a third party's putting questions to him. I am of opinion he may (when he thinks that another is about to take into his service one whom he knows ought not to be taken) set himself in motion, and do some act to induce that other to seek information from and put questions to him. The answer to such questions, given bond fide with the intention of communicating such facts as the other party ought to know, will, although they contain slanderous. matter, come within the scope of a privileged communication." (Per Bayley, J., in Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C., at p. 584.)

If, after a favourable character has been given, facts come to the knowledge of the former master which induce him to alter his opinion, it is his duty to inform the person to whom he gave the character of his altered opinion. Hence, a letter written to retract a favourable character previously given will also be privileged. (Gardner v. Slade, 13 Q. B. 796; 18 L. J. Q. B. 334; 13 Jur. 826; Child v. Affleck and wife, 9 B. & C. 403; 4 M. & R. 338.)

So, again, if a servant comes with a good character given her by B., and her master is sadly disappointed in her, he may write and inform B. that she does not deserve the character he gave her, so that he may refrain from recommending her to others; and such a letter would be privileged. (Dixon v. Parsons, 1 F. & F. 24. But see the dicta in Fryer v. Kinnersley, 15 C. B. N. S. 429; 33 L. J. C. P. 96.)

When a master discharges a servant, it is his duty to tell her why she is dismissed; he may also tell her parents or guardians; and the privilege will not be lost, if his wife or a friend be present at the interview. (Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313.) A master may also warn his present servants against associating with a former servant whom he has discharged, and state his reasons for dismissing her. (Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 C. B. 590; 20 L. J. C. P. 131.)

Illustrations.

After a mercantile firm has given to one of its clerks a general recommendation by means of which he obtains a situation, if a partner subsequently discovers facts which alter his opinion of that clerk's character, it is his duty to communicate the new facts and his change of opinion to the new employer of that clerk, in order to guard against his being misled by the previous recommendation of the firm.

Fowles v. Bowen, 3 Tiffany (30 N. Y. R.), 20.

If I happen to hear that a discharged servant of mine is about to enter the service of B., it may be my duty to write off at once and inform B. of the servant's misconduct. It is certainly safer to wait till B. applies to me for the servant's character. Eagerness to prevent a former servant obtaining another place has the appearance of malice, and if it were found that I wrote systematically to every one to whom the plaintiff applied for work, the jury would probably give damages against me. On the other hand, if B. was an intimate friend or a relation of mine, and there was no other evidence of malice, except that I volunteered the information, the occasion would still be privileged. In short, when a master "volunteers to give the character, stronger evidence will be required that he acted bona fide, than in the case where he has given the character after being required so to do." Per Littledale, J., in

Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578, 586; 3 C. & P. 387.

The defendant, a linendraper, dismissed his apprentice without sufficient legal excuse: he wrote a letter to her parents, informing them that the girl would be sent home, and giving his reasons for her dismissal. Cockburn, C.J., held this letter privileged.

James v. Jolly, Bristol Summer Assizes, 1879.

See Fowler and wife v. Homer, 3 Camp. 294.

So, of course, a letter to the girl herself, stating in detail the faults her late employer found with her, is privileged.

R. v. Perry, 15 Cox, C. C. 169.

So where a lady, who had dismissed her maid-servant, wrote a similar letter to the aunt of the plaintiff, who was in the position of a mother to her.

Aberdein v. Macleay, (1893) 9 Times L. R. 539.

If a master about to dismiss his servant for dishonesty, calls in a friend to hear what passes, the presence of such third person does not take away privilege from words which the master then uses, imputing dishonesty.

Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308; 20 L. J. Q. B. 313; 15 Jur. 746.
Jones v. Thomas, 34 W. R. 104; 53 L. T. 678; 50 J. P. 149.

Where a master discharged his footman and cook, and they asked him his reason for doing so, and he told the footman, in the absence of the cook, that

he and the cook had been robbing him ;" and told the cook, in the absence of the footman, that he had discharged her "because she and the footman had been robbing him: " held, that these were privileged communications as respected the absent parties, as well as those to whom they were respectively made. 18 C. B. 544; 25 L. J. C. P. 294; 2 Jur. N. S. 1004.

