in proceedings before a Master of the Supreme Court under Order LXV. r. 27 (39) are absolutely privileged. Pedley and May v. Morris, 61 L. J. Q. B. 21; 40 W. R. 42; 65 L. T. 526. So are statements made under s. 4, sub-s. 2, of the Lunacy Act, 1890, in the particulars given in the form required by the Act, upon an application to a justice of the peace, or other judicial authority, for a detention order. Hodson v. Pare, (1899) 1 Q. B. 455; 68 L. J. Q. B. 309; 47 W. R. 241; 80 L. T. 13. A letter of complaint against a solicitor in respect of his professional conduct, with affidavit of alleged charges attached, forwarded to the Registrar of the Incorporated Law Society in accordance with Form 1 in the Schedule of the Rules under the Solicitors Act, 1888, is a step in a judicial proceeding, and the statements contained in such letter and affidavit are absolutely privileged. Lilley v. Roney, (1892) 61 L. J. Q. B. 727; 8 Times L. R. 642. But the proceeding must be in its nature judicial-that is, it must be either the adjudication and determination by a competent tribunal of the legal rights of the parties before it, or some necessary step preliminary thereto. Illustrations. The London County Council is not a Court: no judicial business was transferred to it (see s. 78, sub-s. 2, of the Local Government Act, 1888). When it is discussing the advisability of granting a music and dancing licence, it is dealing with the administrative business of the county: it is not acting judicially. Hence, the remarks made by a county councillor during such a discussion are not absolutely privileged. Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, (1892) 1 Q. B. 431; 61 L. J. Q. B. 409; 40 W. R. 450; 66 L. T. 513; 56 J. P. 404. When a grand jury is dealing with the fiscal business of the county, a statement made by one of their number, impugning the solvency of a proposed roadcontractor, is privileged, but not absolutely privileged. Little v. Pomeroy, Ir. R. 7 C. L. 50. The service on a debtor of a notice under the Canadian Insolvent Act of 1869, demanding payment of a debt, though an important piece of evidence, should bankruptcy proceedings follow, is not in itself a judicial proceeding; and the delivery of such a notice to a lawyer's clerk for service is a privileged, but not an absolutely privileged, publication. Bank of British North America v. Strong, 1 App. Cas. 307; 34 L. T. 627. It is submitted that a case laid before counsel for his opinion is not absolutely privileged; at all events, if no writ be yet issued. Minter v. Brockman, May 23rd, 1895 (not reported). An affidavit made voluntarily when no cause is pending, or made coram non judice, is not privileged as a judicial proceeding. Maloney v. Bartley, 3 Camp. 210. An attorney's bill of costs is in no sense a judicial proceeding, though delivered under a judge's order, and no privilege can be claimed for it. Bruton v. Downes, 1 F. & F. 668. (iii.) Acts of State. A similar immunity, resting also on obvious grounds of public policy, is accorded to all reports made by a military officer to his military superiors in the course of his duty, and to evidence given by any military man to a court martial or other military court of inquiry; it being essential to the welfare and safety of the State that military discipline should be maintained without any interference by civil tribunals. In short, "all acts done in the honest exercise of military authority are privileged."' The law is the same as to the navy. Naval and military matters are for naval and military tribunals to determine, and not the ordinary civil courts. (Hart v. Gumpach, L. R. 4 P. C. 439; 9 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 241; 42 L. J. P. C. 25; 21 W. R. 365; Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53; 18 W. R. 336; 21 L. T. 584; Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, L. R. 7 H. L. 744; 45 L. J. Q. B. 8; 23 W. R. 931; 33 L. T. 196; 4 F. & F. 806; Att.-Gen. of the Cape of Good Hope v. Van Reenen, (1904) A. C. 114; 73 L. J. P. C. 13; 89 L. T. 591.) A similarly absolute privilege extends to all acts of State, and to the official notification thereof in the London Gazette, to all State papers, and to all advice given to the Crown by its ministers. Illustrations. A military court of inquiry may not be strictly a judicial tribunal, but where such court has been assembled under the orders of the General Commanding-inChief in conformity with the King's Regulations for the government of the army, a witness who gives evidence thereat stands in the same situation as a witness giving evidence before a judicial tribunal, and all statements made by him thereat, whether orally or in writing, having reference to the subject of the inquiry, are absolutely privileged. Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, L. R. 7 H. L. 744; 45 L. J. Q. B. 8; 23 And see Keighley v. Bell, 4 F. & F. 763. So also are statements contained in the report made by the presiding officer of such a court to the Commander-in-Chief. Home v. Bentinck, 2 B. & B. 130; 4 Moore, 563. The defendant being the plaintiff's superior officer, in the course of his military duty forwarded to the Adjutant-General certain letters written by the plaintiff, and at the same time, also in accordance with his military duty, reported to the Commander-in-Chief on the contents of such letters, using words defamatory of the plaintiff. It was alleged that the defendant did so maliciously, and without any reasonable, probable, or justifiable cause, and not in the bona fide discharge of his duty as the plaintiff's superior officer. Held, on demurrer, by the majority of the Court of Q. B. (Mellor and Lush, JJ.), that such reports being made in the course of military duty were absolutely privileged, and that the civil courts had no jurisdiction over such purely military matters. Cockburn, C.J., dissented, on the grounds that it never could be the duty of a military officer falsely, maliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause to libel his fellow-officer; that the courts of common law have jurisdiction over all wilful and unjust abuse of military authority; and that it would not in any way be destructive of military discipline or of the efficiency of the army to submit questions of malicious oppression to the opinion of a jury. Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94; 39 L. J. Q. B. 53; 18 [N.B.-There was no appeal in this case. The arguments of Cockburn, C.J., deserve the most careful attention. In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, suprà, the decision of the House of Lords turned entirely on the fact that the defendant was a witness in a proceeding of a judicial nature. Neither Kelly, C.B., nor any of the Law Lords (except perhaps Lord Penzance), rest their judgment on the incompetency of a court of common law to inquire into purely military matters. The Court of Exchequer Chamber no doubt express an opinion that "questions of military discipline and military duty alone are cognisable only by a military court, and not by a court of law." (L. R. 8 Q. B. 271.) But after referring to "the eloquent and powerful reasoning of Cockburn, C.J., in Dawkins v. Lord F. Paulet," the Court goes on to express its satisfaction that the question "is yet open to final consideration before a court of the last resort." However, in a court of first instance, at all events, it must now be taken to be the law that the civil courts of common law can take no cognisance of purely military or purely naval matters (Sutton v. Johnstone, (1785) 1 T. R. 493; Grant v. Gould (1792) 2 Hen. Bl. 69; Barwis v. Keppel, (1766) 2 Wils. 314); but wherever the civil rights of a person in the military or naval service are affected by any alleged oppression or injustice at the hands of his superior officers, or any illegal action on the part of a military or naval tribunal, there the civil courts may interfere. (Re Mansergh, 1 B. & S. 400; 30 L. J. Q. B. 296; Warden v. Bailey, 4 Taunt. 67.)] But private letters written by the commanding officer of the regiment to his immediate superior on military matters, as distinct from his official reports, are not absolutely privileged; the question of malice should be left to the jury. Dickson v. Earl of Wilton, 1 F. & F. 419. [N.B.-If this be not the distinction, these cases must be taken to be overruled by the cases cited above. See L. R. 8 Q. B. 272-3.] By a general order it was declared that all unemployed Indian officers ineligible for public employment by reason of misconduct or physical or mental inefficiency should be removed to the pension list. Under this order the plaintiff was removed to the pension list and a notification of such removal was published in the Indian Gazette. Held, on demurrer, that no action lay either for the removal of the plaintiff, or for the official publication of the fact: although special damage was alleged. Grant v. Secretary of State for India, 2 C. P. D. 445; 25 W. R. 848; 37 L. T. 188. See Doss v. Secretary of State for India in Council, L. R. 19 Eq. 509 ; 23 W. R. 773; 32 L. T. 294. And Oliver v. Lord Wm. Bentinck, 3 Taunt. 456. A petition to the King is absolutely privileged. Hare v. Mellers, 3 Leon. 138, 163. Any communication relating to State matters made by one officer of State to another in the course of his official duty is absolutely privileged, and cannot be made the subject of an action for libel. Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India in Council, (1895) 2 Q. B. 189; 64 L. J. Q. B. 676; 72 L. T. 858; 39 J. P. 596. CHAPTER X. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. WE now pass to the consideration of those occasions which afford the defendant a qualified privilege only; i.e., to cases in which it is open to the plaintiff to destroy the prima facie privilege arising out of the occasion by showing that the defendant acted from an improper motive. Occasions of qualified privilege may be grouped under four heads: I. Where it is the duty of the defendant to make a communication to another person who has an interest in the subject-matter of the communication, or some duty in connection with it. II. Where the defendant has an interest in the subjectmatter of the communication, and the person to whom the communication is made has a corresponding interest, or some duty in connection with the matter. III. Communications made in self-defence, &c. IV. Fair and accurate reports of the proceedings of any Court of Justice, or of Parliament, or of a public meeting. Fair comments on matters of public interest, which are sometimes treated as a fifth class of privileged communications, have been already dealt with in Chapter VIII., ante, pp. 184-214. Privileged reports are discussed in the next chapter. This chapter is confined to occasions on which a qualified privilege arises from duty or common interest, or self-defence. "The reason for holding any occasion privileged is |