entitled to an injunction and to damages, which were subsequently assessed at 7007. Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., (1893) 1 Ch. 413; 62 L. J. Ch. 196; 41 W. R. 217; 67 L. T. 696; 2 R. 179; 9 R. P. C. 406; (1894) 2 Ch. 581; 63 L. J. Ch. 826; 71 L. T. 110; 8 R. 455; 10 R. P. C. 1. IV. Other Words which Injure a Man in his Profession or Trade. There are many other cases in which words produce special damage to the plaintiff in his business without in any way affecting either his personal or his commercial reputation; and for such words, if spoken without lawful occasion, an action on the case will lie, provided the damage be the necessary or probable consequence of the words. Illustrations. The County Herald printed and published that the plaintiff had ceased to carry on his business of engineer and boiler-maker, and that the firm of Ratcliffe & Sons no longer existed. This statement was untrue, and the plaintiff's business fell off in consequence. The jury found that the words did not reflect upon the plaintiff's character, and were not libellous; that they were not published bonâ fide; and that the plaintiff's business suffered injury to the extent of 1207. from their publication. Judgment for the plaintiff for 1201. damages with costs. Ratcliffe v. Evans, (1892) 2 Q. B. 524 ; 61 L. J. Q. B. 535; 40 W. R. 578; 66 L. T. 794; 56 J. P. 837. The plaintiff and the defendant were architects, who formerly carried on business in partnership, and as such they joined in, designed, and supervised the construction of many important buildings in London. Immediately after the dissolution of their partnership the defendant circulated photographs of these buildings, with the words below: "Designed by Thomas Archer, F.R.I.B.A.,” omitting all reference to the plaintiff. Held, that no action lay, for the omission of the plaintiff's name was no libel on him; and there was no slander of title and no special damage. Green v. Archer, (1891) 7 Times L. R. 542. There are two kinds of Australian hardwood, "karri" and "jarrah." The plaintiffs dealt in "jarrah" only; the defendants dealt in both. The defendants advertised that they were "the only importers of both;" and two learned judges held that this advertisement might be taken to mean that the plaintiffs did not deal in either, and that if so, an action might lie. Grantham, J., dissented. Jarrahdale Timber Co. v. Temperley & Co., (1894) 11 Times L. R. 119. Procuring a breach of contract of sale by a false claim of lien is an actionable wrong. Green v. Button, 2 C. M. & R. 707. The plaintiff was making money at Glasgow by printing silk handkerchiefs with an ornamental design; the defendant, hoping to acquire that design for himself, falsely represented to the plaintiff that it was a registered pattern, that the true owner had compelled him to give up the plaintiff's name, and was about to proceed against the plaintiff in Chancery for an injunction; the plaintiff, naturally alarmed, stayed the execution of certain orders in hand for handkerchiefs with that design, and travelled up to London to explain matters to the supposed true owner; the defendant meanwhile went on printing and selling silk handkerchiefs printed with the design. Held, that the plaintiff had a good cause of action, it appearing that the defendant had knowingly uttered a falsehood with intent to deprive the plaintiff of a benefit and acquire it to himself, as the damage naturally flowed from the plaintiff's belief in the truth of the defendant's statement. Barley v. Walford, (1846) 9 Q. B. 197; 15 L. J. Q. B. 369; 10 Jur. 917. The defendant uttered words imputing adultery to Mrs. Riding, and certain customers ceased to deal with Mr. Riding in consequence. Mr. and Mrs. Riding as co-plaintiffs brought an action of slander, but at that time it was not actionable to impute adultery to a married woman unless the words caused special damage to her. The Court therefore struck out her name as a plaintiff and amended the declaration so that it ran "that the plaintiff carried on business as a grocer and draper, and was assisted in the conduct of his business by his wife, and that the defendant falsely and maliciously published of-the plaintiff's wife in relation to the business that she had committed adultery, whereby the plaintiff was injured in his business and sustained special damage" And the Court held that on a declaration so framed an action might be maintained... Riding v. Smith, 1 Ex. D. 91; 45 L. J. Ex. 281; 24 W. R. 487; 3+ And in the same case (1 Ex. D., p. 94) Kelly, C.B., says: "Here the statement was that the wife of the plaintiff was guilty of adultery, and it is the natural consequence of such a statement that persons should cease to resort to the shop. Supposing the statement made not to be slander, but something else calculated to injure the shopkeeper in the way of his trade, as, for instance, the statement that one of his shopmen was suffering from an infectious disease, such as scarlet fever, this would operate to prevent people coming to the shop; and whether it be slander or some other statement which has the effect I have mentioned, an action can, in my opinion, be maintained on the ground that it is a statement made to the public which would have the effect of preventing their resorting to the shop and buying goods of the owner." And see Levet's Case, Cro. Eliz. 289; ante, p. 63. Baldwin v. Flower, 3 Mod. 120; post, p. 335. It is actionable to put a man's name on a "black list," with the object of inducing people not to have business dealings with him, or with the object of bringing him into public odium and contempt. Trollope & Sons v. London Building Trades Federation, (1895) 72 L. T. 342; 11 Times L. R. 228, 280. Same v. Same, (1896) 12 Times L. R. 373. Leathem v. Craig and others, (1899) 2 Ir. R. 667. Newton v. Amalgamated Musicians' Union, (1896) 12 Times L. R. 623. The defendant was a retail dealer in pianos. He