1000 years. And at the end of the latter period, shall we find it a whit less possible to conceive generation to proceed to any assignable period? Nay, conceive it (which is as much within the limit of possibility as the first supposition) to have proceeded to the last limit that can be numbered, yet we see no reason for saying that here successive generation must stop; in fact we feel that such an assertion would be absurd. Well, then, if it be possible that successive generation may exist beyond any assignable period, it may exist through eternity to come, it may have existed through a past eternity. There is no more difficulty in the one supposition than the other. Any hypothesis as to the production of animals by any changes or convulsions in the globe are more conjectural than probable, and when reared, independent of facts, rest upon very sandy foundations, but the reasoning just insisted on, is as logical as metaphysics will allow.

I am surprised that Mr. H. should represent matter as an inert substance, which possesses within itself neither form nor activity, when the discoveries of natural philosophers have proved that there is no part, but is in a state of activity; that every part of matter is in motion; that it is never, for a single instant, at rest; and that motion is inseperably connected with, and evidently one of its properties. Indeed, what is motion without matter? Nothing. Matter and motion, I have no hesitation in affirming, though I may be sneered at, do to all appearance, arrange between them, the events and circumstances of eternal ages, and the order and disorder of a boundless universe, uniting in themselves both causes and effects; both of them passive, yet both active, both insensible but neither as a whole intelligent.

In the 11th paragraph Mr. H. expresses his agreement with me in the proposition, that it is man's interest to be virtuous;" but he does not think that he who understands his interest best is most virtuous, and asserts that the prospect of a future reward is a very important if not absolutely necessary, stimulus, even to a virtuous mind. He accuses me of interpolating a passage of his with the words "(to a well constituted mind") which he protests against,as giving an unfair version of the original text. He acquits me of an intentional interpolation, for which I feel obliged to him, as nothing was farther from my intention than taking any unfair advantage. But on turning to the third paragraph of Mr. H.'s lecture, I find the following words. "It is, say these philosophers, a man's present interest to be virtuous; and the consciousness of acting right, is an ample reward

TO A WELL CONSTITUTED MIND." And this position he immediately attempts to disprove as a reference to his lecture will shew, and will fully justify my version of the text. And though he does not attempt to prove "that the consciousness of integrity (to a well constituted mind) without the prospect of future reward would be an INsufficient stimulus to virtuous conduct, yet he takes some pains to prove that it is NOT sufficient, and I cannot yet distinguish the difference in the meaning, He says that there is an essential difference between requiring a stimulus to virtue, and being charmed with vice. To a person perfectly aware of the advantages of virtue and the evil consequences of vice, the latter could have no charms for him, for the connexion would appear so inseperable that it would destroy all inclination that might be produced by its inviting appearance. A man passionately fond of fruit would not taste of the most luscious grapes, if he knew that the indulgence of his appetite would cause the amputation of a limb. Virtue, to a person properly apprized of its great advantages, will appear so charming, as to render any other stimulus unnecessary.

In the 12th paragraph, Mr. H. appears to understand the word knowledge in a sense very different to that in which I use it. I do not look upon literature as synonimous with knowledge, nor think a person ignorant because he is illiterate. I think a man may be a great linguist or an eminent mathematician, and be very deficient in that sort of science which includes a correct knowledge of his own interest. I admit that literature and the sciences are calculated to increase greatly both the mental and physical enjoyments of their possessors, but high, very high, attainments in them are not always accompanied with a knowledge of the science of morals; but, when a man's acquisitions include the whole, he will be a very useful and happy man indeed. He will be virtuous in a very superior degree, and I therefore maintain that virtue and knowledge are inseperable; so also are vice and ignorance; that the generality of believers meet death more with apprehension and fear than with hope and joy, Mr. H. says is a very broad and bold assertion, but directly contrary to history, observation and fact. I for my part, am perfectly willing to abide by their decision. I have read the history of Christian martyrs and confessors, and I have also read of the martyrs and confessors of other religions and 'those of no religion at all. And what does the whole prove? that the feelings of men and women may be excited to any pitch and by almost any means. If the

