Arson. "I never set my premises on fire," was held sufficiently clear in Cutler v. Cutler, 10 J. P. 169. 64 But see Sweetapple v. Jesse, 5 B. & Ad. 27; 2 N. & M. 36. Barham's Case, 4 Rep. 20; Yelv. 21. • Did he have a fire twice? He is a funny fellow." Held, insufficient in the absence of a proper innuendo. Jacobs v. Schmaltz, (1890) 62 L. T. 121; 6 Times L. R. 155. Embezzlement. "He made a few hundreds in my service-God only knows whether honestly or otherwise," is a sufficient imputation of embezzlement. Clegg v. Laffer, 3 Moore & Sc. 727; 10 Bing. 250. Larceny. The following words are a sufficient charge of larceny : "Baker stole my box-wood, and I will prove it." It was argued that it did not appear from the words that the box-wood was not growing; and that to cut down and remove growing timber is a trespass only, not a larceny. But the Court gave judgment for the plaintiff, holding that "ex vi termini" stealing "did import felony." Baker v. Pierce, 2 Ld. Raym. 959; 6 Mod. 23; Holt, 654. Overruling Mason v. Thompson, Hutt. 38. Gybbons asked May: "Have you brought home the forty pounds you stole ?" Held, that an action lay. May v. Gybbons, Cro. Jac. 568. "Thou hast stolen our bees, and thou art a thief." After verdict it was contended that larceny cannot be committed of bees, unless they be hived; but the Court held that the subsequent words " thou art a thief" showed that the larceny imputed was of such bees as could be stolen. Tibbs v. Smith, 3 Salk. 325; Sir Thos. Raym. 33. 'Thou art a corn-stealer" held sufficient, in spite of the objection might be that the corn was growing, and so no felony." Anon., (1597) Cro. Eliz. 563. Smith v. Ward, (1624) Cro. Jac. 674. "that it So a charge of being "privy and consenting to" a larceny is actionable. Mot et ux. v. Butler, Cro. Car. 236. "He is a pickpocket; he picked my pocket of my money," was once held an insufficient charge of larceny. Watts v. Rymes, 2 Lev. 31; 1 Ventr. 213; 3 Salk. 325. But now this would clearly be held sufficient. Baker v. Pierce, suprà. Stebbing v. Warner, 11 Mod. 255. "He was put into the round-house for stealing ducks at Crowland.” Beavor v. Hides, 2 Wilson, 300. "You have been cropped for felony." Wiley v. Campbell, 5 Monroe (19 Kentucky), 396. But it is not actionable to say "You as good as stole the canoe." Stokes v. Arey, 8 Jones (North Carolina), 66. Or, "A man that would do that would steal." Stees v. Kemble, 27 Penn. St. (3 Casey) 112. Or, "If you have got money you stole it. I believe you will steal." Το Receiving Stolen Goods. say, "I have been robbed of three dozen winches; you bought two, one at 38., one at 28.; you knew well when you bought them that they cost me three times as much making as you gave for them, and that they could not have been honestly come by," is a sufficient charge of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen. [An indictment which merely alleged that the prisoner knew the goods were not honestly come by would be bad. R. v. Wilson, 2 Mood. C. C. 52.] Alfred v. Farlow, 8 Q. B. 854; 15 L. J. Q. B. 258; 10 Jur. 714. King v. Bagg, Cro. Jac. 331. Bigamy. Mrs. Heming was sister to Mr. Alleyne. The defendant said :-" It has been ascertained beyond all doubt that Mr. Alleyne and Mrs. Heming are not brother and sister, but man and wife." Held, that it was open to the jury to construe this as a charge of bigamy as well as of incest. Heming and wife v. Power, 10 M. & W. 564. Perjury. "I will make thee an example, for a perjured knave." Comyns' Digest, Defamation E. 1. "You are forsworn," without more, is insufficient. Stanhope v. Blith, (1585) 4 Rep. 15. Holt v. Scholefield, 6 T. R. 691. Hall v. Weedon, 8 D. & R. 140. But to write and publish that they "did not scruple to turn affidavit-men" is sufficient. Roach v. Garvan, Re Read and Huggonson, (1742) 2 Atk. 469; 2 Dick. 794. "Thou art forsworn in a court