is . . . to inquire into and redress such injury, the occasion is privileged; because I have an interest in the subject-matter of my charge, and the person to whom I make the communication has on hearing the communication a duty to discharge in respect of it." (Per Fitzgerald, B., in Waring v. M'Caldin, (1873) 7 Ir. Rep. C. L. at p. 288.) Illustrations. A petition to the House of Commons charging the plaintiff with oppression and extortion in his office of Vicar-General to the Bishop of Lincoln, is privileged, although the petition was printed, and copies distributed amongst the members. Lake V. King, 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 131; Sid. 414; 1 Mod. 58. The defendant deemed it his duty as a churchman to write to the Bishop of London informing him that a report was current in the parish of Bethnal Green that a stand-up fight had occurred in the school-room of St. James-the-Great between the plaintiff, the incumbent, and the school-master, during school hours. The letter was held privileged under the Church Discipline Act, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 86, s. 3, although the defendant did not live in the district of which the plaintiff was incumbent, but in an adjoining district of the same parish. James v. Boston, 2 C. & K. 4. A letter sent to the Postmaster-General, or to the secretary to the General Post Office, complaining of misconduct in a postmaster, is privileged, if it was written as a bonâ fide complaint, to obtain redress for a grievance that the party really believed he had suffered; and particular expressions are not to be too strictly scrutinised, if the intention of the defendant was good. Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & P. 548. Bannister v. Kelty, 59 J. P. 793. The defendant drafted a memorial to the Home Secretary on a matter within his jurisdiction, and read it to M. in the presence of M.'s wife, and asked M. to sign it. M. signed it, and the defendant then sent it to the Home Secretary. Grove, J., held that both the petition and the conversation with M. were privileged. Spackman v. Gibney, Bristol Spring Assizes, 1878. The plaintiff was a sanitary inspector under the statute 41 & 42 Vict. c. 74, s. 42, appointed by the local authority, but removable by the Privy Council; the defendant addressed a letter to the Privy Council, charging the plaintiff with corruption and misconduct in his office. Held, that no action lay without proof of malice. Proctor v. Webster, 16 Q. B. D. 112; 55 L. J. Q. B. 150; 53 L. T. 765. Wieman v. Mabee, 45 Mich, 484; 40 Amer. R. 477. An elector of Frome petitioned the Home Secretary, stating that the plaintiff, a magistrate of the borough, had made speeches inciting to a breach of the peace, and praying for an inquiry, and that the Home Secretary should advise her Majesty to remove the plaintiff from the commission of the peace. Such petition was held to be privileged, although it should more properly have been addressed to the Lord Chancellor. Harrison v. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25; 1 Jur. N. S. 846; 2 Jur. N. S. 90. A timekeeper employed on public works, on behalf of the Board of Works, wrote a letter to the secretary of the Board, imputing fraud to the contractor. Blackburn, J., directed the jury that if they thought the letter was written in good faith for the information of his employers, it was privileged, although such a complaint should have been addressed to the resident engineer, in the first instance. Scarll v. Dixon, 4 F. & F. 250. The defendant wrote to the inspector of constabulary, saying that he had been informed that the plaintiff, a Government medical officer, had refused to attend a poor woman, who died in consequence. Held, that the occasion was privileged, although such a complaint should more properly have been submitted to the superintending medical officer. Jenoure v. Delmege, (1891) A. C. 73; 60 L. J. P. C. 11; 39 W. R. 388; 63 L. T. 814; 55 J. P. 500. The plaintiff was about to be sworn in as a paid constable, by the justices, when the defendant, a parishioner, made a statement against the plaintiff's character in the hearing of several by-standers. Held, that even if such statement ought rather to have been made to the vestry, who drew up the list of constables whom the justices were to swear in, still it was privileged, as the justices had a discretion to select from that list the persons who were to be sworn in as paid constables. Kershaw v. Bailey, 1 Exch. 743; 17 L. J. Ex. 129. A letter to the Secretary at War, with the intent to prevail on him to exert his authority to compel the plaintiff (an officer in the army) to pay a debt due from him to defendant, was held privileged, although the Secretary at War had no direct power or authority to order the plaintiff to pay his debt. Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 642; 1 Chit. 85; 1 D. & R. 252. The plaintiff was a teacher in a district school; the inhabitants of the district prepared a memorial charging the plaintiff with drunkenness and immorality, which they sent to the local superintendent of schools. It ought strictly to have been sent to the trustees of that particular school in the first instance, and such trustees would then, if they thought fit, in due course forward it to the local superintendent for him to take action upon it. Held, that the publication was nevertheless privileged, as the ultimate decision lay with the local superintendent. McIntyre v. McBean, 13 Up. Canada Q. B. Rep. 534. But where the defendant wrote a letter to the Home Secretary complaining of the conduct of the plaintiff, a solicitor, as clerk to the borough magistrates, this was held not to be privileged, because the Home Secretary had no power or jurisdiction whatever over the plaintiff. Blagg v. Sturt, 10 Q. B. 899; 16 L. J. Q. B. 39; 8 L. T. (Old S.) 135; 11 Jur. 101. A lieutenant in the navy was appointed by the Government agent or superintendent on board a transport ship, The Jupiter. He wrote a letter to the secretary of Lloyd's Coffee-house imputing misconduct and incapacity to the plaintiff, the master of The Jupiter. This was held altogether unprivileged; the information should have been given to the Government alone, by whom the defendant was employed. Harwood v. Green, 3 C. & P. 141. Where the defeated candidates at an election of guardians of the poor wrote and signed a memorial, accusing a successful candidate of bribery and treating, and sent it to the new board of guardians, who had no jurisdiction in the matter and no duty or interest in connection with it, this was held not to be a privileged communication. Hebditch v. MacIlwaine and others, (1894) 2 Q. B. 54; 63 L. J. Q. B. 587; 42 W. R. 422; 70 L. T. 826; 58 J. P. 620. An Irish coroner sent to the Chief Secretary of Ireland a report of an inquest which he had held on the body of an out-door pauper, and at which the plaintiff, who was the relieving officer, had given evidence. He mentioned in this report that the parish priest, who happened to be in court, stated publicly at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, "This is nothing short of perjury." Held, that this portion of the report at all events was not privileged, as the Chief Secretary could have no interest in hearing Father Callary's opinion of the plaintiff's evidence. Lynam v. Gowing, 6 L. R. Ir. 259. II. WHERE THE DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECTMATTER OF THE COMMUNICATION, AND THE PERSON TO WHOM THE COMMUNICATION IS MADE HAS A CORRESPONDING INTEREST OR SOME DUTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE MATTER. Every communication made in such circumstances is privileged by reason of the occasion. (Per Lopes, L.J., in Hunt v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. at p. 192.) In the same case the Master of the Rolls said (p. 191) :"The occasion had arisen if the communication was of such a nature that it could be fairly said that those who made it had an interest in making such a communication, and those to whom it was made had a corresponding interest in having it made to them. When those two things co-exist, the occasion is a privileged one, and the question whether it was or was not misused, is an entirely different one.' Such common interest is generally a pecuniary one; as that of two customers of the same bank, two directors of the same company, two creditors of the same debtor. But it may also be professional, as in the case of two officers in the same corps, or masters in the same school, anxious to preserve the dignity and reputation of the body to which they both belong. In short, it may be any interest arising from the joint exercise of any legal right or privilege, or from the joint performance of any duty imposed or recognised by the law. Thus, two executors of the same will, two trustees of the same settlement, have a common interest, though not a pecuniary one, in the management of the trust estate. So the ratepayers of a parish have a common interest in the selection of fit and proper officers to serve in the parish, their salary being paid out of the rates. So relations by blood or marriage have a common interest in their family concerns. The "common interest" must be one which the law recognises and appreciates. No privilege attaches to gossip, |