templated in the will and the death of his wife; the death of a beneficiary or of a sole legatee;* testator's re-marriage; the increase of his estate and his long continued insanity.‡ A will impliedly revoked as by marriage, or marriage and birth of issue, is not revived by the dissolution of the marriage or the death of the issue, but in order to be revived must be republished by the testator. What is meant by republication will be taken up in a later section.§ SAME Sec. 994. SUBJECT-EFFECT OF BIRTH OF CHILD UPON PREVIOUS WILL. -As a rule, State statutes provide: 1. That the birth of a child to testator, revokes any will previously made, unless such child is provided for, or intentionally excluded by the provisions of such will. 2. That where testator has a child or children at the time of executing his will, but who has a child absent or reported dead, or ||Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492; Warner v. Beach, 4 Gray (70 Mass.) 162. *Brown v. Just, 118 Mich. 678; In re Hickman, 101 Cal. 609; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475. Charlton v. Miller, 27 O. S. 298. See Sec. 997; Ash v. Ash, 9 O. S. 383; Corker v. Corker, 87 Cal. 643; Bowers v. Bowers, 53 Ind. 430. [Rev. Stat. of Ohio, Sec. 5959; Belton v. Summer, 31 Fla. 139; Smith v. Robertson, 89 N. Y. 555; Rhodes v. Weldy, 46 O. S. 234. The Ohio Statute provides that "no other evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation shall be received." And a will thus revoked will not be revived by the death of the child in the lifetime of the testator. Ash v. Ash, 9 O. S. 383. shall afterwards have a child which is not provided for in such will, such absent or after-born child shall take the same share of the estate, both real and personal, as if the testator had died intestate, unless the intention to exclude such child is shown by the terms of the will.* 3. That unless the testator provides for his children, or by language in the will shows his intention to omit to provide for them, such children will take the same share of his estate as they would have taken had he died intestate.† Sec. 995. SAME SUBJECT-INTENTIONAL OMISSION EXPLAINED.-Where the statutes allow the testator to disinherit a child by intentionally omitting to make provision for such child, it is not necessary for him to use any formal language in expressing such intention. The intention may be inferred from the language used. Thus by the weight of authority where the testator disposes of all of his property, without naming his children, it is not shown that his intention was to make no provision for them. While where the property is all left to the wife of testator, and the will then states that this was done because the testator knows she will *Rev. Stat. of Ohio, Sec. 5961; Grosvenor v. Fogg, 81 Pa. St. 400; Burs v. Allen, 93 Tenn. 149; Bowen v. Hoxie, 130 Mass. 527. These statutes do not revoke the will, but simply provide what the omitted child shall take; so that if the omitted child dies without issue the will is not changed or avoided. †Trotter v. Trotter, 31 Ark. 145; Lurie v. Radnitzer, 106 Ill. 609; Smith v. Olmstead, 88 Cal. 582. Ward v. Ward, 120 Ill. 111; Carpenter v. Snow, 117 Mich. 489; Burch v. Brown, 46 Mo. 441; contra, Lurie v. Radnitzer, 166 III. 609. always be a kind and devoted mother to his children, the intention not to provide for his children sufficiently appears.* A specific reference to his unborn children by testator, and a provision for them in the alternative, is a sufficient intention to exclude such children except as to such provision.† SAME SUBJECT-WHAT CON So the testator may by express declaration provide that a child, naming him, shall have no part of his estate, and this is unquestionably sufficient (Block v. Block, 3 Mo. 594). Sec. 996. STITUTES A PROVISION FOR A CHILD. To constitute a provision for a child to satisfy the statutes the provision must be an interest which will take effect immediately upon the death of the testator, and not a future interest, as a remainder or a reversion, whether vested or contingent. Hence where the provision was a devise to testator's wife during her life and at her death to the heirs of her body, it was held not to be sufficient provision for an after-born child.§ Although the decisions are not uniform and there are cases which *Rhodes v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645; contra, Walker v. Hall, 34 Pa. St. 488. †Osborn v. Bank, 116 Ill. 130; Verrinder v. Winter, 98 Wis. 287. ‡Allen v. Johnson, 63 Ia. 124; Rhodes v. Weldy, 46 O. S. 284; Willard's Est., 68 Pa. St. 287; Ramsdill v. Wentworth, 101 Mass. 125. §Rhodes v. Weldy, 46 O. S. 234; Bowen v. Hoxie, 187 Mass. 587. hold that a reversion or a remainder is a sufficient provision under the statutes.* The fact that the child was in being but not born at the time of the execution of the will does not matter, and such child comes within the rule of after-born children (Evans v. Anderson, 15 O. S. 324). So the birth of an illegitimate child, after the making of a will, where the statutes allow such child to inherit when acknowledged by both parents, and this is done, effects a revocation of the will (Milburn v. Milburn, 60 Ia. 411). But the adoption of a child by testator does not revoke a previously executed will.† *Verrinder v. Winter, 98 Wis. 287. †Davis v. Fogel, 124 Ind. 41; Comassi's Will, 107 Cal. 1; contra, Woods v. Drake, 135 Mo. 393. CHAPTER VIII. REPUBLICATION, JOINT WILLS, CONTRACTS TO WILL, ETC. REPUBLICATION OF A Sec. 997. THE WILL.-By republication is meant the reissuing and revalidating of a will previously executed. Literally, republication means a second making public, but when applied to wills, it signifies the revival, either by re-execution or by a codicil adapted to the purpose, of a will previously executed, and which may have been revoked.* After revocation, a will can only be given effect again by a republication. This may be accomplished, either by re-execution with the required formalities, or by the due execution of a codicil or other instrument, recognizing the will as still existing.† At Common Law, before the passage of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II, Ch. 3, Sec. 5), wills of both real and personal property could be revived or republished by parol evidence of the testator's acts and declarations, or any informal writing of the testator showing an intention to revive, and by keeping the revoked will and speaking about it as his will. By the Statute of *Abbott's Law Dict., "Wills;" Whiting's App., 67 Conn. 379. †Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 369; Neff's Appeal, 48 Pa. St. 509; Barker v. Bell, 46 Ala. 216. Schouler on Wills (2d ed.), Sec. 444; Miller v. Brown, 2 Hagg. 209; Harvard v. Davis, 2 Binn. Pa. 425. |