fresh publication by the defendant, and that the action lay in spite of the Statute of Limitations. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185; 19 L. J. Q. B. 20; 14 Jur. 110; 3 C. & K. 10. A porter who, in the course of business, delivers parcels containing libellous handbills, is not liable in an action for libel, if shown to be ignorant of the contents of the parcel, for he is but doing his duty in the ordinary way. Day v. Bream, 2 M. & Rob. 54. A servant carries for his master a letter addressed to C., containing a libel on D. It is his duty not to read it. If he does read it, and then delivers it to C., this is a publication by the servant to C., and D. can sue either the master, or the servant or both. If the servant never reads it, but simply delivers it as he was bidden, then he is not liable to any action, unless he either knew or ought to have known that he was being employed illegally. If he either knew or ought to have known that, then it is no defence for him to plead, "I was only obeying orders." The defendant kept a pamphlet shop; she was sick and upstairs in bed; a libel was brought into the shop without her knowledge, and subsequently sold by her servant on her account. She was held criminally liable for the act of her servant on the ground that "the law presumes that the master is acquainted with what his servant does in the course of his business." R. v. Dodd, 2 Sess. Cas. 33. Nutt's Case, Fitzg. 47; 1 Barnard. 306. But later judges would not be so strict; the sickness upstairs, if properly proved by the defendant, would now be held an excuse, at all events in a criminal case. R. v. Almon, 5 Burr. 2686. R. v. Gutch, Fisher and Alexander, Moo. & Mal. 433. A rule was granted calling on Wiatt to show cause why he should not be attached for selling a book containing a libel on the Court of King's Bench. The book was in Latin. On filing an affidavit that he did not understand Latin, and on giving up the name of the printer from whom he obtained it, and the name of the author, the rule was discharged. R. v. Wiatt, (1722) 8 Mod. 123. The defendants were newsvendors on a large scale at the Royal Exchange. In the ordinary course of their business they sold several copies of a newspaper called "Money," which contained a libel on the plaintiff. The jury found that the defendants did not, nor did either of them, know that the newspapers at the time they sold them contained libels on the plaintiff; that it was not by negligence on the defendants' part that they did not know there was any libel in the newspapers; and that the defendants did not know that the newspaper was of such a character that it was likely to contain libellous matter, nor ought they to have known so. Held, that defendants had not published the libel, but had only innocently disseminated it. Emmens v. Pottle and Son, 16 Q. B. D. 354; 55 L. J. Q. B. 51; 34 W. R. 116; 53 L. T. 808; 50 J. P. 228. Ridgway v. W. H. Smith and Son, (1890) 6 Times L. R. 275. Mallon v. W. H. Smith and Son, (1893) 9 Times L. R. 621. But where the libellous book had been called in by the publisher, and notices calling it in had been received by the defendant, though not read by him, the Court of Appeal held that the jury had rightly found that the defendant was guilty of negligence, and therefore the defence failed. Vizetelly v. Mudie's Select Library, Limited, (1900) 2 Q. B. 170 ; 69 L. J. Q. B. 645; 16 Times L. R. 352. The defendants were the Trustees and the Librarian of the British Museum. They purchased two pamphlets relating to the litigation between the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher and Mr. Tilton, which they catalogued for reference. In the course of years some four or five readers consulted these pamphlets, which were now proved to contain libels on the female plaintiff. None of the defendants or their servants knew that these pamphlets contained libels on the plaintiff or libels at all. The findings of the jury were construed to mean that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants. Held, no publication. Martin and wife v. Trustees of the British Museum and Thompson, (1894) 10 Times L. R. 338. Every one who requests or procures another to write, print, or publish a libel, is answerable as though he wrote, printed, or published it himself. And such request need not be express. Thus, it may be inferred from the defendant's conduct in sending his manuscript to the editor of a magazine, or making a statement to the reporter of a newspaper, with the knowledge that they will be sure to publish it, and without any effort to restrain their so doing. And it is not necessary that the defendant's communication be inserted