of record, and that I will prove," was held sufficient, though it was argued after verdict that he might only have been talking in the court-house and so forsworn himself; but the Court held that the words would naturally mean forsworn while giving evidence in some judicial proceeding in a court of record. Ceely v. Hoskins, (1639) Cro. Car. 509, practically overruling Plaintiff had recently given evidence in an action against defendant, who thereupon wrote and published of him :-"The man at the sign of the Bible is no slouch at swearing to an old story." Held, that if these words did not amount to a charge of actual perjury, they at least imputed that he swore with levity without due regard to the solemnity of an oath, and therefore, being written, were actionable. Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (New York) 214; see post, p. 147. Conspiracy. "He had, in conjunction with his sister, broken open a box belonging to his wife." No innuendo. These words were held not to amount to a charge of a criminal conspiracy. Lemon v. Simmons, (1888) 57 L. J. Q. B. 260; 36 W. R. 351; 4 Times But see O'Connell v. Mansfield, 9 Irish L. R. 179. False Pretences. The words," He has defrauded a mealman of a roan horse," held not to imply a criminal act of fraud, as it is not stated that the mealman was induced to part with his property by means of any false pretence. Richardson v. Allen, 2 Chit. 657. Needham v. Dowling, 15 L. J. C. P. 9. Blackmailing. It is actionable to say of A. that he brought a blackmailing action against B. Marks v. Samuel, (1904) 2 K. B. 287; 73 L. J. K. B. 587; 53 W. R. 88; 90 L. T. 590; 20 Times L. R. 430. Attempt to Commit a Felony. The following words were held sufficient: - "He sought to murder me, and I can prove it." Preston v. Pinder, Cro. Eliz. 308. She would have cut her husband's throat, and did attempt it." Scot et ux. v. Hilliar, Lane, 98; 1 Vin. Abr. 440. The following insufficient : "Thou wouldst have killed me." 66 Dr. Poe's Case, cited in Murrey's Case, 2 Buls. 206; 1 Vin. Abr. 440. Sir Harbert Crofts keepeth men to rob me." Sir Harbert Crofts v. Brown, 3 Buls. 167. "He would have robbed me." Stoner v. Audely, Cro. Eliz. 250. For here no overt act is charged, and mere intention is not criminal. Other instances of a criminal charge indirectly made will be found in Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East, 463; 2 Smith, 28. Where words clearly refer to the plaintiff's office and his conduct therein, or otherwise clearly touch and injure him therein, it is unnecessary that the defendant should expressly name his office or restrict his words thereto; it shall be intended that he was speaking of him in the way of his office or trade. To say Illustrations. of a clerk, "He cozened his master," is actionable, though the defendant did not expressly state that the cozening was done in the execution of the clerk's official duties; that will be intended. Reignald's Case, (1640) Cro. Car. 563. Reeve v. Holgate, (1672) 2 Lev. 62. To say of a trader, "He has been arrested for debt," is actionable, though no express reference be made to his trade at the time of publication; for such words must necessarily affect his credit in his trade, whatever it was. Jones v. Littler, 7 M. & W. 423; 10 L. J. Ex. 171. So where the plaintiff was charged with being "a public robber; " it was held, in Canada, that it was not necessary for him to aver that he was in any office, trade, or employment in which he could have robbed the public. Taylor v. Carr, 3 Up. Can. Q. B. Rep. 306. It is not necessary that the imputation on the plaintiff should be stated explicitly in so many words, or expressed in direct and positive language. Frequently the defendant only hints at or insinuates his meaning. He may try to guard himself by prefixing such words as "I think," "I understand," or "I hear so-and-so; "but