PART I. THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER. CHAPTER I. DEFAMATORY WORDS. No man may disparage or destroy the reputation of another. Every man has a right to have his good name maintained unimpaired. This right is a jus in rem, a right absolute and good against all the world. Words which produce, in any given case, appreciable injury to the reputation of another are called DEFAMATORY. Defamatory 'words, if false, are actionable. False defamatory words; if written and published, constitute a libel; if spoken, a slander.. Words which on the face of them must injure the reputation of the person to whom they refer, are clearly defamatory, and, if false, are actionable, without proof that any particular damage has followed from their use. Words, on the other hand, which merely might tend to injure the reputation of another are prima facie not defamatory, and even though false are not actionable, unless as a matter of fact some appreciable injury has followed from their use. Illustrations. 66 To say "A. is a coward," or "a liar," or a rascal," is not defamatory, unless it can be proved that some one seriously believed and acted on the assertion, to the prejudice of A. Such words, though false, are not actionable without some evidence to show that A.'s reputation has as a matter of fact been actually impaired thereby. De minimis non curat lex. O.L.S. B To say of B.:-" He forged his master's signature to a cheque for 1007." is clearly defamatory, and, if false, actionable. It must injure B.'s reputation to bring such a specific charge against him. No general rule can be laid down defining absolutely and once for all what words are defamatory, and what are not. Words which would seriously injure A.'s reputation, might do no harm to B.'s. Each case must be decided mainly on its own facts. In each case the question will be: Have the defendant's words appreciably injured the plaintiff's reputation? Such injury may be either (i) presumed from the nature of the words themselves; or (ii) proved by evidence of their consequences. (i) It will be presumed from the nature of the words themselves, (a) if the words, being written and published or printed and published, disparage the plaintiff or tend to bring him into ridicule and contempt. (b) if the words, being spoken, (1) charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime;.. (2). impute to the plaintiff a contagious disorder (4) impute unchastity or adultery to any woman In all these cases the words are said to be actionable per se, because on the face of them they clearly must have injured the plaintiff's reputation. (ii) But in all other cases of spoken words, the fact that the plaintiff's reputation has been injured thereby, must be proved at the trial by evidence of the consequences that directly resulted from their utterance. Such evidence is called "evidence of special damage," as distinguished from that general damage which the law assumes, without express proof, to follow from the employment of words. actionable per se. If in any given case the words employed by the defendant have appreciably injured the plaintiff's reputation, the plaintiff has suffered an injury which is actionable without proof of any other damage. Every man has an absolute right to have his person, his property, and his reputation, preserved inviolate. And just as any invasion of a man's property is actionable without proof of any pecuniary loss, so is any actual disparagement of his good name. "His reputation is his property, and, if possible, more valuable than other property." (Per Malins, V.-C., in Dixon v. Holden, L. R. 7 Eq. 492; 17 W. R. 482; 20 L. T. 357.) "Indeed, if we reflect on the degree of suffering occasioned by loss of character, and compare it with that occasioned by loss of property, the amount of the former injury far exceeds that of the latter." (Per Best, C.J., in De Crespigny v. Wellesley, 5 Bing. at p. 406.) Often, too, a man's livelihood depends on his reputation. Whenever, therefore, the words are such that they will necessarily injure the reputation of the plaintiff, they are defamatory on the face of them, and actionable per se. But in many cases of slander it is by no means clear from the words themselves that they must have injured the plaintiff's reputation, e.g., where the words are merely idle abuse or expressions of contempt which injure no man's credit; in such cases, therefore, the Court requires proof of some special damage to show that as a matter of fact the words have in this case impaired the plaintiff's good name. The injury to the plaintiff's reputation is the gist of the action; and where this is not obvious, he must prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he has in fact sustained some appreciable damage for which compensation can be assessed. Illustrations. To say of A., "He is a forger and a felon," or "He hath the French pox," to call a physician a quack, or a tradesman a bankrupt, to say of a magistrate that he is a corrupt judge, is in each case actionable without proof of special damage. A fortiori, if the words be written, or printed, and published. To call a man a rogue, a fool, or a blackguard, is not actionable, without proof of special damage, if the words be spoken only; but is actionable per se, if the accusation be reduced into writing and published to the world. Thus the presumption that words are defamatory arises much more easily in cases of libel than in cases of slander. Many words which if printed and published would be presumed to have injured the plaintiff's reputation, will not be actionable per se, if merely spoken. Two reasons are usually given for this distinction: 1. A slander may be uttered in the heat of a moment, and under a sudden provocation; the reduction of the charge into writing and the subsequent publication of a libel show greater deliberation and malice. 2. Vox emissa volat; litera scripta manet. The written or printed matter is permanent, and no one can tell into whose hands it may come. Every one now can read. The circulation of a newspaper is enormous, and many people implicitly believe every word they see in print. And even a private letter may turn up in after years, and reach persons for whom it was never intended, and so do incalculable mischief. Whereas a slander only reaches the immediate bystanders, who can observe the manner and note the tone of the speaker, who have heard the rest of the conversation which may greatly qualify his assertion,-who probably are acquainted with the speaker, and know what value is to be attached to any charge made by him; the mischief is thus much less in extent, and the publicity less durable. This sharp distinction between slander and libel has been recognised in English law by Hale, C.B., in King v. Lake, (1678) Hardres, 470; by Lord Hardwicke, C.J., in Bradley v. Methwyn, Selw. N. P. 982; by Sir James Mansfield, C.J., in Thorley v. Lord Kerry, (1812) 4 Taunt. 355; 3 Camp. 214, n., and in numerous other cases, and is far too well established to be ever shaken. The intention or motive with which the words were employed is, as a rule, immaterial. If the defendant has in fact injured the plaintiff's reputation, he is liable, although he did not intend so to do, and had no such purpose in his mind when he wrote or spoke the words. Every man must be presumed to know and to intend the natural and ordinary consequences of his acts: and this presumption (if indeed it is ever rebuttable) is not rebutted merely by proof that at the time he published the words the defendant did not attend to or think of their natural or probable consequences, or hoped or expected that these consequences would not follow. Such proof can only go to mitigate the damages. Sometimes, however, it is a man's duty to speak fully |