verbatim, so long as the sense and substance of it appear in print. This rule is of great value in cases where the words employed are not actionable when spoken; but are so if written. Here, though the proprietor of the newspaper is of course liable for printing them, still it is more satisfactory, if possible, to make the author of the scandal defendant. An action of slander will not lie; but if he spoke the words under such circumstances as would ensure their being printed, or if in any other way he requested or contrived their publication in the paper, he is liable in an action of libel as the actual publisher. Qui facit per alium facit per se. Illustrations. Hudson brought the manuscript of a libellous song to Morgan to have 1,000 copies printed; Morgan printed 1,000 and sent 300 to Hudson's shop. Hudson gave several copies to a witness, who sang it about the streets. It did not O.L.S. M appear in whose handwriting the manuscript was, but probably it was not in Hudson's. Held, that both Hudson and Morgan had published the libel. Johnson v. Hudson and Morgan, 7 A. & E. 233, n.; 1 H. & W. 680. If a manuscript in the handwriting of the defendant be sent to the printer or publisher of a magazine, who prints and publishes it, the defendant will be liable for the full damages caused by such publication, although there is no proof offered that he expressly directed the printing and publishing of such manuscript. Bond v. Douglas, 7 C. & P. 626. R. v. Lovett, 9 C. & P. 462. Burdett v. Abbot, 5 Dow, H. L. 201; 14 East, 1. And this is so, although the editor has cut the article up, omitting the most libellous passages and only publishing the remainder. Tarpley v. Blabey, 2 Bing. N. C. 437; 2 Scott, 642; 1 Hodges, 414; 7 C. & P. 395. Pierce v. Ellis, 6 Ir. C. L. R. 55. Strader v. Stryder, 67 Ill. 404. If I compose a libel and leave it inside my desk among my papers, and my clerk surreptitiously takes a copy and sends it to the newspapers, he is liable, but I am not, for the damage caused thereby. For although he could not have taken a copy had I not first written the libel, still its subsequent publication in print is caused entirely by my clerk's own independent and wrongful act, for the consequences of which he alone is liable. Secus, if I in any way encouraged or contrived his taking a copy, knowing that he would be sure to publish it in the newspapers. A newspaper reporter told defendant he should send defendant's statements to the paper for publication. Defendant replied, "Let them go." Held, that defendant had published them in the paper. Clay v. People, 86 Ill. 147. So where Cooper told the editor several good stories against the Rev. J. K., and asked him to 66 show Mr. K. up;" and subsequently the editor published the substance of them in the newspaper, and Cooper read it and expressed his approval; this was held a publication by Cooper, although the editor knew of the facts from other quarters as well. R. v. Cooper, 15 L. J. Q. B. 206; 8 Q. B. 533. And see Adams v. Kelly, Ry. & Moo. 157; and the judgments of At the meeting of a board of guardians, at which reporters were present, it was stated that the plaintiff had turned his daughter out of doors, and that she consequently had been admitted into the workhouse and had become chargeable to the parish. Ellis, one of the guardians, said, "I hope the local press will take notice of this very scandalous case," and requested the chairman, Prescott, to give an outline of it. This Prescott did, remarking, "I am glad gentlemen of the press are in the room, and I hope they will give publicity to the matter." Ellis added, "And so do I." From the notes taken in the room the reporters prepared a condensed account, which appeared in the local newspapers, and which, though partly in the reporter's own language, was substantially a correct report of what took place at the meeting. Held, by the majority of the Court of Exchequer Chamber (Montague Smith, Keating, and Hannen, JJ., Byles and Mellor, JJ., dissenting), that Martin, B., was wrong in directing the jury that there was no evidence to go to the jury that Prescott and Ellis had directed the publication of the account which appeared in the papers. [N.B.