Manby v. Witt,
Eastmead v. Witt,

The plaintiff was a guard in the service of the defendants, a railway company. The defendants dismissed him on the ground that he had been guilty of gross neglect of duty, and published his name in a printed monthly circular addressed

to their servants, stating that he had been dismissed and the ground of his dismissal. The plaintiff brought an action for libel against the defendants. Held, affirming the decision of Stephen, J., that the statement was made on a privileged occasion, and that the defendants were not liable.

Hunt v. Great Northern Railway Co., (1891) 2 Q. B. 189; 60 L. J. Q. B. 498; 55 J. P. 234, 648.

Information as to Crime or Misconduct of others.

Again, it is a duty which every one owes to society and to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct, and to promote the detection of any crime. All information given bond fide in response to any inquiries made with this object is clearly privileged (ante, p. 239). But this duty does not arise merely when confidential inquiries are made. If facts come under my knowledge which lead me reasonably to conclude that a crime has been, or is about to be, committed, it is my duty at once to give information to the police or to the persons interested.

"When it comes to the knowledge of any one that a crime has been committed, a duty is laid on that person, as a citizen of the country, to state to the authorities what he knows respecting the commission of the crime; and if he states only what he knows and honestly believes, he cannot be subjected to an action of damages merely because it turns out that the person as to whom he has given the information is, after all, not guilty of the crime." (Per Inglis, Lord President, in Lightbody v. Gordon, 9 Scotch Sessions Cases, 4th Series, 937, 938.)

*So all material statements made by the persons interested in the detection of a crime, during their investigations and relevant thereto, are privileged. "For the sake of public justice, charges and communications which would otherwise be slanderous, are protected if bond fide made in the prosecution of an inquiry into a suspected crime." (Per Coleridge, J., in Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 382.)* See also the remarks of Lord Eldon, C.J., in Johnson v.

* This passage was cited with approval by Collins, M.R., in Collins v. Cooper, (1902) 19 Times L. R. at p. 119.

Evans, 3 Esp. 33, and of Lord Ellenborough, in Fowler et ux. v. Homer, 3 Camp. at p. 295.

Illustrations.

Defendant discharged his servant, the plaintiff, and sent for a constable, intending to give her in charge. All that he said to the constable in the course of his charge and complaint against the plaintiff is privileged, although ultimately he did not give her into charge.

Johnson v. Evans, Clerk, 3 Esp. 32.

Defendant was a haberdasher. On a Saturday evening, while he was absent, Mrs. Fowler came into his shop and bought some goods. Soon after she was gone his shopman missed a roll of riband, and mistakenly supposed that she had stolen it, but did not then pursue her. On the following Monday, as she was again passing the shop, the shopman pointed her out to the defendant as the person who had stolen the riband. The defendant brought her into the shop and accused her of the robbery, which she positively denied. He then took her into an adjoining room and sent for her father, to whom he repeated the accusation. After a good deal of altercation she was allowed to go home, and there the matter rested. Lord Ellenborough decided that no action lay.

Fowler et ux. v. Homer, 3 Camp. 294.

Mensel sent his servant, the plaintiff, to the defendant's shop on business; while there, the plaintiff had occasion to go into an inner room. Shortly after he left, a box was missed from that inner room. No one else had been in the room except the plaintiff. The defendant thereupon went round to Mr. Mensel's, and calling him aside into a private room, told him what had happened, adding that the plaintiff must have taken the box. Later on, the plaintiff came to the defendant's house, and the defendant repeated the accusation to him; but, an English girl being present, defendant was careful to speak in German. Both communications were held privileged.

Amann v. Damm, 8 C. B. N. S. 597; 29 L. J. C. P. 313; 7 Jur. N. S. 47; 8 W. R. 470.

Hurtert v. Weines, 27 Iowa, 134.

Dale v. Harris, 13 Browne, (109 Mass.) 193.