advertised for sale in a newspaper a new piano of the plaintiffs' manufacture at the price at which the plaintiffs supplied the same to the trade, and thereby caused other dealers to give up dealing with the plaintiffs. He continued the advertisement after he ceased to have in stock any pianos of the plaintiffs' manufacture, and after the plaintiffs had refused to supply him. He expected to be able to acquire pianos of the plaintiffs from other dealers. Held, as the defendant honestly intended to sell the pianos at the price named, he had a legal right to issue the advertisement; and that though the advertisement amounted to an implied representation that the defendant had in his possession a piano of the advertised description, which latterly was not the case, this representation was not the cause of the damage to the plaintiffs' trade, and consequently gave no right of action. Ajello v. Worsley, (1898) 1 Ch. 274; 67 L. J. Ch. 172; 46 W. R. 245; 77 L. T. 783. V. Other Words which cause Damage. Words which injure a man's reputation are defamatory, and give rise to an action of libel or slander. Words which impugn his title to property or injure him in his profession or trade are actionable in the cases indicated in the preceding pages of this chapter. There remain words which do not affect a man's reputation, profession, or trade, but which yet cause him special damage. It is submitted that if such words are written or spoken by the defendant with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, and the contemplated injury follows as the direct result of the defendant's words, an action on the case will lie whatever be the nature of the words which the defendant has employed to carry into effect his malicious design. A curious point of this kind was raised and discussed in the case of Kelly v. Partington, 4 B. & Ad. 700; 5 B. & Ad. 645, decided in 1833. The Solicitor-General (Sir John Campbell) contended that, if praise produced special damage, praise was actionable, an argument with which the Court appeared much amused. Littledale, J., puts him a case (p. 648), "Suppose a man had a relation of a penurious disposition, and a third person, knowing that it would injure him in the opinion of that relation, tells the latter generous act which the first had done, by which he induces the relation not to leave him money, would that be actionable?" And Sir John Campbell answers, "If the words were spoken falsely with intent to injure, they would be actionable." And surely he is right. It might be difficult to prove the intent with which the words were spoken. But if a malicious intent be clear, the damage is not too remote, for the defendant contemplated it; and the speaking of the words was wrongful because done maliciously, falsely, and with intent to injure the plaintiff; so here is et damnum et injuria, and an action lies. Illustrations. A solicitor, who was one of the creditors of a bankrupt firm, advertised, for the information of all other creditors, that the plaintiff was a partner in that firm, and was solvent. The plaintiff was solvent, but he was not a partner in Malins, V.-C., granted an injunction. the bankrupt firm. Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 488; 17 W. R. 482; 20 L. T. 357. An action will lie for persuading, procuring, and enticing a married woman to continue absent and apart from her husband, whereby he loses the comfort and society of his wife, and her aid and assistance in domestic affairs. Winsmore v. Greenbank, (1745) Willes Rep. (Common Pleas) 577. 291. Smith v. Kaye and another, (1904) 20 Times L. R. 261. The defendant told the plaintiff, a married woman, that her husband had met with an accident and had broken both his legs. These statements were false to the knowledge of the defendant, but were made as a practical joke by him with the intent that they should be believed. The plaintiff became seriously ill as a result of shock to the nervous system caused by the publication of the words. Held, by Wright, J., that an action lay. Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q. B. 57; 66 L. J. Q. B. 493; 45 W. R. 525; 76 L. T. 493. And see R. v. Martin, 8 Q. B. D. 54; 51 L. J. M. C. 36; 30 W. R. 106; 45 L. T. 444; 46 J. P. 228; 14 Cox C. C. 633. CHAPTER V. CONSTRUCTION AND CERTAINTY. CONSTRUCTION is the correct interpretation of words, the method of ascertaining the sense in which they were understood by those who first heard or read them. What meaning the speaker intended to convey is immaterial in all actions of defamation. (Haire v. Wilson, 9 B. & C. 645.) He may have had no intention of injuring the plaintiff's reputation, but if he has in fact done so, he must compensate the plaintiff. He may have meant one thing and said another; if so, he is answerable for so inadequately expressing his meaning. If a man in jest conveys a serious imputation, he jests at his peril. (Per Smith, B., in Donoghue v. Hayes, (1831) Hayes (Irish Exch.) at p. 266.) Or he may have used ambiguous language which to his mind was harmless, but to which the bystanders attributed an injurious meaning; if so, he is liable for the injudicious. phrase he selected. What was passing in his own mind is immaterial, save in so far as his hearers could perceive it at the time. Words cannot be construed according to the secret intent of the speaker. (Hankinson v. Bilby, 16 M. & W. 445; 2 C. & K. 440.) "The slander and the damage consist in the apprehension of the hearers." (Per cur. in Fleetwood v. Curley, (1619) Hobart, 268.) The question therefore is always: How were the words understood by those to whom they were originally published? We must assume that they were persons of ordinary intelligence. We must assume, too, that they gave to ordinary English words their ordinary English meaning, to local or technical phrases their local and technical meaning. That being done, what meaning did the whole passage convey to an unbiassed mind? |