-Of the six judges concerned, three were of one opinion, three of the other.] Parkes v. Prescott and Ellis, L. R. 4 Ex. 169; 38 L. J. Ex. 105; 17 W. R. 773; 20 L. T. 537. The defendants were the trustees of a trade union, called The General Railway Workers' Union. They entered into a written agreement with the proprietors and publishers of a newspaper called The Railway Workmen's Times. The agreement provided that the proprietors of the paper should print and publish for the Union every week a special edition of The Workmen's Times under the style and title of "The Railway Workmen's Times, the organ of the General Railway Workers' Union;" and that the secretary of the Union should furnish to the proprietors of The Workmen's Times matter to fill up one page of the said special edition each week. The editor was to have full and free liberty to reject wholly or partially any matter supplied by the secretary, or to vary it as he might think best, and with a view to fulfilling the provisions of the Newspaper Libel Act. This agreement, though the defendants were therein described in their representative capacity of trustees for the Union, was signed by them personally without any limitation. Held, that the defendants were personally liable for the publication of a libel supplied by the secretary of the Union and published in the special weekly edition of The Workmen's Times. Rapkins v. Hall and others, (1894) 10 Times L. R. 466. It is on this principle that the proprietor of a newspaper is always liable for whatever appears in its columns: for he has given general orders to his men to print whatever the editor passes and sends into the printing department. The editor is on the same principle responsible for all matter which he sends to press. It is of no avail for either proprietor or editor to plead that he never read the libellous words; for they have both in fact ordered the compositors. to set them up in type, and their other employés to print and circulate them. So a master-printer is liable for all that his men print. Illustrations. The proprietor of a newspaper is always liable for whatever appears in its columns; although the publication may have been made without his knowledge and in his absence. R. v. Walter, 3 Esp. 21. Storey v. Wallace, 11 Ill. 51. Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 10. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., (1902) 4 F. 645 (Ct. of Session). Surely a person who derives profit from, and who furnishes means for, carrying on the concern, and intrusts the conduct of the publication to one whom he selects, and in whom he confides, may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and ought to be answerable, although you cannot show that he was individually concerned in the particular publication.” Tenterden, C.J., in R. v. Gutch and others, Moo. & Malk. 548. But now in criminal cases, see 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 7, post, p. 548. Per Lord R. v. Holbrook and others, 3 Q. B. D. 60; 4 Q. B. D. 42; 47 L. J. Q. B. 35; 48 L. J. Q. B. 113; 26 W. R. 144; 27 W. R. 313; 37 L. T. 530; 39 L. T. 536. So is the printer; though he had no knowledge of the contents. R. v. Dover, 6 How. St. Tr. 547; and see 2 Atkyns, at p. 472. So, in England, the acting editor is always held liable. Watts v. Fraser and another, 7 C. & P. 369; 7 Ad. & E. 223; 1 M. & In America, however, though the proprietor and printer of a paper are always held liable, the editor is, it would seem, allowed to plead as a defence that the libel was inserted without his orders and against his will. The Commonwealth v. Kneeland, Thacher's C. C. 346. Or without any knowledge on his part that the article was a libel on any particular individual. Smith v. Ashley, (1846) 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 367. The proprietor of a newspaper is liable even for an advertisement inserted and paid for in the ordinary course of business; although the plaintiff is bringing another action against the advertiser at the same time. Harrison v. Pearce, 1 F. & F. 567; 32 L. T. (Old S.) 298. "If you look upon the editor as a person who has published a libellous advertisement incautiously, of course, he is liable." Per Pollock, C.B., in Keyzor and another v. Newcomb, 1 F. & F. 559. Every one who writes, prints, or publishes a libel, or is in any way responsible for its being written, printed, or published, may be sued by the person defamed. And to such an action it is no defence that another wrote it, or that it was printed or published by the desire or procurement of another, whether that other be made a defendant to the action or not. All concerned in publishing the libel or in procuring it to be published are equally responsible for all damages which flow from the joint publication, whether the author be sued or not. If the libel appear in a newspaper, the proprietor, the editor, the printer, and the publisher are all liable to be sued, either separately or together; and each defendant is liable for all the ensuing damage, for there is no contribution between tort-feasors. So that the proprietor of a paper sued jointly with his careless editor or |