this will not avail him. If an actionable imputation be in fact conveyed, it does not matter how it was expressed. "The stereotyped formulas of slander' they say,' 'it is said,' 'it is generally believed,' are about as effectual modes of blasting reputation as distinctly and directly to charge the crime." (Per cur. in Johnson v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 65 Missouri, at p. 541.) Illustrations. The following words have been held to convey an imputation with sufficient certainty and precision: 66 Master Halley is infected of the robbery and murder lately committed, and doth smell of the murder." Halley v. Sidenham, (1572) Dyer, 318. 'Kempe will be within these two days a bankrupt.” Kempe's Case, (1553) Dyer, 72. “I heard a bird sing that you had committed a felony," or "I dreamed so." Per Lord North, C.J., in Earl of Peterborough v. Mordant, (1669) 1 Lev. 277. "I believe all is not well with Daniel Vivian; there be many merchants who have lately failed, and I expect no otherwise of Daniel Vivian;" for this is a charge of present pecuniary embarrassment. Vivian v. Willet, 3 Salk. 326; Sir Thos. Raym. 207; 2 Keble, 718. Two dyers are gone off, and for aught I know Harrison will be so too within this twelvemonth." Harrison v. Thornborough, 10 Mod. 196; Gilb. Cas. 114. "He has become so inflated with self-importance by the few hundreds made in my service-God only knows whether honestly or otherwise; " for the speaker clearly means to insinuate that they were made dishonestly. Clegg v. Laffer, 3 Moore & Sc. 727; 10 Bing. 250. "I think in my conscience if Sir John might have his will, he would kill the king;" for this is a charge of compassing the king's death. Sidnam v. Mayo, 1 Roll. Rep. 427; Cro. Jac. 407. Peake v. Oldham, Cowp. 275; 2 Wm. Bl. 959; ante, p. 134. It is actionable to say, "I am of opinion that such a Privy Councillor is a traitor," or "I think such a judge is corrupt." Per Wyndham and Scroggs, JJ., and North, C.J., in Lord Townshend v. Dr. Hughes, 2 Mod. 166. So where the defendant, on hearing that his barns were burnt down, said, "I cannot imagine who it should be but the Lord Sturton." Lord Sturton v. Chaffin, (1563) Moore, 142. "I have every reason to believe he burnt the barn" is actionable. Logan v. Steele, 1 Bibb (Kentucky), 593. It is the general opinion of the people in Jones's neighbourhood that he burnt C.'s house" is actionable. Waters v. Jones, 3 Port. (Alabama), 442. To state that criminal proceedings are about to be taken against the plaintiff (e.g., that the Attorney-General had directed a certain attorney to prosecute him for perjury) is actionable, although the speaker does not expressly assert that the plaintiff is guilty of the charge. Roberts v. Camden, 9 East, 93. Tempest v. Chambers, 1 Stark. 67. But where the defendant said, "I have a suspicion that you and B. have robbed my house, and therefore I take you into custody," the jury found that the words did not amount to a direct charge of felony, but only indicated what was passing in defendant's mind (ante, p. 42). Tozer v. Mashford, 6 Exch. 539; 20 L. J. Ex. 225. Harrison v. King, 4 Price, 46; 7 Taunt. 431; 1 B. & Ald. 161. No action lies for such words as "Thou deservest to be hanged; " for here no fact is asserted against the plaintiff. Hake v. Molton, Roll. Abr. 43. Cockaine v. Hopkins, 2 Lev. 214. "If you have got money, you stole it. I believe you will steal words as will sustain an action. McKee v. Ingalls, 4 Scam. (Illinois), 30. are not such A defamatory charge may be insinuated in a question, e.g.: "We should be glad to know how many popish priests enter the nunneries at Scorton and Darlington each week, and also how many infants are born in them every year, and what becomes of them, whether the holy fathers bring them up or not, or whether the innocents are murdered out of hand or not." |