martyrdom, or joyous death of a Christian is to be cited as a proof of the strong hope of a future reward, I suppose that the hope of the poor wretch who throws himself beneath the wheels of the car of the bloody and obscene Lingam of Hindostan, or that of the North American Savage, who sings under his tortures and, insultingly defies the malice and ingenuity of his tormentors, will be equally just and well founded. But amidst the thousands and tens of thousands who have triumphed in the glorious prospect of future reward, the millions of believers who cling to life with the tenacity of despair and die with doubt and apprehension, are thrown aside in the calculation. Religion is the offspring of fear, and is inseperable from its parent. If I take my arguinent from history, observation, and facts, I am directly told to seperate christianity from its corruptions and the wicked practices of bad men which Mr. H. says do not belong to or result from those exalted doctrines which breathe nothing but the purest love to God and man. In my reply to the 5th paragraph, I shewed that these doctrines are not so pure in their breathings as is here asserted, and though especial regard may be exhibited in them towards the deity, yet the happiness of man is clearly of very subordinate importance. But why must I be compelled to take Christianity otherwise than I find it, a mass of institutions, and practices, which have been the curse and degradation of mankind. Paganism, Mahometanism, Brahminism, nay every superstition, that ever infested man would have nothing but excellent qualities in it, if we take away all that is vicious. Henbane would most probably be a nourishing plant if its deleterious properties were extracted. Martyrdom itself proves nothing, but the sincerity and enthusiasm of the martyr, nay in some cases it will not prove even that, for some have fled from martyrdom, whom shame has brought back to the stake in order to recover a lost reputation. Some men notoriously vicious have suffered martyrdom in the early ages of Christianity, it being believed by great numbers, that it purged the sinner of all crime and was an immediate passport to immortality. And though it may be admitted that the prospect of future reward did excite to martyrdom; yet, in how few instances can it be proved that such prospect was an incentive to a moral and virtuous life! The reader of "Middleton's Free Inquiry" and the "Ecclesiastical History of Mosheim," will find my opinions supported by the record of undisputed facts.

Mr. H. in his 13th paragraph says, "it really seems use

less, and in fact almost impossible, to reason with one, who can see no beauty, nor order, nor design, nor beneficial tendency, and but little of enjoyment and happiness either in the natural or the moral world," &c. Let us not mistake one another. I am not aware that my words will bear the inference Mr. H.'s words imply. I can see beauty, order, apparent design, &c. &c. but along with these I perceive deformity, disorder, want of design, maleficent tendency, pain and misery; and how can an impartial observer conclude that their author is a being of infinite power and benevolence?" What can we reason but from what we know," and such an inference is as unphilosophical, as would be that of a courtier, who should declare his king to be full of kindness and beneficence, because the parasites of the palace revelled in luxury wrung from the toil and slavery of millions. What have exceptions to a rule to do in a system framed by an infinitely wise, and powerful being? Checks and counterpoises to the man who is guided by experience and analogy seem the natural result of the action of matter upon matter, sometimes apparently, without design, as in storms, eruptions, inundations, &c., and at other times designed by intelligence, as in the case of a clock or a steam engine. I am again very glad that the clock seems as much to M. H.'s mind as the watch, and admit all that he has said about it, as well as the steam engine, and think they prove a great share of ingenuity in the contriver. But even in these two cases, it is well known to those acquainted with their history, how little can be placed to the credit of design and how much to that of mere accident.

In the the 14th paragraph a reference is made to the machinery of the solar system, upon which I see no necessity for remark, except as to the observation that but for the wise contrivance of the centripetal and centrifugal forces, wild motion (one of the atomic deities) would, if unrestrained, necessarily hurry them all into the boundless regions of space. Are we not already there? if not, where are we? Having no experience upon the subject and no analogy for a guide, I cannot, like Mr. H. take upon me to say what would be the consequence of the want of these two forces or of either of them, but if our system were really to be carried into the boundless regions of space, I should be glad to be informed how our situation would then differ from our present. I suppose the principal difference would be as to our revolution round the sun, but my experience tells me that pious Optimists would clearly discover any situation to

be the very best possible, it being, of course, contrived by infinite wisdom. The Pietist of the moon can doubtless demonstrate the advantages which the inhabitants of the Hemisphere of that orb, which is always turned from the earth, enjoy from the invariable nightly darkness which is the consequence of the exact monthly motion of that satellite upon its axis. It is supposed by some astronomers that all the planetary satellites in our system are subject to the same law as our moon, and, if so, they will all have the like benefit of one hemisphere of each never facing its primary. While I am upon the subject of design I shall just notice that anatomists point out numerous parts in the construction of animals which answer no purpose whatever; I shall merely mention one instance which every one will understand, the breasts and nipples of the human male species. I have next to complain of a violent perversion both of my words and meaning, where Mr. H. says "But when your correspondent, Leucippus, has asserted that a clock-maker would be ashamed of introducing checks and counterpoises to his machinery, he very cavalierly adds, I feel here no necessity for argument, and leave this paragraph, as I am sure it will be, to its own confutation." In referring to my answer to the sixth paragraph of Mr. H.'s lecture (where he had said that "without the constant superintendence of infinite wisdom, some of the most common agents in nature would acquire such a predominating influence, as would involve the universal system in disorder and ruin") I find my words to be" what has the all-wise creator so formed the world, that if left to itself it has a tendency to nothing but disorder and ruin.? A clock maker would be ashamed if such a charge could be established against his work." Now what is the

obvious meaning of all this? Why that the clock maker would be ashamed if he could not leave his work without its falling into disorder and ruin; not of introducing checks and counterpoises into the machinery. I am very willing to suppose that Mr. H.'s misrepresentation of my argument has been undesigned, but I cannot afford in this case to be as generous as he professed to be in another, but must insist upon retaining both my own words and my own inferences. Having made these observations, I yet feel no necessity for argument, but am inclined to leave the field without changing either the MOOD or tense of the verb which Mr. H. has so liberally put into my mouth.

The two next paragraphs do not seem to require any observation after what I have already said; for though I may