Defendant charged the plaintiff, his porter, with stealing his bed-ticks, and with plaintiff's permission subsequently searched his house, but found no stolen property. The jury found that defendant bonâ fide believed that a robbery had been committed by the plaintiff, and made the charge with a view to investigation, but added, "The defendant ought not to have said what he could not prove." Held, that this finding was immaterial, that the occasion was privileged, and that there was no evidence of malice. Judgment for the defendant. Howe v. Jones, (1884) 1 Times L. R. 19; (1885) ib. 461. Fowler et ux. v. Homer, 3 Camp. 294.

Farquharson forged the name 'J. Smith on a cheque and sent a boy to present it and get the money. The defendant was cashier of the bank. He looked hard at the boy, and satisfied himself as he thought that it was Smith's boy, the plaintiff, and so gave him the money. When inquiries were made, defendant told Smith it was his boy who presented the cheque, and described him accurately. He told the detective so too. Plaintiff was accordingly tried along

with Farquharson, who pleaded guilty. The Sheriff found the charge not proven against the plaintiff. Then plaintiff sued defendant and recovered damages 301., by a verdict of eight jurymen to four. The Court set the verdict aside on the ground that there was no evidence whatever of malice.

Lightbody v. Gordon, 9 Scotch Sessions Cases, 4th Series, 934. Barton, a friend of the defendant, employed a builder, the plaintiff's master, to build a house for him: the defendant informed Barton that the plaintiff while at work on his house had removed some quarterings. Barton complained to the master builder, who came down to the defendant's and said, "I am told you say that you saw my man Kine take away some of the quarterings from Mr. Barton's premises." A repetition of the charge made then to the plaintiff's master without malice was held privileged, and as the plaintiff had not called Barton to prove the original remark, the jury found for the defendant, and a new trial was: refused. Parke, B., said, "Is a man's mouth to be closed when I ask him if he has seen another man take away my timber ?"

Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297.

Certain merchants in New York, believing on reasonable grounds that they had been defrauded by plaintiff and others, drew up an agreement reciting that they had "been robbed and swindled" by plaintiff and others named, whom they were determined to prosecute, and promising that each person signing would pay his fair share towards the expenses of the prosecution, &c. This agreement was left with A.'s manager in order that he might procure A.'s signature thereto. Held, a privileged publication.

Klinck v. Colby and others, 1 Sickels (46 N. Y.) 427.

Defendant accused the plaintiff, in the presence of a third person, of stealing his wife's brooch; plaintiff wished to be searched; defendant repeated the accusation to two women, who searched the plaintiff and found nothing. Subsequently it was discovered that defendant's wife had left the brooch at a friend's house. Held, that the mere publication to the two women did not destroy the privilege attaching to charges, if made bonâ fide; but that all the circumstances should have been left to the jury, who should determine whether or no the charge was made recklessly and unwarrantably, and repeated before more persons than necessary.

Padmore v. Lawrence, 11 A. & E. 380; 4 Jur. 458; 3 P. & D. 209. Jones v. Thomas, (1885) 34 W. R. 104; 53 L. T. 678; 2 Times L. R. 95. A discharged servant of the defendant's charged plaintiff, her former manager, with embezzlement. Defendant went to plaintiff's house, and, finding him out, said to his wife, He has robbed me." This was held not to be privileged ; though the jury found that defendant spoke in the performance, as she believed, of a duty and in the bonâ fide belief that what she said was true, and without malice. Judgment for the plaintiff. Damages 51.

Jones v. Williams, (1885) 1 Times L. R. 572.

Plaintiff assaulted the defendant on the highway; defendant, meeting a constable, requested him to take charge of the plaintiff, and the constable refusing to arrest the plaintiff unless the defendant would charge him with felony, the defendant did so. Held, on demurrer to the defendant's plea, that the charge of felony, made in these circumstances was not privileged.

Smith v. Hodgeskins, Cro. Car. 276.

But where the defendant's shop had undoubtedly been robbed, and he went